100 Philosophie und Psychologie
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Some realists in political theory deny that the notion of feasibility has any place in realist theory, while others claim that feasibility constraints are essential elements of realist normative theorising. But none have so far clarified what exactly they are referring to when thinking of feasibility and political realism together. In this article, we develop a conception of the realist feasibility frontier based on an appraisal of how political realism should be distinguished from non-ideal theories. In this realist framework, political standards are feasible if they meet three requirements: they are (i) politically intelligible, (ii) contextually recognisable as authoritative, and (iii) contestable. We conclude by suggesting that our conception of realist feasibility might be compatible with utopian demands, thereby possibly finding favour with realists who otherwise refuse to resort to the notion of feasibility.
The concept of the political in Carl Schmitt’s works is not only defined by the distinction between friend and enemy, but also by the criterion of breaching the rules in a normatively unbound act of decision. According to Schmitt, this decision is, however, not arbitrary, but provoked by the necessity of a historical situation. This aspect of necessity calls the freedom of the decision into question and leads to tensions within Schmitt’s theory of the political. More explicitly than in Schmitt’s political and legal writings, this conflict between freedom and necessity is exposed in his theory of tragedy. In a reading of his book Hamlet or Hecuba, published in 1956, I will show, in a first step, how the act of breaching the rules is not external to normativity, but occurs from within normativity itself. It is the act of self-breaching – of breaking the rules of its own genre – by which, according to Schmitt, modern tragedy is defined. This breach, however, is compelled by the necessity of a real, i. e. extraliterary, event. In a second step, I will expound on how this idea of self-breaching, which also characterises Schmitt’s understanding of the political, leads to a loss of decision which not only questions his idea of sovereignty, but also topples his concept of the political.
Within democratic orders, it is the declared aim of a state of exception to secure or restore the endangered foundation of democracy. The provided measures are, however, undemocratic insofar they directly affect individual rights as the principle on which democracy is based: By suspending rights, the state of exception treats individuals not as members of a democratic community (demos), but as parts of a population which has to be secured. Whereas individual rights enable individuals to be part of the demos, the state of exception – by restraining rights – enforces a politics of population. In my article, I show in what way individual rights, too, are used as a strategy of governing the population. Referring to the history of individual rights in the early modern period, I describe a specific form of alienation of individual rights. I argue that this alienation consists in the separation of a private from the political component of individual rights. This alienation is the reason for a dialectical shift from demos to population which occurs in an extreme form in the state of exception. Against this background, the question of the state of exception and the question of individual rights appear in an unfamiliar but crucial relation. In order to oppose the dialectical shift and the misuse of exceptional measures, I claim it necessary to insist on the inextricable link between the private and the political component of individual rights – that is to extend the domain of democracy.
The «spirit of the laws» is, as a concept, an answer to a problem of the laws. Regarding modern law, this problem is about unity: How can the manyness of the laws be coherent in one legal order? In my paper, I reconstruct three different models which establish unity as relational (Montesquieu), absolute (Kelsen), and interruptive (Schmitt). The interruptive model connects an aspect of the first with an aspect of the second model insofar it conceives unity as heterogeneous (related to something different) and nonetheless immanent (a unity in itself). As such, unity has to be thought of as a process or an activity. Schmitt’s account of this activity, however, leads to problematic consequences because it separates the activity from the norms and denies the political and democratic dimension of the laws; as a result, the difference between law and violence vanishes. Against this background, I argue for a different understanding of the immanent heterogeneity of the unity (and accordingly of what is called «spirit of the laws»). In this perspective, the spirit of the laws does no longer appear as the solution for the problem of the laws, but becomes the starting point of their critical investigation.
Hegels Nützlichkeit
(2021)
In der gegenwärtigen Corona-Krise erscheinen die Entstehung der Krise – die Verbreitung der Krankheit Covid-19 zur Pandemie – und die Bewältigung der Krise – die rechtlichen Einschränkungen und Maßnahmen – scharf getrennt. Die Entstehung der Krise geht auf ein Stück Natur zurück, auf ein für Menschen bedrohliches Virus. Die Bewältigung der Krise geht mit staatlichem und gesellschaftlichem Handeln einher, das in zahlreichen Ländern im Rahmen rechtlicher Ausnahmezustände erfolgte. Den markanten Trennungspunkt zwischen Entstehung und Bewältigung der Krise bildet die Ausrufung der Ausnahmemaßnahmen, durch die in das Pandemiegeschehen interveniert wurde. Diese Einteilung kann den Eindruck erwecken, die mit Natur verbundene Entstehung der Krise sei eine Zeit, die gänzlich vor dem Handeln liegt: eben die Zeit des natürlichen Prozesses, die von der mit Handeln verbundenen Bewältigung der Krise abgekoppelt sei. Dieser Aufsatz zielt demgegenüber darauf, die Phasen der Entstehung und der Bewältigung der Corona- Krise in ihrer jeweiligen Ambivalenz hervortreten zu lassen. Das Ziel ist dabei ein doppeltes: Einerseits soll hervortreten, inwiefern die Phase der Entstehung der Krise nicht nur prä-aktiv und die Krise damit keine bloß natürlich gegebene, sondern auch eine gesellschaftlich gemachte ist. Andererseits soll deutlich werden, in welcher Weise die Phase der Bewältigung der Pandemie nicht allein krisenreaktiv, sondern auch krisenproduktiv ist.
Einleitend werde ich die genannte Zeitlichkeit – Entstehung und Bewältigung – erläutern, die einem gängigen Krisenverständnis zugrunde liegt, das auch in der gegenwärtigen Pandemie wirksam ist. Darauf werde ich darlegen, inwiefern das Denken des Ausnahmezustands ein Denken ebendieser Zeitlichkeit und damit zweier Phasen der Krise ist (I.1), und zeigen, warum sich die gegenwärtige Krise gerade aufgrund ihrer Verbindung mit Natur in dieses Denken einfügt (I.2). Auf dieser Grundlage gehe ich dazu über, ein komplizierteres Verständnis der gegenwärtigen Krise zu gewinnen, indem ich darlege, wie in ihrer Entstehung natürliche Prozessualität und gesellschaftliches Handeln untrennbar zusammenwirken (II.1) und an welchen Punkten ihrer Bewältigung die Krisenreaktion so in Krisenproduktion umschlägt, dass das gesellschaftliche bzw. staatliche Handeln wiederum auf Natur zurückwirkt (II.2). Durch diese Schritte soll deutlich werden, inwiefern sich in der gegenwärtigen Krise weder natürliche Prozesse und soziale Praxis noch Krisenreaktion und Krisenproduktion äußerlich gegenüberstehen, sondern intern verbunden sind. Das eingangs erläuterte Krisenverständnis erfährt dadurch eine Modifikation.
Sobre la libertad política
(1998)
Este artículo presenta un argumento en favor de un concepción intersubjetivista de la libertad política constituida por cinco diferentes nociones de autonomía: moral, ética, legal, política y social. Más allá de las nociones estrictamente liberales o comunitarias, negativas o positivas, el concepto de libertad política incluye todas aquellas libertades que los ciudadanos, en tanto continentes y usuarios autónomos de la libertad, pueden conceder y garantizar de forma recíproca y general. Así, en la base de este concepto reposa un principio de justiticación moral y política.
This article corrects the following: Hope in political philosophy,
Claudia Blöser Jakob Huber Darrel Moellendorf. Volume 15Issue 5Philosophy Compass First Published online: April 17, 2020.
It has come to the author's attention that the reference citation of ‘Meirav, 2009’ on page 2 of his published article entitled, ‘Hope in political philosophy’ does not provide bibliographical details regarding the article and does not include it in its list of works cited.
Here is the bibliographical information: Meirav, A. (2009). The nature of hope. Ratio, 22, 216–233.