100 Philosophie und Psychologie
Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Article (95)
- Part of a Book (13)
- Working Paper (9)
- Review (8)
- Book (7)
- Doctoral Thesis (7)
- Part of Periodical (4)
- magisterthesis (3)
- Report (2)
- Preprint (1)
Language
- English (149) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (149)
Keywords
- Critical Theory (6)
- Frankfurt School (6)
- Philosophie (5)
- Adorno (4)
- Marcuse (4)
- Walter Benjamin (4)
- Escola de Frankfurt (3)
- Ganzheit (3)
- Geschichte (3)
- Horkheimer (3)
Institute
- Philosophie (68)
- Gesellschaftswissenschaften (50)
- Institut für Sozialforschung (IFS) (36)
- Philosophie und Geschichtswissenschaften (11)
- Exzellenzcluster Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen (10)
- Neuere Philologien (3)
- LOEWE-Schwerpunkt Außergerichtliche und gerichtliche Konfliktlösung (2)
- Medizin (2)
- Rechtswissenschaft (2)
- Evangelische Theologie (1)
This article attempts to read the Transcendental Dialectic through Meillassoux’s model of the absolute contingency of being in order to rethink some of its central difficulties. Specifically, this concerns better understanding the role played by the categories of relation and modality in the empirical use of the ideas of reason, which underlies their regulative use that is directed at an absolute unity of reason. It will be discussed which questions are implied in the central claim of Meillassoux’s ontology, i.e., that it is possible to derive from the necessity of contingency the existence and noncontradictory being of the thing in itself. First, I will retrace basic points of Meillassoux’s critique of “correlationism”, by means of which he reconfigures the divisions between metaphysics, physics, and ontology. Second, against the background of the Kantian concept of hope, I will examine a relation between the Transcendental Dialectic and ethics, as, respectively, conceived of in Kant and in Meillassoux’s reinterpretation. Third, I will critically ask in how far absolute contingency can be understood as grounding a concept of experience and in which sense the idea of the antinomy chapter in the Transcendental Dialectic contains an argument more complex than Meillassoux’s model suggests.
Rethinking Romanticism with Spinoza : encounter and individuation in Novalis, Ritter, and Baader
(2021)
Siarhei Biareishyk setzt sich mit Berührung bei Novalis, Joachim Ritter und Franz Baader auseinander, bei denen er ein materialistisches Denken findet, das starke Parallelen zur Philosophie Spinozas zeigt. Mit Novalis erweist sich Berührung - und nicht 'Begegnung' wie etwa bei Gilles Deleuze - als eine zentrale Denkfigur für Individuierungsprozesse und Konzepte der Transindividualität. Der um Novalis angesiedelte Kreis der 'Freiberger Romantik' bildet so ein interessantes Scharnier zwischen einem Denken von Berührung und aktuellen Debatten um einen neuen Materialismus.
February 18th 2024 marked the centenary of the birth of Evald Ilyenkov (1924–1979) - a brilliant and influential Soviet philosopher whose most important early works remained unpublished during his lifetime. Two days before Ilyenkov's 100th birthday, Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny was found dead in a Siberian prison colony; that news overshadowed the little attention given to Ilyenkov's anniversary in Russia. The manner in which Ilyenkov's centenary and Navalny's death were treated reflects memory culture in Putin's Russia, where the legacies of Soviet Marxism are often suppressed by ultra-nationalist propaganda. Abroad, Ilyenkov's prestige has seen a remarkable rise in recent years, accompanied by translations and new scholarship in, for example, Sweden, Ukraine, Peru, Turkey, Canada and Cuba.
This thesis develops a naturalist theory of phenomenal consciousness. In a first step, it is argued on phenomenological grounds that consciousness is a representational state and that explaining consciousness requires a study of the brain’s representational capacities. In a second step, Bayesian cognitive science and predictive processing are introduced as the most promising attempts to understand mental representation to date. Finally, in a third step, the thesis argues that the so-called “hard problem of consciousness” can be resolved if one adopts a form of metaphysical anti-realism that can be motivated in terms of core principles of Bayesian cognitive science.
Development economists have suggested that the hopes of the poor are a relevant factor in overcoming poverty. I argue that Kant’s approach to hope provides an important complement to the economists’ perspective. A Kantian account of hope emphasizes the need for the rationality of hope and thereby guards against problematic aspects of the economists’ discourse on hope. Section 1 introduces recent work on hope in development economics. Section 2 clarifies Kant’s question “What may I hope?” and presents the outlines of his answer. Crucially, hope is rational if it is rational to trust in the structures of reality on which the realization of one’s hope depends. Section 3 argues that central tenets of Kant’s account of what makes hope rational can be applied to the context of poverty. It becomes apparent that the poor often have good reason to be hopeless since they may not trust fundamental structures that are necessary for realizing their hope. Thus, the insight that the poor need more hope must go hand in hand with a commitment to establishing trustworthy political structures, such that their hope can be rational. Section 4 highlights the relevance of the secular highest good for a better understanding of the justification and scope of our duties to the poor in a Kantian framework.
A remark on the bank cases
(2021)
Since their formulation by Keith DeRose (1992), the so-called bank cases have played a major role in the discussion about whether knowledge depends on practical factors. According to the proponents of pragmatic encroachment, the proper conclusion to be drawn from the bank cases and similar examples is that knowledge of a proposition p does not supervene on one’s evidence for or against p. In my view, this conclusion is ill-founded. The reason is that the bank cases and similar examples suffer from an ambiguity concerning the known proposition — an ambiguity that has so far been overlooked. When this ambiguity is made explicit, it becomes clear that the conclusion does not follow.
A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three most common answers provided by contemporary philosophy explain the consciousness of value in terms of judgment, emotion, or perception. An alternative view endorsed mainly by authors inspired by the phenomenological tradition argues that values are apprehended by an intentional feeling. In this model, it is by virtue of a feeling that objects are presented as being in different degrees and nuances fair or unfair, boring or funny, good or bad. This paper offers an account of this model of feeling and its basic features, and defends it over alternative models. To this end, the paper discusses different versions of the model circulating in current research which until now have developed in parallel rather than in mutual exchange. The paper also applies the proposed account to the moral domain and examines how a feeling of values is presupposed by several moral experiences.
In this paper, I will address the issue of translation as a critique of autochthony that emerges in the context of Fritz Mauthner's linguistic scepticism. Translation, for Mauthner, becomes a privileged prism through which to consider identity and belonging, as well as a way of understanding uprootedness, since language is a continuous product of borrowing, bastardization, stratification, and contingency. According to Mauthner, languages are not possession, but borrowing; not purity, but contagion; not an abstract crystallization, but transit. Therefore, love of the mother tongue - the only way to conceive patriotism - is not a physical connection with the land, roots, or nation, but a refuge, an always precarious 'Heimat' (home).
David Rothenberg, a philosophy professor and Jazz musician, has been improvising with nonhuman animals for years, among his playing partners are birds and whales, known to be territorial animals. As Deleuze and Guattari propose that the origin of art is precisely the territorialising animal and more a function of nature than a specifically human cultural achievement, their concept of territory and rhythm offers a non-anthropocentric way of looking at these encounters. Rothenberg’s sonic experiments in resonance and interspecies interaction do not rely on language, thus I argue that the human and the nonhuman animals form a temporary joint territory via sonic rhythms and engage in a mutual becoming by forming a rhizome. His sound thinking practice thus also helps in decentralising further anthropocentric models of music and art.
Self Study is a genre-bending work of autophilosophy. It opens a rare, rear window into the schizoid position of self-sufficient withdrawal and impassive indifference. This inability to be enriched by outer experiences feeds the relentless suspicion that hell is other people. Laying bare his life and work, Kishik engages with psychoanalysis, philosophy, and cultural inquiry to trace loneliness across the history of thought, leading to today's shut-in society and the autonomous subject of liberal capitalism.