Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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The financial crisis of 2007-08 has stressed the importance of a sound financial system. Unlike other studies weighing the pros and cons of market versus bank-based systems, this paper investigates whether the main elements of the German financial system can be regarded as complementary and consistent. This assessment refers to the idea that there is a potential for positive interaction between different elements in the system that is actually used to make it more valuable to economy and society and more robust to crises. It is shown that the old German bank-based system, where the risk of long-term lending by large private commercial banks was limited by the membership in supervisory boards and strong personal ties between all stakeholders, was a consistent system of well-adjusted complementary elements. After reunification, a hybrid system has emerged where, on the one hand, public savings banks and cooperative banks maintain their role as lenders, but on the other, large private banks have withdrawn from their former dominant role in financing and corporate governance. It is argued that this transition to stronger capital-market and, accordingly, shareholder value orientations has occurred at the expense of consistency.
The term structure of interest rates is crucial for the transmission of monetary policy to financial markets and the macroeconomy. Disentangling the impact of monetary policy on the components of interest rates, expected short rates and term premia, is essential to understanding this channel. To accomplish this, we provide a quantitative structural model with endogenous, time-varying term premia that are consistent with empirical findings. News about future policy, in contrast to unexpected policy shocks, has quantitatively significant effects on term premia along the entire term structure. This provides a plausible explanation for partly contradictory estimates in the empirical literature.
In the course of the crisis, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) has acted several times to support the EU Member States and banking systems in financial distress by purchasing debt instruments: Covered Bonds Programmes (CBP), Securities Market Programmes (SMP), Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO), and Targeted Long Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO), followed by the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and then the Extended Asset Purchase Programmes (EAPP) – colloquially labelled as Quantitative Easing (QE).
Initially, the support measures of the ESCB might have to be judged as monetary policy but the selectivity of OMT and – even more – SMP in conjunction with the transfer of risks to the ESCB speak against it.
We show that "quasi-dark" trading venues, i.e., markets with somewhat non-transparent trading mechanisms, are important parts of modern equity market structure alongside lit markets and dark pools. Using the European MiFID II regulation as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that dark pool bans lead to (i) volume spill-overs into quasi-dark trading mechanisms including periodic auctions and order internalization systems; (ii) little volume returning to transparent public markets; and consequently, (iii) a negligible impact on market liquidity and short-term price efficiency. These results show that quasi-dark markets serve as close substitutes for dark pools and consequently mitigate the effectiveness of dark pool regulation. Our findings highlight the need for a broader approach to transparency regulation in modern markets that takes into consideration the many alternative forms of quasi-dark trading.
We study how the informativeness of stock prices changes with the presence of high-frequency trading (HFT). Our estimate is based on the staggered start of HFT participation in a panel of international exchanges. With HFT presence, market prices are a less reliable predictor of future cash flows and investment, even more so for longer horizons. Further, firm-level idiosyncratic volatility decreases, and the holdings and trades by institutional investors deviate less from the market-capitalization weighted portfolio as a benchmark. Our results document that the informativeness of prices decreases subsequent to the start of HFT. These findings are consistent with theoretical models of HFTs' ability to anticipate informed order flow, resulting in decreased incentives to acquire fundamental information.
Nach der 2008 startenden Finanzmarktkrise sind Maßnahmen zur Regulierung und Stabilisierung der Finanzmärkte in das Zentrum der politischen und der gesellschaftlichen Aufmerksamkeit gerückt. Insbesondere die hohen fiskalischen Kosten der Staaten zur Stützung ihrer Bankensysteme sowie die volkswirtschaftlichen Kosten infolge des Einbruchs des Wirtschaftswachstums in den Jahren nach der Insolvenz der US Investmentbank Lehman Brothers hatten einen globalen Konsens über die Notwendigkeit neuer Regulierungsmaßnahmen zur Folge. Im Ergebnis wurden das internationale Regulierungswerk Basel III sowie weitere nationale Maßnahmen zur Stabilisierung des Finanzsektors neu konzipiert und in Europa im Wege einer in nationales Recht umzusetzenden Richtlinie (die Capital Require-ments Directive IV - CRD IV) sowie einer Verordnung (die Capital Requirements Regulation CRR, welche unmittelbar geltendes Recht darstellt) eingeführt.
Vor diesem Hintergrund analysiert das vorliegende interdisziplinäre Gutachten die Auswirkungen der Regulierungsmaßnahmen, die zwischen 2008 bis zu Beginn des Jahres 2018 umgesetzt wurden auf dem deutschen Finanzsektor.
In this paper we argue that the own findings of the SSM THEMATIC REVIEW ON PROFITABILITY AND BUSINESS MODEL and the academic literature on bank profitability do not provide support for the business model approach of supervisory guidance. We discuss in the paper several reasons why the regulator should stay away from intervening in management practices. We conclude that by taking the role of a coach instead of a referee, the supervisor generates a hazard for financial stability.
We study the effects of market incompleteness on speculation, investor survival, and asset pricing moments, when investors disagree about the likelihood of jumps and have recursive preferences. We consider two models. In a model with jumps in aggregate consumption, incompleteness barely matters, since the consumption claim resembles an insurance product against jump risk and effectively reproduces approximate spanning. In a long-run risk model with jumps in the long-run growth rate, market incompleteness affects speculation, and investor survival. Jump and diffusive risks are more balanced regarding their importance and, therefore, the consumption claim cannot reproduce approximate spanning.
Using a unique confidential contract level dataset merged with firm-level asset price data, we find robust evidence that firms' stock market valuations and employment levels respond more to monetary policy announcements the higher the degree of wage rigidity. Data on the renegotiations of collective bargaining agreements allow us to construct an exogenous measure of wage rigidity. We also find that the amplification induced by wage rigidity is stronger for firms with high labor intensity and low profitability, providing evidence of distributional consequences of monetary policy. We rationalize the evidence through a model in which firms in different sectors feature different degrees of wage rigidity due to staggered renegotiations vis-a-vis unions.