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One of the motivations for establishing a European banking union was the desire to break the ties with between national regulators and domestic financial institutions in order to prevent regulatory capture. However, supervisory authority over the financial sector at the national level can also have valuable public benefits. The aim of this policy letter is to detail these public benefits in order to counter discussions that focus only on conflicts of interest. It is informed by an analysis of how financial institutions interacted with policy-makers in the design of national bank rescue schemes in response to the banking crisis of 2008. Using this information, it discusses the possible benefits of close cooperation between financial institutions and regulators and analyzes these in the wake of a European banking union.
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside debt exerts important indirect effects on the role of equity incentives: When inside debt is large and unsecured, equity incentives increase credit spreads; When inside debt is small or secured, this effect is weakened or reversed. We test our model on a sample of U.S. public firms with traded CDS contracts, finding evidence supportive of our predictions. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we also show that our results are robust to using an instrumental variable approach.
We study self- and cross-excitation of shocks in the Eurozone sovereign CDS market. We adopt a multivariate setting with credit default intensities driven by mutually exciting jump processes, to capture the salient features observed in the data, in particular, the clustering of high default probabilities both in time (over days) and in space (across countries). The feedback between jump events and the intensity of these jumps is the key element of the model. We derive closed-form formulae for CDS prices, and estimate the model by matching theoretical prices to their empirical counterparts. We find evidence of self-excitation and asymmetric cross-excitation. Using impulse-response analysis, we assess the impact of shocks and a potential policy intervention not just on a single country under scrutiny but also, through the effect on cross-excitation risk which generates systemic sovereign risk, on other interconnected countries.
We study the behavioral underpinnings of adopting cash versus electronic payments in retail transactions. A novel theoretical and experimental framework is developed to primarily assess the impact of sellers’ service fees and buyers’ rewards from using electronic payments. Buyers and sellers face a coordination problem, independently choosing a payment method before trading. In the experiment, sellers readily adopt electronic payments but buyers do not. Eliminating service fees or introducing rewards significantly boosts the adoption of electronic payments. Hence, buyers’ incentives play a pivotal role in the diffusion of electronic payments but monetary incentives cannot fully explain their adoption choices. Findings from this experiment complement empirical findings based on surveys and field data.
When markets are incomplete, social security can partially insure against idiosyncratic and aggregate risks. We incorporate both risks into an analytically tractable model with two overlapping generations and demonstrate that they interact over the life-cycle. The interactions appear even though the two risks are orthogonal and they amplify the welfare consequences of introducing social security. On the one hand, the interactions increase the welfare benefits from insurance. On the other hand, they can in- or decrease the welfare costs from crowding out of capital formation. This ambiguous effect on crowding out means that the net effect of these two channels is positive, hence the interactions of risks increase the total welfare benefits of social security.
This paper investigates extensions of the method of endogenous gridpoints (ENDGM) introduced by Carroll (2006) to higher dimensions with more than one continuous endogenous state variable. We compare three different categories of algorithms: (i) the conventional method with exogenous grids (EXOGM), (ii) the pure method of endogenous gridpoints (ENDGM) and (iii) a hybrid method (HYBGM). ENDGM comes along with Delaunay interpolation on irregular grids. Comparison of methods is done by evaluating speed and accuracy. We find that HYBGM and ENDGM both dominate EXOGM. In an infinite horizon model, ENDGM also always dominates HYBGM. In a finite horizon model, the choice between HYBGM and ENDGM depends on the number of gridpoints in each dimension. With less than 150 gridpoints in each dimension ENDGM is faster than HYBGM, and vice versa. For a standard choice of 25 to 50 gridpoints in each dimension, ENDGM is 1.4 to 1.7 times faster than HYBGM in the finite horizon version and 2.4 to 2.5 times faster in the infinite horizon version of the model.
This paper explores consequences of consumer education on prices and welfare in retail financial markets when some consumers are naive about shrouded add-on prices and firms try to exploit it. Allowing for different information and pricing strategies we show that education is unlikely to push firms to disclose prices towards all consumers, which would be socially efficient. Instead, price discrimination emerges as a new equilibrium. Further, due to a feedback on prices, education that is good for consumers who become sophisticated may be bad for consumers who stay naive and even for the group of all consumers as a whole
Social impact bonds are a special type of bond whose purpose is to provide long term funds to projects with a social impact. Especially in the UK and in the US these bonds are increasingly being used to raise funds to finance government projects. Their return depends on the social improvements achieved. Especially in times of crisis, governments lack funds to prevent the social consequences of recessions. Faia argues that the European Union should develop an equivalent to the British Social Finance Ltd. to finance projects for social improvement.
Exit strategies
(2014)
We study alternative scenarios for exiting the post-crisis fiscal and monetary accommodation using a macromodel where banks choose their capital structure and are subject to runs. Under a Taylor rule, the post-crisis interest rate hits the zero lower bound (ZLB) and remains there for several years. In that condition, pre-announced and fast fiscal consolidations dominate - based on output and inflation performance and bank stability - alternative strategies incorporating various degrees of gradualism and surprise. We also examine an alternative monetary strategy in which the interest rate does not reach the ZLB; the benefits from fiscal consolidation persist, but are more nuanced.
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside debt exerts important indirect effects on the role of equity incentives: When inside debt is large and unsecured, equity incentives increase credit spreads; When inside debt is small or secured, this effect is weakened or reversed. We test our model on a sample of U.S. public firms with traded CDS contracts, finding evidence supportive of our predictions. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we also show that our results are robust to using an instrumental variable approach.
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the relationship between austerity measures and economic growth. We propose a general equilibrium model where (i) agents have recursive preferences; (ii) economic growth is endogenously driven by investments in R&D; (iii) the government is committed to a zero-deficit policy and finances public expenditures by means of a combination of labor taxes and R&D taxes. We find that austerity measures that rely on reducing resources available to the R&D sector depress economic growth both in the short- and long-run. High debt EU members are currently implementing austerity measures based on higher taxes and/or lower investments in the R&D sector. This casts some doubts on the real ability of these countries to grow over the next years.
On average, "young" people underestimate whereas "old" people overestimate their chances to survive into the future. We adopt a Bayesian learning model of ambiguous survival beliefs which replicates these patterns. The model is embedded within a non-expected utility model of life-cycle consumption and saving. Our analysis shows that agents with ambiguous survival beliefs (i) save less than originally planned, (ii) exhibit undersaving at younger ages, and (iii) hold larger amounts of assets in old age than their rational expectations counterparts who correctly assess their survival probabilities. Our ambiguity-driven model therefore simultaneously accounts for three important empirical findings on household saving behavior.
This article explores life insurance consumption in 31 European countries from 2003 to 2012 and aims to investigate the extent to which market transparency can affect life insurance demand. The cross-country evidence for the entire sample period shows that greater market transparency, which resolves asymmetric information, can generate a higher demand for life insurance. However, when considering the financial crisis period (2008-2012) separately, the results suggest a negative impact of enhanced market transparency on life insurance consumption. The mixed findings imply a trade-off between the reduction in adverse selection under greater market transparency and the possible negative effects on life insurance consumption during the crisis period due to more effective market discipline. Furthermore, this article studies the extent to which transparency can influence the reaction of life insurance demand to bad market outcomes: i.e., low solvency ratios or low profitability. The results indicate that the markets with bad outcomes generate higher life insurance demand under greater transparency compared to the markets that also experience bad outcomes but are less transparent.
A greater firm-level transparency through enhanced disclosure provides more information regarding the risk situation of an insurer to its outside stakeholders such as stock investors and policyholders. The disclosure of the insurer's risktaking can result in negative influences on, for example, its stock performance and insurance demand when stock investors and policyholders are risk-averse. Insurers, which are concerned about the potential ex post adverse effects of risk-taking under greater transparency, are thus inclined to limit their risks ex ante. In other words, improved firm-level transparency can induce less risktaking incentive of insurers. This article investigates empirically the relationship between firm-level transparency and insurers' strategies on capitalization and risky investments. By exploring the disclosure levels and the risk behavior of 52 European stock insurance companies from 2005 to 2012, the results show that insurers tend to hold more equity capital under the anticipation of greater transparency, and this strategy on capital-holding is consistent for different types of insurance businesses. When considering the influence of improved transparency on the investment policy of insurers, the results are mixed for different types of insurers.
The Solvency II standard formula employs an approximate Value-at-Risk approach to define risk-based capital requirements. This paper investigates how the standard formula’s stock risk calibration influences the equity position and investment strategy of a shareholder-value-maximizing insurer with limited liability. The capital requirement for stock risks is determined by multiplying a regulation-defined stock risk parameter by the value of the insurer’s stock portfolio. Intuitively, a higher stock risk parameter should reduce risky investments as well as insolvency risk. However, we find that the default probability does not necessarily decrease when reducing the investment risk (by increasing the stock investment risk parameter). We also find that depending on the precise interaction between assets and liabilities, some insurers will invest conservatively, whereas others will prefer a very risky investment strategy, and a slight change of the stock risk parameter may lead from a conservative to a high risk asset allocation.
This paper uses laboratory experiments to provide a systematic analysis of how di↵erent presentation formats a↵ect individuals’ investment decisions. The results indicate that the type of presentation as well as personal characteristics influence both, the consistency of decisions and the riskiness of investment choices. However, while personal characteristics have a larger impact on consistency, the chosen risk level is determined more by framing e↵ects. On the level of personal characteristics, participants’ decisions show that better financial literacy and a better understanding of the presentation format enhance consistency and thus decision quality. Moreover, female participants on average make less consistent decisions and tend to prefer less risky alternatives. On the level of framing dimensions, subjects choose riskier investments when possible outcomes are shown in absolute values rather than rates of return and when the loss potential is less obvious. In particular, reducing the emphasis on downside risk and upside potential simultaneously leads to a substantial increase in risk taking.
We show that market discipline, defined as the extent to which firm specific risk characteristics are reflected in market prices, eroded during the recent financial crisis in 2008. We design a novel test of changes in market discipline based on the relation between firm specific risk characteristics and debt-to-equity hedge ratios. We find that market discipline already weakened after the rescue of Bear Stearns before disappearing almost entirely after the failure of Lehman Brothers. The effect is stronger for investment banks and large financial institutions, while there is no comparable effect for non-financial firms.
Using fiscal reaction functions for 3a panel of actual euro-area countries the paper investigates whether euro membership has reduced the responsiveness of countries to increases in the level of inherited debt compared to the period prior to succession to the euro. While we find some evidence for such a loss in prudence, the results are not robust to changes in the specification, as for example an exclusion of Greece from the panel. This suggests that the current debt problems may result to a large extent from pre-existing debt levels prior to entry or from a larger need for fiscal prudence in a common currency, while an adverse change in the fiscal reaction functions for most countries does not apply.
We introduce a new measure of systemic risk, the change in the conditional joint probability of default, which assesses the effects of the interdependence in the financial system on the general default risk of sovereign debtors. We apply our measure to examine the fragility of the European financial system during the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. Our analysis documents an increase in systemic risk contributions in the euro area during the post-Lehman global recession and especially after the beginning of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. We also find a considerable potential for cascade effects from small to large euro area sovereigns. When we investigate the effect of sovereign default on the European Union banking system, we find that bigger banks, banks with riskier activities, with poor asset quality, and funding and liquidity constraints tend to be more vulnerable to a sovereign default. Surprisingly, an increase in leverage does not seem to influence systemic vulnerability.
We present a thought-provoking study of two monetary models: the cash-in-advance and the Lagos and Wright (2005) models. We report that the different approach to modeling money — reduced-form vs. explicit role — neither induces theoretical nor quantitative differences in results. Given conformity of preferences, technologies and shocks, both models reduce to one difference equation. The equations do not coincide only if price distortions are differentially imposed across models. To illustrate, when cash prices are equally distorted in both models equally large welfare costs of inflation are obtained in each model. Our insight is that if results differ, then this is due to differential assumptions about the pricing mechanism that governs cash transactions, not the explicit microfoundation of money.
This paper summarizes the key proposals of the report by the Liikanen Commission. It starts with an explanation of a crisis narrative underlying the Report and its proposals. The proposals aim for a revitalization of market discipline in financial markets. The two main structural proposals of the Liikanen Report are: first, for large banks, the separation of the trading business from other parts of the banking business (the "Separation Proposal"), and the mandatory issuing of subordinated bank debt thought to be liable (the strict "Bail-in Proposal"). The credibility of this commitment to private liability is achieved by strict holding restrictions. The anticipated consequences of the introduction of these structural regulations for the financial industry and markets are addressed in a concluding part.
This note proposes a new set-up for the fund backing the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The proposed fund is a Multi-Tier Resolution Fund (MTRF), restricting the joint and several supranational liability to a limited range of losses, bounded by national liability at the upper and the lower end. The layers are, in ascending order: a national fund (first losses), a European fund (second losses), the national budget (third losses), the ESM (fourth losses, as a backup for sovereigns). The system works like a reinsurance scheme, providing clear limits to European-level joint liability, and therefore confining moral hazard. At the same time, it allows for some degree of risk sharing, which is important for financial stability if shocks to the financial system are exogenous (e.g., of a supranational macroeconomic nature). The text has four parts. Section A describes the operation of the Multi-Tier Resolution Fund, assuming the fund capital to be fully paid-in (“Steady State“). Section B deals with the build-up phase of the fund capital (“Build up“). Section C discusses how the proposal deals with the apparent incentive conflicts. The final Section D summarizes open questions which need further thought (“Open Questions“).
Ausgehend von einer Erläuterung der Kriseninterpretation (crisis narrative), wie sie in dem Bericht der Liikanen-Kommission zugrunde liegt, werden die nach Ansicht des Verfassers zentralen Vorschläge des Kommissionsberichts ausgewählt, vorgestellt und in den größeren Rahmen einer erneuerten Ordnungspolitik für die Finanzmärkte Europas eingeordnet. Die mit den Vorschlägen eng zusammenhängenden Reformelemente der Bankenunion werden in diesem Text bewusst ausgeklammert. Die beiden zentralen Strukturvorschläge des Liikanen-Berichts betreffen die Abspaltung der Handelsgeschäfte von dem Universalbankengeschäft für große, internationale Banken (der Trennbankenvorschlag), sowie die verpflichtende Emission nachrangigen, glaubwürdig haftenden Fremdkapitals (der strenge Bail-in Vorschlag). Glaubwürdigkeit der Haftungszusage wird durch strenge Halterestriktionen erreicht. Vorhersehbare Folgerungen einer Einführung dieser Strukturregeln für die Finanzindustrie und -märkte werden in einem abschließenden Teil angesprochen.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the ECB has experienced an unprecedented deterioration in the level of trust. This raises the question as to what factors determine trust in central banking. We use a unique cross-country dataset which includes a rich set of socio-economic characteristics and supplement it with variables meant to reflect a country’s macroeconomic condition. We find that besides individual socio-economic characteristics, macroeconomic conditions play a crucial role in the trust-building process. Our results suggest that agents are boundedly rational in the trust-building process and that current ECB market operations may even be beneficial for trust in the ECB in the long-run.
The financial crisis which started in 2007 has caused a tremendous challenge for monetary policy. The simple concept of inflation targeting has lost its position as state of the art. There is a debate on whether the mandate of a central bank should not be widened. And, indeed, monetary policy has been very accommodative in the last couple of years and central banks have modified their communication strategies by introducing forward guidance as a new policy tool. This paper addresses the consequences of these developments for the credibility, the reputation and the independence of central banks. It also comments on the recent debate among economists concerning the question whether the ECB's OMT program is compatible with its mandate.
SAFE Newsletter : 2013, Q3
(2013)
Research: Joachim Weber, Benjamin Loos, Steffen Meyer, Andreas Hackethal "Individual Investors' Trading Motives and Security Selling Behavior"
Ignazio Angeloni, Ester Faia "Monetary Policy and Prudential Regulations with Bank Runs"
Helmut Siekmann "Legal Limits to Quantitative Easing"
Policy Margit Vanberg "SAFE Summer Academy 2013 on 'International Financial Stability'"
Guest Commentary Peter Praet "Cooperation between the ECB and Academia"
Monetary theorists have advanced an intriguing notion: we exchange money to make up for a lack of enforcement, when it is difficult to monitor and sanction opportunistic behaviors. We demonstrate that, in fact, monetary equilibrium cannot generally be sustained when monitoring and punishment limitations preclude enforcement — external or not. Simply put, monetary systems cannot operate independently of institutions — formal or informal — designed to monitor behaviors and sanction undesirable ones. This fundamental result is derived by integrating monetary theory with the theory of repeated games, studying monetary equilibrium as the outcome of a matching game with private monitoring.
SAFE Newsletter : 2013, Q2
(2013)
We examine whether the robustifying nature of Taylor rule cross-checking under model uncertainty carries over to the case of parameter uncertainty. Adjusting monetary policy based on this kind of cross-checking can improve the outcome for the monetary authority. This, however, crucially depends on the relative welfare weight that is attached to the output gap and also the degree of monetary policy commitment. We find that Taylor rule cross-checking is on average able to improve losses when the monetary authority only moderately cares about output stabilization and when policy is set in a discretionary way.
This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some banks, the amount of insured deposits increased significantly; for others, it was a minor change. Our analysis shows that the more affected banks increase their investments in risky commercial real estate loans and become more risky relative to unaffected banks following the change. This effect is most distinct for affected banks that are low capitalized.
SAFE Newsletter : 2013, Q1
(2013)
SAFE Newsletter : 2013, Q4
(2013)
The IMFS Interdisciplinary Study 2/2013 contains speeches of Michael Burda (Humboldt University ), Benoît Coeuré (European Central Bank), Stefan Gerlach (Bank of Ireland and former IMFS Professor), Patrick Honohan (Bank of Ireland), Sabine Lautenschläger (Deutsche Bundesbank), Athanasios Orphanides (MIT) and Helmut Siekmann as well as Volker Wieland.
Um den Teufelskreis sich wechselseitig verstärkender Banken- und Staatsschuldenkrisen zu durchbrechen, haben sich die europäischen Institutionen grundsätzlich dazu bekannt, eine Bankenunion zu schaffen. Der Dreh- und Angelpunkt der verfolgten Strategie liegt dabei darin, durch die Schaffung zentraler, d.h. supranationaler Auffangmechanismen die Ausfallrisiken von Banken und Staaten nachhaltig zu entkoppeln. Dabei ist zu beachten, dass gerade auch die einzelnen Elemente des institutionellen Reformpakets in ihrer Binnenstruktur so beschaffen sein müssen, dass vorhersehbare Ineffizienzen nicht dazu führen, dass Vorteile der Supranationalisierung aufgehoben oder gar in ihr Gegenteil verkehrt werden. Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert den Verordnungsentwurf der EU Kommission für einen Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) vor dem Hintergrund dieser Forderung.
This policy letter provides an overview of the strengths, weaknesses, risks and opportunities of the upcoming comprehensive risk assessment, a euro area-wide evaluation of bank balance sheets and business models. If carried out properly, the 2014 comprehensive assessment will lead the euro area into a new era of banking supervision. Policy makers in euro area countries are now under severe pressure to define a credible backstop framework for banks. This framework, as the author argues, needs to be a broad, quasi-European system of mutually reinforcing backstops.
Außerhalb Griechenlands herrscht die Ansicht vor, dass eine höhere Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gleichbedeutend ist mit Preissenkungen für Güter und Dienstleistungen. Angesichts der begrenzten Bereitschaft in Griechenland, Reformen umzusetzen, fordern die Gläubiger drastische Lohnkürzungen, um die Produktivität zu erhöhen und die öffentlichen Ausgaben zu senken. Doch mit einer Kürzungsrunde nach der anderen lässt sich Wettbewerbsfähigkeit nicht erreichen. Umfangreiche flächendeckende Lohnkürzungen reduzieren vielmehr die erwartete Produktivität, da sie die besten Arbeitnehmer vertreiben, dem Rest Anreize zur Produktivität nehmen und neue gute Leute fernhalten.
In der vierten Veranstaltung der „Gesprächsreihe zu Strukturreformen im europäischen Bankensek-tor“ diskutierte Dr. Elke König, Präsidentin der Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), die Wiederherstellung privater Haftung und die zukünftige Rolle der Aufsicht, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Vorschläge der Liikanen-Kommission.
König warnte, dass man systemische Risiken, die vor allem während der Finanzkrise zu Problemen geführt hätten, noch nicht im Griff habe. Sowohl die Bankenaufsicht als auch die Wissenschaft suche immer noch nach einer geeigneten Lösung dieses Problems. Systemische Risiken führen dazu, dass komplexe und stark vernetzte Institute von Staaten gestützt werden, wenn diese ins Straucheln gera-ten. In der Finanzkrise hatte dies zur Folge, dass Banken letztlich vom Steuerzahler gerettet wurden. Diesen Quasi-Insolvenzschutz systemrelevanter Institute müsse man aufheben, um Fehlanreize im Markt zu korrigieren, so König. Verantwortung und Haftung für unternehmerisches Handeln müssten wieder in einer Hand liegen, und zwar in der der Institute, seiner Eigner und Gläubiger.
König ist deshalb der Meinung, dass ein einheitlicher Abwicklungsmechanismus für Banken notwen-dig sei, der auch grenzüberschreitend wirke. Als einen wichtigen Bestandteil dieses Mechanismus nannte sie die Umsetzung eines breiten Bail-ins. Durch Bail-in werden Eigentümer und Gläubiger von Bankinstituten an einer Restrukturierung beteiligt. Eine Umwandlung von Fremdkapital in Eigenkapi-tal kann darüber hinaus dazu dienen, ein Brückeninstitut mit Kapital auszustatten.
Zur konkreten Ausgestaltung von Bail-in-Instrumenten gibt es unterschiedliche Ansätze: Die Liikanen-Kommission plädierte in ihrem Vorschlag für eine Schaffung konkreter Bail-in-Anleihen, vergleichbar mit den Contingent Convertible Bonds (CoCo-Bonds), die in der Schweiz bereits eingeführt wurden. Die BaFin setze dagegen, ähnlich wie die Europäische Kommission, auf einen möglichst breiten An-satz und habe sich gegen die Emission einer neuen Gattung vertraglicher Bail-in-Instrumente ausge-sprochen, sagte König. Die Höhe der bail-in-fähigen Instrumente sowie die Reihenfolge der Haftung müssten aber trotzdem für jedes Institut klar definiert sein.
König betonte, dass es wichtig sei, nun die institutsspezifischen Sanierungs- und Abwicklungspläne zu entwickeln. Die BaFin habe mit der Erstellung der Abwicklungspläne auch schon begonnen. Bail-in sei dabei nur ein Baustein in dem wesentlich umfangreicheren Instrumentenkasten der Sanierungs- und Abwicklungspläne.
In der anschließenden Diskussion sagte König, dass es eine Abwicklungsbehörde für Institute, die in Zukunft einer europäischen Aufsicht unterliegen, derzeit nur auf nationaler Ebene geben könne. An-dernfalls sei eine Änderung der europäischen Verträge notwendig, da die Mittel, die für eine Abwick-lung aufgewendet werden müssten, aus nationalen Haushalten kämen. Bei einer Abwicklungsbehör-de auf europäischer Ebene würden die Haushaltsbelastung und die Entscheidung über die Verwen-dung der Mittel auseinanderfallen.
Insurance guarantee schemes aim to protect policyholders from the costs of insurer insolvencies. However, guarantee schemes can also reduce insurers’ incentives to conduct appropriate risk management. We investigate stock insurers’ risk-shifting behavior for insurance guarantee schemes under the two different financing alternatives: a flat-rate premium assessment versus a risk-based premium assessment. We identify which guarantee scheme maximizes policyholders’ welfare, measured by their expected utility. We find that the risk-based insurance guarantee scheme can only mitigate the insurer’s risk-shifting behavior if a substantial premium loading is present. Furthermore, the risk-based guarantee scheme is superior for improving policyholders’ welfare compared to the flat-rate scheme when the mitigating effect occurs.
We introduce a new measure of systemic risk, the change in the conditional joint probability of default, which assesses the effects of the interdependence in the financial system on the general default risk of sovereign debtors. We apply our measure to examine the fragility of the European financial system during the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. Our analysis documents an increase in systemic risk contributions in the euro area during the post-Lehman global recession and especially after the beginning of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. We also find a considerable potential for cascade effects from small to large euro area sovereigns. When we investigate the effect of sovereign default on the European Union banking system, we find that bigger banks, banks with riskier activities, with poor asset quality, and funding and liquidity constraints tend to be more vulnerable to a sovereign default. Surprisingly, an increase in leverage does not seem to influence systemic vulnerability.
We outline a procedure for consistent estimation of marginal and joint default risk in the euro area financial system. We interpret the latter risk as the intrinsic financial system fragility and derive several systemic fragility indicators for euro area banks and sovereigns, based on CDS prices. Our analysis documents that although the fragility of the euro area banking system had started to deteriorate before Lehman Brothers' file for bankruptcy, investors did not expect the crisis to affect euro area sovereigns' solvency until September 2008. Since then, and especially after November 2009, joint sovereign default risk has outpaced the rise of systemic risk within the banking system.
This paper presents a theory that explains why it is beneficial for banks to engage in circular lending activities on the interbank market. Using a simple network structure, it shows that if there is a non-zero bailout probability, banks can significantly increase the expected repayment of uninsured creditors by entering into cyclical liabilities on the interbank market before investing in loan portfolios. Therefore, banks are better able to attract funds from uninsured creditors. Our results show that implicit government guarantees incentivize banks to have large interbank exposures, to be highly interconnected, and to invest in highly correlated, risky portfolios. This can serve as an explanation for the observed high interconnectedness between banks and their investment behavior in the run-up to the subprime mortgage crisis.
After initial temporary measures in support of Greece prooved insufficient to end the sovereign debt crisis, extensive countermeasures have ensued. The heads of state of the euro group have agreed to permanent support mechanims over the course of the past two years. In addition, the European Central Bank (ECB) has become involved in the assistance program. The article provides an overview of the various support mechanisms installed and cautions against the connected legal problems.
In its decision of December 13, 2011, the Constitutional Court of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia ruled that a State Court of Auditors is granted by the constitution a broad scope of powers not only to control the immediate state administration but also entities outside the direct state administration, as far as they exercise financial responsibility for the state. This ruling may have serious implications for the capital guarantees extended by EU Member States to the newly established institutions on the European level, as for instance the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
The idea of appointing a non-national as Central Bank Governor remains surprisingly controversial. Nevertheless, given the skills required by the Governor in order to manage what no doubt are increasingly complex institutions, considering non-nationals makes good sense for at least two reasons. First, increasing the pool of candidates to include those with broader skills and backgrounds makes it easier to find a suitable person for the job. Second, non-nationals are less likely to be beholden to domestic pressure groups and could help better insulate the central bank from political pressures.
Großer Beifall
(2012)
Wie kann das Projekt gemeinsame Währung seine Glaubwürdigkeit wiederherstellen? Otmar Issing argumentiert, dass eine gemeinsame Währung ohne politische Union nur mit dem No-bail-out Prinzip funktionieren kann. Er warnt gleichzeitig davor, die politische Union nur als Mittel zur Krisenbewältigung voranzutreiben.
Dieser Text fasst eine Studie zusammen, die für das Bundesministeriums für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz verfasst wurde und sich mit dem Kundennutzen von Anlageberatung auseinandersetzt. Das erhebliche Potenzial von interessenskongruenter Anlageberatung wird aufgezeigt und die aktuell geringe Leistungstransparenz im Markt kritisiert. Es wird empfohlen, ein standardisiertes Vokabular für Depotrisiken einzuführen und den Zugang aller Anleger zu leicht verständlichen und vergleichbaren Informationen zu historischem Depotrisiko und historischer Deporendite sicherzustellen. Die Studie fokussiert auf Wertpapierberatung und damit zuvorderst auf jene Teilmenge von Verbrauchern, die über Anlagevermögen verfügen. Die Grundideen zu Leistungstransparenz und standardisiertem Risikovokabular lassen sich jedoch auch z.B. auf den Alterssicherungsmarkt übertragen.
The exceptional circumstances in which the ECB has been operating in the past years are testing not only the currency union itself, but also its institutional design. While the Governing Council of the ECB was designed to mainly set interest rates optimally for the union as a whole, the recent crisis has expanded the tools of the ECB to include unconventional monetary policy actions that potentially increase the risk exposure of its balance sheet. Since each country would contribute to the losses according to its capital key, a different voting mechanism that takes into account the single country’s contribution to the ECB’s capital could be advisable.
In the event of a Greek exit from the Eurozone, the stronger members of the monetary union, especially Germany, face at least two risks: First, the debt of the Greek National Bank vis-à-vis the Eurosystem of central banks will most likely be lost. Secondly, the large flow of capital from Greece and other periphery countries to Germany will accelerate inflation.
Der Deutsche Coprporate Governance Kodex soll das deutsche Corporate Governance System transparent und nachvollziehbar machen. Der Kodex stellt gesetzliche Vorschriften zur Leitung und Überwachung deutscher börsennotierter Gesellschaften dar und enthält international anerkannte Standards guter und verantwortungsvoller Unternehmensführung. Die Stellungnahme befasst sich mit von der Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex vorgebrachten Änderungsvorschlägen.
We build on previous work on operational performance evaluation of private equity portfolio companies as we are able to at least partially decrypt the black box consisting of restructuring tools these investors use and the corresponding impact on their portfolio companies. Beyond answering whether private equity improves operating efficiency we figure out which of the typical restructuring tools drive operating efficiency. Using a set of over 300 international leveraged buyout transactions in the last thirty years we find that while there is vast improvement in operational efficiency these gains vary considerably. Our top performing transactions are subject to strong equity incentives, frequent asset restructuring and tight control by the investor. Furthermore, investors experience has a positive and financial leverage a negative influence on operational performance.
This contribution draws on two recent publications in which the macroeconomic model data base (www.macromodelbase.com) is employed for model comparisons. The comparative approach is used to base policy analysis on a systematic evaluation of the different implications that a certain economic policy can have when submitted to different modeling approaches. In this manner, policy recommendations are more robust to modeling uncertainty. By extending the comparative approach to forecasting, the authors investigate the accuracy of different forecasting models and obtain more reliable mean forecasts.
In 2011 wurde der Preis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften der schwedischen Reichsbank im Gedenken an Alfred Nobel an die US-Ökonomen Thomas J. Sargent von der New York University und Chistopher A. Sims von Princeton University verliehen. Gerade deutsche Zeitungskommentare kritisierten die Forscher vielfach für die Verwendung „unrealistischer“ Annahmen wie Nutzenmaximierung und rationale Erwartungen. Diese Kritik verkennt den maßgeblichen Beitrag von Sargent und Sims zur Entwicklung der modernen Makroökonomik. Ihre empirischen Methoden sind heute Standardwerkzeuge der akademischen Forschung und werden auch von Ökonomen in Zentralbanken, Finanzministerien und internationalen Organisationen eingesetzt. Sie haben grundlegende neue Erkenntnisse ermöglicht, zum Beispiel über die Wirkungsweise der Geld- und Fiskalpolitik.
Schlechte Erfahrungen
(2012)
Eine Transaktionssteuer auf Finanzgeschäfte würde weniger Geld einbringen, als viele ihrer Anhänger hoffen - und sie birgt gravierende ökonomische und juristische Risiken. Die Bundesregierung sollte sich der Belastungen durch eine Finanztransaktionssteuer bewusst sein – und sie nicht ohne Beteiligung der weltweit führenden Finanzplätze einführen. Eine internationale Einigung auf strengere Eigenkapitalvorschriften für Banken muss Vorrang haben.
Der Beitrag diskutiert den unlängst veröffentlichten Referentenentwurf eines Finanzstabilitätsgesetzes, der vorsieht, dass die Bundesbank ab 2013 ein Mandat zur makroprudenziellen Überwachung bekommt. Die Entscheidungen über die Vorschläge, die sich vor allem an die Bundesregierung oder an die Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Bafin) richten dürften, wird ein neuer Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität beim Bundesfinanzministerium treffen. Der Autor befasst sich mit der Zusammensetzung dieses Ausschusses und mit den Instrumenten, die für die Umsetzung der Empfehlungen des Ausschusses zur Verfügung stehen.
Das neue Kreditinstitute-Reorganisationsgesetz, das als Artikel 1 des Restrukturierungsgesetzes vom 9. Dezember 2010 erlassen worden ist, führt für deutsche Kreditinsitute eine Bankenabgabe ein. Die Abgabe soll als Mittel der Prävention und Intervention dienen, um Finanzkrisen vorzubeugen und zu bekämpfen. Der vorliegende Beitrag bewertet die deutsche Bankenabgabe nach verfassungsrechtlicher Zulässigkeit und nach ihrer Zweckerfüllung.
Vermutlich schon bald wird sich die Politik mit der gesetzlichen Verankerung eines makroprudenziellen Mandats für die Deutsche Bundesbank befassen. Welche Ziele soll das Mandat beinhalten, die über die bereits bestehende Aufgabe der Bundesbank, zur Finanzstabilität im Euroraum beizutragen, hinausgehen? Welche Instrumente sollen bei der Ausübung des Mandats zum Einsatz kommen?
Risiko muss wieder kosten
(2011)
Die Macht der Ratingagenturen beruht auch auf den vielen Gesetzen und Verordnungen, die eine Orientierung an den Ratings der drei großen Agenturen vorschreiben, sagt Wirtschaftsprofessor Reinhard Schmidt. Um die Macht der Ratingagenturen zu begrenzen, empfiehlt er viele dieser Regeln ersatzlos zu streichen.
Rechtsbrüche im Euroraum
(2011)
Der Weg in die Knechtschaft
(2011)
Die Marktwirtschaft beruht auf dem Prinzip, dass sich die Akteure im Rahmen des gesetzlichen Regelwerkes frei entfalten können. Hier liegt die entscheidende Stärke eines marktwirtschaftlichen, freiheitlichen Systems. Millionen von Individuen erwägen, welche Aktivitäten welche Chance eröffnen. Kein anderes System ist in der Lage, das Potential auszuschöpfen, das in unzähligen Individuen steckt. Der Markt ist nun einmal das beste "Entdeckungsverfahren", wie Hayek erkannte. Wer im Rahmen der Spielregeln Erfolg hat, darf nach diesen Prinzipien den Gewinn behalten, muss aber auch für den Misserfolg haften.
Das vornehmliche Ziel der OGAW Richtlinien ist es einen gemeinsamen europäischen Markt für Investment-Dienstleistungen auf Basis wohldefinierten Qualitätsstandards zu erreichen. Ein grenzüberschreitender Vertrieb eröffnet die Möglichkeit der Ausweitung von Geschäftsaktivitäten auf neue wirtschaftlich attraktive Absatzmärkte. Die Stellungnahme kommentiert die im Gesetzesentwurf vorgeschlagenen regulatorischen Instrumente vor dem Hintergrund verschiedener gegebener Kriterien.
Reforms or bankruptcy?
(2011)
Almost 20 Greek academic economists from renowned universities in Europe and the US have prepared a one-page statement regarding the Greek crisis. In their statement the economic experts call upon the Greek public to accept the economic program of structural reforms, privatization, efficient tax collection, and shrinking of the public sector proposed and financed by the EU partners and the IMF. Among the signatories are this year's Nobel Prize winner Christopher Pissarides and Michalis Haliassos, Director of the Center for Financial Studies and Professor for Macroeconomics and Finance at the House of Finance.
Prodigal Italy Greece Spain?
(2011)
Contrary to widely held perceptions, workers in the southern European states that are most afflicted by the sovereign debt crisis work hard. However, labor productivity in these countries lags far behind the EU average. Structural reforms to boost productivity should be at the top of the reform agenda.
Die unkonventionellen Maßnahmen der EZB haben nicht nur zu Bilanz- und Reputationsrisiken geführt. Vielmehr haben sie auch die Grenzen der monetären Politik zur Verteilungs- und Finanzpolitik verwischt. Die Strukturen im Finanzsystem müssen durch ordnungspolitische Maßnahmen robuster gemacht werden.
Die Studie untersucht die Frage, ob der Gesetzgeber des ARUG die Ziele erreicht hat, die mit der Reform des Rechts der Anfechtung von HVBeschlüssen verfolgt wurden. Darüber hinaus gehend soll die Entwicklung der Beschlußmängelklagen seit der letzten Studie der Verfasser hierzu nachgezeichnet werden. Unsere Studie zeigt, daß seit Inkrafttreten des ARUG ein deutlicher Rückgang der Beschlußmängelklagen und Freigabeverfahren zu verzeichnen ist. Dagegen ist der Anteil der von „Berufsklägern“ erhobenen Klagen und Nebeninterventionen gleich geblieben, wobei sich die Anzahl der Personen in der Gruppe der „Berufskläger“ nochmals vergrößert hat. Das ARUG hat insoweit keine erkennbare Wirkung gehabt...
This article discusses the effects of the countercyclical premium discussed in insurance supervision in the context of Solvency II. While the basic principle of introducing countercyclical elements into Solvency II is endorsed, the authors argue for a system based on market scenarios which would enforce stricter capital requirements in boom times and less strict requirements in times of crisis.
The European Commission's Green Paper "The EU corporate governance framework" raises 25 questions in order to assess the effectiveness of the current corporate governance framework for European companies. The authors contribute to the EU's consultation, respond to the 25 questions and comment on the suggestions set out in the Green Paper.
Am 27. März 2011 wird im Rahmen der hessischen Kommunalwahlen auch über eine Schuldenbremse abgestimmt. Diese sieht vor, dass vom Jahr 2020 an der Landeshaushalt grundsätzlich auszugleichen ist. Alfons Weichenrieder argumentiert, dass eine in der Verfassung verankerte Schuldenregel dazu geeignet ist die im politischen Prozess angelegten Anreize zur Verschuldung zu zügeln. Auf die disziplinierende Wirkung der Finanzmärkte alleine zu vertrauen reicht nicht.
Die Mehrheit der auf High Frequency Trading basierenden Strategien trägt zur Marktliquidität (Market-Making-Strategien) oder zur Preisfindung und Markteffizienz (Arbitrage-Strategien) bei. Eine ungeeignete Regulierung dieser Strategien oder eine Beeinträchtigung der zugrunde liegenden Geschäftsmodelle durch übermäßige Belastungen kann kontraproduktiv sein und unvorhergesehene Auswirkungen auf die Marktqualität haben. Allerdings muss jede missbräuchliche Strategie effektiv durch die Aufsichtsbehörden bekämpft werden.
Das deutsche Bankensystem ruht seit Jahrzehnten auf drei Säulen: den privaten Kreditbanken, den öffentlichen Banken des Sparkassensystems und den genossenschaftlichen Banken. Das Drei-Säulen-System scheint ursächlich für die Stabilität im deutschen Bankensystem zu sein. Gerade die Krise hat gezeigt, dass es für ein Bankensystem vorteilhaft ist, wenn es darin nicht nur einen Typus von Banken gibt. Wir müssen eine Pluralität von Organisationsformen im Bankwesen erhalten und weiterentwickeln.
Europa - wohin?
(2011)
Gemäß der Krönungstheorie der europäischen Währungsunion wurde der Euro eingeführt, um die Notwendigkeit gemeinsamen Regierens in der Europäischen Union allen vor Augen zu führen und so ein geordnetes Vorrücken zur europäischen Integration zu ermöglichen. In der gegenwärtigen Phase scheint indes politischer Opportunismus die Integration zu bestimmen.
Die große Herausforderung, um das systemische Risiko im Finanzsektor zu vermindern, besteht darin, kluge Finanzarchitektur zu etablieren, die gewährtleistet, dass ein verbindlicher Anteil von Bankanleihen außerhalb des Finanzsektors gehalten wird. Die Anleihegläubiger von außerhalb des Bankensektors müssen sich dadurch auszeichnen, dass sie kein Refinanzierungsrisiko haben, wenn sie eine plötzliche Verlussituation erleben.
Stellungnahme zum Antrag der SPD-Fraktion auf Einführung einer Finanztransaktionssteuer in Europa
(2011)
Die Finanztransaktionssteuer ist kein geeignetes Instrument zur Verringerung systemischer Risiken, noch ein Mittel zur Vorbeugung einer Finanzkrise. Da sie zudem nur in Deutschland, Frankreich und einzelnen anderen Staaten eingeführt würde, wäre das Steueraufkommen, aufgrund von Steuerumgehung durch Verlagerung von Finanztransaktionen ins Ausland, gering.
The bail-in puzzle
(2011)
Under the current conditions of a global financial crisis, notably in Europe’s banking industry, the governance role of bond markets is defunct. In fact, investors have understood that bank debt will almost always be rescued with taxpayers’ money. The widespread practice of government-led bank bailouts has thus severely corrupted the bond market, leading to the underestimation of risk and, as a consequence, the destruction of market discipline. Any feasible solution to the bank-debt-is-too-cheap problem will have to re-install true default risk for bank bond holders.
Depending on the point of time and location, insurance companies are subject to different forms of solvency regulation. In modern regulation regimes, such as the future standard Solvency II in the EU, insurance pricing is liberalized and risk-based capital requirements will be introduced. In many economies in Asia and Latin America, on the other hand, supervisors require the prior approval of policy conditions and insurance premiums, but do not conduct risk-based capital regulation. This paper compares the outcome of insurance rate regulation and risk-based capital requirements by deriving stock insurers’ best responses. It turns out that binding price floors affect insurers’ optimal capital structures and induce them to choose higher safety levels. Risk-based capital requirements are a more efficient instrument of solvency regulation and allow for lower insurance premiums, but may come at the cost of investment efforts into adequate risk monitoring systems. The paper derives threshold values for regulator’s investments into risk-based capital regulation and provides starting points for designing a welfare-enhancing insurance regulation scheme.
Homestead exemptions to personal bankruptcy allow households to retain their home equity up to a limit determined at the state level. Households that may experience bankruptcy thus have an incentive to bias their portfolios towards home equity. Using US household data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation for the period 1996-2006, we find that especially households with low net worth maintain a larger share of their wealth as home equity if a larger homestead exemption applies. This home equity bias is also more pronounced if the household head is in poor health, increasing the chance of bankruptcy on account of unpaid medical bills. The bias is further stronger for households with mortgage finance, shorter house tenures, and younger household heads, which taken together reflect households that face more financial uncertainty.
At the upcoming G20 meetings the issue what can be done to avoid a repetition of the current deep financial crisis will again be debated. Much attention and criticism will be directed to central banks. That is unavoidable: central banks must never again permit the development of financial imbalances that are large enough to lead to the collapse of major parts of the financial system when they unwind. In the future, policy makers must “lean against the wind” and tighten financial conditions if they perceive that imbalances are forming, even if there is little hard data to rely on. And they must be mindful that the costs of acting too late can dwarf those of acting too early.
This European Policy Analysis discusses the need to strengthen the institutions underpinning the euro and makes several policy recommendations. The Stability and Growth Pact must be reinforced, have greater automaticity and entail graduated sanctions. Fiscal surveillance must be improved through the establishment of a European Fiscal Stability Agency. Finally, the European Financial Stability Facility must be made permanent.
The European Commission's Green Paper "Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis" raises 38 questions regarding how the audit function could be enhanced in order to contribute to increased financial stability. The authors comment on these 38 questions, arguing that the general level of audit quality can be enhanced by extending the duties of care and by tightening the regulations on liability.
Wir halten das bisher in Deutschland und anderen Ländern praktizierte Krisenmanagement für ordnungspolitisch inakzeptabel. Die aktuelle Notlage 2007 und 2008, verbunden mit einem enormen Überraschungsmoment, ließ möglicherweise keine andere Wahl, als die betroffenen Banken unbürokratisch zu retten - aber nun ist es Zeit, grundlegende Lehren aus den Rettungsaktionen zu ziehen.
How to be a good European...
(2010)
Unter der Überschrift "Ich kaufe griechische Staatsanleihen weil..." sollten Persönlichkeiten aus Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur kurz begründen, warum sie griechische Staatsanleihen gekauft haben bzw. kaufen werden--idealerweise unter Nachweis ihres finanziellen Engagements. Zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt kaufe ich keine griechischen Staatsanleihen...
Unternehmen und Ethik
(2010)
Die noch nicht völlig überwundene Finanzmarktkrise hat nicht nur den Gesetzgeber auf den Plan gerufen. Auch die Frage nach der Ethik der Akteure wird vielfach erörtert. Haben von Gier getriebene Finanzmarktakteure nicht nur Rechtsregeln, sondern auch ethische Normen, die Grundsätze des Wirtschaftens ehrbarer Kaufleute, gewissenlos beiseite geschoben, um sich zu bereichern? Wie läßt sich die Beachtung dieser Normen künftig sichern? Diese aktuelle Debatte soll Anlaß zu einigen allgemeineren Betrachtungen zum Thema „Unternehmen und Ethik“ sein.
We highlight the implications of combining underwriting services and lending for the choice of underwriters and for competition in the underwriting business. We show that cross-selling can increase underwriters’ incentives, and we explain three phenomena: first, that cross-selling is important for universal banks to enter the investment banking business; second, that cross-selling is particularly attractive for highly leveraged borrowers; third, that less-than-market rates are no prerequisite for cross-selling to benefit a bank’s clients. In our model, cross-selling reduces rents in the underwriting business.
US investors hold much less foreign stocks than mean/variance analysis applied to historical data predicts. In this article, we investigate whether this home bias can be explained by Bayesian approaches to international asset allocation. In contrast to mean/variance analysis, Bayesian approaches employ different techniques for obtaining the set of expected returns. They shrink sample means towards a reference point that is inferred from economic theory. We also show that one of the Bayesian approaches leads to the same implications for asset allocation as mean-variance/tracking error criterion. In both cases, the optimal portfolio is a combination the market portfolio and the mean/variance efficient portfolio with the highest Sharpe ratio.
Applying the Bayesian approaches to the subject of international diversification, we find that substantial home bias can be explained when a US investor has a strong belief in the global mean/variance efficiency of the US market portfolio and when he has a high regret aversion falling behind the US market portfolio. We also find that the current level of home bias can justified whenever regret aversion is significantly higher than risk aversion.
Finally, we compare the Bayesian approaches to mean/variance analysis in an empirical out-ofsample study. The Bayesian approaches prove to be superior to mean/variance optimized portfolios in terms of higher risk-adjusted performance and lower turnover. However, they not systematically outperform the US market portfolio or the minimum-variance portfolio.
This paper uses the co-incidence of extreme shocks to banks’ risk to examine within country and across country contagion among large EU banks. Banks’ risk is measured by the first difference of weekly distances to default and abnormal returns. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the paper examines whether the observed frequency of large shocks experienced by two or more banks simultaneously is consistent with the assumption of a multivariate normal or a student t distribution. Further, the paper proposes a simple metric, which is used to identify contagion from one bank to another and identify “systemically important” banks in the EU.
The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, bank charter values, and risk taking for European banks. Utilising cross-sectional and time series variation in the existence of deposit insurance schemes in the EU, we find that the establishment of explicit deposit insurance significantly reduces the risk taking of banks. This finding stands in contrast to most of the previous empirical literature. It supports the hypothesis that in the absence of deposit insurance, European banking systems have been characterised by strong implicit insurance operating through the expectation of public intervention at times of distress. Hence the introduction of an explicit system may imply a de facto reduction in the scope of the safety net. This finding provides a new perspective on the effects of deposit insurance on risk taking. Unless the absence of any safety net is credible, the introduction of deposit insurance serves to explicitly limit the safety net and, hence, moral hazard. We also test further hypotheses regarding the interaction between deposit insurance and monitoring, charter values and "too-big-to-fail." We find that banks with lower charter values and more subordinated debt reduce risk taking more after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance, in support of the notion that charter values and subordinated debt may mitigate moral hazard. Finally, large banks (as measured in relation to the banking system as a whole) do not change their risk taking in response to the introduction of deposit insurance, which suggests that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance does not mitigate "too-big-to-fail" problems.