Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)
Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (214)
- Part of Periodical (15)
- Article (8)
- Report (8)
- Book (2)
- Doctoral Thesis (1)
- Periodical (1)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (249)
Keywords
- monetary policy (14)
- DSGE (7)
- Geldpolitik (7)
- Federal Reserve (6)
- Monetary Policy (6)
- Numerical accuracy (6)
- Solution methods (6)
- Bayesian estimation (5)
- DSGE models (5)
- Deutschland (5)
- banking union (5)
- model uncertainty (5)
- Bank (4)
- ECB (4)
- Monetary policy (4)
- central bank independence (4)
- crises (4)
- household finance (4)
- model comparison (4)
- policy rules (4)
- quantitative easing (4)
- Aktienkurs (3)
- DSGE model (3)
- EZB (3)
- European Central Bank (ECB) (3)
- Fiscal Policy (3)
- Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (3)
- Inflation (3)
- Machine Learning (3)
- Neural Networks (3)
- Optimal policy (3)
- Risikokapital (3)
- Transition risk (3)
- Zero Lower Bound (3)
- banknotes (3)
- business cycles (3)
- discretion (3)
- entry (3)
- forecasting (3)
- interest rates (3)
- money (3)
- prudential supervision (3)
- real-time data (3)
- sovereign debt (3)
- zero lower bound (3)
- Agency-Theorie (2)
- Bankenaufsicht (2)
- Bayesian Analysis (2)
- Bayesian Estimation (2)
- Business Cycles (2)
- Cash (2)
- Climate change (2)
- DSGE Estimation (2)
- Deutsche Bundesbank (2)
- Discretion (2)
- Environmental policy (2)
- European Banking Authority (EBA) (2)
- European Central Bank (2)
- Europäische Union (2)
- Europäische Zentralbank (2)
- FOMC (2)
- Finanzverfassung (2)
- Fiskalpolitik (2)
- Heterogeneous Agents (2)
- Hongkong (2)
- Japan (2)
- Kreditgewährung (2)
- Kreditmarkt (2)
- Kreditwürdigkeitsprüfung (2)
- Leistungsbilanz (2)
- New Keynesian model (2)
- Quantitative Easing (2)
- Recht (2)
- Sachbearbeiter (2)
- Sign Restrictions (2)
- Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) (2)
- Transfer Learning (2)
- Verbraucherschutz (2)
- Zero lower bound (2)
- Zero nominal interest rate bound (2)
- bail-in (2)
- beliefs (2)
- branches (2)
- business cycle (2)
- competition (2)
- consolidating supervision (2)
- consumption (2)
- cross-border banking (2)
- current account fluctuations (2)
- euro area (2)
- expectation formation (2)
- financial crisis (2)
- financial literacy (2)
- fiscal policy (2)
- forward guidance (2)
- frequency domain (2)
- inflation (2)
- markups (2)
- micro-prudential supervision (2)
- monetary policy strategy (2)
- policy evaluation (2)
- policy robustness (2)
- political economy of bureaucracy (2)
- refugees (2)
- regulatory capture (2)
- social interactions (2)
- stabilization (2)
- subsidiaries (2)
- survey (2)
- time-varying risk premia (2)
- unemployment (2)
- wealth inequality (2)
- Öffentliche Schulden (2)
- ARMA (1)
- Allfinanzkonzern (1)
- Altersversorgung (1)
- Argentinien (1)
- Artificial Intelligence (1)
- Artificial Intelligence; (1)
- Aufsicht (1)
- Backward error (1)
- Bank lending standards (1)
- Bank of Japan (1)
- Bankenaufsichtsrecht (1)
- Bankenkrise (1)
- Bankkredit (1)
- Basel regulation (1)
- Bayes-Lernen (1)
- Bayesian VAR (1)
- Bayesian analysis (1)
- Bayesian inference (1)
- Bayesian learning (1)
- Bayesian time-varying parameter estimation (1)
- Behandlungskapazität (1)
- Bevölkerungsentwicklung (1)
- Blue Chip (1)
- Budgetierung (1)
- Capital Inflows (1)
- Capital-Asset-Pricing-Modell (1)
- Central Bank Communication (1)
- Central Bank Losses (1)
- Central Bank of Cyprus (1)
- Central Banks and Their Policies (1)
- Classification (1)
- Climate finance (1)
- Collateral (1)
- Commitment (1)
- Complexity (1)
- Compliance (1)
- Computational Methods (1)
- Condition number (1)
- Conditional Forecasts (1)
- Container Trade (1)
- Corona (1)
- Credit (1)
- Credit supply (1)
- Crises Forecasting (1)
- Currency Board (1)
- Cyprus (1)
- DSGE Model (1)
- Deficit spending (1)
- Deflation (1)
- Delphic forward guidance (1)
- Determinacy (1)
- Disinflation (1)
- Dual rates (1)
- Dunkelziffer (1)
- Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (1)
- ELA (1)
- Economic research (1)
- Effective Lower Bound (1)
- Effektivinflation (1)
- Energy crisis (1)
- Entscheidungsprozess (1)
- Epidemiologic model (1)
- Epidemiologisches Modell (1)
- Estimation (1)
- Europarecht (1)
- European Monetary Fund (1)
- European Monetary Union (1)
- European Stability Mechanism (1)
- Eurosystem (1)
- Eurozone (1)
- Exchange rate regime (1)
- Financial Frictions (1)
- Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy (1)
- Financial frictions (1)
- Finanzausgleich (1)
- Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (1)
- Finanzierung (1)
- Finanzplanung (1)
- Finanzwirtschaft (1)
- Fiscal Consolidation (1)
- Fiscal Multiplier (1)
- Fiscal Stimulus (1)
- Fiscal policy (1)
- Fiscal stress (1)
- Fokker-Planck equation (1)
- Forecast Comparison/ Competition (1)
- Forecasting (1)
- Forecasting and Simulation (1)
- Forward Guidance (1)
- Forward error (1)
- Forward guidance (1)
- Forward-looking data (1)
- Frankfurt <Main, 2007> (1)
- Frequency Domain (1)
- G-SIB (1)
- Garantie (1)
- Gegenwartspreise (1)
- German Reunification (1)
- German natural gas market (1)
- Geschichte 1980-2007 (1)
- Geschichte 1983-2008 (1)
- Geschichte 1986-2006 (1)
- Geschäftsleiterermesse (1)
- Gewinnverwendung (1)
- Global Optimization (1)
- Global financial crisis (1)
- Globalization (1)
- Government Debt (1)
- Government Deficit (1)
- Government Spending (1)
- Government spending multiplier (1)
- Great Recession (1)
- Greenbook (1)
- Hamilton filter (1)
- Haushalt (1)
- Hedge Fund (1)
- Herdenimmunität (1)
- Hierarchies (1)
- Hong Kong (1)
- House Prices (1)
- Hypothekarkredite (1)
- Income and Wealth Inequality (1)
- Incomplete Markets (1)
- Infektionsdynamik (1)
- Inflation Forecasting (1)
- Inflationssteuerung (1)
- Information (1)
- Innovation (1)
- Interest Rate Forecasting (1)
- Interest rate rule estimation (1)
- Interest rates (1)
- International Monetary Fund (1)
- Internationaler Kreditmarkt (1)
- Investition (1)
- Kalman Filter (1)
- Kapitalstruktur (1)
- Kaufkraft des Geldes (1)
- Keynesian models (1)
- Keynessche Theorie (1)
- Kongress (1)
- Konkurrent (1)
- Konzernrecht (1)
- Konzernverantwortung (1)
- Kostenplanung (1)
- Kreditgeber (1)
- Kreditsicherung (1)
- Labor cost adjustments (1)
- Landesbank (1)
- Lebenskostenindex (1)
- Lebenszeitverlust (1)
- Liquidity Facilities (1)
- Liquiditätseffekte der Zinspolitik (1)
- Loan market competition (1)
- Local projection (1)
- Länder (1)
- MREL (1)
- Maastricht criteria (1)
- Macroeconomic Forecasting (1)
- Macroeconomic Modeling (1)
- Macroeconomic Models (1)
- Markov-switching DSGE (1)
- Minimum Reserves (1)
- Mixed-frequency data (1)
- Model Comparison (1)
- Model Uncertainty (1)
- Model evaluation (1)
- Model uncertainty (1)
- Models and Applications (1)
- Monetary macroeconomics (1)
- Monetary policy rules (1)
- Monetary policy strategy (1)
- Monetary-fiscal interaction (1)
- Monte Carlo Methods (1)
- Moral Hazard (1)
- Narrative Identification (1)
- Natural Language Processing (1)
- Neural Network (1)
- New Keynesian DSGE (1)
- New Keynesian Model (1)
- New Keynesian Models (1)
- New Keynesian macro-epidemic models (1)
- New Keynesian models (1)
- New Neoclassical synthesis (1)
- Nonlinear Bayesian Estimation (1)
- Nordrhein-Westfalen (1)
- Occasionally Binding Constraints (1)
- Organisationspflichten von Banken (1)
- Output Gap (1)
- Panel VAR (1)
- Phillips Curve (1)
- Phillips curve (1)
- Planungsrechnung (1)
- Policy Rules (1)
- Potential Output (1)
- Production, Saving, Consumption and Investment Forecasting (1)
- Production-based asset pricing (1)
- QE (1)
- RCT (1)
- Real-Time Data (1)
- Real-time data (1)
- Rechtsdurchsetzung (1)
- Rechtsordnung (1)
- Relationship lending (1)
- Reproduktionszahlen (1)
- Restrukturierung (1)
- Reversible Jump Markov Chain Monte Carlo (1)
- Revisions (1)
- Risiko (1)
- Risikomanagement (1)
- Risk channel (1)
- Robustness (1)
- SVAR (1)
- Sanktionen (1)
- Schadensindex (1)
- Sensitivität (1)
- Short-run and long-run inflation expectations (1)
- Sicherstellungspflichten von Geschäftsleitern (1)
- Single Supervisory Mechanism (1)
- Soft Information (1)
- Soft infomation (1)
- Sparkasse (1)
- Spezifität (1)
- Stabilisierung (1)
- Stability and Growth Pact (1)
- Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt (1)
- Sticky Information (1)
- Structural policies (1)
- Supply Chain (1)
- Swiss Army Knife (1)
- TLAC (1)
- Taylor Rule (1)
- Taylor rule (1)
- Temporal aggregation (1)
- Top Income Taxation (1)
- Twitter (1)
- US top-wealth shares (1)
- Unternehmensgründung (1)
- Unternehmenswachstum (1)
- VARs (1)
- Value at Risk (1)
- Vektor-autoregressives Modell (1)
- Verdopplungszeit (1)
- Vergütung (1)
- Vermögenspreise (1)
- Versicherungsaufsicht (1)
- Versicherungsaufsichtsrecht (1)
- Vorteil (1)
- Wechselkurs (1)
- Welfare (1)
- Westdeutsche Landesbank (1)
- Wettbewerb (1)
- Wirtschaftsaufsicht (1)
- Wirtschaftsberichterstattung (1)
- Wohnraum (1)
- Wohnungsfinanzierung (1)
- Word Embedding (1)
- Zentralbankautonomie (1)
- Zentralbanken (1)
- Zinsen (1)
- adaptive learning (1)
- aggregate uncertainty (1)
- asset prices (1)
- asset pricing (1)
- bailouts (1)
- balance sheet risk (1)
- bank resolution (1)
- behavioral inattention (1)
- biased beliefs (1)
- bond markets (1)
- boom-bust (1)
- borrowing (1)
- bubbles (1)
- capital injection to banks (1)
- capital regulation (1)
- capital taxation (1)
- capital taxes (1)
- career concerns (1)
- cash (1)
- cash flow effects of interest rate policy (1)
- central bank (1)
- central bank accountability (1)
- central bank communication (1)
- central bank governance (1)
- central bank mandates (1)
- cliff effect (1)
- climate change (1)
- climate-economy models (1)
- cognitive load (1)
- cognitive sophistication (1)
- collateral (1)
- common factor models (1)
- compensation design (1)
- complexity (1)
- conditional forecasts (1)
- controlled diffusions and jump processes (1)
- convergence (1)
- corporate debt (1)
- corporate taxes (1)
- counterfactual analysis (1)
- credit constraints (1)
- crisis (1)
- debt relief to households (1)
- default premium (1)
- deflation (1)
- demographic trends (1)
- density forecasts (1)
- disaggregated prices (1)
- disagreement (1)
- doubling time (1)
- dynamic factor models (1)
- dynamic investment (1)
- dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (1)
- education (1)
- elections (1)
- employment (1)
- endogenous growth (1)
- equilibrium interest rate (1)
- equity prices (1)
- euro area regional and sectoral inflation (1)
- euro crisis (1)
- expectations (1)
- external instruments (1)
- financial cycles (1)
- financial frictions (1)
- financial regulation (1)
- financial sector (1)
- financial stability (1)
- financial system (1)
- fiscal dominance (1)
- fiscal policy transmission (1)
- fiscal rules (1)
- fiscal stimulus (1)
- forecast combination (1)
- forecasts (1)
- front loading Effekte (1)
- front loading effects (1)
- furlough (1)
- general equilibrium (1)
- geopolitical risk (1)
- global co-movement (1)
- government finance (1)
- green central bank policy (1)
- growth (1)
- growth and development (1)
- herd immunity (1)
- heterogeneous agents (1)
- heterogeneous expectations (1)
- hours per capita measurement (1)
- household debt (1)
- housing debt crisis (1)
- housing investments (1)
- index of lost lifetime (1)
- infection dynamics (1)
- inflation expectations (1)
- inflation forecasting (1)
- inflation persistence (1)
- inflation surge (1)
- inflation target (1)
- information (1)
- information networks (1)
- internal ratings (1)
- labor income taxes (1)
- laboratory experiment (1)
- learning about jumps (1)
- lender of last resort (1)
- leverage (1)
- liftoff (1)
- liquidity premium (1)
- loss index (1)
- loss sharing (1)
- low frequency trends (1)
- lumpy investment (1)
- machine learning (1)
- macro-finance (1)
- macro-financial models (1)
- macro-prudential supervision (1)
- macroeconomic conditions (1)
- macroeconomic experiences (1)
- macrofinancial linkages (1)
- macroprudential policy transmission (1)
- market discipline (1)
- menu costs (1)
- monetary and fiscal policy (1)
- monetary financing (1)
- monetary institutions (1)
- monetary law (1)
- monetary policy real-time output gap (1)
- monetary policy rule (1)
- monetary policy rules (1)
- monetary policy transmission (1)
- monetary transmission (1)
- mortgage loans (1)
- multiple equilibria (1)
- narrative sign restrictions (1)
- natural experiment (1)
- natural gas price (1)
- net wealth (1)
- nominal rigidity (1)
- nonlinearity (1)
- numerical solution method (1)
- online experiments (1)
- opportunity (1)
- optimal monetary policy (1)
- output gap (1)
- output gap estimates (1)
- output hysteresis (1)
- panel VAR (1)
- panel vector autoregression (1)
- peer effects (1)
- perceived wealth (1)
- persistent or transitory inflation shock (1)
- policy normalization (1)
- policy rule (1)
- political economy (1)
- populism (1)
- portfolio choice (1)
- potential output (1)
- price stability (1)
- principal-agent models (1)
- product market competition (1)
- productivity growth (1)
- propagation of inequality (1)
- proportionality (1)
- quantile regressions (1)
- quantity theory (1)
- randomized control trial (1)
- randomized controlled trial (1)
- rational expectations (1)
- rational learning (1)
- real estate lending (1)
- regulatory arbitrage (1)
- reproduction number (1)
- robust monetary policy (1)
- robust policy (1)
- robust simple rules (1)
- rules (1)
- rules vs discretion (1)
- saving (1)
- savings accounts (1)
- search and matching (1)
- seigniorage (1)
- sensitivity (1)
- shadow banking (1)
- shadow banking system (1)
- simple rules (1)
- skewness (1)
- sovereign credit rating (1)
- specificity (1)
- spectral regression (1)
- spending cuts (1)
- state-owned enterprises (1)
- sticky information (1)
- sticky wages (1)
- stochastic volatility (1)
- stock market reaction (1)
- stock prices (1)
- structural breaks (1)
- structural scenario analysis (1)
- subjective expectations (1)
- survey experiment (1)
- survey forecasts (1)
- sustainable finance (1)
- synchronization (1)
- tax reform (1)
- technological growth (1)
- technologische Schocks (1)
- technology shocks (1)
- time-varying parameter (1)
- too low for too long (1)
- treatment capacity (1)
- trend inflation (1)
- trend-cycle decomposition (1)
- trend-extrapolation (1)
- uncertainty (1)
- unconfirmed cases (1)
- unconventional monetary policy (1)
- updating (1)
- vector-autoregression (1)
- venture capital (1)
- war (1)
- working hours (1)
- yield curve (1)
- yields (1)
- z-Transform (1)
- Öffentliche Ausgaben (1)
Institute
This chapter aims to provide a hands-on approach to New Keynesian models and their uses for macroeconomic policy analysis. It starts by reviewing the origins of the New Keynesian approach, the key model ingredients and representative models. Building blocks of current-generation dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are discussed in detail. These models address the famous Lucas critique by deriving behavioral equations systematically from the optimizing and forward-looking decision-making of households and firms subject to well-defined constraints. State-of-the-art methods for solving and estimating such models are reviewed and presented in examples. The chapter goes beyond the mere presentation of the most popular benchmark model by providing a framework for model comparison along with a database that includes a wide variety of macroeconomic models. Thus, it offers a convenient approach for comparing new models to available benchmarks and for investigating whether particular policy recommendations are robust to model uncertainty. Such robustness analysis is illustrated by evaluating the performance of simple monetary policy rules across a range of recently-estimated models including some with financial market imperfections and by reviewing recent comparative findings regarding the magnitude of government spending multipliers. The chapter concludes with a discussion of important objectives for on-going and future research using the New Keynesian framework.
How do changes in market structure affect the US business cycle? We estimate a monetary DSGE model with endogenous
rm/product entry and a translog expenditure function by Bayesian methods. The dynamics of net business formation allow us to identify the 'competition effect', by which desired price markups and inflation decrease when entry rises. We
find that a 1 percent increase in the number of competitors lowers desired markups by 0.18 percent. Most of the cyclical variability in inflation is driven by markup fluctuations due to sticky prices or exogenous shocks rather than endogenous changes in desired markups.
This paper characterises optimal monetary policy in an economy with endogenous
firm entry, a cash-in-advance constraint and preset wages. Firms must make pro
fits to cover entry costs; thus the markup on goods prices is efficient. However, because leisure is not priced at a markup, the consumption-leisure tradeoff is distorted. Consequently, the real wage, hours and production are suboptimally low. Due to the labour requirement in entry, insufficient labour supply also implies that entry is too low. The paper shows that in the absence of
fiscal instruments such as labour income subsidies, the optimal monetary policy under sticky wages achieves higher welfare than under flexible wages. The policy maker uses the money supply instrument to raise the real wage - the cost of leisure - above its flexible-wage level, in response to expansionary shocks to productivity and entry costs. This raises labour supply, expanding production and
rm entry.
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the state of macroeconomicmodeling and the use of macroeconomic models in policy analysis has come under heavy criticism. Macroeconomists in academia and policy institutions have been blamed for relying too much on a particular class of macroeconomic models. This paper proposes a comparative approach to macroeconomic policy analysis that is open to competing modeling paradigms. Macroeconomic model comparison projects have helped produce some very influential insights such as the Taylor rule. However, they have been infrequent and costly, because they require the input of many teams of researchers and multiple meetings to obtain a limited set of comparative findings. This paper provides a new approach that enables individual researchers to conduct model comparisons easily, frequently, at low cost and on a large scale. Using this approach a model archive is built that includes many well-known empirically estimated models that may be used for quantitative analysis of monetary and fiscal stabilization policies. A computational platform is created that allows straightforward comparisons of models’ implications. Its application is illustrated by comparing different monetary and fiscal policies across selected models. Researchers can easily include new models in the data base and compare the effects of novel extensions to established benchmarks thereby fostering a comparative instead of insular approach to model development
(1) Unter „öffentlichen Banken“ sind Kreditinstitute in unmittelbarer oder mittelbarer Trägerschaft einer Gebietskörperschaft zu verstehen.
(2) Eine Bestandsaufnahme ergibt, dass ein nennenswerter Teil der „öffentlichen Banken“ materiell privatisiert oder stark umgeformt worden ist.
(3) Die Sicherung der Kunden durch Anstaltslast und Gewährträgerhaftung ist weitgehend beseitigt worden, ohne dass dies den Betroffenen hinreichend deutlich gemacht worden ist.
(4) Die bestehenden „öffentlichen Banken“ sind deutlich vielgestaltiger organisiert als noch vor wenigen Jahren.
(5) Auch „öffentliche Banken“ unterliegen regelmäßig der „allgemeinen“ Aufsicht und Kontrolle, wie sie für privatwirtschaftliche Institute in ihrer jeweiligen Rechtsform gelten.
(6) Darüber hinaus ist aus verfassungsrechtlichen Gründen eine besondere Leitung, Aufsicht und Kontrolle der „öffentliche Banken“ durch ihr Trägergemeinwesen erforderlich; nicht zuletzt um die Einhaltung ihres besonderen öffentlichen Auftrags kontrollieren zu können.
(7) Die Prüfung durch Wirtschafsprüfer kann diese Aufgaben nicht erfüllen.
(8) Sie ist an erster Stelle Aufgabe der Exekutive des Trägergemeinwesens.
(9) Eine bloße Rechtsaufsicht ist verfassungsrechtlich problematisch, jedenfalls dann wenn eine Einstandspflicht des Trägergemeinwesens besteht.
(10) Die Mitwirkung in Aufsichtsgremien der „öffentliche Banken“ ist keine hinreichende Aufsicht in diesem Sinne.
(11) Darüber hinaus sind die parlamentarische Kontrolle und die Kontrolle durch die Rechnungshöfe ganz wesentlich.
(12) Die Kontrolle durch Sicherungseinrichtungen kann wirksam und sinnvoll sein.
(13) Öffentlich-rechtliche und privatrechtliche Mischformen dürfen nicht zu einer Ausdünnung von Aufsicht und Kontrolle führen.
(14) Der Einsatz des Instituts der Beleihung ist nur dann rechtlich akzeptabel, wenn ein durchgehender Aufsichts- und Leitungsstrang auch gegenüber dem Beliehenen gesichert ist.
(15) Überlegungen zur Neuordnung der „öffentlichen Banken“ müssen zuerst die Frage beantworten, ob und welche Bankdienstleistungen der Staat unmittelbar oder mittelbar anbieten sollte.
(16) Eine Grundversorgung der Bevölkerung mit einfachen Bankdienstleistungen, die sicher, einfach, kostengünstig und leicht erreichbar sind, ist eine staatliche Aufgabe. Hier liegt in weitem Umfang Marktversagen vor.
(17) Ob ein reformiertes Einlagensicherungssystem die notwendige Sicherheit bieten kann, ist zweifelhaft, solange keine Staatsgarantie für die Sicherungseinrichtungen besteht.
(18) Es ist an eine Reaktivierung von Anstaltslast und Gewährträgerhaftung für einfache Institute zur Grundversorgung der Bevölkerung zu denken.
(19) Leitung und Kontrolle des Managements „öffentlicher Banken“ müssen wesentlich strenger werden, um jegliche Risiken für die öffentlichen Haushalte auszuschließen. Gehaltsmäßig muss ihre Leitung so uninteressant sein, dass sie weder für Politiker noch für „Finanzingenieure“ attraktiv ist.
This paper proposes a new approach for modeling investor fear after rare disasters. The key element is to take into account that investors’ information about fundamentals driving rare downward jumps in the dividend process is not perfect. Bayesian learning implies that beliefs about the likelihood of rare disasters drop to a much more pessimistic level once a disaster has occurred. Such a shift in beliefs can trigger massive declines in price-dividend ratios. Pessimistic beliefs persist for some time. Thus, belief dynamics are a source of apparent excess volatility relative to a rational expectations benchmark. Due to the low frequency of disasters, even an infinitely-lived investor will remain uncertain about the exact probability. Our analysis is conducted in continuous time and offers closed-form solutions for asset prices. We distinguish between rational and adaptive Bayesian learning. Rational learners account for the possibility of future changes in beliefs in determining their demand for risky assets, while adaptive learners take beliefs as given. Thus, risky assets tend to be lower-valued and price-dividend ratios vary less under adaptive versus rational learning for identical priors. Keywords: beliefs, Bayesian learning, controlled diffusions and jump processes, learning about jumps, adaptive learning, rational learning. JEL classification: D83, G11, C11, D91, E21, D81, C61
The European Monetary Union euro has done very well since its initiation. Price stability has been secured and the external value of the new currency is more than satisfactory. The confidence in it is also shown by its increasing use as a global reserve currency. It has been a stabilizing factor in the current crisis. The recent budgetary problems of some member states are principally not a problem of the Monetary Union. It is therefore in no way justified to speak of a "Euro-crisis". It is true, however, that the Monetary Union restricts the number of possibilities for member states to solve their financial problems but it does not eliminate them entirely that outside help would have become indispensible. The purchase of debt instruments of member states in financial distress by the ECB is questionable from an economic, and more important, from a legal point of view. The longer the duration, the less legally justifiable is it. Financial support for member states in severe financial distress might be acceptable as a temporary crisis resolution mechanism. A permanent support mechanism needs a basis in the primary law of the EU. The treatment of the risk of "sovereign" debt in the legal framework for financial institutions urgently needs improvement. Especially the capital requirements for credit institutions have to be adjusted.
This dissertation consists of three essays, which study the relation between stock prices and the macroeconomy using vector autoregressions (VARs). The first essay focuses on the link between stock prices and the current account. I find that stock markets provide a channel, in addition to the traditional exchange rate channel, through which external balance for a country with a current account imbalance can be restored. The second essay explores the transmission of U.S. stock price shocks to real activity and prices in G-7 countries. I achieve identification by imposing a small number of sign restrictions on impulse responses, while controlling for monetary policy, business cycle and government spending shocks. The results suggest that stock price movements are important for fluctuations in G-7 real activity and prices, but do not qualify as demand side business cycle shocks. The third essay investigates the impact of monetary and technology shocks on the stock market. I find an important role for technology shocks, but not monetary shocks, in explaining variations in real stock prices. The identification method is flexible enough to study the effects of technology news shocks. The responses are consistent with the idea that news on technology improvements have an immediate impact on stock prices.
Zusammenfassung und Ergebnisse Es ist noch zu früh, eine abschließende Bewertung der Entwicklung auf den Finanzmärkten während der letzten zwei Jahre vorzunehmen. In jedem Fall sind aber alle Regelungen auf den Prüfstand zu stellen. Das Aufsichtsrecht hat insgesamt seine Aufgabe, Finanzstabilität zu gewährleisten, nicht erfüllt. Wesentliche Schritte für eine grundlegende Reform sind: - ein striktes Verständnis des Aufsichtsrechts als Sonderordnungsrecht - eine drastische Reduktion der Komplexität der Rechtsvorschriften - die Internationalisierung und Europäisierung der Aufsicht - die Steigerung der Transparenz der Verbriefung einschließlich eines möglichen Zulassungsverfahrens und des Verbots bestimmter gefährlicher „Produkte“ - die vollständige Neuausrichtung der Bewertung von Finanzunternehmen und ihrer „Produkte“ („ratings“) - Die Schaffung geeigneter Regeln und Verfahren, um auch systemisch relevante Institutionen der Marktdisziplin, also ihrem Untergang, auszusetzen - Die Grundlage für kurzfristige Entscheidung über Fortführung, Zerlegung oder Abwicklung eines Instituts als Maßnahme der Gefahrenabwehr muss geschaffen werden. Ein Sonderinsolvenzrecht für Banken ist nicht angezeigt - Die Einbeziehung des menschlichen Verhaltens und der Persönlichkeitsstruktur der maßgebenden Personen in den Finanzinstitutionen
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG UND ERGEBNISSE (1) Die Schaffung des Europäischen Ausschusses für Systemrisiken stößt nicht auf durchgreifende rechtliche Bedenken. (2) Es ist nicht sicher, dass die Errichtung der neuen Europäischen Aufsichtbehörden ohne entsprechende Änderung des Primärrechts zulässig ist. (3) Es kommt entscheidend darauf an, welche rechtsverbindlichen Einzelweisungsbefugnisse tatsächlich den Behörden verliehen werden. (4) Die nach dem Kompromiss vom 2. Dezember 2009 noch verbliebenen Einzelweisungsbefugnisse der Behörden gegenüber Privaten und gegenüber nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden sind rechtlich kaum abgesichert. (5) Wenn die hoheitlichen Befugnisse weitgehend oder vollständig beseitigt werden, bestehen Bedenken im Hinblick auf die Geeignetheit und Erforderlichkeit der Einrichtungen. (6) Die weitreichenden Unabhängigkeitsgarantien sind nicht mit den Anforderungen demokratischer Aufsicht und Kontrolle zu vereinbaren. (7) Für die Einräumung von Unabhängigkeit ist nach deutschem Verfassungsrecht eine ausdrückliche Regelung in der Verfassung, wie in Art. 88 Satz 2 GG, erforderlich. (8) Die transnationale Kooperation von Verwaltungsbehörden bedarf zumindest dann einer gesetzlichen Ermächtigung, wenn faktisch verbindliche Entscheidungen getroffen werden.
Over the past few decades, changes in market conditions such as globalisation and deregulation of financial markets as well as product innovation and technical advancements have induced financial institutions to expand their business activities beyond their traditional boundaries and to engage in cross-sectoral operations. As combining different sectoral businesses offers opportunities for operational synergies and diversification benefits, financial groups comprising banks, insurance undertakings and/or investment firms, usually referred to as financial conglomerates, have rapidly emerged, providing a wide range of services and products in distinct financial sectors and oftentimes in different geographic locations. In the European Union (EU), financial conglomerates have become part of the biggest and most active financial market participants in recent years. Financial conglomerates generally pose new problems for financial authorities as they can raise new risks and exacerbate existing ones. In particular, their cross-sectoral business activities can involve prudentially substantial risks such as the risk of regulatory arbitrage and contagion risk arising from intra-group transactions. Moreover, the generally large size of financial conglomerates as well as the high complexity and interconnectedness of their corporate structures and risk exposures can entail substantial systemic risk and can therefore threaten the stability of the financial system as a whole. Until a few years ago, there was no supervisory framework in place which addressed a financial conglomerate in its entirety as a group. Instead, each group entity within a financial conglomerate was subject to the supervisory rules of its pertinent sector only. Such silo supervisory approach had the drawback of not taking account of risks which arise or aggravate at the group level. It also failed to consider how the risks from different business lines within the group interrelate with each other and affect the group as a whole. In order to address this lack of group-wide prudential supervision of financial conglomerates, the European legislator adopted the Financial Conglomerates Directive 2002/87/EC8 (‘FCD’) on 16 December 2002. The FCD was transposed into national law in the member states of the EU (‘Member States’) by 11 August 2004 for application to financial years beginning on 1 January 2005 and after. The FCD primarily aims at supplementing the existing sectoral directives to address the additional risks of concentration, contagion and complexity presented by financial conglomerates. It therefore provides for a supervisory framework which is applicable in addition to the sectoral supervision. Most importantly, the FCD has introduced additional capital requirements at the conglomerate level so as to prevent the multiple use of the same capital by different group entities. This paper seeks to examine to what extent the FCD provides for an adequate capital regulation of financial conglomerates in the EU while taking into account the underlying sectoral capital requirements and the inherent risks associated with financial conglomerates. In Part 1, the definition and the basic corporate models of financial conglomerates will be presented (I), followed by an illustration of the core motives behind the phenomenon of financial conglomeration (II) and an overview of the development of the supervision over financial conglomerates in the EU (III). Part 2 begins with a brief elaboration on the role of regulatory capital (I) and gives a general overview of the EU capital requirements applicable to banks and insurance undertakings respectively. A delineation of the commonalities and differences of the banking and the insurance capital requirements will be provided (II). It continues to further examine the need for a group-wide capital regulation of financial conglomerates and analyses the adequacy of the FCD capital requirements. In this context, the technical advice rendered by the Joint Committee on Financial Conglomerates (JCFC) as well as the currently ongoing legislative reforms at the EU level will be discussed (III). The paper finally closes with a conclusion and an outlook on remaining open issues (IV).
Misselling through agents
(2009)
This paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents: prospecting for customers and advising on the product's "suitability" for the specific needs of customers. When structuring sales-force compensation, firms trade off the expected losses from "misselling" unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing marketing incentives. We characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling (and thus the scope of policy intervention) depends on features of the agency problem including: the internal organization of a firm's sales process, the transparency of its commission structure, and the steepness of its agents' sales incentives. JEL Classification: D18 (Consumer Protection), D83 (Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge), M31 (Marketing), M52 (Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects).
This paper considers a firm that has to delegate to an agent, such as a mortgage broker or a security dealer, the twin tasks of approaching and advising customers. The main contractual restriction, in particular in light of related research in Inderst and Ottaviani (2007), is that the firm can only compensate the agent through commissions. This standard contracting restriction has the following key implications. First, the firm can only ensure internal compliance to a "standard of sales", in terms of advice for the customer, if this standard is not too high. Second, if this is still feasible, then a higher standard is associated with higher, instead of lower, sales commissions. Third, once the limit for internal compliance is approached, tougher regulation and prosecution of "misselling" have (almost) no effect on the prevailing standard. Besides having practical implications, in particular on how to (re-)regulate the sale of financial products, the novel model, which embeds a problem of advice into a framework with repeated interactions, may also be of separate interest for future work on sales force compensation. JEL Classification: D18 (Consumer Protection), D83 (Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge), M31 (Marketing), M52 (Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects).
This article shows that investors financing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of their financial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems. Competition for scarce informed capital at the refinancing stage strengthens investors’ bargaining positions. And yet, entrepreneurs’ incentives may be improved, because projects funded by investors with ‘‘shallow pockets’’ must have not only a positive net present value at the refinancing stage, but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio projects. Our article may help understand provisions used in venture capital finance that limit a fund’s initial capital and make it difficult to add more capital once the initial venture capital fund is raised. (JEL G24, G31)
We analyze how two key managerial tasks interact: that of growing the business through creating new investment opportunities and that of providing accurate information about these opportunities in the corporate budgeting process. We show how this interaction endogenously biases managers toward overinvesting in their own projects. This bias is exacerbated if managers compete for limited resources in an internal capital market, which provides us with a novel theory of the boundaries of the firm. Finally, managers of more risky and less profitable divisions should obtain steeper incentives to facilitate efficient investment decisions.
We present a simple model of personal finance in which an incumbent lender has an information advantage vis-a-vis both potential competitors and households. In order to extract more consumer surplus, a lender with sufficient market power may engage in "irresponsible"lending, approving credit even if this is knowingly against a household’s best interest. Unless rival lenders are equally well informed, competition may reduce welfare. This holds, in particular, if less informed rivals can free ride on the incumbent’s superior screening ability.
This paper argues that banks must be sufficiently levered to have first-best incentives to make new risky loans. This result, which is at odds with the notion that leverage invariably leads to excessive risk taking, derives from two key premises that focus squarely on the role of banks as informed lenders. First, banks finance projects that they do not own, which implies that they cannot extract all the profits. Second, banks conduct a credit risk analysis before making new loans. Our model may help understand why banks take on additional unsecured debt, such as unsecured deposits and subordinated loans, over and above their existing deposit base. It may also help understand why banks and finance companies have similar leverage ratios, even though the latter are not deposit takers and hence not subject to the same regulatory capital requirements as banks.
This paper shows that active investors, such as venture capitalists, can affect the speed at which new ventures grow. In the absence of product market competition, new ventures financed by active investors grow faster initially, though in the long run those financed by passive investors are able to catch up. By contrast, in a competitive product market, new ventures financed by active investors may prey on rivals that are financed by passive investors by “strategically overinvesting” early on, resulting in long-run differences in investment, profits, and firm growth. The value of active investors is greater in highly competitive industries as well as in industries with learning curves, economies of scope, and network effects, as is typical for many “new economy” industries. For such industries, our model predicts that start-ups with access to venture capital may dominate their industry peers in the long run. JEL Classifications: G24; G32 Keywords: Venture capital; dynamic investment; product market competition
We study a model of “information-based entrenchment” in which the CEO has private information that the board needs to make an efficient replacement decision. Eliciting the CEO’s private information is costly, as it implies that the board must pay the CEO both higher severance pay and higher on-the-job pay. While higher CEO pay is associated with higher turnover in our model, there is too little turnover in equilibrium. Our model makes novel empirical predictions relating CEO turnover, severance pay, and on-the-job pay to firm-level attributes such as size, corporate governance, and the quality of the firm’s accounting system.
Corporate borrowers care about the overall riskiness of a bank’s operations as their continued access to credit may rely on the bank’s ability to roll over loans or to expand existing credit facilities. As we show, a key implication of this observation is that increasing competition among banks should have an asymmetric impact on banks’ incentives to take on risk: Banks that are already riskier will take on yet more risk, while their safer rivals will become even more prudent. Our results offer new guidance for bank supervision in an increasingly competitive environment and may help to explain existing, ambiguous findings on the relationship between competition and risk-taking in banking. Furthermore, our results stress the beneficial role that competition can have for financial stability as it turns a bank’s "prudence" into an important competitive advantage.
This paper presents a novel model of the lending process that takes into account that loan officers must spend time and effort to originate new loans. Besides generating predictions on loan officers’ compensation and its interaction with the loan review process, the model sheds light on why competition could lead to excessively low lending standards. We also show how more intense competition may fasten the adoption of credit scoring. More generally, hard-information lending techniques such as credit scoring allow to give loan officers high-powered incentives without compromising the integrity and quality of the loan approval process. The model is finally applied to study the implications of loan sales on the adopted lending process and lending standard.
Inhalt: Prof. Dr. Helmut Siekmann : Stellungnahme für die öffentliche Anhörung des Haushalts- und Finanzausschusses des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen am 29. Oktober 2009 Gesetzentwurf der Landesregierung NRW : LANDTAG NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN 14. Wahlperiode - Drucksache 14/9380 - 10.06.2009 Gesetz über die Feststellung eines zweiten Nachtrags zum Haushaltsplan des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 und zur Änderung des Gesetzes zur Errichtung eines Fonds für eine Inanspruchnahme des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen aus der im Zusammenhang mit der Risikoabschirmung zugunsten der WestLB AG erklärten Garantie (Zweites Nachtragshaushaltsgesetz 2009) - Auszug Ergänzung der Landesregierung NRW zu dem Gesetzentwurf der Landesregierung - Drucksache 14/9380 (Zweites Nachtragshaushaltsgesetz 2009) - Drucksache 14/9510 – 01.07.2009 - Auszug Zweite Ergänzung der Landesregierung zu dem Gesetzentwurf der Landesregierung - Drucksachen 14/9380 und 14/9510 (1. Ergänzung) - Drucksache 14/9910 – 02.10.2009 - Auszug
Aus der Vielzahl der damit verbundenen Probleme sollen im Folgenden einige Aspekte etwas näher betrachtet werden. Dabei sollen die Maßnahmen zur unmittelbaren Krisenbewältigung ausgeklammert werden. Auch können die drängenden Fragen nach der Rolle der Geldpolitik sowie der globalen außenwirtschaftlichen Ungleichgewichte, die beide einen erheblichen, wenn nicht gar entscheidenden Beitrag zur Entstehung der Instabilitäten geleistet haben,19 hier nicht näher behandelt werden. Das Hauptaugenmerk soll stattdessen auf folgende Fragenkreise gelegt werden: I. Der Beitrag der Rechtsordnung zu Entstehung und Verlauf der Krise II. Verbesserung von Aufsicht und Kontrolle als Kern einer Neugestaltung III. Die Rolle der Ratingagenturen IV. Die reale Bedeutung von Finanzmärkten und Finanzinstitutionen V. Überlegungen zur Prävention Dabei sollen nicht Detailregelungen im Vordergrund der Betrachtung stehen, sondern die grundsätzliche Rolle der Rechtsordnung für die Stabilisierung der Finanzmärkte.
Der Präsident der Europäischen Kommission, José Manuel Barroso, hat im Oktober 2008 eine Gruppe von Sachverständigen unter Vorsitz des früheren Präsidenten des Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) und der Banque de France, Jacques de Larosière, mit der Ausarbeitung von Ratschlägen zur Zukunft der europäischen Finanzregulierung („financial regulation“) und Aufsicht („supervision“) beauftragt. Die Gruppe hat ihren Bericht am 25. Februar 2009 vorgelegt. Kapitel III des Berichts behandelt das Aufsichtssystem auf EU-Ebene und gelangt im Wesentlichen zu zwei Empfehlungen: - Errichtung einer präventiv tätigen, institutsübergreifenden („macroprudential“) Aufsichtseinrichtung mit dem Namen „European Systemic Risk Council“ [ESRC] - Umwandlung der bestehenden Ebene-3 Ausschüsse („3L3 committees“) in ein neues europäisches System von Finanzaufsicht [ESFS] mit hoheitlichen Funktionen Vor allem die geforderte Neustrukturierung der Aufsicht ist unter verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten kritisch zu würdigen. Die Erwägungen konzentrieren sich dabei auf die Frage, ob die Umsetzung der Vorschläge ohne Änderung des primären Gemeinschaftsrechts möglich erscheint. Der Abschluss von separaten Verwaltungsabkommen oder von Staatsverträgen, mit denen ad hoc neue Einrichtungen geschaffen werden könnten, soll im Folgenden nicht weiter untersucht werden. Zwar könnte auf diese Weise ein vollständiger Rechtsrahmen für Aufsichtseinrichtungen auf EU-Ebene geschaffen werden. Er könnte auch die Grundlage für die Übertragung von Hoheitsbefugnissen bilden, doch wäre dies mit gravierenden Nachteilen verbunden. Es ist keineswegs sicher, dass alle Mitglieder der EU eine solche Vereinbarung unterzeichnen würden, so dass unterschiedliche Aufsichtssysteme entstehen würden. Einer der Hauptgründe für eine Aufsicht auf europäischer Ebene würde verfehlt. Zum anderen würde eine institutionelle Parallelstruktur im Kernbereich der EU, dem gemeinsamen Binnenmarkt mit den Grundfreiheiten, geschaffen, die zahlreiche gravierende Probleme der Koordination und Abstimmung zwischen diesen, voneinander unabhängigen Systemen hervorrufen würde.
I. EINLEITUNG II. VORSCHLAG DER WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTLICHEN ABTEILUNG ZUM 67. DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG 1. Darstellung und Begriffsbestimmung 2. Begründung III. BEDEUTUNG DES AUßERBÖRSLICHEN HANDELS IN DEUTSCHLAND IV. RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE BETRACHTUNG VON AKTIEN- UND KAPITALMARKTRECHT 1. Deutschland a) Organisation des Kapitalmarktes b) Differenzierung im Rahmen des Aktienrechts 2. Großbritannien a) Organisation des Kapitalmarktes b) Differenzierungen im „Companies Act 2006“ 3. USA a) Rechtsquellen des Kapitalgesellschafts- und Kapitalmarktrechts b) Organisation des Kapitalmarktes c) Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht V. STELLUNGNAHME 1. Anknüpfung der vorhandenen Regelungen an die Kapitalmarktorientierung 2. Verwischung der Grenzen zwischen Aktien- und Kapitalmarktrecht 3. Missbrauchsgefahr durch selbstbestimmte Wahl der Satzungsstrenge 4. Bisherige Reformansätze im deutschen Schrifttum 5. Die Abkehr von einer Differenzierung im Aktienrecht in der aktuellen Reformdiskussion 6. Ökonomische Analyse des Aktienrechts („Opt-In-Modell“) VI. FAZIT: Der Deregulierungsansatz, der eine Differenzierung zwischen börsen- und nichtbörsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften vorsieht, ist nicht zu befürworten. Vor dem Hintergrund der rechtsvergleichenden Betrachtung der Beispiele Großbritannien und der USA stellt sich vielmehr eine kapitalmarktorientierte Differenzierung der Anlegerschutzbestimmungen des Aktienrechts als vorzugswürdig dar. Die Anknüpfung von Deregulierungsmaßnahmen an das Kriterium der Kapitalmarktorientierung findet sich im Ansatz auch im bereits geltenden deutschen Recht. So enthält sowohl das Aktienrecht als auch das Kapitalmarktrecht entsprechend differenzierende Regelungen. Zudem weisen auch aktuelle nationale Gesetzesvorhaben und die Entwicklungen im europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht Tendenzen zu einer Abgrenzung nach dem Kriterium der Kapitalmarktferne oder -offenheit auf. Auch birgt der enge Anwendungsbereich der zwingenden Anlegerschutznormen des Aktienrechts auf börsennotierte Aktiengesellschaften erhebliche Missbrauchsrisiken. Aktiengesellschaften könnten in den außerbörslichen Handel wechseln, um in den Genuss von Deregulierungen und geringeren Transparenz- und Anlegerschutzanforderungen zu kommen. Letztlich folgt der Vorzug einer kapitalmarktorientierten Differenzierung auch aus der aktuellen Diskussion um Reformansätze zur Steigerung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des deutschen Gesellschafts- und Kapitalmarktrechts. Die in diesem Zusammenhang geforderte Aufhebung der Satzungsstrenge bei gleichzeitiger Normierung entsprechender Informations- und Anlegerschutzpflichten im Kapitalmarktrecht würde dazu führen, dass an bestehende Differenzierungen des Kapitalmarktrechts angeknüpft werden könnte.
This paper explores the relationship between equity prices and the current account for 17 industrialized countries in the period 1980-2007. Based on a panel vector autoregression, I compare the effects of equity price shocks to those originating from monetary policy and exchange rates. While monetary policy shocks have a limited impact, shocks to equity prices have sizeable effects. The results suggest that equity prices impact on the current account through their effects on real activity and exchange rates. Furthermore, shocks to exchange rates play a key role as well. Keywords: current account fluctuations, equity prices, panel vector autoregression
The risk of deflation
(2009)
This paper was prepared for the meeting on Financial Regulation and Macroeconomic Stability: Key issues for the G20, organised by the CEPR and the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee, London, 31 January 2009. Introduction: The onset of financial instability in August 2007, which quickly spread across the world, raises a number of questions for policy makers. First, what are the roots of the crisis? Many factors have been emphasized in the debate, including the opacity of complex financial products; the excessive confidence in ratings; weak risk management by financial institutions; massive reliance on wholesale funding; and the presumption that markets would always be liquid. Furthermore, poorly understood incentive effects – arising from the originate-to-distribute-model, remuneration policies and the period of low interest rates – are also widely seen as having played a role. Second, how can a repetition of the crisis can be avoided? Much attention is being focused on regulation and supervision of financial intermediaries. The G-20, at its summit in November 2008, noted that measures need to be taken in five areas: (i) financial market transparency and disclosure by firms need to be strengthened; (ii) regulation needs to be enhanced to ensure that all financial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate; (iii) the integrity of financial markets should be improved by bolstering investor and consumer protection, avoiding conflicts of interest, and by promoting information sharing; (iv) international cooperation among regulators must be enhanced; and (v) international financial institutions must be reformed to reflect changing economic weights in the world economy better in order to increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of these institutions. Third, how can the consequences for economic activity be minimized? Many of the adverse developments in financial markets – in particular the collapse of term interbank markets – reflect deeply entrenched perceptions of counterparty risk. Prompt and far-reaching action to support the financial system, in particular the infusion of equity capital in financial institutions to reduce counter-party risk and get credit to flow again, is essential in order to restore market functioning. A particular risk at present is that the rapid decline in inflation in many countries in recent months will turn into deflation with highly adverse real economic developments. This background paper considers how large the risk of deflation may be and discusses what policy can do to reduce it. It is organized as follows. Section 2 defines deflation and discusses downward nominal wage rigidities and the zero lower bound on interest rates. While these factors are frequently seen as two reasons why deflation can be associated with very poor economic outcomes, they should not be overemphasized. Section 3 looks at the current situation. Inflation expectations and forecasts in the subset of economies we look at (the euro area, the UK and the US) are positive, indicating that deflation is not expected. This does not imply that the current concerns of deflation are unwarranted, only that the public expects the central bank to be successful in avoiding deflation. The section also looks at the evolution of headline and “core” inflation, focusing on data from the US and the euro area. Section 4 reviews how monetary and fiscal policy can be conducted to ensure that deflation is avoided. Section 5 briefly discusses special issues arising in emerging market economies. Finally, Section 6 offers some conclusions. An Appendix discusses deflation episodes in the period 1882-1939.
This paper examines the sustainability of the currency board arrangements in Argentina and Hong Kong. We employ a Markov switching model with two regimes to infer the exchange rate pressure due to economic fundamentals and market expectations. The empirical results suggest that economic fundamentals and expectations are key determinants of a currency board’s sustainability. We also show that the government’s credibility played a more important role in Argentina than in Hong Kong. The trade surplus, real exchange rate and inflation rate were more important drivers of the sustainability of the Hong Kong currency board.
Inhalt: Prof. Dr. Helmut Siekmann : Stellungnahme für die öffentliche Anhörung des Ausschusses für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Energie und des Haushalts- und Finanzausschusses des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen Keine Hilfe für Banken ohne einen neuen Ordnungsrahmen für die Finanzmärkte Stellungnahme 14/2328 Antrag der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen : Keine Hilfe für Banken ohne einen neuen Ordnungsrahmen für Finanzmärkte Drucksache 14/7680 Fragenkatalog zur Anhörung von Sachverständigen am 04. Februar 2009 zum Antrag der Fraktion Bündnis90/Die Grünen Tableau Anhörung von Sachverständigen 57. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Energie 85. Sitzung des Haushalts- und Finanzausschusses am Mittwoch, dem 4. Februar 2009
Hong Kong’s Linked Exchange Rate System (LERS) has been in operation for twenty-five years during which time many other fixed exchange rate systems have succumbed to shocks and/or speculative attacks. This fact alone suggests that the LERS is a robust system which enjoys a large measure of credibility in financial markets. This paper intends to investigate whether this is indeed the case, and whether it has been the case throughout its 25-year history. In particular we will use the tools of modern finance to extract information from financial asset prices about market expectations that are related to the credibility of the LERS. The main focus is on how market participants ‘judged’ the various changes made to the LERS, such as the ‘seven technical measures’ introduced in September 1998 and the ‘three refinements’ made in May 2005. These changes have been characterizes as making the system less discretionary over time, and we hypothesize that they have also made it more credible as revealed in the prices of exchange rate related asset prices. We also investigate the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates in the current system in light of modern models of target-zone exchange rate systems. We will examine whether the intramarginal intervention in November 2007 changed the dynamic properties of the exchange rate as suggested by such models.
Inhalt: Prof. Dr. Helmut Siekmann : Stellungnahme für die öffentliche Anhörung des Haushaltsausschusses zu dem Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion der SPD und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen für ein Gesetz zur Änderung der Hessischen Landeshaushaltsordnung Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der SPD und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen für ein Gesetz zur Änderung der Hessischen Landeshaushaltsordnung (LHO) : Drucksache 17/265 Liste der Anzuhörenden im Haushaltsausschuss : am 17.09.2008 zur Drucksache 17/265
Ensuring financial stability : financial structure and the impact of monetary policy on asset prices
(2008)
This paper studies the responses of residential property and equity prices, inflation and economic activity to monetary policy shocks in 17 countries, using data spanning 1986-2006. We estimate VARs for individual economies and panel VARs in which we distinguish between groups of countries on the basis of the characteristics of their financial systems. The results suggest that using monetary policy to offset asset price movements in order to guard against financial instability may have large effects on economic activity. Furthermore, while financial structure influences the impact of policy on asset prices, its importance appears limited. Keywords: asset prices, monetary policy, panel VAR. JEL Number: C23, E52
Inhalt Prof. Dr. Helmut Siekmann : Föderalismuskommission II für eine zukunftsfähige Gestaltung der Finanzsysteme nutzen. Stellungnahme für das Expertengespräch des Haushalts- und Finanzausschusses des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen am 14.02.2008 Stellungnahme 14/1785 Antrag der Fraktion BÜNDNIS90/Die Grünen im Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen: Drucksache 14/4338 Fragenkatalog zum Expertengespräch des Haushalts- und Finanzausschusses und des Hauptausschusses am 14.02.2008
Schuldenanstieg und Haftungsausschluss im deutschen Föderalstaat : zur Rolle des Moral Hazard
(2007)
Einleitung: Die deutschen Staatsschulden sind in den letzten Jahrzehnten kontinuierlich gestiegen. Künftige Generationen werden zusätzlich aufgrund der demographischen Entwicklung durch die umlagenfinanzierten sozialen Sicherungssysteme belastet. Gerade auch der Anstieg der Verschuldung der Bundesländer war in den letzten Jahrzehnten spürbar. So betrug die Verschuldung aller deutschen Bundesländer zusammengenommen 1991 noch 168 Mrd. Euro, während Anfang 2007 die Verschuldung 483 Mrd. Euro betrug, was eine knappe Verdopplung der Schuldenquote der Länder (Verschuldung in Prozent des BIP) auf ca. 21 Prozent impliziert. In der aktuellen Diskussion um die Reform des deutschen Föderalismus besteht Einigkeit in der Diagnose des Problems. Die Entwicklung der Staatsschulden ist kritisch und darf sich so nicht fortsetzen. Uneinigkeit herrscht hingegen über die Ursache des Anstiegs. Ebenfalls wird um die beste Möglichkeit, diesen zu bremsen, gerungen. Verschiedene Autoren argumentieren, dass der Verschuldungsanstieg der deutschen Bundesländer vor allem auf den Moral Hazard Anreiz zurückzuführen ist. Der vorliegende Diskussionsbeitrag diskutiert dies als einen der möglichen Gründe des Schuldenanstiegs. Hierzu wird zunächst das Konzept kurz eingeführt. Anschließend wird die bestehende empirische Evidenz für Deutschland diskutiert. Schließlich wird eine Bewertung und Einordnung in die aktuelle Debatte vorgenommen. Schlußbemerkungen: Im vorliegenden Diskussionsbeitrag wird das "Moral hazard" Problem als einer der möglichen Gründe für den beobachteten starken Anstieg der Verschuldung deutscher Bundesländer diskutiert. Es wurde gezeigt, dass die Finanzmärkte kaum auf die erheblichen Unterschiede in den fiskalischen Fundamentaldaten der Länder reagieren. Mit einer Fallstudie wurde außerdem verdeutlicht, dass das aktuelle Bundesverfassungsgerichtsurteil zu einer eventuellen Haushaltsnotlage von Berlin Berlin die Risikoeinschätzung der Märkte für deutsche Bundesländer nicht verändert hat. Alles in allem scheint es sinnvoll, über eine größere Beteiligung der Gläubiger an Risiken einzelner Länder nachzudenken. Dies dürfte aber den Schuldenanstieg nur bei bereits hoch verschuldeten Ländern begrenzen und möglicherweise einem Notlagenfall vorbeugen, nicht aber den grundsätzlichen "Defizit-Bias" der Finanzpolitik kompensieren. Insgesamt scheinen deswegen vorgelagerte Regeln notwendig, um den Anstieg der Verschuldung schon früh zu unterbinden und somit Belastungen zukünftiger Generationen zu reduzieren.
Recently, the Bank of Japan outlined a “two perspectives” approach to the conduct of monetary policy that focuses on risks to price stability over different time horizons. Interpreting this as pertaining to different frequency bands, we use band spectrum regression to study the determination of inflation in Japan. We find that inflation is related to money growth and real output growth at low frequencies and the output gap at higher frequencies. Moreover, this relationship reflects Granger causality from money growth and the output gap to inflation in the relevant frequency bands. Keywords: spectral regression, frequency domain, Phillips curve, quantity theory. JEL Numbers: C22, E3, E5
We test the menu cost model of Ball and Mankiw (1994, 1995), which implies that the impact of price dispersion on inflation should differ between inflation and deflation episodes, using data for Japan and Hong Kong. We use a random cross-section sample split when calculating the moments of the distribution of price changes to mitigate the small-cross-sectionsample bias noted by Cecchetti and Bryan (1999). The parameter on the third moment is positive and significant in both countries during both the inflation and deflation periods, and the parameter on the second moment changes sign in the deflation period, as the theory predicts. Keywords: inflation, deflation, menu costs, Hong Kong, Japan JEL Numbers: E31
Inhalt: Vorwort Grußwort Vizepräsident Professor Dr. Ingwer Ebsen Grußwort Professor Dr. Helmut Siekmann Dr. Guntram B. Wolff : „Moral hazard und bail-out im deutschen Föderalstaat“ Ernst Burgbacher :„Erwartungen an die Föderalismusreform II – mehr Wettbewerb und mehr Autonomie für den deutschen Bundesstaat“ Professor Dr. Joachim Wieland : „Rechtsregeln für den Umgang mit extremen Haushaltsnotlagen“ Professor Dr. Kai A. Konrad : „Vorschläge zur wirksamen Verschuldungsbegrenzung der Länder“
Die Spielbankenunternehmer haben in Nordrhein-Westfalen eine Spielbankabgabe in Höhe von 80 % der Bruttospielerträge zu entrichten, § 4 Abs. 2 Satz 1 des Spielbankengesetzes NW1. Nach Absatz 3 derselben Norm sind sie dafür von denjenigen Landes- und Gemeindesteuern befreit, die in unmittelbarem Zusammenhang mit dem Betrieb der Spielbank stehen. Ein „angemessener“ Anteil dieser Abgabe ist den jeweiligen Spiel-bankgemeinden wegen der Befreiung des Spielbankunternehmers von Gemeindesteuern zuzuwenden. Durch Rechtsverordnung bestimmt der Innenminister im Einvernehmen mit dem Finanzminister die Höhe dieses Anteils, § 4 Abs. 2 Satz 3 Spielbankgesetz NW. Dies ist in § 1 der Verord-nung über den Anteil der Spielbankgemeinden an der Spielbankabgabe vom 8. Mai 19852 geschehen. Nr. 7 des Haushaltsstrukturgesetzes 20063 hat diesen Anteil von 15 % auf 12 % abgesenkt. Die Absenkung ist am 1. Juli 2006 in Kraft getreten, § 2 Nr. 2 des Haushaltsstrukturgesetzes 2006. Als Folge von Artikel 2 des Gesetzes zur Eindämmung missbräuchlicher Steuergestaltungen wird die zu zahlende Umsatzsteuer seit dem 6. Mai 2006 auf die Spielbankabgabe angerechnet. Das bedeutet, dass sich der Landesanteil an den Bruttospielerträgen um die anzurechnende Umsatzsteuer verringert. Im Folgenden soll untersucht werden, ob Rechte der Spielbankgemeinden in Nordrhein-Westfalen verletzt worden sind. Es handelt sich um die Städte Aachen, Bad Oeynhausen, Dortmund und Duisburg.
Die Abhandlung ist eine überarbeitete und erweiterte Fassung der vom Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability am 19. Juni 2006 veranstalteten Guest Lecture des Autors zum Thema "Demystifying Hedge Funds"