Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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Central bank intervention in the form of quantitative easing (QE) during times of low interest rates is a controversial topic. The author introduces a novel approach to study the effectiveness of such unconventional measures. Using U.S. data on six key financial and macroeconomic variables between 1990 and 2015, the economy is estimated by artificial neural networks. Historical counterfactual analyses show that real effects are less pronounced than yield effects.
Disentangling the effects of the individual asset purchase programs, impulse response functions provide evidence for QE being less effective the more the crisis is overcome. The peak effects of all QE interventions during the Financial Crisis only amounts to 1.3 pp for GDP growth and 0.6 pp for inflation respectively. Hence, the time as well as the volume of the interventions should be deliberated.
We create an alternative version of the present utility value formula to explicitly show that every store-of-value in the economy bears utility-interest (non-pecuniary income) for ist holder regardless of possible interest earnings from financial markets. In addition, we generalize the well-known welfare measures of consumer and producer surplus as present value concepts and apply them not only for the production and usage of consumer goods and durables but also for money and other financial assets. This helps us, inter alia, to formalize the circumstances under which even a producer of legal tender might become insolvent. We also develop a new measure of seigniorage and demonstrate why the well-established concept of monetary seigniorage is flawed. Our framework also allows us to formulate the conditions for liability-issued money such as inside money and financial instruments such as debt certificates to become – somewhat paradoxically – net wealth of the society.
This paper studies discrete time finite horizon life-cycle models with arbitrary discount functions and iso-elastic per period power utility with concavity parameter θ. We distinguish between the savings behavior of a sophisticated versus a naive agent. Although both agent types have identical preferences, they solve different utility maximization problems whenever the model is dynamically inconsistent. Pollak (1968) shows that the savings behavior of both agent types is nevertheless identical for logarithmic utility (θ = 1). We generalize this result by showing that the sophisticated agent saves in every period a greater fraction of her wealth than the naive agent if and only if θ ≥ 1. While this result goes through for model extensions that preserve linearity of the consumption policy function, it breaks down for non-linear model extensions.
SAFE Update April 2024
(2024)
Almost ten years after the European Commission action plan on building a capital markets union (CMU) and despite incremental progress, e.g. in the form of the EU Listing Act, the picture looks dire. Stock exchanges, securities markets, and supervisory authorities remain largely national, and, in many cases, European companies have decided to exclusively list overseas. Notwithstanding the economic and financial benefits of market integration, CMU has become a geopolitical necessity. A unified capital market can bolster resilience, strategic autonomy, and economic sovereignty, reduce dependence on external funding, and may foster economic cooperation between member states.
The reason for the persistent stand-still in Europe’s CMU development is not so much the conflict between market- and state-based integration, but rather the hesitancy of national regulatory and supervisory bodies to relinquish powers. If EU member states wanted to get real about CMU (as they say, and as they should), they need to openly accept the loss of sovereignty that follows from a true unified capital market. Building on economic as well as historical evidence, the paper offers viable proposals on how to design competent institutions within the current European framework.
This note outlines the case for speedy capital market integration and for the adoption of a common regulatory framework and single supervisory authority from a political economy perspective. We also show the alternative case for harmonization and centralization via regulatory competition, elaborating how competition between EU jurisdictions by way of full mutual recognition may lead to a (cost-)efficient and standardized legal framework for capital markets. Lastly, the note addresses the political economy conflict that underpins the implementation of both models for integrating capital markets. We point out that, in both cases, national authorities experience a loss of legislative and jurisdictional competence at the national level. We predict that any plan to foster a stronger capital market union, following an institution based or a market-based strategy, will face opposition from powerful national stakeholders.
This study analyses potential consequences of exiting the Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO) of the European Central Bank (ECB). Thanks to its asset purchase programs, the Eurosystem still holds plenty of reserves even with a full exit from the TLTROs. This explains why voluntary and mandatory repayments of TLTRO III borrowing went smoothly. Nevertheless, the more liquidity is drained from the banking system, the more important becomes interbank market borrowing and lending, ideally between euro area member states. Right now, the usual fault lines of the euro area show up. The German banking system has plenty of reserves while there are first signs of aggregate scarcity in the Italian banking system. This does not need to be a source of concern if the interbank market can be sufficiently reactivated. Moreover, the ECB has several tools to address possible future liquidity shortages.
This document was provided/prepared by the Economic Governance and EMU scrutiny Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
Homeownership rates differ widely across European countries. We document that part of this variation is driven by differences in the fraction of adults co-residing with their parents. Comparing Germany and Italy, we show that in contrast to homeownership rates per household, homeownership rates per individual are very similar during the first part of the life cycle. To understand these patterns, we build an overlapping-generations model where individuals face uninsurable income risk and make consumption-saving and housing tenure decisions. We embed an explicit intergenerational link between children and parents to capture the three-way trade-off between owning, renting, and co-residing. Calibrating the model to Germany we explore the role of income profiles, housing policies, and the taste for independence and show that a combination of these factors goes a long way in explaining the differential life-cycle patterns of living arrangements between the two countries.
We extend the canonical income process with persistent and transitory risk to cyclical shock distributions with left-skewness and excess kurtosis. We estimate our income process by GMM for US household data. We find countercyclical variance and procyclical skewness of persistent shocks. All shock distributions are highly leptokurtic. The tax and transfer system reduces dispersion and left-skewness. We then show that in a standard incomplete-markets life-cycle model, first, higherorder risk has sizable welfare implications, which depend on risk attitudes; second, it matters quantitatively for the welfare costs of cyclical idiosyncratic risk; third, it has non-trivial implications for self-insurance against shocks.
A stochastic forward-looking model to assess the profitability and solvency of European insurers
(2016)
In this paper, we develop an analytical framework for conducting forward-looking assessments of profitability and solvency of the main euro area insurance sectors. We model the balance sheet of an insurance company encompassing both life and non-life business and we calibrate it using country level data to make it representative of the major euro area insurance markets. Then, we project this representative balance sheet forward under stochastic capital markets, stochastic mortality developments and stochastic claims. The model highlights the potential threats to insurers solvency and profitability stemming from a sustained period of low interest rates particularly in those markets which are largely exposed to reinvestment risks due to the relatively high guarantees and generous profit participation schemes. The model also proves how the resilience of insurers to adverse financial developments heavily depends on the diversification of their business mix. Finally, the model identifies potential negative spillovers between life and non-life business thorugh the redistribution of capital within groups.
This paper studies whether Eurosystem collateral eligibility played a role in the portfolio choices of euro area asset managers during the “dash-for-cash” episode of 2020. We find that asset managers reduced their allocation to ECB-eligible corporate bonds, selling them in order to finance redemptions, while simultaneously increasing their cash holdings. These findings add nuance to previous studies of liquidity strains and price dislocations in the corporate bond market during the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, indicating a greater willingness of dealers to increase their inventories of corporate bonds pledgeable with the ECB. Analysing the price impact of these portfolio choices, we also find evidence pointing to price pressure for both ECB-eligible and ineligible corporate bonds. Bonds that were held to a larger extent by investment funds in our sample experienced higher price pressure, although the impact was lower for ECB-eligible bonds. We also discuss broader implications for the related policy debate about how central banks could mitigate similar types of liquidity shocks.
We consider an additively time-separable life-cycle model for the family of power period utility functions u such that u0(c) = c−θ for resistance to inter-temporal substitution of θ > 0. The utility maximization problem over life-time consumption is dynamically inconsistent for almost all specifications of effective discount factors. Pollak (1968) shows that the savings behavior of a sophisticated agent and her naive counterpart is always identical for a logarithmic utility function (i.e., for θ = 1). As an extension of Pollak’s result we show that the sophisticated agent saves a greater (smaller) fraction of her wealth in every period than her naive counterpart whenever θ > 1 (θ < 1) irrespective of the specification of discount factors. We further show that this finding extends to an environment with risky returns and dynamically inconsistent Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences.
Using a structural life-cycle model and data on school visits from Safegraph and school closures from Burbio, we quantify the heterogeneous impact of school closures during the Corona crisis on children affected at different ages and coming from households with different parental characteristics. Our data suggests that secondary schools were closed for in-person learning for longer periods than elementary schools (implying that younger children experienced less school closures than older children), and that private schools experienced shorter closures than public schools, and schools in poorer U.S. counties experienced shorter school closures. We then extend the structural life cycle model of private and public schooling investments studied in Fuchs-Schündeln, Krueger, Ludwig, and Popova (2021) to include the choice of parents whether to send their children to private schools, empirically discipline it with data on parental investments from the PSID, and then feed into the model the school closure measures from our empirical analysis to quantify the long-run consequences of the Covid-19 school closures on the cohorts of children currently in school. Future earnings- and welfare losses are largest for children that started public secondary schools at the onset of the Covid-19 crisis. Comparing children from the topto children from the bottom quartile of the income distribution, welfare losses are ca. 0.8 percentage points larger for the poorer children if school closures were unrelated to income. Accounting for the longer school closures in richer counties reduces this gap by about 1/3. A policy intervention that extends schools by 3 months (6 weeks in the next two summers) generates significant welfare gains for the children and raises future tax revenues approximately sufficient to pay for the cost of this schooling expansion.
Using a structural life-cycle model, we quantify the heterogeneous impact of school closures during the Corona crisis on children affected at different ages and coming from households with different parental characteristics. In the model, public investment through schooling is combined with parental time and resource investments in the production of child human capital at different stages in the children’s development process. We quantitatively characterize the long-term consequences from a Covid-19 induced loss of schooling, and find average losses in the present discounted value of lifetime earnings of the affected children of close to 1%, as well as welfare losses equivalent to about 0.6% of permanent consumption. Due to self-productivity in the human capital production function, skill attainment at a younger stage of the life cycle raises skill attainment at later stages, and thus younger children are hurt more by the school closures than older children. We find that parental reactions reduce the negative impact of the school closures, but do not fully offset it. The negative impact of the crisis on children’s welfare is especially severe for those with parents with low educational attainment and low assets. The school closures themselves are primarily responsible for the negative impact of the Covid-19 shock on the long-run welfare of the children, with the pandemic-induced income shock to parents playing a secondary role.
We characterize the optimal linear tax on capital in an Overlapping Generations model with two period lived households facing uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income risk. The Ramsey government internalizes the general equilibrium effects of private precautionary saving on factor prices and taxes capital unless the weight on future generations in the social welfare function is sufficiently high. For logarithmic utility a complete analytical solution of the Ramsey problem exhibits an optimal aggregate saving rate that is independent of income risk, whereas the optimal time-invariant tax on capital implementing this saving rate is increasing in income risk. The optimal saving rate is constant along the transition and its sign depends on the magnitude of risk and on the Pareto weight of future generations. If the Ramsey tax rate that maximizes steady state utility is positive, then implementing this tax rate permanently induces a Pareto-improving transition even if the initial equilibrium capital stock is below the golden rule.