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Institute
This dissertation consists of three essays, which study the relation between stock prices and the macroeconomy using vector autoregressions (VARs). The first essay focuses on the link between stock prices and the current account. I find that stock markets provide a channel, in addition to the traditional exchange rate channel, through which external balance for a country with a current account imbalance can be restored. The second essay explores the transmission of U.S. stock price shocks to real activity and prices in G-7 countries. I achieve identification by imposing a small number of sign restrictions on impulse responses, while controlling for monetary policy, business cycle and government spending shocks. The results suggest that stock price movements are important for fluctuations in G-7 real activity and prices, but do not qualify as demand side business cycle shocks. The third essay investigates the impact of monetary and technology shocks on the stock market. I find an important role for technology shocks, but not monetary shocks, in explaining variations in real stock prices. The identification method is flexible enough to study the effects of technology news shocks. The responses are consistent with the idea that news on technology improvements have an immediate impact on stock prices.
Zusammenfassung und Ergebnisse Es ist noch zu früh, eine abschließende Bewertung der Entwicklung auf den Finanzmärkten während der letzten zwei Jahre vorzunehmen. In jedem Fall sind aber alle Regelungen auf den Prüfstand zu stellen. Das Aufsichtsrecht hat insgesamt seine Aufgabe, Finanzstabilität zu gewährleisten, nicht erfüllt. Wesentliche Schritte für eine grundlegende Reform sind: - ein striktes Verständnis des Aufsichtsrechts als Sonderordnungsrecht - eine drastische Reduktion der Komplexität der Rechtsvorschriften - die Internationalisierung und Europäisierung der Aufsicht - die Steigerung der Transparenz der Verbriefung einschließlich eines möglichen Zulassungsverfahrens und des Verbots bestimmter gefährlicher „Produkte“ - die vollständige Neuausrichtung der Bewertung von Finanzunternehmen und ihrer „Produkte“ („ratings“) - Die Schaffung geeigneter Regeln und Verfahren, um auch systemisch relevante Institutionen der Marktdisziplin, also ihrem Untergang, auszusetzen - Die Grundlage für kurzfristige Entscheidung über Fortführung, Zerlegung oder Abwicklung eines Instituts als Maßnahme der Gefahrenabwehr muss geschaffen werden. Ein Sonderinsolvenzrecht für Banken ist nicht angezeigt - Die Einbeziehung des menschlichen Verhaltens und der Persönlichkeitsstruktur der maßgebenden Personen in den Finanzinstitutionen
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG UND ERGEBNISSE (1) Die Schaffung des Europäischen Ausschusses für Systemrisiken stößt nicht auf durchgreifende rechtliche Bedenken. (2) Es ist nicht sicher, dass die Errichtung der neuen Europäischen Aufsichtbehörden ohne entsprechende Änderung des Primärrechts zulässig ist. (3) Es kommt entscheidend darauf an, welche rechtsverbindlichen Einzelweisungsbefugnisse tatsächlich den Behörden verliehen werden. (4) Die nach dem Kompromiss vom 2. Dezember 2009 noch verbliebenen Einzelweisungsbefugnisse der Behörden gegenüber Privaten und gegenüber nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden sind rechtlich kaum abgesichert. (5) Wenn die hoheitlichen Befugnisse weitgehend oder vollständig beseitigt werden, bestehen Bedenken im Hinblick auf die Geeignetheit und Erforderlichkeit der Einrichtungen. (6) Die weitreichenden Unabhängigkeitsgarantien sind nicht mit den Anforderungen demokratischer Aufsicht und Kontrolle zu vereinbaren. (7) Für die Einräumung von Unabhängigkeit ist nach deutschem Verfassungsrecht eine ausdrückliche Regelung in der Verfassung, wie in Art. 88 Satz 2 GG, erforderlich. (8) Die transnationale Kooperation von Verwaltungsbehörden bedarf zumindest dann einer gesetzlichen Ermächtigung, wenn faktisch verbindliche Entscheidungen getroffen werden.
Over the past few decades, changes in market conditions such as globalisation and deregulation of financial markets as well as product innovation and technical advancements have induced financial institutions to expand their business activities beyond their traditional boundaries and to engage in cross-sectoral operations. As combining different sectoral businesses offers opportunities for operational synergies and diversification benefits, financial groups comprising banks, insurance undertakings and/or investment firms, usually referred to as financial conglomerates, have rapidly emerged, providing a wide range of services and products in distinct financial sectors and oftentimes in different geographic locations. In the European Union (EU), financial conglomerates have become part of the biggest and most active financial market participants in recent years. Financial conglomerates generally pose new problems for financial authorities as they can raise new risks and exacerbate existing ones. In particular, their cross-sectoral business activities can involve prudentially substantial risks such as the risk of regulatory arbitrage and contagion risk arising from intra-group transactions. Moreover, the generally large size of financial conglomerates as well as the high complexity and interconnectedness of their corporate structures and risk exposures can entail substantial systemic risk and can therefore threaten the stability of the financial system as a whole. Until a few years ago, there was no supervisory framework in place which addressed a financial conglomerate in its entirety as a group. Instead, each group entity within a financial conglomerate was subject to the supervisory rules of its pertinent sector only. Such silo supervisory approach had the drawback of not taking account of risks which arise or aggravate at the group level. It also failed to consider how the risks from different business lines within the group interrelate with each other and affect the group as a whole. In order to address this lack of group-wide prudential supervision of financial conglomerates, the European legislator adopted the Financial Conglomerates Directive 2002/87/EC8 (‘FCD’) on 16 December 2002. The FCD was transposed into national law in the member states of the EU (‘Member States’) by 11 August 2004 for application to financial years beginning on 1 January 2005 and after. The FCD primarily aims at supplementing the existing sectoral directives to address the additional risks of concentration, contagion and complexity presented by financial conglomerates. It therefore provides for a supervisory framework which is applicable in addition to the sectoral supervision. Most importantly, the FCD has introduced additional capital requirements at the conglomerate level so as to prevent the multiple use of the same capital by different group entities. This paper seeks to examine to what extent the FCD provides for an adequate capital regulation of financial conglomerates in the EU while taking into account the underlying sectoral capital requirements and the inherent risks associated with financial conglomerates. In Part 1, the definition and the basic corporate models of financial conglomerates will be presented (I), followed by an illustration of the core motives behind the phenomenon of financial conglomeration (II) and an overview of the development of the supervision over financial conglomerates in the EU (III). Part 2 begins with a brief elaboration on the role of regulatory capital (I) and gives a general overview of the EU capital requirements applicable to banks and insurance undertakings respectively. A delineation of the commonalities and differences of the banking and the insurance capital requirements will be provided (II). It continues to further examine the need for a group-wide capital regulation of financial conglomerates and analyses the adequacy of the FCD capital requirements. In this context, the technical advice rendered by the Joint Committee on Financial Conglomerates (JCFC) as well as the currently ongoing legislative reforms at the EU level will be discussed (III). The paper finally closes with a conclusion and an outlook on remaining open issues (IV).
Misselling through agents
(2009)
This paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents: prospecting for customers and advising on the product's "suitability" for the specific needs of customers. When structuring sales-force compensation, firms trade off the expected losses from "misselling" unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing marketing incentives. We characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling (and thus the scope of policy intervention) depends on features of the agency problem including: the internal organization of a firm's sales process, the transparency of its commission structure, and the steepness of its agents' sales incentives. JEL Classification: D18 (Consumer Protection), D83 (Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge), M31 (Marketing), M52 (Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects).
This paper considers a firm that has to delegate to an agent, such as a mortgage broker or a security dealer, the twin tasks of approaching and advising customers. The main contractual restriction, in particular in light of related research in Inderst and Ottaviani (2007), is that the firm can only compensate the agent through commissions. This standard contracting restriction has the following key implications. First, the firm can only ensure internal compliance to a "standard of sales", in terms of advice for the customer, if this standard is not too high. Second, if this is still feasible, then a higher standard is associated with higher, instead of lower, sales commissions. Third, once the limit for internal compliance is approached, tougher regulation and prosecution of "misselling" have (almost) no effect on the prevailing standard. Besides having practical implications, in particular on how to (re-)regulate the sale of financial products, the novel model, which embeds a problem of advice into a framework with repeated interactions, may also be of separate interest for future work on sales force compensation. JEL Classification: D18 (Consumer Protection), D83 (Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge), M31 (Marketing), M52 (Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects).
This article shows that investors financing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of their financial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems. Competition for scarce informed capital at the refinancing stage strengthens investors’ bargaining positions. And yet, entrepreneurs’ incentives may be improved, because projects funded by investors with ‘‘shallow pockets’’ must have not only a positive net present value at the refinancing stage, but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio projects. Our article may help understand provisions used in venture capital finance that limit a fund’s initial capital and make it difficult to add more capital once the initial venture capital fund is raised. (JEL G24, G31)
We analyze how two key managerial tasks interact: that of growing the business through creating new investment opportunities and that of providing accurate information about these opportunities in the corporate budgeting process. We show how this interaction endogenously biases managers toward overinvesting in their own projects. This bias is exacerbated if managers compete for limited resources in an internal capital market, which provides us with a novel theory of the boundaries of the firm. Finally, managers of more risky and less profitable divisions should obtain steeper incentives to facilitate efficient investment decisions.
We present a simple model of personal finance in which an incumbent lender has an information advantage vis-a-vis both potential competitors and households. In order to extract more consumer surplus, a lender with sufficient market power may engage in "irresponsible"lending, approving credit even if this is knowingly against a household’s best interest. Unless rival lenders are equally well informed, competition may reduce welfare. This holds, in particular, if less informed rivals can free ride on the incumbent’s superior screening ability.
This paper argues that banks must be sufficiently levered to have first-best incentives to make new risky loans. This result, which is at odds with the notion that leverage invariably leads to excessive risk taking, derives from two key premises that focus squarely on the role of banks as informed lenders. First, banks finance projects that they do not own, which implies that they cannot extract all the profits. Second, banks conduct a credit risk analysis before making new loans. Our model may help understand why banks take on additional unsecured debt, such as unsecured deposits and subordinated loans, over and above their existing deposit base. It may also help understand why banks and finance companies have similar leverage ratios, even though the latter are not deposit takers and hence not subject to the same regulatory capital requirements as banks.
This paper shows that active investors, such as venture capitalists, can affect the speed at which new ventures grow. In the absence of product market competition, new ventures financed by active investors grow faster initially, though in the long run those financed by passive investors are able to catch up. By contrast, in a competitive product market, new ventures financed by active investors may prey on rivals that are financed by passive investors by “strategically overinvesting” early on, resulting in long-run differences in investment, profits, and firm growth. The value of active investors is greater in highly competitive industries as well as in industries with learning curves, economies of scope, and network effects, as is typical for many “new economy” industries. For such industries, our model predicts that start-ups with access to venture capital may dominate their industry peers in the long run. JEL Classifications: G24; G32 Keywords: Venture capital; dynamic investment; product market competition
We study a model of “information-based entrenchment” in which the CEO has private information that the board needs to make an efficient replacement decision. Eliciting the CEO’s private information is costly, as it implies that the board must pay the CEO both higher severance pay and higher on-the-job pay. While higher CEO pay is associated with higher turnover in our model, there is too little turnover in equilibrium. Our model makes novel empirical predictions relating CEO turnover, severance pay, and on-the-job pay to firm-level attributes such as size, corporate governance, and the quality of the firm’s accounting system.
Corporate borrowers care about the overall riskiness of a bank’s operations as their continued access to credit may rely on the bank’s ability to roll over loans or to expand existing credit facilities. As we show, a key implication of this observation is that increasing competition among banks should have an asymmetric impact on banks’ incentives to take on risk: Banks that are already riskier will take on yet more risk, while their safer rivals will become even more prudent. Our results offer new guidance for bank supervision in an increasingly competitive environment and may help to explain existing, ambiguous findings on the relationship between competition and risk-taking in banking. Furthermore, our results stress the beneficial role that competition can have for financial stability as it turns a bank’s "prudence" into an important competitive advantage.