Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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In this note, we first highlight different developments for banks under direct ECB supervision within the SSM that may prompt further investigation by supervisors. We find that banks that were weakly capitalized at the start of direct ECB supervision (1) still face elevated levels of non-performing loans, (2) are less cost-efficient and (3) reduced their share of subordinated debt financing over the last years. We then stress the importance of continuous and ongoing cost-benefit analysis regarding banking supervision in Europe. We also encourage processes to question existing supervisory practices to ensure a lean and efficient banking supervision. Finally, we underline the need of continuous and intensified coordination among regulatory bodies in the Banking Union since the efficacy of European bank supervision rests on its interplay with many different institutions.
This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. It was originally published on the European Parliament’s webpage.
There is substantial disagreement about the consequences of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017, which constitutes the most extensive tax reform in the United States in more than 30 years. Using a large-scale two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, we find that the TCJA increases GDP by about 2% in the medium-run and by about 2.5% in the long-run. The shortrun impact depends crucially on the degree and costs of variable capital utilization, with GDP effects ranging from 1 to 3%. At the same time, the TCJA does not pay for itself. In our analysis, the reform decreases tax revenues and raises the debt-to-GDP ratio by about 15 percentage points in the medium-run until 2025. We show that combining the TCJA with spending cuts can dampen the increase in government indebtedness without reducing its expansionary effect.
In diesem explorativen Beitrag machen wir uns Gedanken über die Zukunft von Deutscher Bank und Commerzbank und entwickeln einen neuen Zugang zu dem Thema: Statt einer Fusion von DB und CB schlagen wir eine Teilfusion nur der Datenzentren vor – es entsteht auf diese Weise die Grundlage für eine Open Banking Plattform als „utility“, also als Betrieb im Eigentum der Nutzer, an der perspektivisch weitere Finanzinstitute teilnehmen können. Die über die Daten kooperierenden Institute bleiben mit Blick auf Produkte und Dienstleistungen unverändert Konkurrenten – „national champions“ entstehen auf diese Weise nicht. Aber es wird damit in Europa die Basis für einen erfolgversprechenden Wettbewerb mit den großen Datenplattformen aus USA und China (Facebook, Amazon, Alipay) gelegt, die früher oder später in den Finanzmarkt eindringen werden. Das von uns vorgeschlagene Modell einer offenen Datenplattform für Banken verhindert das Entstehen von „national champions“ und schützt damit auch das Kernanliegen der Bankenunion: Die Schaffung eines Finanzsystems, dessen Banken jede für sich ausscheiden können ohne eine systemische Krise auszulösen, und ohne den Steuerzahler zu einer Rettungsaktion zu zwingen
Alexander Ludwig: The discussion about lower delayed retirement credits in the German public pension system misses the point. Instead, it would be more important to increase both, delayed retirement credits and early retirement penalties, and to link them to the longer life expectancy of the working population.
This paper sheds light on the life insurance sector’s liquidity risk exposure. Life insurers are important long-term investors on financial markets. Due to their long-term investment horizon they cannot quickly adapt to changes in macroeconomic conditions. Rising interest rates in particular can expose life insurers to run-like situations, since a slow interest rate passthrough incentivizes policyholders to terminate insurance policies and invest the proceeds at relatively high market interest rates. We develop and empirically calibrate a granular model of policyholder behavior and life insurance cash flows to quantify insurers’ liquidity risk exposure stemming from policy terminations. Our model predicts that a sharp interest rate rise by 4.5pp within two years would force life insurers to liquidate 12% of their initial assets. While the associated fire sale costs are small under reasonable assumptions, policy terminations plausibly erase 30% of life insurers’ capital due to mark-to-market accounting. Our analysis reveals a mechanism by which monetary policy tightening increases liquidity risk exposure of non-bank financial intermediaries with long-term assets.
This paper studies insurance demand for individuals with limited financial literacy. We propose uncertainty about insurance payouts, resulting from contract complexity, as a novel channel that affects decision-making of financially illiterate individuals. Then, a trade-off between second-order (risk aversion) and third-order (prudence) risk preferences drives insurance demand. Sufficiently prudent individuals raise insurance demand upon an increase in contract complexity, while the effect is reversed for less prudent individuals. We characterize competitive market equilibria that feature complex contracts since firms face costs to reduce complexity. Based on the equilibrium analysis, we propose a monetary measure for the welfare cost of financial illiteracy and show that it is mainly driven by individuals’ risk aversion. Finally, we discuss implications for regulation and consumer protection.
Telemonitoring devices can be used to screen consumer characteristics and mitigate information asymmetries that lead to adverse selection in insurance markets. Nevertheless, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private information with insurers. In a secondbest efficient Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence (MWS) framework, we allow consumers to reveal their risk type for an individual subjective cost and show analytically how this affects insurance market equilibria as well as social welfare. We find that information disclosure can substitute deductibles for consumers whose transparency aversion is sufficiently low. This can lead to a Pareto improvement of social welfare. Yet, if all consumers are offered cross-subsidizing contracts, the introduction of a screening contract decreases or even eliminates cross-subsidies. Given the prior existence of a cross-subsidizing MWS equilibrium, utility is shifted from individuals who do not reveal their private information to those who choose to reveal. Our analysis informs the discussion on consumer protection in the context of digitalization. It shows that new technologies challenge cross-subsidization in insurance markets, and it stresses the negative externalities that digitalization has on consumers who are unwilling to take part in this development.
The paper illustrates based on an example the importance of consistency between the empirical measurement and the concept of variables in estimated macroeconomic models. Since standard New Keynesian models do not account for demographic trends and sectoral shifts, the authors proposes adjusting hours worked per capita used to estimate such models accordingly to enhance the consistency between the data and the model. Without this adjustment, low frequency shifts in hours lead to unreasonable trends in the output gap, caused by the close link between hours and the output gap in such models.
The retirement wave of baby boomers, for example, lowers U.S. aggregate hours per capita, which leads to erroneous permanently negative output gap estimates following the Great Recession. After correcting hours for changes in the age composition, the estimated output gap closes gradually instead following the years after the Great Recession.
The authors relax the standard assumption in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) literature that exogenous processes are governed by AR(1) processes and estimate ARMA (p,q) orders and parameters of exogenous processes. Methodologically, they contribute to the Bayesian DSGE literature by using Reversible Jump Markov Chain Monte Carlo (RJMCMC) to sample from the unknown ARMA orders and their associated parameter spaces of varying dimensions.
In estimating the technology process in the neoclassical growth model using post war US GDP data, they cast considerable doubt on the standard AR(1) assumption in favor of higher order processes. They find that the posterior concentrates density on hump-shaped impulse responses for all endogenous variables, consistent with alternative empirical estimates and the rigidities behind many richer structural models. Sampling from noninvertible MA representations, a negative response of hours to a positive technology shock is contained within the posterior credible set. While the posterior contains significant uncertainty regarding the exact order, the results are insensitive to the choice of data filter; this contrasts with the authors’ ARMA estimates of GDP itself, which vary significantly depending on the choice of HP or first difference filter.
This paper revisits the macroeconomic effects of the large-scale asset purchase programmes launched by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England from 2008. Using a Bayesian VAR, we investigate the macroeconomic impact of shocks to asset purchase announcements and assess changes in their effectiveness based on subsample analysis. The results suggest that the early asset purchase programmes had significant positive macroeconomic effects, while those of the subsequent ones were weaker and in part not significantly different from zero. The reduced effectiveness seems to reflect in part better anticipation of asset purchase programmes over time, since we find significant positive macroeconomic effects when we consider shocks to survey expectations of the Federal Reserve’s last asset purchase programme. Finally, in all estimations we find a significant and persistent positive impact of asset purchase shocks on stock prices.
We use minutes from 17,000 financial advisory sessions and corresponding client portfolio data to study how active client involvement affects advisor recommendations and portfolio outcomes. We find that advisors confronted with acquiescent clients stick to their standards and recommend expensive but well diversified mutual fund portfolios. However, if clients take an active role in the meetings, advisors deviate markedly from their standards, resulting in poorer portfolio diversification and lower Sharpe ratios. Our findings that advisors cater to client requests parallel the phenomenon of doctors prescribing antibiotics to insistent patients even if inappropriate, and imply that pandering diminishes the quality of advice.