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This study looks at potential windfall profits for the four banking acquisitions in 2023. Based on accounting figures, an FT article states that a total of USD 44bn was left on the table. We see accounting figures as a misleading analysis. By estimating marked-based cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), we find positive abnormal returns in all four cases which when made quantifiable, are around half of the FT’s accounting figures. Furthermore, we argue that transparent auctions with enough bidders should be preferred to negotiated bank sales.
This document was provided/prepared by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
This briefing paper describes and evaluates the law and economics of institution(al) protection schemes. Throughout our analysis, we use Europe’s largest such scheme, that of German savings banks, as paradigm. We find strengths and weaknesses: Strong network-internal monitoring and early warning seems to be an important contributor to IPS network success. Similarly, the geographical quasi-cartel encourages banks to build a strong client base, including SME, in all regions. Third, the growth of the IPS member institutions may have benefitted from the strictly unlimited protection offered, in terms of euro amounts per account holder. The counterweighing weaknesses encompass the conditionality of the protection pledge and the underinvestment risk it entails, sometimes referred to as blackmailing the government, as well as the limited diversification potential of the deposit insurance within the network, and the near-incompatibility of the IPS model with the provisions of the BRRD, particularly relating to bail-in and resolution. Consequently, we suggest, as policy guidance, to treat large IPS networks similar to large banking groups, and put them as such under the direct supervision of the ECB within the SSM. Moreover, we suggest strengthening the seriousness of a deposit insurance that offers unlimited protection. Finally, to improve financial stability, we suggest embedding the IPS model into a multi-tier deposit re-insurance scheme, with a national and a European layer. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
This paper discusses policy implications of a potential surge in NPLs due to COVID-19. The study provides an empirical assessment of potential scenarios and draws lessons from previous crises for effective NPL treatment. The paper highlights the importance of early and realistic assessment of loan losses to avoid adverse incentives for banks. Secondary loan markets would help in this process and further facilitate bank resolution as laid down in the BRRD, which should be uphold even in extreme scenarios.
Do we need a bad bank?
(2009)
WE STUDY WHETHER PRIVATE EQUITY (PE) FIRMS HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF THEIR GERMAN PORTFOLIO COMPANIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE IPO. OUR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IS BASED ON A UNIQUE AND LARGE DATASET OF ALL IPOS IN GERMANY BETWEEN 2000 AND 2007. WE FIND THAT PE FIRMS SELECT COMPANIES WITH BELOW AVERAGE PERFORMANCE AND THEN IMPROVE PERFORMANCE SUBSTANTIALLY UNTIL THE IPO DATE AND IN MANY CASES ALSO THEREAFTER. THIS IMPLIES THAT PE FIRMS FILL A VOID ALSO IN GERMAN FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THAT THEY WILL ALSO PLAY A FUTURE ROLE IN FINANCING GERMAN ENTERPRISES.
In this paper we argue that the own findings of the SSM THEMATIC REVIEW ON PROFITABILITY AND BUSINESS MODEL and the academic literature on bank profitability do not provide support for the business model approach of supervisory guidance. We discuss in the paper several reasons why the regulator should stay away from intervening in management practices. We conclude that by taking the role of a coach instead of a referee, the supervisor generates a hazard for financial stability.