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... "Eurobonds" werden in den Verträgen nicht erwähnt. Hier fangen die Probleme also bereits an. Auf der Suche nach Kompetenzgrundlagen für die Einrichtung von Eurobonds wäre denkbar, Gebrauch von den dem Rat in Art. 136 AEUV übertragenen Befugnissen zu machen oder alternativ dazu Art. 352 mit Art. 133 und 136 AEUV heranzuziehen. Diese Bestimmungen sind jedenfalls vom Europäischen Parlament im Brok/Gualtieri-Bericht im März 2011 als in den Verträgen vorgesehene Möglichkeiten zur Einrichtung eines ständigen Stabilitätsmechanismus erörtert worden. ...
Die Diskussion um Eurobonds hält an. Es gibt gute Gründe gegen solche Bonds, aber auch welche dafür. Einerseits wird darauf verwiesen, dass durch die Einführung von Eurobonds der Reform- und Spardruck auf verschwenderische Fiskalpolitik zu sinken droht. Und dass zuviel Liquidität – leicht verfügbares Geld – genau das Ausgangsproblem war. Auf der anderen Seite wird daran erinnert, dass Staatsaufgaben nun einmal weiter finanziert werden müssen, und es wird bezweifelt ob ausschließliches Sparen wirklich trägt. Gemeinsame Anleihen würden für die meisten Staaten zudem günstigere Konditionen bedeuten, freilich nicht für Deutschland – wobei Deutschland unter verschiedenen Aspekten von der derzeitigen Situation profitiert. ...
Mit Schillers Wort von Sprache, die selbst dichtet und denkt, rekurrierte Ernst Forsthoff zeitweise auf einen unverfügbaren Eigenwert der Rechtssprache jenseits positivistischer Legalitätsmanöver, auswechselbarer Naturrechtsideologien, aber auch eines mehr oder weniger beliebigen, bestimmte Gegebenheiten akzentuierenden oder idealisierenden konkreten Ordnungsdenkens. Gegenüber solcher Funktionalisierung und – nahe Heidegger’schem Jargon – "technischer Zurichtung" bei ständiger "Veränderung der Wertskala der Zwecke" wollte Forsthoff die Wissenschaft der "Belehrung durch die Sprache selbst überlassen". Er plädierte für eine "Wiederherstellung der juristischen Hermeneutik als Disziplin von eigener logischer Struktur", stark angelehnt an Savigny und, wie Florian Meinel betont, "seiner Zeit um zwanzig Jahre voraus" (262). Angesichts der Missbrauchsanfälligkeit der selbst ideologischen Vorstellung einer wahren Sprache kann man mit dem Brieffreund Fritz von Hippel eine weitere Steigerung der Sprachverwirrung monieren und Forsthoffs Appell an die hermeneutische Tugend mit Meinel als "juristische Durchhalteparole im Weltbürgerkrieg der Ideologien" auffassen (263f.). Tiefschichtiger interpretiert Meinel sodann aber die von Forsthoff gesuchte Anlehnung an die Sprachphilosophie von Hamann und Herder im Sinne einer theologischen Rechtsbegründung, die die göttlich gestiftete und nicht menschlich gemachte Sprache wie Ordnung dem instrumentalistischen Zugriff des Exegeten entrücken soll (264). Übrigens hat Forsthoff dieses rechtstheologische Moment in seiner unveröffentlichten rechtsphilosophischen und ebenfalls an Savigny orientierten Studie "Die Institutionen als Rechtsbegriff" (1944/47) fortgeschrieben, bezugnehmend jetzt vornehmlich auf vorgeordnete organische Ordnungszusammenhänge, wie sie auch schon in "Recht und Sprache" aufgeschienen waren. Jede Institution sollte neben einem sachlichen ein personelles Element in Form eines bestimmten Menschenbildes aufweisen, das der evangelische Pfarrerssohn nach der Lehre Martin Luthers durch Fehlsamkeit und Erlösungsbedürftigkeit bestimmte und von da aus die Einordnung individueller Willensautonomie in Strukturen objektiver, überindividueller, gleichwohl geschichtlich wandelbarer Bindungen anthropologisch rechtfertigte (291). Den alles ins Provisorische und Diskutable schiebenden "modernen Massendemokratien", einschließlich der auf "Herrenkult" aufbauenden "massendemokratischen Diktaturstaaten", schrieb Forsthoff eine geradezu antiinstitutionelle Verschleißkraft zu (292f.). Dass auch dieser Versuch, dem juristischen Denken einen neutralen, ideologiefreien Raum zu vindizieren, nicht gelingen konnte, weil sich hinter dem institutionellen Rechtsdenken ebenfalls ein eigenes geschichtliches Legitimitätskonzept versteckte (298), leuchtet theoretisch ein und unterstreicht den Standort im Zeitalter der Ideologien. ...
This article tries to outline possible research topics in the field of comparative 20th century legal history between Europe and Latin-America. It seeks to examine changes both in Labour and Property law as core areas where social conceptions began to influence »liberal« private law. Focussing on an example from Mexican law in the aftermath of the revolution which took place in the first decades of the 20th century, it is argued that new conceptions in both fields were discussed using similar conceptual patterns in Europe and LatinAmerica. In the reaction of the jurists from both continents to the challenges of the new century lies a possibility for fruitful comparison. Conducting research in such a framework can also produce comparative results on the interplay between constitutional law and private law – especially when the focus lies on Germany and Mexico, where new constitutions at the beginning of the new century did evoke reactions in the discourses about private law. With regard to methodology it has to be observed that such research has to go far beyond the traditional pattern of »reception« of legal concepts from Europe in Latin-America, and to highlight more complex ways of transition of legal forms between the two continents.
Raymond Saleilles (1855–1912) gilt als einer der größten Juristen seiner Epoche und Wegbereiter der französischen Rechtswissenschaft in ein neues Jahrhundert. Auch außerhalb Frankreichs hat sein vielschichtiges Werk in letzter Zeit historische Aufmerksamkeit erfahren, unter anderem mit Schwerpunkt auf der Rechtsvergleichung (Alfons Aragoneses) oder Saleilles’ Beurteilung der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft (Birte Gast). Der Florentiner Rechtshistoriker Marco Sabbioneti hat nun eine umfassende Monographie über Privatrechtsdogmatik und politisch-religiöse Grundeinstellungen des französischen Juristen vorgelegt, dessen Werk oft schlagwortartig mit – aus deutscher Sicht – kulturhistorischen Epocheneinteilungen wie "Belle Epoque" oder "Modernismo" in Verbindung gebracht wird. ...
Die rechtsförmige Bewältigung von Leid, Ungerechtigkeit und Unrecht, die durch die kommunistischen Regime der DDR, Osteuropas und der UdSSR verursacht wurden, ist Gegenstand zahlreicher rechts- und geschichtswissenschaftlicher Studien. Untersucht werden die Aufarbeitung des Unrechts durch Strafrecht und die Regelung von Restitution sowie Entschädigung im Fall von Enteignungen. Oft wird – auch infolge der Spezialisierung der jeweiligen Wissenschaftler – das Genre des Länderberichts gewählt. Untersuchungen, die in vergleichender Absicht auch die Aufarbeitung nationalsozialistischen Unrechts einbeziehen, gehen von einer Vergleichbarkeit aus, ohne dass darüber ein neuer Historikerstreit entbrannt wäre. ...
No se puede reducir sólo a un fenómeno religioso el hecho histórico de la existencia del Cristianismo. Ya como judíos marginales en el siglo I o como habitantes del Imperio Romano, con una obediencia debida pero limitada a las autoridades seculares, los cristianos fueron constituyéndose en un grupo difícil de integrar bajo una perspectiva únicamente religiosa. Entre los miembros de la Iglesia Católica, además de una multitud humilde y pobre, no faltarán nobles, filósofos, juristas, científicos, reyes, emperadores, cuyas actividades marcarán a propios y ajenos por el carácter dogmático de una creencia religiosa cuyas aristas van mucho más allá de la práctica privada. Los acontecimientos históricos, que aquí sobraría desarrollar, llevaron al desarrollo y constitución de la Santa Sede, «institución», o más tarde, «persona jurídica pública», por nombrar sólo algunas formas de caracterizarla. La autoridad religiosa y moral, incluso civil, del Romano Pontífice, y por lo tanto, extensiva jurídicamente a la Santa Sede, influyó decididamente, en forma positiva o negativa, en la cultura occidental aun cuando en sus efectos no se hubiese deseado de esa manera. Como Obispo de Roma, sucesor del Apóstol Pedro, es cabeza de la Iglesia Católica, y gobernará la conciencia y actuar de millares durante ya casi dos milenios. ...
"Selbstverwaltung" war das Thema der Hofgeismarer Tagung der Vereinigung für Verfassungsgeschichte 2008. So interessant die einzelnen Referate auch waren, ihre unterschiedlichen Zugriffe und inhaltlichen Ausrichtungen gebieten es doch, nicht die einzelnen Aufsätze des Tagungsbandes zu referieren, sondern den Versuch zu unternehmen, aus der Vielfalt der Beiträge strukturierende Überlegungen herauszuarbeiten. Daher sei nur kurz auf die Themen der einzelnen Referate verwiesen. Gerhard Dilcher sprach über die mittelalterliche Stadt, Ludwig Elle über die Selbstverwaltung(sbestrebungen) der Sorben; Matthias Asche trug zur Autonomie der Hugenotten und Waldenser vor und J. Friedrich Battenberg zu der der jüdischen Gemeinden und Landjudenschaften im Heiligen Römischen Reich. Christoph Schönberger befasste sich mit französischen Parlamenten (vor der Revolution), Jörg-Detlef Kühne mit den Selbstverwaltungsvorstellung von Steins. Hans-Christof Kraus referierte zur englischen Selbstverwaltung und deren deutscher Rezeption, Thomas Simon behandelte die Föderalisierung Österreichs. Und schließlich trug Dieter Kugelmann zum Stellenwert des Selbstverwaltungsgedankens in der europäischen Kooperation und Integration vor. – Die folgenden Ausführungen beschränken sich darauf, diejenigen Aussagen herauszustellen, die sich in grundsätzlicher Weise zu Selbstverwaltungsverständnissen (1), zu den Realisierungsformen von Selbstverwaltung (2), zu den Ursachen von Selbstverwaltung (3) und zu Konzeptualisierungen von Selbstverwaltung (4) äußern. ...
Spätestens seit den 1980er Jahren ist Partizipation ein mächtiges Schlagwort. In neuerer Zeit kann man damit sogar Wahlen gewinnen. Wo herkömmliche Legitimationsmodi der repräsentativen Demokratie an Kraft verlieren oder zu verlieren scheinen, sucht man nach Ersatz. Das Prinzip der Legitimation durch allgemeine Wahl der Vertretungskörperschaften funktioniert da nicht, wo es solche Vertretungskörperschaften nicht gibt – bzw. diese, wie in der EU, auf weiten Gebieten nicht über die Entscheidungsprärogative verfügen – oder sie als verkrustet angesehen werden und/oder dort, wo die Mobilisierung des Bürgers zwischen den Wahlterminen nötig erscheint. Bürgerschaftliche Partizipation hat einen ambivalenten Charakter. Sie kann Belebung oder Gefährdung von Demokratie sein, wobei dies auch vom jeweils zugrundegelegten Demokratieverständnis abhängt. ...
Um die verworrene Lage im Regelungsdickicht aus Urheberrecht, Nutzungsbedingungen und Kopierschutz bei digitalen Downloads ging es bei iRights.info gerade ausführlich am Beispiel von Musik sowie Filmen und E-Books. In einer neuen Urheberrechts-Debattenreihe bei Süddeutsche.de hat sich heute CDU-Netzpolitiker Peter Tauber für ein Recht auf Privatkopie bei gekauften Downloads ausgesprochen ...
Seit dem 17. Jahrhundert gibt es historische Reflexionen darüber, wie und warum das antike römische Recht, geformt durch Lehre und Praxis des mittelalterlichen Italiens nördlich der Alpen, "rezipiert" worden sei. Ebenso diskutierte man seit dem 19. Jahrhundert über das Lübecker Stadtrecht im Rahmen der Hanse sowie die Ausbreitung des Magdeburger Rechts auf Städte im slawischen Osten. Die heutige Rechtsgeschichte sucht nach neuen Modellen und Terminologien, um den Transfer von Gesetzbüchern, Rechtsprinzipien, Institutionen, Rechtssprache oder kulturellem Habitus von Rechtsanwendern angemessener zu erfassen. Berichtet wird hier über ein Südosteuropaprojekt (1850 bis 1933) mit Blick auf den Transfer normativer Ordnungen (Verfassungsrecht, Zivilrecht, Strafrecht) in ehemaligen Provinzen des Osmanischen Reichs, die nun zu jungen Nationalstaaten wurden, etwa Griechenland, Rumänien, Bulgarien, Serbien, Montenegro und Albanien.
Die Wissenschaftsgeschichte des öffentlichen Rechts, ein noch schwaches Pflänzchen im Garten der Rechtsgeschichte, kann erfreuliche Zuwächse verzeichnen, und zwar aus der Schweiz. Zum einen sind in Band 130 (2011) der Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht zwei große, fast Buchformat erreichende Aufsätze erschienen, von Anne-Christine Favre, Cent ans de droit administratif: de la gestion des biens de police à celle des risques environnementeaux, 227–330 sowie von Benjamin Schindler, 100 Jahre Verwaltungsrecht in der Schweiz, S. 331–437. Zum anderen gibt es das hier zu würdigende Werk von Andreas Kley, der in Zürich Öffentliches Recht, Verfassungsgeschichte sowie Staats- und Rechtsphilosophie lehrt. Nimmt man diese drei Arbeiten zusammen und fügt noch die Verfassungsgeschichte der Schweiz des unvergessenen Alfred Kölz (1944–2003) hinzu, dann kann geradezu von einem Quantensprung gesprochen werden. ...
Fragen nach der Schrift und ihrem Gebrauch zählen zu den "Dauerbrennern" der mediävistischen Forschung: Mehrere Sonderforschungsbereiche widmeten und widmen sich dem Thema, auch wenn sie den Zugang aus unterschiedlichen Richtungen suchen. In der Vielzahl der hier produzierten Studien positioniert sich der anzuzeigende Band durch den Fokus auf Phänomene des Rechts, sowie vor allem durch den im Titel stehenden Begriff der "Performanz". Fasst man letzteren als Verweis auf den handlungsbezogenen Charakter des Agierens – hier also bei rechtsbezogenen Praktiken –, so ist eine wertvolle Ergänzung zu den etablierten Forschungen über "rituelles Handeln" zu erhoffen. Schon M. Mosterts Einleitung (S. 1–10) relativiert allerdings allzu überzogene Erwartungen: Zwar problematisiert der Autor nicht nur die Begriffe "legal" und "law", deren reflektierte Anwendung auf vormoderne Verhältnisse er fordert, sondern auch jenen der "performance". Die Differenz zum Ritualbegriff markieren aber lediglich knappe Verweise auf die "performativen Sprechakte" nach Austin und auf den "Spielcharakter" (im Sinne Huizingas) rechtlichen Handelns in der Vormoderne (S. 6–9). ...
Die "Jedermann-Lizenzen" von Creative Commons (CC) geben Menschen die Möglichkeit, ihre kreativen Werke unter bestimmten Bedingungen zur Nutzung freizugeben. Weil Urheber unterschiedliche Motive und Interessen haben, gibt es sechs verschiedene Lizenzvarianten. Die beliebteste ist die Einschränkung, dass Werke nur nicht-kommerziell verwendet werden können. Das hat aber weitreichende Folgen für die Verbreitung der Inhalte. Gleichzeitig erreichen viele Creative-Commons-Nutzer dadurch gar nicht die gewünschten Ziele. Diese Broschüre informiert über Folgen, Risiken und Nebenwirkungen einer Beschränkung der CC-Lizenz auf nicht-kommerzielle Nutzung.
Jacob Taubes (1923-1987) und Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) zählen zu den umstrittenen, aber auch faszinierenden intellektuellen Figuren der Bundesrepublik: hier der jüdische Denker und Religionsphilosoph, ausgewiesener Kenner der apokalyptischen Strömungen in Judentum, Christentum, Gnosis samt ihren Folgen, die - nicht nur im christlichen Sinn - Filiationen innerhalb der Antike und ihres Nachlebens darstellen, dort der katholische Autor und Staatsrechtler, bekannt als Wortführer politischer Theologie, berüchtigt für seinen "aufhaltsamen Aufstieg zum 'Kronjuristen'" (Mehring) des Nationalsozialismus - ein Umstand, der sein Werk bis heute tief verschattet. Taubes und Schmitt haben polarisiert und tun es immer noch. Zu Lebzeiten provozierten sie durch ein Verhalten, das vielen als gemein, willkürlich, oft auch irritierend erschien, weil es übliche akademische Kabalen und Winkelzüge auf brüske Weise überschritt. Auch ergriffen sie rücksichtslos Partei, selbst bis zur fast völligen Isolierung: etwa wenn sich Schmitt 1933 als einziger aus der Kölner Juridischen Fakultät weigerte, für den Kollegen Hans Kelsen zu sprechen, als dieser von den Nationalsozialisten entlassen worden war (vgl. Rüthers), etwa wenn Taubes sich in erbitterte, persönliche Verletzungen bereitwillig in Kauf nehmende, akademische Kämpfe verstrickte, die er Ende der 1970er Jahre am notorischen Fachbereich 11 der Freien Universität Berlin [im Folgenden: FU] gegen nahezu alle führte. Doch verstanden es beide auch, geistig anzuziehen und intellektuell anzuregen, wenn sie Debatten begannen oder in sie eingriff en und Ideen aufnahmen, eben eine akademische Kardinaltugend aufs Beste beherrschten: das Verknüpfen von Wissen zwischen den Fächern, um persönliche oder sachliche Verbindungen für neue Fragen produktiv zu machen. Gerade durch die Missachtung gesetzter Grenzen ihrer jeweiligen Disziplin vermochten sie zu einer reicheren Erkenntnis vorzudringen. Darin sind sie Pioniere: Schmitt am Schnittpunkt von staatlichem Recht und christlicher Religion, Taubes in den Konstellationen jüdisch-christlicher Debatten jenseits aller konfessionell betriebenen Bemühungen um Dialog und Versöhnung. Weil ihr Einsatz als Denker - ungeachtet von Eskapaden und Eklats - ein geistig-existentieller war, wirken ihre Impulse weiter, in den letzten Jahren sogar zunehmend, davon zeugen die amerikanischen Übersetzungen, die viele ihrer Schriften und Texte erfahren haben, davon zeugt das Interesse, das sie gerade bei Jüngeren in Europa, Israel und den USA finden, die Philosophie, Jüdische Studien, Kultur-, Literatur-, Religionswissenschaft betreiben.
The European Union is currently challenged by right-wing populism and economic stress. To understand the nature of these challenges, we need to take an interdisciplinary approach in which empirical studies of politics are combined with studies of the normative implications of European policy-making. To this end, I draw attention to the right to free movement, which is pivotal both for European politics and liberal political philosophy. I show that even though transnational rights, such as the free movement for people, products and money, are normatively sound and desirable, enhancement of free movement may challenge the heterogeneity among the national models of rights and societal commitments. The risk is that the national institutions as a political arena face difficulties in coping with current political challenges such as right-wing radicalism, social inequality, environmental regulation, immigration and financial insecurity. On the other hand, I argue that we should be aware that the transnational rights might in some countries enhance human rights, which national parliaments have not been able to accommodate.
The paper examines obligations towards bearers of the right to asylum in circumstances of partial compliance. Who should bear the burdens when a state responsible for assisting bearers of the right to asylum fails to comply with the requirements of justice and unjustly defaults on its responsibilities? Are the complying states obligated to ‘take up the slack’ and assist the bearers of the right to asylum, or are they obligated to bear only their ‘fair share’ of burdens in the global protection of the right to asylum? The paper argues that the complying states with the capacity to assist can have an obligation of justice to assist bearers of the right to asylum when other states unjustly default on their responsibilities.
As recent newspaper headlines show the topic of patents/patent laws is still heavily disputed. In this paper I will approach this topic from a theoretical-historical and history of economic thought-perspective. In this regard I will link the patent controversy of the nineteenth century with Walter Eucken’s Ordoliberalism – a German version of neoliberalism. My paper is structured as follows: The second chapter provides the reader with a historical introduction. At the heart of this paragraph are the controversy and discourse on patent laws in nineteenth century Europe as well as the pro and contra arguments presented by the anti-patent/free-trade movement respectively by the advocates of patent protection. The focus of my paper is on the struggle for the protection of inventions and innovations in nineteenth century Germany, since Walter Eucken, main representative of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics, picks up the counter-arguments presented in the national debate and in particular by the Kongress deutscher Volkswirthe. The third chapter deals intensively with the question whether patent laws are just ‘nonsense upon stilts’ from an ordoliberal perspective. Here, Eucken’s arguments against the current patent system are elaborated in great detail. The paper ends with a summary of my main findings.
O presente artigo tem como objetivo a realização de uma aproximação entre a Teoria do Reconhecimento de Axel Honneth, representante da Escola de Frankfurt, com a teoria do Bem Jurídico penal. Acredita-se que, desse modo, possa ser feito contributo para melhor elucidar as aporias do conceito de bem jurídico penal. Portanto, pretende-se explicitar que a Teoria do Reconhecimento oferece um arcabouço teórico que permite o desenvolvimento e fundamentação de um Direito Penal voltado à proteção de bens jurídicos, no contexto de um Estado Democrático do Direito, que, ao mesmo tempo, não ignora e, pelo contrário, permite a compreensão da lógica moral dos conflitos sociais.
Fazit
1. Aufgrund der Regelungen über Produktinterventionen nach Artt. 31, 32 MiFIR-E könnte den mitgliedstaatlichen Behörden und – subsidiär – ESMA künftig ein scharfes Schwert zur Abwehr von Gefahren für den Anlegerschutz, die Finanzmärkte und die Finanzstabilität im Rahmen der Wertpapieraufsicht zur Verfügung stehen. Da die Eingriffsvoraussetzungen vage formuliert und noch durch delegierte Rechtsakte der Kommission zu konkretisieren sind, lässt sich die künftige Bedeutung dieser Aufsichtsbefugnisse zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt noch nicht abschließend einschätzen. Insbesondere ist unklar, welche Anforderungen an eine zu Eingriffen berechtigende Gefahr für den Anlegerschutz zu stellen sind.
2. Der Vorstand eines als Aktiengesellschaft verfassten Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmens muss seine Entscheidungen künftig auch daran ausrichten, dass weder die von der Gesellschaft entwickelten und vertriebenen Finanzinstrumente noch ihre Finanztätigkeiten oder Finanzpraktiken eine Gefahr für den Anlegerschutz, die Integrität und das Funktionieren der Finanzmärkte oder die Stabilität des Finanzsystems darstellen, die Anlass für eine Intervention sein könnte.
3. Ist die Gesellschaft Adressat eines auf der Grundlage von Artt. 31, 32 MiFIR-E erlassenen Verbots oder einer Beschränkung, muss der Vorstand die Entscheidung über das Einlegen von Rechtsmitteln nach den allgemeinen aktienrechtlichen Grundsätzen an der Förderlichkeit für das Unternehmensinteresse ausrichten.
4. Schließlich wird sich künftig die Frage nach der Haftung der Gesellschaft gegenüber den Anlegern stellen, wenn Finanzinstrumente entgegen einem im Interesse des Anlegerschutzes ergangenen Verbot vertrieben werden. Sofern der Gesetzgeber keine abweichende Entscheidung trifft, ist anzunehmen, dass die abgeschlossenen Verträge nicht nach § 134 BGB nichtig, sondern allenfalls anfechtbar sind. Darüber hinaus können vertragliche oder deliktische Schadensersatzansprüche der Anleger bestehen.
In seiner Entscheidung in Sachen Fresenius - Der Konzern 2012, 420 - hat der Bundesgerichtshof entschieden, der Vorstand einer Aktiengesellschaft handele pflichtwidrig, wenn er einem Aufsichtsratsmitglied die vereinbarte Vergütung für Beratungsleistungen zahle, noch bevor der Aufsichtsrat dem Vertrag zugestimmt habe. In diesem Zusammenhang hat er die bereits zuvor herrschende Lehre bestätigt, der zufolge § 114 AktG auch Beratungsverträge zwischen einem Aufsichtsratsmitglied und einem von der Aktiengesellschaft abhängigen Unternehmen erfasst. Schließlich hat der Bundesgerichtshof seine Rechtsprechung konkretisiert, nach der § 114 AktG auch dann Anwendung findet, wenn die Beratungsleistung nicht von einem Aufsichtsratsmitglied, sondern von einer Gesellschaft erbracht wird, an der das Aufsichtsratsmitglied beteiligt ist, sofern es nur in nicht unerheblichem Umfang an der Vergütung partizipiert. Der vorliegende Beitrag nimmt kritisch zu allen vorgenannten Aspekten des Fresenius-Urteils Stellung.
Eine wesentliche Voraussetzung für die Entschlüsselung herrschender Justizverständnisse ist die Auseinandersetzung mit den Rollen, die die beteiligten Akteure in einem Rechtssystem einnehmen sowie die Untersuchung der rechtlichen und institutionellen Bedingungen unter denen diese Akteure handeln. Der vorliegende Beitrag beschäftigt sich zunächst mit der Macht- und Aufgabenverteilung zwischen Richtern und Parteien. Dabei wird deutlich, dass die Rollenallokation nicht einheitlich ist, sondern in Abhängigkeit von unterschiedlichen verfahrensrechtlichen und institutionellen Voraussetzungen variiert. In Verfahren vor einer Jury wird die richterliche Autorität durch eine maximal ausgeprägte Parteiautonomie stark eingeschränkt. Als Rechthonoratioren (im Weberschen Sinne) agieren Richter dagegen immer dann, wenn Sie ohne Geschworene Recht sprechen. Dies geschieht insbesondere in den einzelstaatlichen Obergerichten und den Bundesberufungsgereichten, aber auch in Verfahren erster Instanz, in denen „claims in equity“ zu entscheiden sind. Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich abschließend mit dem Einfluss, den die Besonderheiten der amerikanischen Juristenausbildung auf das amerikanische Justizverständnis ausüben: Sie prägen und reproduzieren eine der Rollen und Selbstbilder unter amerikanischen Juristen, sowohl in der Anwaltschaft als auch auf Seiten der Richter.
Der vorliegende Beitrag leitete das Programm des Workshops „Schlichten und Richten – Differenzierung und Hybridisierung” (Frankfurt/Main, 9./10. Februar 2012) ein. Mit diesem Workshop begann das Arbeitsprogramm des LOEWE–Schwerpunkts „Außergerichtliche und gerichtliche Konfliktlösung“, der am 1. Januar 2012 seine Tätigkeit aufgenommen hatte (siehe hierzu www.konfliktloesung.eu; eine leicht veränderte Fassung des Beitrags in englischer Sprache wird in Kürze abrufbar sein unter: http://www.ssrn.com/link/Max-Planck-Legal-History-RES.html ). Der Ausgangspunkt des Workshops ist eine deutsche Debattentradition, die die Alternativität von gerichtlichen und nichtgerichtlichen, kontradiktorischen oder konsensualen sowie mehr formalisierten und mehr informalisierten Konfliktlösungsformen unter dem Schlagwort „Schlichten oder Richten“ (auch „Schlichten statt Richten“ oder „Schlichten oder Richten“) thematisierte.
Der Beitrag problematisiert zunächst die bisherige mangelnde rechtshistorische Aufmerksamkeit, die Alternativen zur gerichtlichen Konfliktlösung zugewandt wurde. Er weist daraufhin, dass auch die heutige Diskussion über gelungenes Konfliktlösungsmanagement oft explizit oder implizit von – zuweilen nicht ausreichend reflektierten – historischen Vorannahmen geprägt ist und – damit verbunden – von Vorstellungen über rechtskulturelle Fremdheit und Nähe.
Im zweiten und dritten Abschnitt skizziert der Beitrag kurz den historischen Gang der deutschen Diskussion über „Schlichten und Richten“ seit dem Aufkommen auch rechtswissenschaftlich anerkannter Schlichtungsinstitutionen zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts. Er versucht, deren wechselnde zeitgenössische Kontexte sichtbar zu machen und zeigt, wie sich in diesen Diskussionen (zuweilen utopisch scheinende) rechtspolitische Verheißungen ansiedeln konnten, welch fruchtbaren Boden diese Diskussionen aber auch für neue Kategorienbildungen und multidisziplinäre Zugänge bot.
Im vierten Abschnitt wird versucht, Verknüpfungen mit der gegenwärtigen ADR-Diskussionen herzustellen, während im fünften Abschnitt in analytischer Absicht Konfigurationen des Wortpaars „Schlichten“ und „Richten“ vorgestellt werden: „Schlichten“ und „Richten“ als Alternative, als Abhängigkeitsverhältnis und als Abfolge. Der fünfte Abschnitt schließlich fragt nach Funktionselementen und den Funktionsbedingungen von Schlichten und Richten, d.h.: Welche Leitrationalitäten, Partizipationsmechanismen, Legitimationsnarrative und Reflexionsformen lassen sich jeweils der einen oder anderen Form der Konfliktlösung zuordnen.
All diese Überlegungen sind eher tentativer Art und vermitteln nur erste umrisshafte Vorstellungen. Sie dienen in erster Linie dem Diskussionsanstoß und sollen erste Schneisen in dieses komplexe Forschungsfeld schlagen. Die Vortragsform ist beibehalten und der Fußnotenapparat ist auf das nötige Minimum reduziert.
O artigo investiga a formação, a carreira e os trabalhos de Max Weber como jurista, assim como delineia as linhas gerais do impacto e das influências de sua formação jurídica na sua obra em geral. Especial atenção merece sua tese de doutorado sobre as sociedades comerciais na Idade Média, que é apresentada em sua problematização geral e em suas principais ideias. Com isso, procura-se indicar como os problemas tratados por Weber em sua tese de doutorado - sua principal obra jurídica - antecipam temas e problemas que serão desenvolvidos na obra posterior de modo ampliado e aprofundado.
Law making becomes an increasingly important function of the higher courts in civil law matters. This observation leads to the question of whether the law making function is nevertheless carried out in a “classical” legal-principled way or whether the courts increasingly employ a political-formative style. To answer this question, one should not only focus on the content of the courts’ reasoning but also on their procedural-institutional framework. From that perspective, the processing of so-called legislative facts is a key issue in determining the role of courts between legal reasoning and social engineering. The paper shows that Germany, England and the United States pursue different lines in processing legislative facts. Notwithstanding these differences, it seems to be the case that the increasing importance of law making will also change the institutional framework of appellate courts towards a quasi-legislative forum.
Power and law in enlightened absolutism : Carl Gottlieb Svarez' theoretical and practical approach
(2012)
The term Enlightened Absolutism reflects a certain tension between its two components. This tension is in a way a continuation of the dichotomy between power on one hand and law on the other. The present paper shall provide an analysis of these two concepts from the perspective of Carl Gottlieb Svarez, who, in his position as a high-ranking Prussian civil servant and legal reformist, has had unparalleled influence on the legislative history of the
Prussian states towards the end of the 18th century. Working side-by-side with Johann Heinrich Casimir von Carmer, who held the post of Prussian minister of justice from 1779 to 1798, Svarez was able to make use of his talent for reforming and legislating. From 1780 to 1794 he was primarily responsible for the elaboration of the codification of the Prussian private law – the “Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten” in 1794. In the present paper, Svarez’ approach to the relation between law and power shall be analysed on two different levels. Firstly, on a theoretical level, the reformist’s thoughts and reflections as laid down in his numerous works, papers and memorandums, shall be discussed. Secondly, on a practical level, the question of the extent to which he implemented his ideas in Prussian legal reality shall be explored.
Mit der Europäischen Rechtsgeschichte verfügt die Rechtsgeschichte seit vielen Jahrzehnten über eine Tradition transnationaler rechtshistorischer Forschung. Sie wurde von deutschsprachigen Wissenschaftlern der Vor- und Nachkriegszeit geprägt – Emil Seckel, Paul Koschaker, Franz Wieacker, Helmut Coing – und stand im Kontext des westeuropäischen Nachkriegsprojekts. Noch heute bauen wir auf ihren großen Leistungen auf. Sie war, wie alle Geschichtswissenschaft, Teil eines Prozesses der gesellschaftlichen Selbstverständigung über die eigene Identität und zeichnete das Bild einer distinkten europäischen Rechtskultur.
In den letzten Jahren sind im Zuge der Diskussion um postkoloniale Perspektiven auf die Geschichte, um Transnationale und Globalgeschichte, viele Grundlagen der traditionellen Europahistoriographie kritisiert und massiv erschüttert worden. Das wirft Fragen auch an die Europäische Rechtsgeschichte auf: Welches Europabild liegt ihr zu Grunde? Auf welchen intellektuellen und konzeptionellen Grundlagen beruht sie? Wie antwortet sie auf die Vorwürfe des Eurozentrismus, des epistemischen Kolonialismus, wie auf die Forderung, Europa zu ‘provinzialisieren’? Wie definiert sie das Verhältnis der Europäischen zur Transnationalen und Globalen Rechtsgeschichte? - Diesen und ähnlichen Fragen wenden sich die folgenden Überlegungen zu. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf einer Auseinandersetzung mit der Tradition, ihren konzeptionellen Grundlagen und deren wissenschaftshistorischem Kontext (1. Teil, 1.-6.). Aus dieser kritischen Bestandsaufnahme und den Ergebnissen der Debatte um Globalgeschichte ergeben sich Ausgangspunkte und Aufgaben einer in vielem auf den Leistungen der Disziplin aufbauenden, doch notwendigerweise auf einer anderen Konzeption beruhenden Rechtsgeschichte Europas in globalhistorischer Perspektive (2. Teil, 7.-11.).
Das Gesetz zur Änderung des Vormundschafts- und Betreuungsrechts ist am 14. April 2011 vom Deutschen Bundestag beschlossen worden; der Bundesrat hat am 25.05.2011 zugestimmt. Dieses Gesetz trat – mit einigen Ausnahmen, die erst ein Jahr nach der Verkündung des Gesetzes in Kraft treten – am 6.7.2011 in Kraft. Der Schwerpunkt dieses Beitrags soll nicht bei den durch diese Reform bereits erfolgten bzw. demnächst in Kraft tretenden Änderungen und den sich bereits abzeichnenden Schwierigkeiten seiner Umsetzung liegen, vielmehr soll es um die Ziele und Grundsätze einer noch weitergehenden Reform (zweite Stufe) gehen, die die Rechtspolitik im Rahmen der Verabschiedung dieses Gesetzes für erforderlich gehalten und bereits in Aussicht gestellt hat (zweite Stufe). Dennoch sollen zunächst die Essentials dieses ersten wichtigen und richtigen Reformschritts nochmals in Stichworten am Anfang dieses Beitrags stehen. Dieses Gesetz wurde auch schon als "Amtsvormundschaftsverbesserungsgesetz" und als Minimalkompromiss apostrophiert, was angesichts der Fokussierung dieses ersten Reformschrittes nicht überrascht.
Der vorliegende Band enthält die Referate des 2. Familienrechtlichen Forums
Göttingen vom 2. Juli 2011, welches aktuelle Problemstellungen des Kindschaftsrechts
zum Gegenstand hatte. Vor dem Hintergrund jüngst abgeschlossener
und bevorstehender Gesetzesnovellen erörterten ausgewählte Experten
aus Wissenschaft, Politik und Praxis verschiedene Problemschwerpunkte: Zum
einen wurde die anstehende Novellierung des Sorgerechts nicht miteinander
verheirateter Eltern thematisiert und nach Lösungen für den Umgang mit dem
Umgangsboykott gesucht. Dabei eröffnete die interdisziplinäre und rechtsvergleichende
Annährung an die aufgeworfenen Probleme neue Perspektiven. Zum
anderen wurden die nur wenige Tage nach der Veranstaltung abgeschlossene
Vormundschaftsrechtsreform sowie das inzwischen ebenfalls in Kraft getretene
Bundeskinderschutzgesetz einer kritischen Würdigung unterzogen. Die Veranstaltung
endete mit einer kritischen Zwischenbilanz zum kindschaftsrechtlichen
Verfahren nach dem FamFG, das die Praxis vor zahlreiche Probleme stellt.
Although their applications have not yet extended widely due to their incipient state, nano-technologies and nano-medicines may be presumed to be at the origin of the next great technological revolution, foreseeably contributing to a new stage with respect to evolutions in mankind’s progress. Their possibilities are truly immense in enormously varied spheres, but the risks and uncertainties they engender are enormous too. Because access and use of the unceasingly increasing mega-quantity of information they generate will place further strain on the protection of personal life, privacy, the exercise of freedom, as well as the safeguarding of other fundamental principles and rights.
The requalification of Habermas’ discussions on political philosophy and legal theory after the publication of Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion (2005), and his most recent texts and debates on religion and the public sphere, suggest a revision of the Habermasian theory of rationalization as it was firstly presented in Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (1982), especially on what concerns the processes of dessacralization and the linguistification of religious authority. In search of contributing to this revision, this paper intends to focus on the problem of a supposedly “lost” aesthetic-expressive understanding of religious authority in Habermas’s theory of rationalization, which may have contributed to a theory of law in Faktizität und Geltung (1992) that does not give satisfactory account to the aesthetical-expressive character of the modern understanding of legal authority. A better understanding of this special character, however, may contribute not only to the avoidance of fundamentalisms and new attempts of “aesthetization of politics”, but also to a rational strengthening of the solidarity of the citizens of democratic constitutional states.
This paper aims to discuss in which sense public hearings in supreme courts of democratic rules of law can be seen as proceduralization of popular sovereignty policies. These policies constitute expressions of a normative claim for a wider “publicization of law” by democratic states’ institutional powers and organs; a claim that becomes evident when one undertakes an intersubjective interpretation of law. This theoretical argument will be presented in the first section of the paper through a new articulation of Jürgen Habermas’ discursive theory of law and his most recent studies on the concept of political public sphere. The theoretical section gives normative and procedural criteria for the second section of the paper, which consists on a critical analysis of the procedures and practical cases of public hearings held at the Brazilian Supreme Court, constituting the first scientific study to date on the Court’s use of this legal instrument.
Since the XIX century, a pleiad of philosophers and historians support the idea that Greek philosophy, usually reported to have started with the presocratics, lays its basis in a previous moment: the Greek myths – systematized by Homer and Hesiod – and the Greek arts, in particular the lyric and tragedy literature. According to this, it is important to retrieve philosophical elements even before the pre-Socratics to understand the genesis of specific concepts in Philosophy of Law. Besides, assuming that the Western’s core values are inherited from Ancient Greece, it is essential to recuperate the basis of our own justice idea, through the Greek myths and tragedy literature. As a case study, this paper aims on the comparison of two key-works, each one representing a phase of the Greek tragedy: The Orestea, by Aeschylus, and Orestes, by Euripides. Both contain the same story, telling how the Greeks understood the necessity of solving their conflicts not by blood revenge, but through a political way, and also the political drama. Although, in Aeschylus’s one, men still leashed by their fate, while the gods play a major role, in order to punish human pride (hybris). In a different way, on Euripides’s work men face their own loneliness, in a world fulfilled with gods, each one demanding divergent actions. That represents a necessary moment to the flourishing freedom and human subjectivity, and, once the exterior divinity is unable to resolve human problems, men will need to discover their interior divinity: that is how the Philosophy emerges.
Dworkin`s political theory is characterized by the interpretative integrity of morality, law, and politics, the so-called “hedgehog’s approach”. The interpretative integrity approach functions on multiple levels. Firstly, philosophical foundations of his theory of justice are linked to his conception of just liberal society and state. Secondly, from the perspective of political morality, interpretative concepts of law and morality are internally connected, in addition to interpretative concepts of equality, liberty, and democracy. Thirdly, from the perspective of philosophical foundations, individual ethics, personal morality and political morality are mutually connected. The aforementioned ethical and moral foundations are also related – in a wider sense of philosophical foundations - with his gnoseological conception regarding value concepts in law, politics and morality, and with his episthemological conception regarding an objective truth in the field of values, in a sense that the value concepts are interpretative and can be objectively true when articulated in accordance with methodological rules and standards of a »reflexive equilibrium« and an interpretative integrity, and in accordance with the so-called internal scepticism in the context of value pluralism.
The term “ethics” in a “narrower” sense refers to individual ethics, the study of how to live well, while the “ethics” in a “broader” sense refers to personal morality, the study of how we must treat other people. The term “morality” however, is used primarily to denote a political morality, the issue of how a sovereign power should treat its citizens.
Philosophical foundations of Dworkin`s political theory of justice, his conception of two cardinal values of humanity, his concievement of individual ethics, personal morality and political morality will be in the focus of consideration.
Agamben has claimed to work inside the tradition inaugurated by the archaeological method of Michel Foucault but not to fully coincide with it. “My method is archaeological and paradigmatic in a sense which is very close to that of Foucault, but not completely coincident with it. The question is, facing the dichotomies that structuralize our culture, to go beyond the exceptions that have been producing the former, however, not to find a chronologically originary state, but to be able to understand the situation in which we are. Archaeology is, in this sense, the only way to access present” (interview to Flavia Costa, trad. Susana Scramim, in Revista do Departamento de Psicologia – Universidade Federal Fluminense, Niterói, v. 18 - n. 1, 131-136, Jan./Jun. 2006, 132, translated by the author). However, the aspects in which Agamben follows Foucault's method and the ones he does not were never very clear. This situation seems to change with the edition of Agamben's most extensive and explicit texts on method, Signatura Rerum. Sul Metodo (2008, italian edition). The goal of this article is to identify the points of intersection between their methods and some points in which they differ.
John Gray is the thinker who has reconstructed the main tenets of ethical pluralism inherent in the work of its initiator - Isaiah Berlin - and pointed to its consequences for political philosophy. In particular he singled out three levels of conflict in ethics identifiable in Berlin’s writings: among the ultimate values belonging to the same morality or code of conduct, among whole ways or styles of life and within goods or values which are themselves internally complex and inherently pluralistic.
It is the third, internal kind of conflict that proves to be the richest in implications.Because it undermines a whole constellation of contemporary liberal doctrines informed by the Kantian-Lockean tradition that conform to the legal paradigm. From the pluralist perspective such monumental theories (e.g. those of Rawls or Dworkin) are no longer sustainable due to the recognition that no ultimate value is immune to the phenomenon of incommensurability. Thus, irresolvable conflicts may also break out within the given regulative value.
Confronting ethical pluralism with general reflection on law has mostly negative consequences. Nevertheless, the incommensurability thesis sheds considerable light on certain legal disputes. This claim will be illustrated by interpreting from the pluralist perspective the controversy over the verdict by the European Tribunal of Human Rights of 3 November 2010 concerning hanging crosses in classrooms.
Brazil has one of the worst distributions of income in the world. The wealth of the richest 1% of the population is equal to that of the poorest 50%. Brazil has a greater concentration of wealth than ninety-five percent of the countries on which data is available. In the legal field, tax justice is based on the constitutional principle of the “ability to pay”, according to which taxes should be paid based on the economic capacity of the taxpayer. This principle first appeared in the Brazilian legal order in the 1946 Constitution, was excluded from the texts of 1967/69, and reappeared in § 1 of article 145 of the 1988 Constitution. The aim of this paper is to examine two possible grounds for the ability to pay principle (equal sacrifices and proportional sacrifices) to show how, in Brazil, the interpretations that seek to assign a positive content to the principle are limited to the horizons of a particular form of State associated with the theory of equal sacrifice. This theory for its turn is consistent with a theory of justice, under which no expense or charge levied by the government can alter the distribution of welfare produced by the market. As the application of the ability to pay principle is done within the limits of that horizon, as a consequence, this principle does not play an important role in the issue of reduction of inequality in Brazil.
In their book Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress offer an account of bioethics, called “Principlism”, by way of specifying and balancing four clusters of principles.2 These principles are found, as the author state, in a common morality, understood as a set of universally shared moral beliefs.
This paper seeks to introduce the following questions: Does this account of Beauchamp and Childress flow from common morality in a natural way? Can their proposals claim to be endorsed by the authority of common morality? If not, in what way does Principlism contribute to bioethics?
This paper is aimed to re-elaborate questions and discuss them rather than presenting answers. It starts with the dialog concerning specific contributions of philosophy of language to Law, followed by the re-elaboration of some yet unanswered problems, as well as the discussion of possible paths for this issue.
Since de advent of what is known as new constitucionalism, jurists have faced a difficult task in order to overcome some failures of normative positivism. In this context, the judiciary has played a renewed role, which can be justified on grounds of legal theory and on institutional reasons. However, this new role has led legal philosophers to several concerns, such as the relationship between law and ethics. On one hand, Critical Legal Studies points out that the judge always acts informed by his own convictions. On the other hand, according to R. Forst (within another context, but also relevant here), this is not really a problem, because a rule can be provided with ethics, but not ethically justified. This openness of law to moral makes it difficult for the interpretative judicial discourse to be taken as claimed by K. Günther: as a discourse of application only, and not of justification. All these controversies, however, lead to a common statement: the constitutional adjudication has been exercising a different activity. Some legal systems allows such activity legitimacy in some extent, like Brazilian’s, for example, which i) states a very broad adjudication, ii) provides an extensive catalog of basic rights, and iii) contains several procedural mechanisms for their protection. This empowers the adjudication to exercise what can be called a political activity. Therefore, a series of moral issues which were once exclusive to the political arena have been brought to the judiciary, such as: gay marriage, abortion, affirmative action, religious freedom, federation, separation of powers, distribution of scarce resources. In a democracy, these moral questions ought to be mainly decided through deliberation outside the judiciary, but not always this is what happens. The paper discusses these issues, showing also how the Brazilian Supreme Court has dealt - technically, or not - with this relationship between law and justice in a complex and pluralist society.
Are Kantian philosophy and its principle of respect for persons inadequate to the protection of environmental values? This paper answers this question by elucidating how Kantian ethics can take environmental values seriously. In the period that starts with the Critique of Judgment in 1790 and ends with the Metaphysics of Morals in 1797, the subject would have been approached by Kant in a different manner; although the respect that we may owe to non-human nature is still grounded in our duties to mankind, the basis for such respect stems from nature’s aesthetic properties, and the duty to preserve nature lies in our duties to ourselves. Compared to the “market paradigm”, as it is called by Gillroy (the reference is to a conception of a public policy based on a criterion of economic efficiency or utility), Kantian philosophy can offer a better explanation of the relationship between environmental policy and the theory of justice. Kantian justice defines the “just state” as the one that protects the moral capacities of its “active” citizens, as presented in the first Part of the Metaphysics of Morals. In the Kantian paradigm, the environmental risk becomes a “public” concern. That means it is not subsumed under an individual decision, based on a calculus.
The increase in the volume of litigation verified since the 1990’s, having the Brazilian society as context, made the judiciary open itself to new technologies which facilitate the access to justice, as well as to a faster resolution of the demands. However, the intense insertion of technical rationalization in the process and decision operations by the judiciary, during the last years, led to a legalization supported by presuppositions of technical-instrumental regulation. According to the goal policy established by the CNJ, the annoyance of the instrumental rationality is present “with respect to purposes”, which demands, more and more, a mere fulfillment of previously instituted goals from the law operators. The matter is to know if the implementation of new technologies to solve the growing litigation coming from the complexity of societies is enough to adjust the Law to a post-conventional platform. If the social complexity implies resources coming from new technologies, it’s not certain that such technologies, on their own, satisfactorily answer a judicial model which, seen under the eyes of the post- conventional legitimacy and regulation, is adequate to complex societies. This illustrates that a judicial model, able to deal with the social plurality, must take into account not only the rules of instrumental rationality, but also the fundamental issues of communicative rationality. This current work intends to evaluate if the applicability of the instrumental rationality in the judiciary equally allows the law to extent the useful conditions of the communicative rationality to the consensual formation of will and opinion in the Democratic State of Law.
Civil Society became an important theme in the recent discussion of political or social theory. Civil Society is playing a substantial role for the legislation process. We can find it especially in the activities of international NGO. It gives a new aspect of the relationship between state and society, and legal philosophically speaking, of validity of law. Activities of Civil Society are socially recognized and their support systems are gradually institutionalized also domestic in Japan. But Japanese NPO has its own weak point, which arises from the political structure of our society.
Scientific and technical achievements can cause deep changes in spheres of morals and law. I am going to discuss some philosophical conclusions which follow from two significant ideas of contemporary civilization. First of them is a thesis about indistinguishability of natural from artificial, and the second one is an opportunity of creation of artificial human.
The first thesis is a consequence of the principle of relativity of physical reality to conditions and a way of observation, on which both interpretations of quantum theory and Einstein’s theories of relativity are based. I show that the given principle deprives us of objective criteria to distinguish natural from artificial, freedom from necessity, freedom from violence.
Today power of technique is directed not only on the external world, but also on a person. Due to information technology, and biotechnology an opportunity of creation of artificial and controlled individual increases. So human loses many features of a person and transforms to a part of a collective super individual subject. In modern time a search of the transcendental basis of law and power leads to impersonal human and recognition of super individuality.
Traditional belief about natural rights will disappear. There is necessity of revision of such concept as right of freedom. Liberal belief about freedom as a condition of human existence is changing. Prospects of technical development make justified R. Dworkin's reflections about superiority of right of equality in comparison with right of freedom.
The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 declares Brazil as a Democratic State of Law. This formally democratic legal status has been facing difficulties when it comes to its material implementation. Brazilian legal procedures are still greatly influenced by the catholic heritage from Portugal in the times of colonization, translated in the present times into a strong moral set of dogmas that still reflects upon the legal production and interpretation in the country. Recently in Brazil, a debate brought to the Supremo Tribunal Federal, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, has evidenced the struggle between Ethics and Morality in the country’s legal scenario. The focus of the discussion was the possibility of abortion of anencephalic fetuses (in Brazil, abortion in considered a crime against life). In order to properly ground its decision, the Court invited scientists, doctors, members of feminist movements and representatives of certain religions to a public dialogue, in which both scientific-technical and purely moral-religious arguments were presented. Although these procedures encouraged and promoted a democratic and pluralistic legal debate, it seems like the crucial point of the discussion were not taken into account: the scientific character of Law. This is the object of the present manuscript: in order to ensure an intersubjective construction and application of Law, this must be perceived as an Applied Social Science and judges, lawyers, legislators and all other legal actors must proceed in a scientific way. To illustrate the theme, the specific case of abortion of anencephalic fetuses will be mentioned through the text.
The very idea of the European Convention on Human Rights is to bring the laws of contracting states into line with fundamental human rights principles. Where the Convention is not explicit, the Court should never rule restrictively so as to reduce the scope of a general right. In the case of homeschooling, the Convention sets forth the general principle that “the state shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.” It must not, therefore, allow a contracting state to eliminate a means of achieving this desired by parents—unless the state can show that the means in question is ineffective.
I will discuss issues which can be seen as taken strictly from the science fiction literature. Nonetheless, I would like to demonstrate that those issues not so far from now will have a big influence on the ethical discourse and also the law and social philosophy. The first part aims at clarifying concept of “cyborg” and “cyborgization”. I will consider only meanings coined for scientific or philosophical purposes. I will also indicate two experiments, which bring to life “the first cyborg” – term in which the head-scientist of these experiments used to describe his effects. In the second part I will show ideas of transhumanists in the context of technological achievements mentioned earlier. I will concentrate on the human enhancement idea, underling majority of transhumanist’s branches. I will try to demonstrate that it is realistic concept. In the third part I will shift my attention to some of consequences which flow from “cyborgisation” and human enhancements mentioned in prior parts. I will present two rights seen by transhumanist’s philosophers as able to become human rights in the near future. In these frames I will consider the “morphological freedom” and the “cognitive liberty”. At the end, in the fourth part I will summarize my considerations about the influence of semi-fictitious technologies. I will try to bring on an unambiguous conclusion that aforesaid issues could in the nearest future become very substantial for every area of the theory and policy of law.
In his new book, R. Dworkin advocates the unity of values thesis. He wants to circumscribe morality as a proper epistemological domain which is methodologically different from scientific inquiry. The epistemological independence of morality is supposed to be a consequence of the irreducible fact/value dichotomy. This paper sustains that unity of values thesis is methodologically correct; all moral reasoning must be a constructive interpretation of its meaning. However, that author fails to recognize that not every axiological interpretation implies moral consequences. From H. Putnam’s pragmatic realism, this paper intends to demonstrate that much of scientific inquiry relies on values interpretation, and that this kind of reasoning is morally neutral. Finally, it should be clear that epistemological choices in legal positivism – e.g. the decision on which aspects of social interaction are theoretically relevant – should not disturb the soundness of its argument nor should it be read as if it had moral implications. This paper concludes that positivist theories cannot be ruled out. Since the choice between descriptive and interpretative models requires a circular justification, legal theory is itself an activity governed by epistemic values interpretation. Likewise natural sciences, it can only be understood from an internal perspective. Accordingly, inclusive positivism holds the advantage of being more consilient than interpretivism, which is arguably parochial.
A discussion regarding the complex relationship that exists between the concepts of efficiency and justice goes a long way back and raises several relevant arguments. One of them, and it must be rejected in advance, is that justice is in the realm of public law, while efficiency in that of private law. Is it unacceptable that the balance between public and private law leads to the belief of a divided legal system; one system, one set of laws, one legal system. Legislators and judges are responsible for determining a balance and no theory can postulate that the balance will always be found with a simple cut between public and private law to distinguish when the criterion should be justice or when it should be efficiency. It is reductionist to confine the discussion to single goals of efficiency and justice, when human dignity and human rights should also be considered when one is discussing law. Moreover, a discussion limited to only the concepts of justice and efficiency, relies on a belief that the terms are mutually exclusive. Posner has said that the economic analysis of law has limits and philosophy of law plays an extremely important role in this discourse, which must be interdisciplinary. There can be no goal other than the realization of human rights and there can be no justice if not shared by all of mankind.
The author will deal with the relationship between law and technology from the viewpoint of technology security standard. One of the relationships can be found in that law has been providing a security level of technology. They have been saying that law would often follow technology. Law is too slow to adapt the changing technology through the advancement of technology. Above all, information technology has an electronic rapidity and a legislation technology has a paper one. There might be a big estrangement between law and technology. However, law must provide a security standard of technology. The standard must be based on a relative security level. The relative level would premise on the ordinary, lawful and ethical use of technology. Most technology has been opened to the public without any technology impact assessment. Technology would have some defect, which the producers have overlooked. As a result, the users might often meet with the accidents caused on the defects.
Then law should provide a technology security standard to exclude the defects from the users’ viewpoint as secure as possible. The security standard must be reflected on the architecture standard of technology. The architecture standard may be a yardstick whether the creators can evade the responsibility for the accidents.
The standard would also premise on the ordinary, lawful and ethical use of technology. The ordinary use means that the users should use normally technology within the extent of the architecture standard. The ethical use means that the users should use technology being conscious of the defects in order to avoid accidents.
The relative security level may be the sum of the architecture standard and the ethical use of technology.
In information society, legal norm communications have been never established in certain fields for a long time. That is, a few legal norms have never obeyed in the fields. Above all, legal norms which relate to data protection, information contents and information security, would often infringed. Most violation would be conducted by using information technologies. Information technologies would often be used in these infringing incidents. It can be said that these infringing incidents would have never been conducted without information technology. These infringing incidents include hacking actions, personal data abuse, personal information disclosure, unauthorized access, infringing copyrights, infringing privacy rights, and so on. A way of preventing those infringements is to raise the level of punishment against the violators. But, it will prove to be disappointing. Furthermore, it would be an ex post facto measure to the last. It would be needed to invent an ex ante measure, if it is possible. As the ex ante measure, the author proposes a fusion of law and information technology. An information technology will lead people to a lawful deed when they conduct actions in using computers and networks. They say that information technology cures information technology. After all, the fusion will aim at realizing laws, and it will contribute to recover a social justice.
Vor Kurzem hat das koreanische Höchstgericht den lebensverkürzenden Behandlungsabbruch durch die Entnahme des Beatmungsgeräts als zulässig befunden. Dafür sollen zwei Voraussetzungen erfüllt sein; 1) der Eintritt des irreversiblen Todesprozesses, 2) der ernstliche mutmaßliche Wille des Patienten. Dabei sind auch die folgenden abweichenden Meinungen vertreten. Sie gehen davon aus, dass im betreffenden Fall der nahe Todesvorgang noch nicht eingetreten ist. Darüber hinaus darf die Selbstbestimmung des Patienten nur in der negativen Weise vollzogen und keinesfalls in positiver Weise, denn dies würde den Selbstmord bedeuten. Außerdem ist der mutmaßliche Wille der Patientin von ihrem hypothetischen zu unterscheiden. Allerdings könnte der Behandlungsabbruch unabhängig vom Willen des Patienten ohne Rekurs auf die Selbstbestimmung des Patienten genehmigt werden, wenn auf die immanenten Schranken des ärztlichen Auftrags abgestellt werden. In der Sterbehilfe steht die Unverfügbarkeit des Lebens im Gegensatz zu der Selbstbestimmung des Patienten. Dabei zeigt sich aber, dass der Schutz des Lebens angesichts der Tötung im Krieg oder in der Notwehrlage nur ein relativer ist. Genauso lässt sich das Recht des Patienten nicht als das auf das eigene Leben, sondern lediglich als das auf den natürlichen Tod verstehen. Im vorliegenden Fall kommt es in rechtlicher Hinsicht auf sog. Passive Sterbehilfe an. Wenn hier der in Kürze bevorstehende Todeseintritt und die mutmaßliche Einwilligung der Patienten nicht abzulehnen ist, soll der Behandlungsabbruch rechtfertigt werden. Allerdings darf der einseitige Behandlungsabbruch nicht bewilligt werden und zwar vor allem deshalb, weil das Selbstbestimmungsrecht des Patienten vernachlässigt werden kann.
The use of most if not all technologies is accompanied by negative side effects, While we may profit from today’s technologies, it is most often future generations who bear most risks. Risk analysis therefore becomes a delicate issue, because future risks often cannot be assigned a meaningful occurance probability. This paper argues that technology assessement most often deal with uncertainty and ignorance rather than risk when we include future generations into our ethical, political or juridal thinking. This has serious implications as probabilistic decision approaches are not applicable anymore. I contend that a virtue ethical approach in which dianoetic virtues play a central role may supplement a welfare based ethics in order to overcome the difficulties in dealing with uncertainty and ignorance in technology assessement.
Der religiöse Pluralismus innerhalb der multikulturellen Gesellschaft erfordert vom Staat das Bemühen, die wechselseitige Achtung nicht nur zwischen Personen mit unterschiedlichen religiösen Glaubensüberzeugungen, sondern auch zwischen Glaubenden und Nicht-Glaubenden sicherzustellen. In diesem Kontext wird es für die vom Staat übernommene Funktion entscheidend sein, rechtzeitig zu beurteilen, ob er eine aktive und positive Rolle als eine Institution spielt, welche dafür sorgt, dass die Religionsfreiheit der Einzelnen und der Gruppen geachtet wird. Im Vorliegenden werden einige Gefahren und Bedrohungen für die Religionsfreiheit in der heutigen Gesellschaft analysiert und eine kritische Betrachtung als Antwort auf diese Krisensituation vorgelegt. Konkret werden die folgenden Punkte erörtert: 1. Der Glaube, daß die Religion nicht mit den Werten einer modernen, liberalen Gesellschaft zu vereinbaren ist. 2. Die Konfessionalisierung des Staates. 3. Der Missbrauch der staatlichen Macht, um die Präferenzen der Bürger durch absichtliche Änderungen im sozialen Kontext zu beeinflussen. 4. Die unnötigen Behinderungen und Beschränkung des Rechts auf Verweigerung aus Gewissengründen, die von einem falschen Verständnisses desselben herrühren. 5. Die Verherrlichung eines falsch verstandenen, radikalen Individualismus. 6. Ein Verständnis des Grundsatzes der Nichtdiskriminierung als ,,Gleichgültigkeit gegenüber den Unterschieden“.
Technocracy is usually opposed to democracy. Here, another perspective is taken: technocracy is countered with the rule of law. In trying to understand the contemporary dynamics of the rule of law, two main types of legal systems (in a broad sense) have to be distinguished: firstly, the legal norm, studied by the science of law; secondly, the scientific laws (which includes the legalities of the different sciences and communities). They both contain normative prescriptions. But their differ in their subjects‘ source: while legal norms are the will’s expression of the normative authority, technical prescriptions can be derived from scientific laws, which are grounded over the commonly supposed objectivity of the scientific knowledge about reality. They both impose sanctions too, but in the legal norm they refer to what is established by the norm itself, while in the scientific legality they consist in the reward or the punishment derived from the efficacy or inefficacy to reach the end pursued by the action. The way of legitimation also differs: while legal norms have to have followed the formal procedures and must not have contravened any fundamental right, technical norms‘ validity depend on its theoretical foundations or on its efficacy. Nowadays, scientific knowledge has become and important feature in policy-making. Contradictions can arise between these legal systems. These conflicts are specially grave when the recognition or exercise of fundamental rights is instrumentally used, or when they are violated in order to increase the policies‘ efficacy. A political system is technocratic, when, in case of contradiction, the scientific law finally prevails.
"Community and law approach" provides an illuminating insight into alternative legal orderings within a social unit. The comprehensiveness of legal systems within a community or a social unit, provides a suitable basis for a structural framework of alternative legal systems or Legal Pluralism, which is missing in the discourse on Legal Pluralism. "Identifying the locus of law within a community", provides us with an indication on how autopoetic a legal system can be within a social unit, taking into account the social rootedness of legal norms.
Legal practitioners and legal scientists need to have knowledge of the general rules that apply in the legal system. This involves both knowledge of the legislation and knowledge of the decisions by judges that function as general rules of law. Law students preparing themselves for the legal profession need to acquire these kinds of knowledge. A student has to have knowledge about where to look for decisions, understand the structure of decisions and learn to determine what makes a decision relevant to the body of applicable rules in the legal system. Legal education primarily aims at acquiring insight in the legal sources, their history and background. This basic knowledge is of great importance; legal problem solving is hardly possible without an understanding of the legal knowledge. To illustrate the use of this knowledge in practice, teachers work through decisions as examples. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to learn by explanation or by imitation alone. A more effective way to obtain expertise is by actually performing the task, i.e. students should do the exercises, while the teacher provides feedback on their solutions. For effective learning, also the solution process should be monitored and provided with feedback. Furthermore it is desirable for students to be able to ask for help at any time during the process. They should also be able to practice over and over again. An ideal situation would have a teacher available for every student, monitoring the student while practicing and providing support where and whenever necessary. However, this being not practically feasible, the second best option is to offer the student electronic support.
CASE (Case Analysis and Structuring Environment) is an environment where a law student can practice with finding decisions, with structuring its text and with analysing the decision in order to be able to determine in what way it adds to the body of applicable rules in the legal system.
CASE is developed using a principled and structured design approach. A short description of this approach is followed by an analysis of the learning task, the difficulties law students experience and the remedies proposed on the basis of both the task analysis and the stated difficulties. This is followed by a description of architecture, functionality, platform and implementation of CASE and a description of a session with CASE and future work.
In this article the author, in the context of the fiftieth anniversary of H.L.A. Hart’s “The Concept of Law”, reconsiders the moderate indeterminacy of law thesis, which derives from the open texture of language. For that purpose, he intends: first, to analyze Hart’s moderate indeterminacy thesis, i.e. determinacy in “easy cases” and indeterminacy in “hard cases”, which resembles Aristotle’s "doctrine of the mean"; second, to criticize his moderate indeterminacy thesis as failing to embody the virtues of a center in between the vices of the extremes, by insisting that the exercise of discretion required constitutes an “interstitial” legislation; and, third, to reorganize an argument for a truly “mean” position, which requires a form of weak interpretative discretion, instead of a strong legislative discretion.
After the absurd terrorism and violence of the totalitarianism and bureaucratic administrative and legal systems of the 20th century it does not give any meaning to rationalize harm as meaningful evil that even though it is evil may have some importance for the development of the world towards the good. Rather, evil is incomprehensible and as radical and banal evil it challenges human rationality. This is indeed the case when we are faced with instrumental and rationalized administrative and political evil. Therefore, we must analyse the banality of evil in politics and in administration in order to understand the concept of evil. Moreover, as proposed by Hannah Arendt, we need to fight this evil with political thinking and social philosophy. The only way to deal with harm and wrongdoing is to return a concept of responsibility that is closely linked to reflective thinking. In this paper, we will on the basis of a discussion of the banality of evil explore this in relation to Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the administration of evil, as expressed by the personality of Adolf Eichmann. Finally, we will place this concept of administrative evil in Hannah Arendt’s general political philosophy.
Es ist die Aufgabe der Wissenschaft, richtige, d.h. möglichst vernünftige Entscheidungen anzuleiten. Der wissenschaftliche Geltungsanspruch umfasst immer sowohl einen Wahrheits- wie einen Wert- und einen Gerechtigkeitsanspruch.
Vernunft lässt sich nur in einem sowohl rationalen wie interrationalen Diskurs annähern:
(1) Im rationalen Diskurs wird der Anspruch erhoben, innerhalb einer bestimmten Rationalität richtige Antworten auf ausgewählte Fragen zu finden (meist innerhalb der Grenzen bestimmter institutionalisierter Schulen oder Disziplinen).
(2) Der interrationale Diskurs setzt bei der Relation zwischen verschiedenen Fragen mit unterschiedlicher Rationalität an und versucht,
(a) zwischen diesen Fragen eine wechselseitige Verständigung herzustellen (Diskurs zur Verständlichkeit), bevor er
(b) auf den Diskurs über die Richtigkeit von Antworten verschiedener Fragestellungen im Zusammenhang eintritt (materieller interrationaler Diskurs).
Der interrationale Diskurs bedarf der Verfassung:
(1) Formelle Verfassung des Diskurses
(a) Institutionelle Strukturen und Prozesse (Gleichberechtigung aller Beteiligten, Symmetrie der Strukturen, z.B. die Tagesordnung einer Ratssitzung)
(b) Methodische Argumentationsstrukturen und -abläufe (Wahrheit, Wert und Gerechtigkeit; Fragen- und Antwortdimension).
(2) Materielle Verfassung: Inhaltliches Argumentarium guter Gründe im Diskurs (bewährte Argumente aus bisherigen Diskursen).
Germany is the focus of this paper, owing to the fact that since 1938 it has had the strictest laws on compulsory schooling worldwide. As a result, homeschooling in Germany has become virtually impossible. There are interesting divergences between policy and practice in the German setting, both in the country’s educational history and present educational problems. The Länder (federal states) have the responsibility for education, and they are taking a much stricter line against homeschoolers than a decade ago, especially by depriving parents of the custody of their homeschooled children at an early stage. The laws relied upon, however, were never intended to deal with such educational matters; they were designed to punish parents who abuse or neglect their children. The present, highly questionable legal action succeeds only because of the consent of state schools, state social welfare offices, and courts. The same laws are not used against the parents of the approximately 250,000 teens who are truant. The functioning of the legal and sociological machinery in Germany is being employed aggressively to stamp out homeschooling, while at the same time it ignores the crucial issue of parents who allow their children to skip school—thus depriving them of an adequate education at home or elsewhere. At the same time, the number of specialists in law and education, as well as politicians and governmental experts who argue in favor of homeschooling is growing, and media reports on homeschooling are much more positive than they were a decade ago.
Human rights and the law: the unbreachable gap between the ethics of justice and the efficacy of law
(2012)
This paper explores the structure of justice as the condition of ethical, inter-subjective responsibility. Taking a Levinasian perspective, this is a responsibility borne by the individual subject in a pre-foundational, proto-social proximity with the other human subject, which takes precedence over the interests of the self. From this specific post-humanist perspective, human rights are not the restrictive rights of individual self-will, as expressed in our contemporary legal human rights discourse. Rights do not amount to the prioritisation of the so-called politico-legal equality of the individual citizen-subject animated by the universality of the dignity of autonomous, reasoned intentionality. Rather, rights enlivened by proximity invert this discourse and signify, first and foremost, rights for the other, with the ethical burden of responsibility towards the other.
The problem of this paper is prompted by the claim of Zagreb University students residing in government subsidized dormitories that their duty to act for free as dorm night porters amounts to forced labour. After a preliminary note on the nature and types of legal scholarship, the paper restates jurisprudential arguments against student rights and analyses limitations inherent in legal scholarship in action, or jurisprudence, that make it unresponsive to student rights: a limited normative framework and a limited subject-matter, most notably a limited focus of inquiry when it comes to force or coercion. A glimpse at an analysis of force in international law indicates that the naked force typical of elementary criminal law has dissolved long ago into phenomena remotely related to naked force, such as economic pressure and ideological propaganda. Two legal and social contexts of force are of primary interest to understanding student rights. The first is legal recognition of the vulnerability of children to naked force. The second is the blind eye of jurisprudence for the vulnerability of workers to economic need. The belief in economic necessity and subjugation of the state to capital has resulted in a bizarre reversal of the roles of corporations and students. Jurisprudence cannot change the world but can interpret it more sensibly. What is required is a re-examination of maturity and emancipation within the emerging world law.
Die Rassenmischung bekam in der Entwicklung der Sozialwissenschaften in Brasilien immer wieder neue Bedeutungen, um sich an jeden politischen Zusammenhang anzupassen. Sie wurde von den Männern des Wissens als Problem und später als Lösung angesehen – nämlich durch die Aufhellung – gemäß der evolutionären Rassentheorien Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts. Aber vor allem in den 1930er Jahren betrachteten einige Intellektuelle Brasiliens, wie Gilberto Freyre, die Mischung der drei Rassen, die das Volk Brasiliens bilden, als Bestandteil der Nation. Eine solche Vorstellung brachte juristische und politische, manchmal unmerkliche Folgen für den Platz des Mischlings innerhalb der brasilianischen Gesellschaft. Dieser wird als Notausstieg Mulatte nach Carl Degler oder als epistemologisches Hindernis nach Eduardo de Oliveira e Oliveira verstanden. Der Zweck dieser Arbeit besteht darin, aufzuzeigen, inwiefern jene Tradition eine tiefe Auseinandersetzung verbirgt und wie sie juristische Auswirkungen in der Gegenwart hervorruft, z.B. in Bezug auf die Debatte über Rassenquoten an öffentlichen Universitäten.
Some advances in legal practical reason: for a progressive dialogue with contemporary hermeneutics
(2012)
This paper intends to critically discuss some points of the contemporary thesis concerning constitutional hermeneutics and methodology of law. Once identified some authors and the lines of argumentation affiliated grosso modo to the linguistic turn and rhetoric, as well as the core of the transcendental powers of communication (v.g. N. MacCormick, R. Alexy, K. Günther), the objective is to identify some dialogue with economics and political science, enlightened by recent researches about Hegel-Marx interpretations of social life. Of course the discussion inevitably passes through methodological questions, opposing analytics vs. dialectics, idealistic vs. realists standpoints. In a effort to foment the inclusive dialogue between points of view concerning the concept of law that may create (not necessarily) radical opponents, the lines of conclusion intents to revisit some foundations of Hegelian "method" (so to speak) and intends to give a modest contribution to a more profound analysis of the relations between sein and sollen categories, in order to enrich the discussions about technology and social life, specially the life of the law nowadays.
Die Auffassung des Rechts in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie weicht bekanntlich von dem ab, was üblicherweise unter „Recht“ verstanden wird. Schon deshalb sind Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts nicht einfach neben andere Werke zur Rechtstheorie zu stellen. Aber Hegels Bestimmung des Rechts ergänzt nicht nur das Recht äußerlich, sondern lässt es auf etwas gründen, das über es selbst deutlich hinausweist: auf jener Normativität, die er als Sittlichkeit bezeichnet. So ist Hegels Rechtsphilosophie nur als eine Sozialphilosophie der Sittlichkeit zu verstehen. Sie kann als die philosophische Selbstreflexion einer Gesellschaft verstanden werden, die sich selbst primär als durch das Recht bestimmt versteht, aber auf eine andere Form von Normativität bezogen ist.
The doubt about certainty like an absolute value in law and as an ideal full in legal system (argument about impossibility) is a controversial fact in contemporary legal theory. In this text I examine some contemporary doctrines about the classic understanding (in critical sense) of this ideal. I have selected the most representative doctrines: doctrine about "open texture of Law" (H.L.A. Hart), starting point in this discussion; doctrine about "Il Diritto mite" (G. Zagrebelsky), from the continental European legal tradition at present; and doctrine about "vagueness in Law" (T.A.O. Endicott), this doctrine is the most recent, from the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. Finally, in Conclusions, I analyze if this doubt (argument about impossibility) contaminates (in some sense) to the concept of law or to the characteristics that describe law in the contemporary Constitutional State.
It is a fact that mediation and other alternative dispute resolution means are becoming increasingly popular. Actually, governments are encouraging people to use them instead of going to Court, as they are quicker, cheaper and more informal than trials, and can be implemented using internet. The author focus on the analysis of the structure and purposes of mediation, in particular. The paper aims to discuss and understand what kind of justice, if any, is offered by alternative dispute resolution.
The relation between law, moral, society and science is shifting in Brazil as it is changing in democratic contemporary societies. This paper proposes to reflect about this change in the Brazilian legal and social context. Jurisprudence and legal practice have been transformed intensively after the Brazilian redemocratization that began in 1985 and Federal Constitution of 1988. In the field of Jurisprudence (Legal Theory), a new legal theory called post-positivism progressively has been overcoming legal critical studies and legal positivism. In recent years, ideas as any moral values can be improved by law (positivism) or law is one of many oppressive institutions in capitalist society (legal critical studies – Marxism) have been losing place in legal theory. Nowadays, when Brazilian Constitution implements just society and legal system, different from the authoritarian military regime (1964 – 1985), it is difficult to work with a complete relativistic idea of law (positivism) or difficult to accept that law is necessarily oppressive in capitalistic societies. Otherwise the idea of science in law at post-positivistic point of view try to overcome in a dialectic way a pure science methodology (normativistic positivism) and the complete political and economic studies of law (critical legal studies – Marxism). After that, the text will show that Brazilian legal practice have changed intensively after post positivistic methodology of law and will reflect about same dilemmas of post-positivism in Brazil in the legal theory and practice.
The paper is concerned with the Hartian idea that the justification of law’s normativity can be traced back to the exquisite social fact, viz. special kind of social convention. After discussing the view that the rule of recognition is a coordinative convention A. Marmor’s idea of constitutive convention is introduced. Relying on J. Dickson’s brilliant enquiry I finally argue that this latter idea is deprieved of any explanatory power, which was pressuposed by H.L.A. Hart when he himself reffered to the conventional rule of recognition as social fact having full normative significance.
In this paper, an analysis of Robert Frost’s poem Mending Wall is presented as a hermeneutical key to investigate and criticize two examples of the oblivion of the reasonable distinction and the reasonable relationship between ethics and law proposed by a new Brazilian private law movement called Escola do Direito Civil-Constitucional (The Private-Constitutional School of Thought). Those examples of unreasonable relationship between ethics and law are: 1) the right to be loved and 2) the right to get a private education without paying for it.
Based on Walter Benjamin’s reflections on history and social struggles, this paper drafts an analysis of the relations of the subject with some problems of constitutional theory, in a first effort to bring the field nearer to social philosophy. After tracing a short narrative on modern constitutionalism and its new relationship with the historical time, we argument that Constitution shall be seen as a cultural document of memory of the social struggles of the past and at the same an object of the struggles of the present. Some inconclusive reflections on the possibility of human emancipation through law are presented as conclusion.
To become self-reflexive, Jurisprudence must to establish a dialogue: the human sciences should lose their exotic character in the eyes of Legal Science. It is in the middle between the "order" and the thinking about it, where the "naked experience" happens, that culture and therefore Law builds itself e it is constructed. This paper demonstrates the need to use other human sciences, with emphasis on anthropology, as "methodological strategies" for Jurisprudence self-reflection to become more faithful to the reality of the researched object. Anthropology has the power to show what is "anti-modern". It questions the intellectual space of modernity where the hard definition of antagonisms detached from reality occurs - West/East, “I”/other, civilized/barbarian. Jurisprudence consolidates antagonisms: the diversity and plurality of human societies are rarely seen as a fact but as an aberration, always demanding a justification. It is necessary to create a methodology using what is most extraordinary and human in the analysis of fact: "Anthopological Blues". Anthropology is capable of breaking with the classical conception of scientific methodology that is based on stiffness to produce absolute truths and also support the fulfillment of legal concepts with content and meaning, providing a reinterpretation of science as a human instrument of intervention on reality.
The debates about the interrelations between reason and law have undergone a change after the eighteenth century. References to the recta ratio of jusnaturalistic tradition have not disappeared, but other comprehensions of legal reason have developed. The European debate over legal positivist science has contributed to this in a manifestation of the rationality of law. This transformation may be considered the basis for the development of true “legal technologies” throughout the twentieth century. On the other hand, in the context of theories of positive law which have taken the relation between ethics and legal reason as a problem, the formation of discourses on coercion (Austin and Holmes), on validity (Kelsen and Hart) and on justification (Alexy and Dworkin) has also contributed to the emergence of new models of legal rationality. In this paper, it is highlighted that the construction of these models is linked to the “points of view” which theories have proposed as legitimate for the interpretation of legal phenomenon. And it is suggested that the discussion over points of view (defined as “focuses”, term which is close to the notion of “attitude”, “stance” or “place of speech”) may aid in the debate on the normativity of law.
New technologies generate risks, for the evaluation of which various mechanisms have been developed; the most frequent of these mechanisms consists of advice from committees of experts to the bodies whose role is to decide whether a new technology should be implemented or not. Such committees try to measure the magnitude of the threats that accompany the introduction of a new technology in order that the policy-makers may take their decisions in the light of the reports of the experts. The legitimacy of such reports is not only found in the technical capacity of its authors, but also in the impartiality of their recommendations. On numerous occasions, nevertheless, the effective presence of this evaluation finds itself today under suspicion. There are various methods that can be employed to try to resolve this problem. Firstly by reinforcing the mechanisms on which the technocratic evaluation of the risk are based; for example, through transparency in the selection of the experts. Secondly, by means of the incorporation of democratic mechanisms in the scientific-technological policy. The exposure of the internal conditions to the dynamics of the technological change that make possible the institutionalised involvement of society in the control of risk, as well as of the mechanisms to realise it are the principal subjects of this work.
Akrasia, or weak-will, is a term denoting a phenomenon when one acts freely and intentionally contrary to his or her better judgment. Discussion of akrasia originates in the Plato's Protagoras where he states that “No one who either knows or believes that there is another possible course of action, better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his present course”. However, in his influential article from 1970, Donald Davidson argued that akrasia is theoretically possible yet irrational. Some other critics of Plato's stance point out that phenomenon of akrasia is common in our everyday experience, therefore it must be possible.
These two arguments in favor of akrasia existence – theoretical and empirical – will be discussed from both – philosophical and psychological points of view. Especially, George Ainslie's argument that akrasia results from hyperbolic discounting will be taken into consideration to show how it affects traditional thinking about weak-willed actions.
Finally, the paper will discuss how the contemporary notion of akrasia may affect the idea of responsibility and free will. Implications for the philosophy of law will be shown, i.a. whether it is possible to claim that a given example of a weak-willed action was indeed free and intentional and one should be held responsible for its results.
Occasionally, in pursuing their adjudicative duties over the course of a legal hearing, judges are called upon to acquire new concepts – that is, concepts which they did not possess at the commencement of the hearing. In performing their judicial role they are required to learn new things and, as a result, conceptualise the world in a way which differs from the way they conceived of things before the hearing commenced. Some theorists have argued that either as a general matter or as a matter specific to judicial practice and the legal context, judges are, with some degree of necessity, incapacitated from acquiring certain kinds of concepts. Such concepts include those possessed by the members of culturally different minority groups. Drawing on contemporary trends in analytic and naturalistic philosophy of mind, this paper explores the extent to which a judge might be incapacitated from acquiring new concepts over the course of a legal hearing and identifies those factors which condition the success or failure of that process.
The main purpose of my article is to discuss what GMOs are, the controversies about this specific issue and the related regulations that are put forward by the authorities. GMOs are genetically altered organisms which have been widely produced and breeded in certain parts of the world. According to some experts, this special practice of agriculture emerged in order to put an end to famine and prevent food scarcity. As growing GMOs seems to be more convenient than the traditional farming, it is more eligible to produce food in large scale which will be a fine solution for food scarcity. However, there are some oppositions to the GMOs. It is strongly believed that the real causes of famine is not related to production, it is a problem of distribution of food. Moreover, patenting the seeds leads to an unstoppable control and dominance over food by the private enterprises. Therefore, the opponents state that the aims of these companies are solely financial gain and monopolisation in food production. Patenting the seeds is another arguable issue. It poses a great threat for the organic farmers since GMO seeds can contaminate the others through natural ways. This is not the only danger that organic farmers face with; thay can also be sued by the GMO producers for this unintended exposure to GMO seeds. Not only the diminishing of the variety of species but also the possible adverse effects of GMOs on human health create a debate between the two groups. These are not the only topics that are open to discussion. In addition to these, labelling the products creates a huge problem among the poorly educated consumers as they have not been clearly regulated in some countries. Hence, this subject having such a close connection to human health cannot be ignored by the law. In fact, a number of countries have enacted legislation in order to regulate this sensitive field. Turkey, having been dependent on the import of the agricultural goods for a period of time, has to join these countries with a recent legislation. All these contemporary issues for Turkey will be highlighted in my article.
In this paper I demonstrate the utility of a Values in Design (VID) perspective for the assessment, the design and development of e-democracy tools. In the first part, I give some background information on Values in Design and Value-Sensitive Design and their relevance in the context of e-democracy. In part 2, I analyze three different e-democracy tools from a VID-perspective. The paper ends with some conclusions concerning the merits of VID for e-democracy as well as some considerations concerning the dual tasks of philosophers in assessing and promoting value-sensitive technology design.
The aim of this paper is to explore the case of the Spanish ‘indignants’ movement of May 2011 as an example of the structural changes occurring in the public sphere after the emergence of a new type of social movement characterized by the widespread use of the ICTs. First I focus on the ideological dimension of discourse of the ‘indignants’ movement, so as to reconstruct the protesters’ self-image. They thought that ICTs were playing a prominent role in a wider trend towards a regeneration of democracy, but they were rather misguided because they lack an accurate description of what really happened. In the second part of this paper I will challenge some features of my case study, emphasizing three basic elements of a democratic public sphere. I aim to call into question the idea that a ‘truly’ democratic public may be hosted by the emergent communicative environment.
In the debate on how the new information and communication technologies impact on democratic politics the role played by the digital architecture seems to be surprisingly underrated. In particular, while a lot of attention has been paid to the possibilities that new technologies open up to democratic theory, few works have attempted to look at how democracy may help in shaping technologies. By adopting as a starting point the approach known as ‘code as law’, the paper aims at two objectives: to re-affirm the importance of discussing normative principles to guide the process of code writing in order to reinvigorate the debate; to claim the importance of input reasons when deciding which principles should be chosen. After having remarked that code is relevant for establishing democratic norms, the paper briefly tackles with the main attempts by European scholars to deal with this issue. Then, a couple of practical examples of how code impacts on democratic rights are sketched out. In the last section of the paper a shift from an output-based approach to the legitimacy of code to an input-based is openly advocated: an inquiry into the legitimacy of code should focus on its production.
The aim of this contribution is to introduce and outline a third theory of rights. Concentrating on claim-rights, it proposes to approach this aim via the concept of a directed duty. This approach is justified by the widely shared presupposition that an entity has a right if and only if a duty is owed to this entity. Unlike some prominent other proposals, this contribution does not contrast directed duties with undirected ones. It contrasts two ways a duty can be related to an entity. On the one hand, a duty can be owed to an entity. In this case it is directed to this entity. On the other hand, a duty can concern an entity. There is no reason to presuppose that they exclude each other, on the contrary. Theories of rights have to reconstruct the difference between these two ways a duty can be related to an entity. After having introduced the starting point for a theory of rights in that way, the two classic theories of rights will be rejected, the will theory and the interest theory. The main focus lies on the shortcomings of the different versions of the interest theory. This criticism helps to formulate the conditions a convincing theory of rights has to meet. In the last part, the status theory of rights will be outlined.
This paper aims to assess the arguments that claim representative democracy may be enhanced or replaced by an updated electronic version. Focusing on the dimension of elections and electioneering as the core mechanism of representative democracy I will discuss: (1) the proximity argument used to claim the necessity of filling the gap between decision-makers and stakeholders; (2) the transparency argument, which claims to remove obstacles to the publicity of power; (3) the bottom-up argument, which calls for a new form of legitimacy that goes beyond classical mediation of parties or unions; (4) the public sphere argument, referred to the problem of hierarchical relation between voters and their representatives; (5) the disintermediation argument, used to describe the (supposed) new form of democracy following the massive use of ICTs. The first way of conceptualizing e-democracy as different from mainstream 20th century representative democracy regimes is to imagine it as a new form direct democracy: this conception is often underlying contemporary studies of e-voting. To avoid some of the ingenuousness of this conception of e-democracy, we should take a step back and consider a broader range of issues than mere gerrymandering around the electoral moment. Therefore I shall problematize the abovementioned approach by analyzing a wider range of problems connected to election and electioneering in their relation with ICTs.
Until three years ago, ICT Technologies represented a main “subordinate clause” within the “grammar” of Participatory Budgeting (PB), the tool made famous by the experience of Porto Alegre and today expanded to more than 1400 cities across the planet. In fact, PB – born to enhance deliberation and exchanges among citizens and local institutions – has long looked at ICTS as a sort of “pollution factor” which could be useful to foster transparency and to support the spreading of information but could also lead to a lowering in quality of public discussion, turning its “instantaneity” into “immediatism,” and its “time-saving accessibility” into “reductionism” and laziness in facing the complexity of public decision-making through citizens’ participation. At the same time, ICTs often regarded Participatory Budgeting as a tool that was too-complex and too-charged with ideology to cooperate with. But in the last three years, the barriers which prevented ICTs and Participatory Budgeting to establish a constructive dialogue started to shrink thanks to several experiences which demonstrated that technologies can help overcome some “cognitive injustices” if not just used as a means to “make simpler” the organization of participatory processes and to bring “larger numbers” of intervenients to the process. In fact, ICTs could be valorized as a space adding “diversity” to the processes and increasing outreach capacity. Paradoxically, the experiences helping to overcome the mutual skepticism between ICTs and PB did not come from the centre of the Global North, but were implemented in peripheral or semiperipheral countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Brazil, Dominican Republic and Portugal in Europe), sometimes in cities where the “digital divide” is still high (at least in terms of Internet connections) and a significant part of the population lives in informal settlements and/or areas with low indicators of “connection.” Somehow, these experiences were able to demystify the “scary monolithicism” of ICTs, showing that some instruments (like mobile phones, and especially the use of SMS text messaging) could grant a higher degree of connectivity, diffusion and accountability, while other dimensions (which could risk jeopardizing social inclusion) could be minimized through creativity. The paper tries to depict a possible panorama of collaboration for the near future, starting from descriptions of some of the above mentioned “turning-point” experiences – both in the Global North as well as in the Global South.
In this article, I examine how open borders can serve the idea of global distributive justice by asking how or how not the existing practices of immigration to rich countries may contribute to global economic redistribution. There are two observations. First, migration is not the redistributive option that anyone has an equal access. In order to make use of migration as a means of global redistribution, rich countries need to provide a chance to migrate to those who cannot afford movement by themselves. Second, as long as brain-drain problems happen, what the perspective of global distributive justice requires is the compensation for some educational cost of raising professionals or some control of their movement. Immigration admissions largely focusing on getting highly skilled professionals may not serve the idea of global redistribution.
The revolution will be tweeted : how the internet can stimulate the public exercise of freedoms
(2012)
This article discusses how new technologies of communication, especially the Internet and, more specifically, social network services, can interfere in social interactions and in political relations. The main objective is to problematize the concept of public liberty and verify how the new technologies can promote the reoccupation of public spaces and the recovery of public life, in opposition to the tendency to valorize the private sphere, observed in the second half of the twentieth century. The theoretical benchmark adopted for the investigation is Hannah Arendt's theory about the exercise of fundamental political capacities in order to establish a public space of freedom, as presented in “On Revolution”. The “Praia da Estação” (“Station Beach”) case is chosen to test the hypothesis. In 2010 in the Brazilian city of Belo Horizonte, different individuals articulated a movement through blogs, Twitter and facebook, in order to protest against the Mayor’s act that banned the assembling of cultural events in one of the main public places of the city, the “Praça da Estação” (Station Square). By applying Arendt's concepts to the selected case, it is possible to demonstrate that the Internet can assume an important role against governmental arbitrariness and abuse of power, as it can stimulate the public exercise of fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of assembly and manifestation.
The role of experts grows in the present and that is, in part, justifiable: as complexity rises, the ones who deliberate feel the need of the help of those who have know-how in specific fields. The question that must be asked revolves around the type of expectations developed in modern societies regarding what experts can do. Though specialization is not a peculiarity of our time (the process can be observed since human beings became sedentary); it has presently gained specific characteristics. Two aspects of modern life are particularly significant on that matter: (i.) the fact that the economic system is based on excitation of new needs (and no longer on the demand for satisfaction of needs); (ii.) the growing pursuit for total administration of conflicts. These factors are constitutive of what Gadamer sees as a great threat to our civilization: the excessive emphasis given in our time to the human ability to adapt. A specific ability is demanded from individuals: the capability of making an apparatus functions properly. Less resistance and more adaptability is requested, and because of that, autonomous thought - that is, not determined by the function it has in a system – is devalued. The threat we currently face is that the abilities of a good technocrat become the only qualities demanded from those who are responsible for practical decisions (especially in politics and law). Teleological reason, that guides the activity of specialists (and requires know-how in a specific area and consists in choosing means to reach a previously established goal), should not substitute practical reason, as the former requires adaptability to experience (not to a plan that was previously established) and is grounded on solidarity. In order to discuss the limits of the activity of specialists, the paper looks back to phrónesis and the way ancient Greeks set boundaries - this exercise should help raising new questions revolving the matter.
Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere can be placed in the context of development of sociology of law. However, Alexander draws not so much on sociological theories but rather on the approaches of philosophy of law, particularly the ideas of Fuller, Dworkin and Habermas. The civil sphere is presented by Alexander as the embodiment of Dworkin’s principal integrity. Locating law within civil morality Alexander reveals the similarity of his viewpoint to Dworkin’s position. Drawing on Fuller’s works Alexander singles out the procedural foundations of the democratic order. At the same time for Alexander the source of morality of law is not the legal system itself but a certain level of civil solidarity. Like Habermas, Alexander emphasizes the culturally embedded character of the legal norms. Alexander shares Habermas’s understanding of law as a regulative mechanism affecting all spheres of social life. However, Habermas is more sensitive to the danger of colonization of law by the imperatives of the economic and political subsystems. Alexander’s approach can be contrasted with Luhmann’s sociological theory of law. Alexander concentrates on interrelation and mutual penetration of the civil sphere and law while Luhmann regards law as an autonomous system following its own logic. While Alexander claims that his theory is rooted both in sociology and philosophy of law in fact his approach is closer to normative philosophy.