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Venture capital-backed firms, unavoidable value-destroying trade sales, and fair value protections
(2021)
This paper investigates the implications of the fair value protections contemplated by the standard corporate contract (i.e., the standard contract form for which corporate law provides) for the entrepreneur–venture capitalist relationship, focusing, in particular, on unavoidable value-destroying trade sales. First, it demonstrates that the typical entrepreneur–venture capitalist contract does institutionalize the venture capitalist’s liquidity needs, allowing, under some circumstances, for counterintuitive instances of contractually-compliant value destruction. Unavoidable value-destroying trade sales are the most tangible example. Next, it argues that fair value protections can prevent the entrepreneur and venture capitalist from allocating the value that these transactions generate as they would want. Then, it shows that the reality of venture capital-backed firms calls for a process of adaptation of the standard corporate contract that has one major step in the deactivation or re-shaping of fair value protections. Finally, it argues that a standard corporate contract aiming to promote social welfare through venture capital should feature flexible fair value protections.
We investigate the impact of reporting regulation on corporate innovation. Exploiting thresholds in Europe’s regulation and a major enforcement reform in Germany, we find that forcing firms to publicly disclose their financial statements discourages innovative activities. Our evidence suggests that reporting regulation has significant real effects by imposing proprietary costs on innovative firms, which in turn diminish their incentives to innovate. At the industry level, positive information spillovers (e.g., to competitors, suppliers, and customers) appear insufficient to compensate the negative direct effect on the prevalence of innovative activity. The spillovers instead appear to concentrate innovation among a few large firms in a given industry. Thus, financial reporting regulation has important aggregate and distributional effects on corporate innovation.
Venture capital-backed firms, unavoidable value-destroying trade sales, and fair value protections
(2020)
This paper investigates the implications of the fair value protections contemplated by the standard corporate contract (i.e., the standard contract form for which corporate law provides) for the entrepreneur–venture capitalist relationship, focusing, in particular, on unavoidable value-destroying trade sales. First, it demonstrates that the typical entrepreneur–venture capitalist contract does institutionalize the venture capitalist’s liquidity needs, allowing, under some circumstances, for counterintuitive instances of contractually-compliant value destruction. Unavoidable value-destroying
trade sales are the most tangible example. Next, it argues that fair value protections can prevent the entrepreneur and venture capitalist from allocating the value that these transactions generate as they would want. Then, it shows that the reality of venture capital-backed firms calls for a process of adaptation of the standard corporate contract that has one major step in the deactivation or re-shaping of fair value protections. Finally, it argues that a standard corporate contract aiming to promote social welfare through venture capital should feature flexible fair value protections
Der Beitrag bietet eine Übersicht zu den Zusammenhängen zwischen Immaterialgüterrechten (IP [intellectual property]-Rechte), Privatautonomie und Innovation. Demnach beruht das IP-Recht auf der Annahme, dass erst die Kombination aus fungiblen Ausschließlichkeitsrechten und Privatautonomie – also die juristische Form der Marktwirtschaft – einen innovationsförderlichen Effekt verspricht. Dementsprechend kombiniert das geltende Recht ein hohes materielles IP-Schutzniveau mit einer weitreichenden Anerkennung der Privatautonomie der Berechtigten. Dieser Regulierungsansatz hat den Vorteil, dass sehr anpassungsfähige Rahmenbedingungen für Innovationen geschaffen werden. Wer für seine Innovation eine umfassende Exklusivität benötigt, kann unter Geltung der beiden genannten Prinzipien ebenso operieren wie Akteure, die auf IP-Schutz teilweise oder ganz verzichten möchten, weil ihnen dies unter den gegebenen Wettbewerbsbedingungen vorzugswürdig erscheint. Und doch erläutert der Beitrag, dass die naheliegende Folgerung zu kurz greift, der Gesetzgeber könne sich darauf beschränken, möglichst umfassende und zugleich fungible IP-Rechte zu kodifizieren, da der Markt stets für eine effiziente und auch sonst sozial wünschenswerte Ressourcenallokation sorge. Denn die mit ausschließlichen IP-Rechten verbundenen Transaktionskosten stehen diesem Ziel nicht selten im Wege. Damit zeigt sich, dass keine noch so elaborierte Vertragsrechtstheorie die Frage nach dem Sinn des logisch vorrangigen Eigentums erübrigt.