Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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Securities transaction tax in France: impact on market quality and inter-market price coordination
(2014)
The general concept of a Securities Transaction Tax is controversial among academics and politicians. While theoretical research is quite advanced, the empirical guidance in a fragmented market context is still scarce. Possible negative effects for market liquidity and market efficiency are theoretically predicted, but have not been empirically tested yet. In light of the agreement of eleven European member states to implement an STT, this study aims to give a comprehensive overview of the effects of the STT, introduced in France in 2012, on liquidity demand, liquidity supply, volatility and inter-market information transmission. The results show that the STT has led to a decline in liquidity demand, has had a detrimental effect on liquidity supply and negatively influences the inter-market information transmission efficiency. However, no effect on volatility can be observed.
Die Stellungnahme befasst sich mit einem wichtigen Aspekt der Offenlegung der Bezüge von Entscheidungsträgern im Bankensektor. Komplementär zu der Diskussion um die Veröffentlichung der Vergütung von Vorstandsmitgliedern börsennotierter Unternehmen ist auch auf Landeseben versucht worden, die Transparenz der Vergütung von Führungskräften kommunaler oder landeseigener Unternehmen zu erhöhen. Namentlich sind die Träger der Sparkassen durch den neuen § 19 Abs. 6 des Sparkassengesetzes von Nordrhein-Westfalen verpflichtet worden, darauf „hinzuwirken“, dass die „gewährten Bezüge jedes einzelnen Mitglieds des Vorstands, des Verwaltungsrates und ähnlicher Gremien unter Namensnennung“ veröffentlich werden. Diese Vorschrift ist jedoch weitgehend wirkungslos geblieben; nicht zuletzt weil das OLG Köln in einer einstweiligen Verfügung die Vorschrift mangels Gesetzgebungskompetenz des Landes als nichtig behandelt hat. In dieser Situation ist am 8. August 2013 der Vorschlag eines Gesetzes „zur Offenlegung der Bezüge von Sparkassenführungskräften im Internet“ durch die Fraktion der Piraten im Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen eingebracht worden. Der Entwurf ist Gegenstand der Stellungnahme, die Helmut Siekmann für den Haushalts- und Finanzausschuss des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen erstellt hat. Sie stellt maßgebend darauf ab, dass die Sparkassen als Anstalten des öffentlichen Rechts einen öffentlichen Auftrag zu erfüllen haben und den Grundsätzen des Verwaltungsorganisationsrechts unterliegen. Als Teil der (leistenden) Verwaltung müssen sie Transparenz- und Kontrollansprüchen der Bürger und ihren Repräsentanten in den Parlamenten genügen.
In the United States, on April 1, 2014, the set of rules commonly known as the "Volcker Rule", prohibiting proprietary trading activities in banks, became effective. The implementation of this rule took more than three years, as “proprietary trading” is an inherently vague concept, overlapping strongly with genuinely economically useful activities such as market-making. As a result, the final Rule is a complex and lengthy combination of prohibitions and exemptions.
In January 2014, the European Commission put forward its proposal on banking structural reform. The proposal includes a Volcker-like provision, prohibiting large, systemically relevant financial institutions from engaging in proprietary trading or hedge fund-related business. This paper offers lessons to be learned from the implementation process for the Volcker rule in the US for the European regulatory process.
Der vorliegende Artikel analysiert systematisch die Erreichung der MiFID-Ziele anhand der wissenschaftlichen Literatur. Ziel der MiFID ist es, die Rahmenbedingungen für einen effizienten und kostengünstigen Wertpapierhandel zu schaffen. Erreicht werden soll dies durch die Verschärfung des Wettbewerbs, die Integration der Märkte, die Offenlegung von Handelsintentionen und -geschäften sowie die Stärkung der rechtlichen Position der Investoren. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass die Förderung des Wettbewerbes als erfolgreich bewertet wird, aber die regulatorischen Möglichkeiten der Marktintegration nicht ausgeschöpft werden. Ferner wird die Forderung nach einheitlichen Transparenzbestimmungen für alle Ordermechanismen nur teilweise umgesetzt. Der Anleger erfährt letztlich gegenüber Finanzintermediären durch die MiFID keinen höheren Schutz.
Financial innovation is, as usual, faster than regulation. New forms of speculation and intermediation are rapidly emerging. Largely as a result of the evaporation of trust in financial intermediation, an exponentially increasing role is being played by the so-called peer to peer intermediation. The most prominent example at the moment is Bitcoin.
If one expects that shocks in these markets could destabilize also traditional financial markets, then it will be necessary to extend regulatory measures also to these innovations.
This policy letter provides an overview of the strengths, weaknesses, risks and opportunities of the upcoming comprehensive risk assessment, a euro area-wide evaluation of bank balance sheets and business models. If carried out properly, the 2014 comprehensive assessment will lead the euro area into a new era of banking supervision. Policy makers in euro area countries are now under severe pressure to define a credible backstop framework for banks. This framework, as the author argues, needs to be a broad, quasi-European system of mutually reinforcing backstops.
Fünf Jahre nach Beginn der Banken- und Staatsschuldenkrise („Finanzkrise“) kämpfen wir weiterhin mit den elementaren Problemen: Bei Märkten und Marktteilnehmern fehlt es an Stabilität und Vertrauen. Viele Banken stehen immer noch nicht auf eigenen Füßen und nehmen die ihnen in Europa traditionell zukommende zentrale Rolle für Wachstum und Entwicklung nicht wahr. Den guten Absichten, auf die sich die großen politischen Mächte während der ersten G-20 Treffen 2008 und 2009 verständigt hatten, ist eine Reihe von sinnvollen Ideen und Konzepten gefolgt. Die Voraussetzungen für einen grundlegenden reformerischen Erfolg sind somit gegeben – doch nun muss die Umsetzung folgen. Dazu bedarf es mutiger Entscheidungen. Im Jahr 2014 muss die europäische Politik gleich mehrere Weichen stellen. Der Bundesregierung kommt dabei die Schlüsselrolle zu. Sie muss den Mut haben zu radikaler Ordnungspolitik!
This article discusses the recent proposal for debt restructuring in the euro zone by Pierre Paris and Charles Wyplosz. It argues that the plan cannot realize the promised debt relief without producing moral hazard. Ester Faia revisits the Redemption Fund proposed in November 2011 by the German Council of Economic Experts and argues that this plan, up to date, still remains the most promising path towards succesful debt restructuring in Europe.
Das ursprüngliche Ziel des Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz war die Verringerung der Emissionen. Eigentlich hat die Politik bereits ein Instrument an der Hand, das dieses Ziel fokussiert und kostensparend erreichen kann: den Handel mit CO2-Zertifikaten. Der Autor argumentiert, dass das Nebeneinander von CO2-Handel und EEG höchst unproduktiv ist und schleunigst beendet werden sollte. Ein plausibleres Argument für den politischen Erfolg des EEG und das derzeitige Herumdoktern im Detail ist, dass die Politik mit dem EEG Industriepolitik betreiben und die Kosten auf zukünftige Parlamente und Generationen überwälzen kann.
On November 8, 2013, several members of the British House of Lords’ Subcommittee A conducted a hearing at the ECB in Frankfurt, Germany, on “Genuine Economic and Monetary Union and its Implications for the UK”. Professors Otmar Issing and Jan Pieter Krahnen were called as expert witnesses.
The testimony began with a general discussion on the elements considered necessary for a functioning internal market. Do economic union and monetary union require a fiscal union or even a political union, beyond the elements of the banking union currently being prepared? In this context, also the critique of the German current account surplus and the international expectations that Germany stimulate internal demand to support growth in crisis countries, were discussed.
With regard to the monetary union, the members of the subcommittee asked for an assessment of how European nations and the banking industry would have fared in the banking crisis that followed the Lehman collapse, had there not been a common currency. Given the important role that the ECB has played in the course of the crisis management, the members further asked for an evaluation of the OMT-program of the ECB and also if the monetary union is in need of common debt instruments, in order to provide the ECB with the possibility of buying EU liabilities, comparable to the Fed buying US Treasury bonds. Finally, the dual role of the ECB for monetary policy and banking supervision was an issue touched on by several questions.
In many cases, the dire situation of public finances calls into question the very soundness of sovereigns and prompts corrective actions with far-reaching consequences. In this context, European authorities responded with several measures on different fronts, for instance by passing the "Fiscal Compact", which entered into force on January 1, 2013. Of critical importance in this framework is the assessment of a country’s situation by way of statistical measures, in order to take corrective actions when called for according to the letter of the law. If these statistics are not correct, there is a risk of imposing draconian measures on countries that do not really need it.
Before the 2007–09 crisis, standard risk measurement methods substantially underestimated the threat to the financial system. One reason was that these methods didn’t account for how closely commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies were linked. As financial conditions worsened in one type of institution, the effects spread to others. A new method that more accurately accounts for these spillover effects suggests that hedge funds may have been central in generating systemic risk during the crisis.
Social impact bonds are a special type of bond whose purpose is to provide long term funds to projects with a social impact. Especially in the UK and in the US these bonds are increasingly being used to raise funds to finance government projects. Their return depends on the social improvements achieved. Especially in times of crisis, governments lack funds to prevent the social consequences of recessions. Faia argues that the European Union should develop an equivalent to the British Social Finance Ltd. to finance projects for social improvement.
Neither Northerners are willing to invest in a South they perceive as unwilling to undertake necessary structural reforms, nor are Southerners willing to invest in their countries in a climate of austerity and policy uncertainty imposed, in their view, by the North. This results in a vicious cycle of mistrust. However, as the author argues, big steps in the direction of reforms may provide just enough thrust to break out of this vicious cycle, propel southern countries – and especially Greece – to a much happier future, and promote the chances for more balanced economic performance in North and South.
Social Security rules that determine retirement, spousal, and survivor benefits, along with benefit adjustments according to the age at which these are claimed, open up a complex set of financial options for household decisions. These rules influence optimal household asset allocation, insurance, and work decisions, subject to life cycle demographic shocks, such as marriage, divorce, and children. Our model-based research generates a wealth profile and a low and stable equity fraction consistent with empirical evidence. We confirm predictions that wives will claim retirement benefits earlier than husbands, while life insurance is mainly purchased by younger men. Our policy simulations imply that eliminating survivor benefits would sharply reduce claiming differences by sex while dramatically increasing men’s life insurance purchases.
One of the motivations for establishing a European banking union was the desire to break the ties with between national regulators and domestic financial institutions in order to prevent regulatory capture. However, supervisory authority over the financial sector at the national level can also have valuable public benefits. The aim of this policy letter is to detail these public benefits in order to counter discussions that focus only on conflicts of interest. It is informed by an analysis of how financial institutions interacted with policy-makers in the design of national bank rescue schemes in response to the banking crisis of 2008. Using this information, it discusses the possible benefits of close cooperation between financial institutions and regulators and analyzes these in the wake of a European banking union.
This paper makes a conceptual contribution to the effect of monetary policy on financial stability. We develop a microfounded network model with endogenous network formation to analyze the impact of central banks' monetary policy interventions on systemic risk. Banks choose their portfolio, including their borrowing and lending decisions on the interbank market, to maximize profit subject to regulatory constraints in an asset-liability framework. Systemic risk arises in the form of multiple bank defaults driven by common shock exposure on asset markets, direct contagion via the interbank market, and firesale spirals. The central bank injects or withdraws liquidity on the interbank markets to achieve its desired interest rate target. A tension arises between the beneficial effects of stabilized interest rates and increased loan volume and the detrimental effects of higher risk taking incentives. We find that central bank supply of liquidity quite generally increases systemic risk.
This paper explores consequences of consumer education on prices and welfare in retail financial markets when some consumers are naive about shrouded add-on prices and firms try to exploit it. Allowing for different information and pricing strategies we show that education is unlikely to push firms to disclose prices towards all consumers, which would be socially efficient. Instead, price discrimination emerges as a new equilibrium. Further, due to a feedback on prices, education that is good for consumers who become sophisticated may be bad for consumers who stay naive and even for the group of all consumers as a whole
This paper makes a conceptual contribution to the effect of monetary policy on financial stability. We develop a microfounded network model with endogenous network formation to analyze the impact of central banks' monetary policy interventions on systemic risk. Banks choose their portfolio, including their borrowing and lending decisions on the interbank market, to maximize profit subject to regulatory constraints in an asset-liability framework. Systemic risk arises in the form of multiple bank defaults driven by common shock exposure on asset markets, direct contagion via the interbank market, and firesale spirals. The central bank injects or withdraws liquidity on the interbank markets to achieve its desired interest rate target. A tension arises between the beneficial effects of stabilized interest rates and increased loan volume and the detrimental effects of higher risk taking incentives. We find that central bank supply of liquidity quite generally increases systemic risk.
Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self-insurance), by participating in interbank markets (coinsurance), or by using flexible financing instruments, such as bank capital (risk-sharing). We use a simple model to show that undiversifiable liquidity risk, i.e. the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank markets, represents an important risk factor affecting their capital structures. Banks facing higher undiversifiable liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that empirically banks that are more exposed to undiversifiable liquidity risk are less active on interbank markets. Therefore, we test for the existence of a negative relationship between bank capital and interbank market activity and find support in a large sample of U.S. commercial banks.