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2. Auflage der "100 größten Unternehmen in Hessen": Jede Region hat ihre Besonderheiten und „Leuchttürme“. Zumeist spielen dabei große Unternehmen eine entscheidende Rolle, denn sie sind häufig Kristallisationspunkte für den Mittelstand. Die Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen und die Hessen Agentur haben diese Schrittmacher für Hessen identifiziert. Sie veröffentlichen zum zweiten Mal die Rangliste der 100 größten Unternehmen in Hessen (1. Auflage 2005). Beschäftigte als Maßstab: Um die Bedeutung der Unternehmen in und für Hessen zu messen, wurde nur auf die Mitarbeiter abgestellt, die an den hessischen Standorten der Firmen beschäftigt waren. Die gewählte Messgröße „hessische Beschäftigte“ sorgte zudem in der später folgenden Unternehmensbefragung für eine hohe Antwortbereitschaft. Hohe Konzentration: Insgesamt arbeiten rund 485.000 Beschäftigte bei den 100 größten Unternehmen in Hessen. Das sind 16 % der hessischen Erwerbstätigen. Dabei konzentrieren sich die Arbeitnehmer auf die zehn größten Unternehmen: Rund 40 % der im Ranking erfassten Mitarbeiter sind bei ihnen angestellt. Die ersten 50 Unternehmen sind die Arbeitgeber für 80 % der Beschäftigten. Wirtschaftliches Umfeld steinig: Das weltwirtschaftliche Umfeld ist für die Großunternehmen steinig: Insgesamt ist 2009 mit einem Rückgang des realen BIP (nicht arbeitstäglich bereinigt) von 2,6 % in Deutschland zu rechnen. Hessen wird aufgrund des Finanz- und Logistiksektors eine höhere Abnahme (-3 %) zu schultern haben, wie auch schon im Rezessionsjahr 2002. Dennoch flackert schon zaghaftes Licht am Ende des Tunnels: Die umfangreichen Konjunkturpakete sollten ihre Adressaten, die Produzenten und Konsumenten, erreichen und damit in der zweiten Jahreshälfte beginnen, der Rezession entgegenzuwirken. Logistik wichtig für Hessen: Logistikunternehmen sind unter den 100 größten Unternehmen in Hessen überdurchschnittlich häufig vertreten: 26 % der Beschäftigten aller befragten Firmen arbeiten bei Logistikunternehmen. Durch die Weiterentwicklung von Logistikstandorten eröffnen sich Chancen für die breite Arbeitnehmerschaft, da die Logistikbranche auf allen Qualifikationsebenen Arbeitsplätze bietet. Sie kann damit das Arbeitsplatzangebot einer Region sinnvoll ergänzen. Im Gegensatz zu der derzeitig konjunkturell schwierigen Lage sind die langfristigen Perspektiven für den Güter- und Personenverkehr nach Prognosen des IFEU Heidelberg (Institut für Energie- und Umweltforschung) äußerst positiv. Das mittelfristige Wachstum wird nicht mit den bisherigen Kapazitäten zu realisieren sein. Offensichtlicher Ansatzpunkt ist hier in Hessen der Infrastrukturausbau im Bereich Flughafen und Straße. Gleichberechtigt dazu sollte aber auch intensiv geforscht werden, denn Forschung stiftet neben dem unmittelbaren Nutzen für die Unternehmen in der Region auch eine Verbesserung der Standortqualität.
Rezensionen zu: Jörg Lesczenski: 100 Prozent Messer. Die Rückkehr des Familienunternehmens 1898 bis heute ; München 2007, Piper Verlag, ISBN 978-3-492-05085-2, 271 Seiten, gebunden, 24,90 Euro. Clemens Reichel : Vom Verbund zum Konzern. Die Metallgesellschaft AG 1945 – 1975 ; Schriften zur hessischen Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensgeschichte 8, Darmstadt 2008, Hessisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, ISBN 978-3-9804506-9-0, 332 Seiten, gebunden, 32 Euro.
Migranten sind in Deutschland weniger in den Arbeitsmarkt integriert als ihre deutschen Mitbürger; daran haben auch Integrationsprogramme der vergangenen Jahre wenig geändert. Warum schlagen diese so häufig fehl? Es mangelt politischen Entscheidern und kommunalen Verwaltungen oft an passgenau aufbereiteten Hintergrundinformationen, um Fördermaßnahmen erfolgreich umsetzen zu können. Der »Hessische Monitor Arbeitsmarkt und Migration« (HeMonA), entwickelt vom Institut für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Kultur (IWAK), setzt an diesem Punkt an, sorgt mit seinem webbasierten nutzerorientierten Informationssystem für mehr Transparenz zur Situation von Migranten auf kommunalen Arbeitsmärkten und hilft damit, deren Integration zu verbessern.
Der europäische Finanzplatz Frankfurt ist stärker als andere deutsche Städte von den Schwankungen des Büromarkts betroffen. Die Liberalisierung der Finanzmärkte führte in der Mainmetropole zu erheblichen Ausschlägen nach oben wie unten. Wie sind die Wechselwirkungen zwischen den beiden Märkten zu erklären? Welchen Einfluss hat die Deregulierung im Finanzsektor auf diese Prozesse? Und wie reagieren die Stadtplaner und Kommunalpolitiker auf die Herausforderung?
We use a novel disaggregate sectoral euro area dataset with a regional breakdown that allows explicit estimation of the sectoral component of price changes (rather than interpreting the idiosyncratic component as sectoral as done in other papers). Employing a new method to extract factors from over-lapping data blocks, we find for our euro area data set that the sectoral component explains much less of the variation in sectoral regional inflation rates and exhibits much less volatility than previous findings for the US indicate. Country- and region-specific factors play an important role in addition to the sector-specific factors. We conclude that sectoral price changes have a “geographical” dimension, as yet unexplored in the literature, that might lead to new insights regarding the properties of sectoral price changes.
We examine intra-day market reactions to news in stock-specific sentiment disclosures. Using pre-processed data from an automated news analytics tool based on linguistic pattern recognition we extract information on the relevance as well as the direction of company-specific news. Information-implied reactions in returns, volatility as well as liquidity demand and supply are quantified by a high-frequency VAR model using 20 second intervals. Analyzing a cross-section of stocks traded at the London Stock Exchange (LSE), we find market-wide robust news-dependent responses in volatility and trading volume. However, this is only true if news items are classified as highly relevant. Liquidity supply reacts less distinctly due to a stronger influence of idiosyncratic noise. Furthermore, evidence for abnormal highfrequency returns after news in sentiments is shown. JEL-Classification: G14, C32
This paper reviews the rationale for quantitative easing when central bank policy rates reach near zero levels in light of recent announcements regarding direct asset purchases by the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. Empirical evidence from the previous period of quantitative easing in Japan between 2001 and 2006 is presented. During this earlier period the Bank of Japan was able to expand the monetary base very quickly and significantly. Quantitative easing translated into a greater and more lasting expansion of M1 relative to nominal GDP. Deflation subsided by 2005. As soon as inflation appeared to stabilize near a rate of zero, the Bank of Japan rapidly reduced the monetary base as a share of nominal income as it had announced in 2001. The Bank was able to exit from extensive quantitative easing within less than a year. Some implications for the current situation in Europe and the United States are discussed.
We investigate the effects of both trust and sociability for stock market participation, the role of which has been examined separately by existing finance literature. We use internationally comparable household data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe supplemented with regional information on generalized trust from the World Value Survey and on specific trust to financial institutions from Eurobarometer. We show that trust and sociability have distinct and sizeable positive effects on stock market participation and that sociability is likely to partly balance the discouragement effect on stockholding induced by low generalized trust in the region of residence. We also show that specific trust in advice given by financial institutions represents a prominent factor for stock investing, compared to other tangible features of the banking environment. Probing further into various groups of households, we find that sociability can induce stockholding among the less well off in Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland where stock market participation is widespread. On the other hand, the effect of generalized trust is strong in countries with limited participation and low average trust like Austria, Spain, and Italy, offering an explanation for the remarkably low participation rates of the wealthy living therein.
We investigate US households’ direct investment in stocks, bonds and liquid accounts and their foreign counterparts, in order to identify the different participation hurdles affecting asset investment domestically and overseas. To this end, we estimate a trivariate probit model with three further selection equations that allows correlations among unobservables of all possible asset choices. Our results point to the existence of a second hurdle that stock owners need to overcome in order to invest in foreign stocks. Among stockholders, we show that economic resources, willingness to assume greater financial risks, shopping around for the best investment opportunities all increase the probability to invest in foreign stocks. Furthermore, we find that households who seek financial advice from relatives, friends and work contacts are less likely to invest in foreign stocks. This result corroborates the conjecture by Hong et al. (2004) that social interactions should discourage investment in foreign stocks, given their limited popularity. On the other hand, we find little evidence for additional pecuniary or informational costs associated with investment in foreign bonds and liquid accounts. Finally, we show that ignoring correlations of unobservables across different asset choices can lead to very misleading results.
We reconsider the issue of price discovery in spot and futures markets. We use a threshold error correction model to allow for arbitrage operations to have an impact on the return dynamics. We estimate the model using quote midpoints, and we modify the model to account for time-varying transaction costs. We find that the futures market leads in the process of price discovery. The lead of the futures market is more pronounced in the presence of arbitrage signals. Thus, when the deviation between the spot and the futures market is large, the spot market tends to adjust to the futures market.
After the introduction of the euro in 1999, the debate on the financial stability architecture in the EU focused on the adequacy of a decentralised setting based on national responsibilities for preventing and managing crises. The Financial Services Action Plan in 1999 and the introduction of the Lamfalussy process for financial regulation and supervision in 2001 enhanced the decentralised arrangements by increasing significantly the level of legal harmonisation and supervisory cooperation. In addition, authorities adopted EU-wide MoUs to safeguard cross-border financial stability. In this context, the financial crisis has proved to be a major challenge to the ongoing process of European financial integration. In particular, momentous events such as the freezing of interbank markets, the loss of confidence in financial institutions, runs on banks and difficulties affecting cross-border financial groups, questioned the ability of the EU financial stability architecture to contain threats to the integrated single financial market. In particular, the crisis has demonstrated the importance of coupling to micro-prudential supervision a macro dimension aimed at a broad and effective monitoring and assessment of the potential risks covering all components of the financial system. In Europe, following the de Larosière Report, the European Commission has put forward proposals for establishing a European System of Financial Supervision and a European Systemic Risk Board, the latter body to be set up under the auspices of the ECB. While the details for the implementation of these structures still need to be spelt out, they should reinforce significantly – ten years after the introduction of the euro – the financial stability architecture at the EU level.
Misselling through agents
(2009)
This paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents: prospecting for customers and advising on the product's "suitability" for the specific needs of customers. When structuring sales-force compensation, firms trade off the expected losses from "misselling" unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing marketing incentives. We characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling (and thus the scope of policy intervention) depends on features of the agency problem including: the internal organization of a firm's sales process, the transparency of its commission structure, and the steepness of its agents' sales incentives. JEL Classification: D18 (Consumer Protection), D83 (Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge), M31 (Marketing), M52 (Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects).
This paper considers a firm that has to delegate to an agent, such as a mortgage broker or a security dealer, the twin tasks of approaching and advising customers. The main contractual restriction, in particular in light of related research in Inderst and Ottaviani (2007), is that the firm can only compensate the agent through commissions. This standard contracting restriction has the following key implications. First, the firm can only ensure internal compliance to a "standard of sales", in terms of advice for the customer, if this standard is not too high. Second, if this is still feasible, then a higher standard is associated with higher, instead of lower, sales commissions. Third, once the limit for internal compliance is approached, tougher regulation and prosecution of "misselling" have (almost) no effect on the prevailing standard. Besides having practical implications, in particular on how to (re-)regulate the sale of financial products, the novel model, which embeds a problem of advice into a framework with repeated interactions, may also be of separate interest for future work on sales force compensation. JEL Classification: D18 (Consumer Protection), D83 (Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge), M31 (Marketing), M52 (Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects).
This article shows that investors financing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of their financial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems. Competition for scarce informed capital at the refinancing stage strengthens investors’ bargaining positions. And yet, entrepreneurs’ incentives may be improved, because projects funded by investors with ‘‘shallow pockets’’ must have not only a positive net present value at the refinancing stage, but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio projects. Our article may help understand provisions used in venture capital finance that limit a fund’s initial capital and make it difficult to add more capital once the initial venture capital fund is raised. (JEL G24, G31)
We analyze how two key managerial tasks interact: that of growing the business through creating new investment opportunities and that of providing accurate information about these opportunities in the corporate budgeting process. We show how this interaction endogenously biases managers toward overinvesting in their own projects. This bias is exacerbated if managers compete for limited resources in an internal capital market, which provides us with a novel theory of the boundaries of the firm. Finally, managers of more risky and less profitable divisions should obtain steeper incentives to facilitate efficient investment decisions.
We present a simple model of personal finance in which an incumbent lender has an information advantage vis-a-vis both potential competitors and households. In order to extract more consumer surplus, a lender with sufficient market power may engage in "irresponsible"lending, approving credit even if this is knowingly against a household’s best interest. Unless rival lenders are equally well informed, competition may reduce welfare. This holds, in particular, if less informed rivals can free ride on the incumbent’s superior screening ability.
This paper argues that banks must be sufficiently levered to have first-best incentives to make new risky loans. This result, which is at odds with the notion that leverage invariably leads to excessive risk taking, derives from two key premises that focus squarely on the role of banks as informed lenders. First, banks finance projects that they do not own, which implies that they cannot extract all the profits. Second, banks conduct a credit risk analysis before making new loans. Our model may help understand why banks take on additional unsecured debt, such as unsecured deposits and subordinated loans, over and above their existing deposit base. It may also help understand why banks and finance companies have similar leverage ratios, even though the latter are not deposit takers and hence not subject to the same regulatory capital requirements as banks.
This paper shows that active investors, such as venture capitalists, can affect the speed at which new ventures grow. In the absence of product market competition, new ventures financed by active investors grow faster initially, though in the long run those financed by passive investors are able to catch up. By contrast, in a competitive product market, new ventures financed by active investors may prey on rivals that are financed by passive investors by “strategically overinvesting” early on, resulting in long-run differences in investment, profits, and firm growth. The value of active investors is greater in highly competitive industries as well as in industries with learning curves, economies of scope, and network effects, as is typical for many “new economy” industries. For such industries, our model predicts that start-ups with access to venture capital may dominate their industry peers in the long run. JEL Classifications: G24; G32 Keywords: Venture capital; dynamic investment; product market competition
We study a model of “information-based entrenchment” in which the CEO has private information that the board needs to make an efficient replacement decision. Eliciting the CEO’s private information is costly, as it implies that the board must pay the CEO both higher severance pay and higher on-the-job pay. While higher CEO pay is associated with higher turnover in our model, there is too little turnover in equilibrium. Our model makes novel empirical predictions relating CEO turnover, severance pay, and on-the-job pay to firm-level attributes such as size, corporate governance, and the quality of the firm’s accounting system.