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This paper addresses the phenomenon of climate-induced displacement. I argue that there is scope for an account of asylum as compensation owed to those displaced by the impacts of climate change which needs only to appeal to minimal normative commitments about the requirements of global justice. I demonstrate the possibility of such an approach through an examination of the work of David Miller. Miller is taken as an exemplar of a broadly ‘international libertarian’ approach to global justice, and his work is a useful vehicle for this project because he has an established view about both responsibility for climate change and about the state’s right to exclude would-be immigrants. In the course of the argument, I set out the relevant aspects of Miller’s views, reconstruct an account of responsibility for the harms faced by climate migrants which is consistent with Miller’s views, and demonstrate why such an account yields an obligation to provide asylum as a form of compensation to ‘climate migrants.’
This paper discusses two possible difficulties with Catherine Lu’s powerful analysis of the moral response to our shared history of colonial evil; both of these difficulties stem from the rightful place of shame in that moral response. The first difficulty focuses on efficacy: existing states may be better motivated by shame at the past than by a shared duty to bring about a just future. The second focuses on equity: it is, at the very least, possible that shame over past misdeeds ought to be brought into the conversation about present duties, in a manner more robust than Lu’s analysis allows.
In Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics Catherine Lu endorses the idea that those who contribute to the reproduction of structural injustice have responsibilities to address that injustice (Lu, 2017). However, in the book, Lu does not explore the grounds and justification for recognising such a responsibility. In order to address this deficit, this paper proposes that those likely to contribute to the reproduction of structural injustice, in the future, have precautionary duties, in the present, that require them to take action aimed at preventing their future contribution. It is proposed that these ‘collectivization duties’ (Collins, 2013) require them to act responsively with a view to forming a collective that can end the structural injustice in question. This account recommends a collective-action solution alongside recognising that each socially connected agent is obliged to act. However, it does not entail that amorphous groups bear responsibilities and is appropriate in its attribution of blame, thus avoiding both Nussbaum’s (2011) critique of perpetually forward-looking accounts and the ‘agency objection’ (Wringe, 2010).
This article analyzes and criticizes the temporal orientation of Catherine Lu’s theory of colonial redress in Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics. Lu argues that colonial historic injustice can, with few exceptions, justify special reparative measures only if these past injustices still contribute to structural injustice in contemporary social relations. Focusing on Indigenous peoples, I argue that the structural injustice approach can and should incorporate further backward looking elements. First, I examine how Lu’s account has backward-looking elements not present in other structural injustice accounts. Second, I suggest how the structural injustice approach could include additional backward-looking features. I presuppose here, with Lu, that all agents connected to an unjust social structure have a forwardlooking political responsibility to reform this structure, regardless of their relation (or lack thereof) to victims or perpetrators of historic injustice. However, I suggest that agents with connections to historic injustice can occupy a social position that makes them differently situated than other agents within that same structure, leading to differences in how these agents should discharge their forward-looking responsibility and differentiated liability for failure to do so. Third, I argue that Lu obscures the importance of rectifying material dispossession. Reparations, pace Lu, can be justified beyond a minimum threshold of disadvantage. Theorists of settler colonialism and Indigenous scholars show how the dispossession of Indigenous land can be seen as a structure that has not yet ended. I conclude by arguing that rectification can be a precondition for genuine reconciliation.
Structural alienation: Lu's structural approach to reconciliation from within a relational framework
(2019)
In Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics Catherine Lu argues that structural reconciliation, rather than interactional reconciliation, ought to be the primary normative goal for political reconciliation efforts. I suggest that we might have good reason to want to retain relational approaches – such as that of Linda Radzik – as the primary focus of reconciliatory efforts, but that Lu’s approach is invaluable for identifying the parties who ought to bear responsibility for those efforts in cases of structural injustice. First, I outline Lu’s analysis of reconciliation, where she argues for the normative priority of structural approaches within the global political sphere, and propose that it will be useful to identify whether or not a relational account could instead identify underlying structural injustices. Second, I examine one particular relational account of reconciliation (based on Radzik’s account of atonement) and argue that this type of account brings to light underlying structural injustices of the kind Lu is concerned with. Finally, I identify an issue for relational accounts in identifying relevant responsible parties for reconciliation before returning to Lu’s structural account to address this gap.
Traditionally, in deciding whether some strategy or action in war is proportionate and necessary and thus permissible both international law and just war theory focus exclusively on civilian deaths and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. I argue in this paper that any argument that can explain why we should care about collateral killing and damage to infrastructure can also explain why collateral displacement matters. I argue that displacement is a foreseeable near-proximate cause of lethal harm to civilians and is relevant for proportionality and necessity calculi. Accepting my argument has significant consequences for what we are permitted to do in war and for what obligations we have towards refugees that result from our actions in war.
Moral refugee markets
(2018)
States are increasingly paying other states to host refugees. For example, in 2010 the EU paid Libya €50 million to continue hosting the refugees within its borders, and five years later Australia offered Cambodia $31.16 million to accept asylum seekers living in Naru. These exchanges, which I call ‘refugees markets,’ have faced criticism by philosophers. Some philosophers claim the markets fail to ensure true protection, and are demeaning, expressing just how much refugees are unwanted. In response, some have defended refugee markets, claiming they can ensure refugees have protection and are not demeaned. I argue that many markets do demean refugees, and therefore have moral costs, but can still be all-things-considered preferable to alternative schemes if they protect refugees more than these alternative schemes.
This essay develops, within the terms of the recent New York Declaration, an account of the shared responsibility of states to refugees and of how the character of that responsibility effects the ways in which it can be fairly shared. However, it also moves beyond the question of the general obligations that states owe to refugees to consider ways in which refugee choices and refugee voice can be given appropriate standing with the global governance of refuge. It offers an argument for the normative significance of refugee’s reasons for choosing states of asylum and linked this to consideration of a refugee matching system and to refugee quota trading conceived as responsibility-trading, before turning to the issue of the inclusion of refugee voice in relation to the justification of the norms of refugee governance and in relation to the institutions and practices of refugee governance through which those norms are given practical expression.
The issue of statelessness poses problems for the statist (or nationalist) approach to the philosophy of immigration. Despite the fact that the statist approach claims to constrain the state’s right to exclude with human rights considerations, the arguments statists offer for the right of states to determine their own immigration policies would also justify citizenship rules that would render some children stateless. Insofar as rendering a child stateless is best characterized as a violation of human rights and insofar as some states have direct responsibility for causing such harm, the problem of non-refugee stateless children points to greater constraints than most statists accept on states’ right to determine their own rules for membership. While statists can ultimately account for the right not to be rendered stateless, recognizing these additional human rights constraints ultimately weakens the core of the statist position.
While global justice theorists heatedly discuss the responsibilities of the affluent and powerful, those states which can legitimately be seen as victims of global injustice have seldom, if ever, been considered as duty bearers to whom responsibilities can be attached. However, recognising agents whose options are constrained not only as victims, but also as duty bearers is necessary as a proof of respect for their agency and indispensable to mobilise the type of action required to alter global injustices. In this article, I explore what responsibilities state officials of dominated states have. I argue that they have the responsibility to resist domination in the name of the dominated states members. While under particular circumstances this responsibility gives rise to a duty to engage in acts of state civil disobedience, under other circumstances state officials of dominated states ought to resist domination in an internal, attitudinal way by recognising themselves as outcome responsible agents.
Fair Trade is under fire. Some critics argue, for instance, that there is no obligation to purchase Fair Trade certified products and that doing so may even be counter-productive. Others worry that well-justified conceptions of what makes trade fair can conflict. Yet others suggest that the common arguments for Fair Trade cannot justify purchasing Fair Trade certified goods, in particular. This paper starts by sketching one common argument for Fair Trade and defends it against this last line of criticism. In particular, it argues that we should purchase Fair Trade certified goods because doing so benefits the poor even though there are other ways to alleviate poverty. It then considers how other common arguments for Fair Trade fare in light of similar criticism and concludes that they may well succeed.
Political realists claim that international relations are in a state of anarchy, and therefore every state is allowed to disregard its moral duties towards other states and their inhabitants. Realists argue that complying with moral duties is simply too risky for a state’s national security. Political moralists convincingly show that realists exaggerate both the extent of international anarchy and the risks it poses to states who act morally. Yet moralists do not go far enough, since they do not question realism’s normative core: the claim that when national security is really at risk, states are allowed to disregard their moral duties. I contend that there is at least one moral duty that states should not disregard even if their inhabitants are at risk of death by military aggression: the duty to reduce extreme global poverty. The reason is that even granting that national security is about securing individuals’ right to life, global poverty relief is about that as well.
There are longstanding calls for international organizations (IOs) to be more inclusive of the voices and interests of people whose lives they affect. There is nevertheless widespread disagreement among practitioners and political theorists over who ought to be included in IO decision-making and by what means. This paper focuses on the inclusion of IOs’ ‘intended beneficiaries,’ both in principle and practice. It argues that IOs’ intended beneficiaries have particularly strong normative claims for inclusion because IOs can affect their vital interests and their political agency. It then examines how these claims to inclusion might be feasibly addressed. The paper proposes a model of inclusion via representation and communication, or ‘mediated inclusion.’ An examination of existing practices in global governance reveals significant opportunities for the mediated inclusion of IOs’ intended beneficiaries, as well as pervasive obstacles. The paper concludes that the inclusion of intended beneficiaries by IOs is both appropriate and feasible.
This article outlines a new approach to answering the foundational question in democratic theory of how the boundaries of democratic political units should be delineated. Whereas democratic theorists have mostly focused on identifying the appropriate population-group – or demos – for democratic decisionmaking, it is argued here that we should also take account of considerations relating to the appropriate scope of a democratic unit’s institutionalized governance capabilities – or public power. These matter because democratically legitimate governance is produced not only through the decision-making agency of a demos, but also through the institutionally distinct sources of political agency that shape the governance capabilities of public power. To develop this argument, the article traces a new theoretical account of the normative and institutional sources of collective agency, political legitimacy, and democratic boundaries, and illustrates it through a democratic reconstruction of the classical body politic metaphor. It further shows how this theoretical account lends strong prescriptive support to pluralist institutional boundaries within democratic global governance.
The democratic boundary problem raises the question of who has democratic participation rights in a given polity and why. One possible solution to this problem is the all-affected principle (AAP), according to which a polity ought to enfranchise all persons whose interests are affected by the polity’s decisions in a morally significant way. While AAP offers a plausible principle of democratic enfranchisement, its supporters have so far not paid sufficient attention to economic participation rights. I argue that if one commits oneself to AAP, one must also commit oneself to the view that political participation rights are not necessarily the only, and not necessarily the best, way to protect morally weighty interests. I also argue that economic participation rights raise important worries about democratic accountability, which is why their exercise must be constrained by a number of moral duties.
Der Beitrag erläutert die Fragestellung, die Kernthesen und den juristischen Erkenntniswert einer „Ontologie des Immaterialgüterrechts“. Ihr Untersuchungsgegenstand ist die Frage, auf welchem Verständnis der Wirklichkeit, genauer: seines Schutzgegenstands, das IP-Recht beruht. Nicht die Seinsweise des Rechts wird analysiert, sondern die hiervon zu unterscheidende Seinsweise einer bestimmten Klasse von Rechtsobjekten, nämlich Immaterialgütern und insbesondere urheberrechtlichen Werken. Die diesbezügliche ontologische und historische Betrachtung ergibt, dass es sich beim abstrakt-unkörperlichen Werk um eine sprachbasierte Konstruktion handelt, die als sozial-institutionelle Tatsache wirkmächtig ist, weil und soweit Menschen seit ca. 200 Jahren so sprechen und denken, als gäbe es unkörperliche Werke – obwohl diese metaphysische Annahme nicht plausibel ist. Der Beitrag erläutert weiter, dass sich das Urheber- und IP-Recht auf der Basis dieser Einsichten und einer alternativen, handlungs- und artefaktbasierten IP-Theorie besser erklären lässt als auf dem Boden des herrschenden Paradigmas vom abstrakten Immaterialgut bzw. Werk. Dies gilt sowohl im Hinblick auf die Dogmatik und Anwendungspraxis des geltenden Rechts als auch im Hinblick auf die ökonomische Analyse und den Rechtsvergleich. Die normativen Implikationen dieser deskriptiven Erkenntnisse sind hingegen begrenzt und richten sich vor allem an die Urheberrechtswissenschaft. Diese sollte tunlichst nicht mehr so reden und argumentieren, als existierten abstrakte Werke, die dem Berechtigten wie Sachen exklusiv zugeordnet sind.
The paper examines the importance of international labour standards for ESG reporting. International labour standards exist today for almost all working conditions. There are many reasons why ESG criteria should be based on these standards. This is already happening to some extent. However, the references to international labor standards should be expanded and the existing references deepened.
According to the standard account, IPRs allocate objects to owners, just like ownership allocates real property. In this paper, I explain that this simplistic paradigm operates on the basis of three fictions: The first – truly Polanyian – fiction concerns IP subject matter that was originally not produced for sale but created for other purposes, e.g. private pleasure. The second fiction is that IP is treated as a marketable good whereas much IP, in particular works and signs, are embedded in communication. Finally, IP is a fictitious concept in that we speak of works, inventions, and other IP objects as of tangible commodities, where in fact IP objects only exist insofar and because we speak and regulate as if they exist as abstract “goods” of value.
In a tribute to Hon. Justice Iorhemen Hwande CFR, Chief Judge of Benue State this book includes contributions from a variety of scholars from Nigeria. 14 essays cover a wide range of topics such as: Insider Dealing by Company Directors and the Nigerian Capital Market; United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea as a Tool for the Resolution of Climate Change Disputes; Is a Practicing Christian Lawyer/Judge in Nigeria an Anachronism?; The Justiciability and Enforcement of Social Rights; and International Economic Law and Development.
Critical Issues in Nigerian Property Law, a collection of writings in honour of Professor Jelili Adebisi Omotola, SAN, a former Vice Chancellor of the University of Lagos, who died on the 29th of March 2006, has ten chapters that closely examine not only the current state of Property Law in Nigeria, but also recent developments and other challenges that have surfaced since the infamous Land Use Act of 1999. The book is clearly a useful contribution to a growing body of knowledge on property law and practice in Nigeria.
African land rights systems
(2014)
This book, from ethical, interdisciplinary, and African perspectives, unveils the root causes of the increasing land disputes. Its significance lies upon the effort of presenting a broad overview founded upon a critical analysis of the existing land-related disputes. It is a perspective that attempts to evaluate the renewed interest in evolving theories of land rights by raising questions that can help us to understand better differences underlying land ownership systems, conflict between customary and statutory land rights systems, and the politics of land reform. Other dimensions explored in the book include the market influence on land-grabbing and challenges accompanying trends of migration, resettlement, and integration. The methodology applied in the study provides a perspective that raises questions intended to identify areas of contention, dispute, and conflict. The study, which could also be categorized as a critical assessment of the African land rights systems, is intended to be a resource for scholars, activists, and organizations working to resolve land-related disputes.
The "Suma de tratos y contratos" (1569-1571) by Tomás de Mercado is the first legal treatise on trade that explicitly takes into account the specificities of Spanish trade with the Indias. Tomás de Mercado was faced with very profound changes in trade: long distances, large convoy sizes, the need for large amounts of funding, high risk, variations in prices and the value of money...
From a theological-legal point of view, these upheavals posed new and complex questions.
Mercado, advisor to the merchants of Seville and an excellent knowledge of New Spain, analyses the sudden transformation of economic and juridical practice with finesse and realism. The 'Suma' is thus an extraordinary real-time testimony to the profound transformations taking place in 16th century commerce.
Moreover, faced with fundamental questions of moral order and juridical legitimacy, Mercado proposes legal solutions of high equilibrium in which theological imperatives are masterfully reconciled with the needs of transatlantic commercial practice.
Few African countries provide for an explicit right to a nationality. Laws and practices governing citizenship effectively leave hundreds of thousands of people in Africa without a country. These stateless Africans can neither vote nor stand for office; they cannot enrol their children in school, travel freely, or own property; they cannot work for the government; they are exposed to human rights abuses. Statelessness exacerbates and underlies tensions in many regions of the continent. Citizenship Law in Africa, a comparative study by two programs of the Open Society Foundations, describes the often arbitrary, discriminatory, and contradictory citizenship laws that exist from state to state and recommends ways that African countries can bring their citizenship laws in line with international rights norms. The report covers topics such as citizenship by descent, citizenship by naturalisation, gender discrimination in citizenship law, dual citizenship, and the right to identity documents and passports. It is essential reading for policymakers, attorneys, and activists. This third edition is a comprehensive revision of the original text, which is also updated to reflect developments at national and continental levels. The original tables presenting comparative analysis of all the continent's nationality laws have been improved, and new tables added on additional aspects of the law. Since the second edition was published in 2010, South Sudan has become independent and adopted its own nationality law, while there have been revisions to the laws in Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child have developed important new normative guidance.
Since 1963, when the African integration project was born, regional Economic Communities (RECs) have been an indispensable part of the continent's deeper socioeconomic and political integration. More than half a century later, such regional institutions continue to evolve, keeping pace with an Africa that is transforming itself amid challenges and opportunities. RECs represent a huge potential to be the engines that drive the continent's economic growth and development as well as being vehicles through which a sense of a continental community is fostered. It is critical therefore that citizens understand the multi-faceted and bureaucratic operations of regional institutions in order to use them to advance their collective interests.
Few African countries provide for an explicit right to a nationality. Laws and practices governing citizenship effectively leave hundreds of thousands of people in Africa without a country. These stateless Africans can neither vote nor stand for office; they cannot enrol their children in school, travel freely, or own property; they cannot work for the government; they are exposed to human rights abuses. Statelessness exacerbates and underlies tensions in many regions of the continent. Citizenship Law in Africa, a comparative study by two programs of the Open Society Foundations, describes the often arbitrary, discriminatory, and contradictory citizenship laws that exist from state to state and recommends ways that African countries can bring their citizenship laws in line with international rights norms. The report covers topics such as citizenship by descent, citizenship by naturalisation, gender discrimination in citizenship law, dual citizenship, and the right to identity documents and passports. It is essential reading for policymakers, attorneys, and activists. This second edition includes updates on developments in Kenya, Libya, Namibia, South Africa, Sudan and Zimbabwe, as well as minor corrections to the tables and other additions throughout.
Labour law in Zimbabwe
(2015)
Um die Voraussetzungen für Heckers Wirken in Baden und das liberale Klima jener Zeit besser zu veranschaulichen, ist eine Betrachtung des Staats-Lexikons angebracht. Die Unterschiede zwischen den beiden ersten Auflagen, die im Deutschen Bund nicht veröffentlicht werden durften und der dritten Auflage sind geradezu umwälzend, sie veranschaulichen, warum das politische Klima des Vormärz nach der 1848er Revolution zum Erliegen kam. Das von Rotteck für die erste Auflage verfasste Vorwort (1834) sieht dessen Aufgabe darin, eine breite Menge der Bürger, Gelehrten und Gebildeten zu belehren und den gemeinen Menschenverstand zu schärfen.
Die Versammlungsfreiheit war ein gesuchtes Gut, das erst einmal zu begründen und im Blick auf mögliche Beschränkungen zu untersuchen war. Die Performativität einer Versammlung – das Beieinandersein freier Individuen zu einem Zweck, der sich nicht oder nicht immer einer reglementierenden Norm verdankte – erscheint heute als Teil jener Ethik der Kohabitation, die aus der Kantischen Notwendigkeit der Koordination der Freiheitsräume als Aneinanderstoßen von Willkürgrenzen kommt und im Blick auf Gefährdungsszenarien aktualisiert ist. Doch Aktualisierungen bedürfen der Grundlage, wollen sie nicht geschichtsvergessen sein (niedergelegt in der Geschichte finden wir die Praktiken, die für die damaligen Akteure Sinn verbürgten).
The «spirit of the laws» is, as a concept, an answer to a problem of the laws. Regarding modern law, this problem is about unity: How can the manyness of the laws be coherent in one legal order? In my paper, I reconstruct three different models which establish unity as relational (Montesquieu), absolute (Kelsen), and interruptive (Schmitt). The interruptive model connects an aspect of the first with an aspect of the second model insofar it conceives unity as heterogeneous (related to something different) and nonetheless immanent (a unity in itself). As such, unity has to be thought of as a process or an activity. Schmitt’s account of this activity, however, leads to problematic consequences because it separates the activity from the norms and denies the political and democratic dimension of the laws; as a result, the difference between law and violence vanishes. Against this background, I argue for a different understanding of the immanent heterogeneity of the unity (and accordingly of what is called «spirit of the laws»). In this perspective, the spirit of the laws does no longer appear as the solution for the problem of the laws, but becomes the starting point of their critical investigation.
Wenn die Bedrohung, wie im Fall des Virus, als natürliche Gegebenheit auftritt, kommen leicht auch die Maßnahmen, um ihn zu beseitigen, als natürliche, d.h. fraglos vorgegebene Maßnahmen in Betracht. Eine Gefahr liegt hier darin, von einer Natürlichkeit des Zwecks auf die Natürlichkeit der Mittel zu schließen. Dass die Maßnahmen aber nicht natürlich gegeben, sondern politisch entschieden sind, muss demgegenüber im Blick bleiben.
In der gegenwärtigen Corona-Krise erscheinen die Entstehung der Krise – die Verbreitung der Krankheit Covid-19 zur Pandemie – und die Bewältigung der Krise – die rechtlichen Einschränkungen und Maßnahmen – scharf getrennt. Die Entstehung der Krise geht auf ein Stück Natur zurück, auf ein für Menschen bedrohliches Virus. Die Bewältigung der Krise geht mit staatlichem und gesellschaftlichem Handeln einher, das in zahlreichen Ländern im Rahmen rechtlicher Ausnahmezustände erfolgte. Den markanten Trennungspunkt zwischen Entstehung und Bewältigung der Krise bildet die Ausrufung der Ausnahmemaßnahmen, durch die in das Pandemiegeschehen interveniert wurde. Diese Einteilung kann den Eindruck erwecken, die mit Natur verbundene Entstehung der Krise sei eine Zeit, die gänzlich vor dem Handeln liegt: eben die Zeit des natürlichen Prozesses, die von der mit Handeln verbundenen Bewältigung der Krise abgekoppelt sei. Dieser Aufsatz zielt demgegenüber darauf, die Phasen der Entstehung und der Bewältigung der Corona- Krise in ihrer jeweiligen Ambivalenz hervortreten zu lassen. Das Ziel ist dabei ein doppeltes: Einerseits soll hervortreten, inwiefern die Phase der Entstehung der Krise nicht nur prä-aktiv und die Krise damit keine bloß natürlich gegebene, sondern auch eine gesellschaftlich gemachte ist. Andererseits soll deutlich werden, in welcher Weise die Phase der Bewältigung der Pandemie nicht allein krisenreaktiv, sondern auch krisenproduktiv ist.
Einleitend werde ich die genannte Zeitlichkeit – Entstehung und Bewältigung – erläutern, die einem gängigen Krisenverständnis zugrunde liegt, das auch in der gegenwärtigen Pandemie wirksam ist. Darauf werde ich darlegen, inwiefern das Denken des Ausnahmezustands ein Denken ebendieser Zeitlichkeit und damit zweier Phasen der Krise ist (I.1), und zeigen, warum sich die gegenwärtige Krise gerade aufgrund ihrer Verbindung mit Natur in dieses Denken einfügt (I.2). Auf dieser Grundlage gehe ich dazu über, ein komplizierteres Verständnis der gegenwärtigen Krise zu gewinnen, indem ich darlege, wie in ihrer Entstehung natürliche Prozessualität und gesellschaftliches Handeln untrennbar zusammenwirken (II.1) und an welchen Punkten ihrer Bewältigung die Krisenreaktion so in Krisenproduktion umschlägt, dass das gesellschaftliche bzw. staatliche Handeln wiederum auf Natur zurückwirkt (II.2). Durch diese Schritte soll deutlich werden, inwiefern sich in der gegenwärtigen Krise weder natürliche Prozesse und soziale Praxis noch Krisenreaktion und Krisenproduktion äußerlich gegenüberstehen, sondern intern verbunden sind. Das eingangs erläuterte Krisenverständnis erfährt dadurch eine Modifikation.
Menschenrechte und Ausnahmezustand sind zwei Weisen, durch die der moderne Staat seine rechtliche Ordnung nicht nur begründet und erhält, sondern auch immer wieder durchbricht. Zwischen ihnen besteht ein Gegensatz: Wo der Ausnahmezustand erklärt wird, werden Menschenrechte eingeschränkt.
Während die beiden Phänomene in ihrem Zweck entgegengesetzt sind, sind sie allerdings in ihren Mitteln verbunden. Darauf beruht ihr dialektisches Verhältnis, das in diesem Buch als Zusammenhang von Berechtigung und Entrechtung ausgewiesen wird. Dazu diskutiert der Autor im ersten Teil die Theorien von Souveränität und Ausnahmezustand bei Carl Schmitt und Giorgio Agamben. Im zweiten, philosophisch und historisch argumentierenden Teil zeigt er auf, dass das für die Menschenrechtsidee konstitutive Konzept der Rechtsperson staatliches (Ausnahme-)Handeln nicht nur begrenzt, sondern es auch ermöglicht.
Die Analyse zielt darauf, das positive Potential der Menschenrechte gegen ihre negativen Effekte in Stellung zu bringen und so gegenüber einer Logik der Maßnahme zu verteidigen.
Für die diesem Buch zugrunde liegende gleichnamige Dissertation wurde Jonas Heller 2018 mit dem Werner Pünder-Preis ausgezeichnet.
Lexikalische Merkmale der türkischen Rechtssprache : am Beispiel des neuen Strafgesetzbuches (YTCK)
(2019)
Ziel dieser Studie ist es, die Besonderheiten von Rechtstexten in türkischer Sprache am Beispiel des neuen türkischen Strafgesetzbuches (YTCK) zu analysieren. In der Arbeit soll untersucht werden, inwieweit das YTCK vom alten türkischen Strafgesetzbuch von 1926 (ETCK) abweicht. Im Fokus des Forschungsinteresses steht die lexikalische Struktur des YTCK. Diese Studie erfordert einen interdisziplinär ausgerichteten Ansatz, der Rechts- und Sprachwissenschaften integriert. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf der lexikalischen Analyse der Fachsprache des Rechts.
Ursprünglich sollte das vorliegende Buch nur eine Studie über die von der Kanzlei des Führers bzw. ihrem Umfeld nach Kriegsbeginn initiierten Entwürfe zu einem NS-„Euthanasie“-Gesetz werden. Dabei sollte vor allem der wichtige, allerdings mit zahlreichen Fehlern behaftete Beitrag von Roth/Aly(1984) revidiert werden. Da diese Fehler auch den Beginn der Debatte über die „Euthanasie“ im NS-Staat und den Beginn der Planung und Durchführung der „NS-Euthanasie“ (1939/1940) betrafen, musste weiter ausgeholt werden. Die Gesetzentwürfe aus der Zeit nach Kriegsbeginn machen unzweifelhaft deutlich, dass die am Krankenmord Beteiligten wussten, dass der auf den 1.9.1939 datierte „Euthanasie“-Erlass Hitlers in legaler Hinsicht nicht „ausreichte“.
UNESCO-Weltdokumentenerbe: Prof. Sybille Steinbacher zur Bedeutung der Akten des Auschwitz-Prozesses
(2017)
[Nachruf] Ilse Staff
(2018)
Kaum jemand hat sich in den 1950er und 1960er Jahre ähnlich intensiv für die strafrechtliche, aber auch die zivilgesellschaftliche Aufarbeitung der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltverbrechen eingesetzt wie Fritz Bauer. Dessen 50. Todestag am 1. Juli 2018 nahm das Fritz Bauer Institut zum Anlass, seinem Namensgeber zwei große Veranstaltungen zu widmen.