330 Wirtschaft
Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (17)
- Article (10)
- Report (5)
- Book (1)
- Preprint (1)
Has Fulltext
- yes (34) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (34)
Keywords
- Compensation (3)
- Funds (3)
- Limited Partnership (3)
- Principal Agent (3)
- Venture Capital (3)
- Bank Resolution (2)
- Bargaining Power (2)
- Covenants (2)
- Deutschland (2)
- Kreditwürdigkeit (2)
- "Event Study" (1)
- Anreizsystem (1)
- Auctions (1)
- BCBS (1)
- BRRD (1)
- Bank (1)
- Bank Acquisition (1)
- Banken (1)
- Banking union (1)
- Basel II (1)
- Basler Eigenkapitalvereinbarung <1988> (1)
- Basler Eigenkapitalvereinbarung, 2001 (1)
- Basler Eigenkapitalvereinbarung, 2010 (1)
- Business Process Outsourcing (1)
- Contract (1)
- Contracting (1)
- Covid-19 (1)
- Credit Default Swaps (1)
- Credit Rating Reasons (1)
- Credit Ratings (1)
- Credit Risk Models (1)
- EU banks (1)
- Eigenkapitalgrundsätze (1)
- European banks (1)
- European market fragmentation (1)
- Europäische Union (1)
- Event Study (1)
- German Corporate Governance System (1)
- German banks (1)
- Geschichte 1999-2003 (1)
- Granger causality (1)
- Higher Education Earnings Capacity (1)
- Human Capital (1)
- IFRS 9 (1)
- IPS (1)
- Informationsverhalten (1)
- Institutioneller Anleger (1)
- Investmentfonds (1)
- Investmentsparen (1)
- Kapitalanlage (1)
- Konkurs (1)
- Kreditinstitute (1)
- Kreditrisiko (1)
- Leistungslohn (1)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (1)
- Non-performing Loans (1)
- Regulierung (1)
- Reputation (1)
- Returns to Education (1)
- Risikokapital (1)
- Schätzung (1)
- Secondary Loan Markets (1)
- Vertrag (1)
- Welt (1)
- Wertpapieranlage (1)
- bank regulation (1)
- banking (1)
- banking regulation (1)
- business cycle (1)
- credit ratings (1)
- credit risk (1)
- credit risk correlation (1)
- deposit guarantee scheme (1)
- deposits (1)
- firm characteristics (1)
- firm performance (1)
- floors (1)
- governance (1)
- hold-up (1)
- household finance (1)
- internal rating models (1)
- leader- follower analysis (1)
- lending relationships (1)
- provisioning rules (1)
- rating agencies (1)
- savings banks (1)
- stress test (1)
- syndicated loans (1)
- validation (1)
We provide insights into determinants of the rating level of 371 issuers which defaulted in the years 1999 to 2003, and into the leader-follower relationship between Moody’s and S&P. The evidence for the rating level suggests that Moody’s assigns lower ratings than S&P for all observed periods before the default event. Furthermore, we observe two-way Granger causal-ity, which signifies information flow between the two rating agencies. Since lagged rating changes influence the magnitude of the agencies’ own rating changes it would appear that the two rating agencies apply a policy of taking a severe downgrade through several mild down-grades. Further, our analysis of rating changes shows that issuers with headquarters in the US are less sharply downgraded than non-US issuers. For rating changes by Moody’s we also find that larger issuers seem to be downgraded less severely than smaller issuers.
The paper describes the legal and economic environment of mergers and acquisitions in Germany and explores barriers to obtaining and executing corporate control. Various cases are used to demonstrate that resistance by different stakeholders including minority shareholders, organized labour and the government may present powerful obstacles to takeovers in Germany. In spite of the overall convergence of European takeover and securities trading laws, Germany still shows many peculiarities that make its market for corporate control distinct from other countries. Concentrated share ownership, cross shareholdings and pyramidal ownership structures are frequent barriers to acquiring majority stakes. Codetermination laws, the supervisory board structure and supermajority requirements for important corporate decisions limit the execution of control by majority shareholders. Bidders that disregard the German preference for consensual solutions and the specific balance of powers will risk their takeover attempt be frustrated by opposing influence groups. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
The paper explores factors that influence the design of financing contracts between venture capital investors and European venture capital funds. 122 Private Placement Memoranda and 46 Partnership Agreements are investigated in respect to the use of covenant restrictions and compensation schemes. The analysis focuses on the impact of two key factors: the reputation of VC-funds and changes in the overall demand for venture capital services. We find that established funds are more severely restricted by contractual covenants. This contradicts the conventional wisdom which assumes that established market participants care more about their reputation, have less incentive to behave opportunistically and therefore need less covenant restrictions. We also find that managers of established funds are more often obliged to invest own capital alongside with investors money. We interpret this as evidence that established funds have actually less reason to care about their reputation as compared to young funds. One reason for this surprising result could be that managers of established VC funds are older and closer to retirement and therefore put less weight on the effects of their actions on future business opportunities. We also explore the effects of venture capital supply on contract design. Gompers and Lerner (1996) show that VC-funds in the US are able to reduce the number of restrictive covenants in years with high supply of venture capital and interpret this as a result of increased bargaining power by VC-funds. We do not find similar evidence for Europe. Instead, we find that VC-funds receive less base compensation and higher performance related compensation in years with strong capital inflows into the VC industry. This may be interpreted as a signal of overconfidence: Strong investor demand seems to coincide with overoptimistic expectations by fund managers which make them willing to accept higher powered incentive schemes.
Die vorliegende empirische Studie analysiert die Vertragsgestaltung zwischen Investoren und europäischen Venture Capital-Fonds. Im Zentrum steht die Analyse der Vergütung des Fondsmanagements sowie der zum Einsatz kommenden Vertragsklauseln. Deren Ausgestaltung ist entscheidend für die Überwindung der Prinzipal-Agenten-Beziehung innewohnenden Agency-Probleme. Hierzu werden 122 Fondsprospekte sowie 46 Gesellschafterverträge von europäischen Venture Capital-Fonds ausgewertet, die in den Jahren 1996 bis 2001, der ersten großen Boomphase des europäischen Venture Capital-Marktes, aufgelegt wurden. Während die jährliche Vergütung des Fondsmanagements auf den ersten Blick sehr standardisiert erscheint, ergeben sich bei einer Barwertbetrachtung aller zu leistenden Management Fees über die gesamte Fondslaufzeit deutliche Anzeichen für Preisdifferenzierung. In Bezug auf den Einsatz von Vertragsklauseln kann eine Zunahme im Zeitablauf und mithin eine zunehmende Komplexität des Vertragsdesigns festgestellt werden. Vor dem Hintergrund der Erfahrungen aus dem US-amerikanischen Venture Capital-Markt kann diese Entwicklung jedoch noch nicht als abgeschlossen gelten. Der europäische Markt bewegt sich in Bezug auf die Verwendung vertraglicher Restriktionen auf dem Niveau, das in den USA bereits Anfang der neunziger Jahre erreicht war.