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Rechtsaspekte des Forschungsdatenmanagements werfen nach wie vor viele Fragen für Forschende und Nachnutzende auf: Wer darf welche Daten zu welchen Zwecken erheben und verarbeiten? Wem können die Daten "zugeordnet" werden? Wer darf entscheiden, ob und wann sie veröffentlicht werden? Welche Lizenzen sind geeignet?
Um den Unsicherheiten im rechtlichen Umgang mit Forschungsdaten zu begegnen, hat HeFDI auf Basis des Gutachtens des DataJus-Projekts (https://tu-dresden.de/gsw/jura/igetem/jfbimd13/ressourcen/dateien/dateien/DataJus/DataJus_Zusammenfassung_Gutachten_12-07-18.pdf?lang=de) die hier publizierte Handreichung zusammengestellt. Die Handreichung dient dazu, Forschenden und Forschungsdatenmanager*innen einen gut verständlichen Zugang zu Rechtsfragen hinsichtlich Forschungsdaten zu ermöglichen. Das anschaulich konzipierte Material kann sowohl in Schulungen zum Datenmanagement als auch in konkreten Beratungsprozessen eingesetzt werden.
In einem ersten Schritt hat HeFDI die Themenfelder (I) Urheber- und Leistungsschutzrechte an Forschungsdaten sowie (II) Entscheidungsbefugnis über den Umgang mit Forschungsdaten in der hier publizierten Handreichung zusammengefasst.
Das vorliegende Material umfasst zum einen eine animierte Präsentation in editierbarem Format. Gleichzeitig stellt HeFDI den Inhalt der Präsentation sowohl editierbar als auch im PDF-Format als Druckvorlage für ein Handout o. Ä. im DIN A4-Format zur Verfügung.
Anforderungen an einen wissenschaftlicher Verbrechensbegriff werden im ersten Teil dieses Textes vorgestellt. Die folgende Untersuchung der „Allgemeinen Theorien des Verbrechens“ zeigt, dass diese ihren Anspruch nicht einlösen können, weil sie eines wissenschaftlich tragfähigen Verbrechensbegriffes entbehren. Doch indem sie diesen Mangel nicht erwähnen, sondern diese Leerstelle mit Schweigen oder losen Verbrechensbegriffen verhüllen, täuschen sie darüber hinweg.
Oft wird behauptet, ein Sachverständiger müsse — besonders im Falle eines die Tat nicht gestehenden Beschuldigten/Probanden — verschiedene vom Gericht für möglich angesehene Geschehensabläufe unterstellen und diese seiner Begutachtung zugrundelegen. Es wird gezeigt, dass dies nur dann nicht zu Fehlschlüssen führt, wenn die Frage nach der Existenz von Erfahrungssätzen getrennt wird von der nach Vorliegen von Symptomen bei dem Probanden und wenn die Antworten auf diese Fragen systematisch getrennt ausgewertet werden.
Freiburg School of Law and Economics, Freiburg (Lehrstuhl-)Tradition and the Genesis of Norms
(2014)
The paper analyzes the parallels and differences between the Freiburg School of Law and Economics represented by the works of Eucken (and Röpke) and the Freiburg (Lehrstuhl-)Tradition represented by the works of Hayek and Vanberg. The parallels are illustrated by making use of the constitutional economics concepts Ordnungspolitik (i.e., order of rules/choices over rules) as well as freedom of privileges and discrimination. The differences, which have received surprisingly little attention, include the following aspects: 1. philosophy of science and epistemology, 2. genesis of norms, and 3. political philosophy. The paper tackles these issues in three steps. The second chapter presents Vanberg’s constitutional economics theory with special emphasis on the concepts of citizen sovereignty and normative individualism. The third chapter reviews the ordoliberal concepts of science and the state which are – to a certain degree – elitist and expertocratic, that is, they rely to a considerable degree on intellectual experts (in particular, scientists) being part of the societal elite. The fourth chapter differentiates two kinds of genesis of norms: an evolutionary one and an elitist-expertocratic one allowing for a differentiation between Eucken’s and Röpke’s Ordoliberalism on the on the hand and Vanberg’s Hayekian -- and Buchanan-style constitutional economics approach on the other hand. The paper ends with a summary of the main findings.
This paper analyzes the inherent dangers of paternalist economic policies associated with the newly established economic sub-disciplines of behavioral economics, economic happiness research and economic psychology. While the authors in general welcome these sub-disciplines for enriching and critically evaluating mainstream economics – especially their criticism of the Homo oeconomicus-heuristic is of great value contributing to a more realistic idea of man –, the political-economic implications as well as inherent risks of paternalist economic policies should be received with concern and thus be subject to a critical review. The paper is structured as follows: In the first step, we recapitulate Kahneman’s, Thaler/Sunstein’s, and Layard’s versions of paternalism pointing at similarities and differences alike. We contrast libertarian or soft paternalism of behavioral economics (Thaler/Sunstein) and economic psychology (Kahneman) with (Layard’s) happiness economics and its hard paternalism. In the second step, we analyze the political and economic implications and consequences of paternalism. We give an overview of the main points of criticism of paternalism from a constitutional economics perspective. The Ordnungs- vs. Prozesspolitik argument is discussed as well as epistemological, political-economic or idea of man arguments. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
Following Foucault's analysis of German Neoliberalism (Ordoliberalism) and his thesis of ambiguity, this paper introduces a two-level distinction between individual and regulatory ethics. In particular, its aim is to reassess the importance of individual ethics in the conceptual framework of Ordoliberalism. The individual ethics of Ordoliberalism is based on the heritage of Judeo-Christian values and the Kantian individual liberty and responsibility. The regulatory or formal-institutional ethics of Ordoliberalism which has so far received most attention on the contrary refers to the institutional and legal framework of a socio-economic order. By distinguishing these two dimensions of ethics incorporated in German Neoliberalism, it is feasible to distinguish different varieties of neoliberalism and to link Ordoliberalism to modern economic ethics.
Variations and disparities between von Hayek and Ordoliberalism can be detected on diverse levels: 1. philosophy of science; 2. setting dissimilar priorities; 3. social philosophy; 4. genesis of norms; and, 5. notion of freedom. Therefore, it is possible to make an important distinction within neoliberalism itself, which contains at least two factions: von Hayek’s evolutionary liberalism, and German Ordoliberalism. The following essay not only takes the neoliberal separation of different varieties as granted; it proceeds further. It focuses on the topic of justice and elaborates the (slightly) differing conceptions of justice within neoliberalism. Thus, the specific contribution of the paper is that it adds a sixth dimension of differences (which is highly interconnected with the differing conceptions of genesis of norms). In this paper, I emphasize the (often neglected) subtle differences between von Hayek, Eucken, Röpke, and Rüstow, with special emphasis on their theories of justice. In this regard, I focus not only on Eucken and von Hayek; in addition, I include the concepts of justice developed by Rüstow and Röpke, as well, and, in consequence, broaden the perspective incorporating Eucken as a member of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics, and Rüstow and Röpke as representatives of Ordoliberalism in the wider sense. The paper tackles these topics in three steps. After briefly examining and discussing the existing literature and providing a literature overview on the decade-long debate on von Hayek and Ordoliberalism, I then describe von Hayek’s conception of commutative justice; particularly, justice of rules and procedures (rather than end-state justice). Then, I examine Eucken’s, Rüstow’s, and Röpke’s theories of justice, which consist of a mixture of commutative and distributive justice. Then, I draw a comparison between the ideas of justice developed by Eucken, Röpke, Rüstow, and von Hayek. The essay ends with a summary of my main findings.
4 June 2013 marked the formal launch of the third generation of the Equator Principles (EP III) and the tenth anniversary of the EPs – enough reasons for evaluating the EPs initiative from an economic ethics and business ethics perspective. This chapter deals with the following questions: What has been achieved so far by the EPs? Which reform steps need to be adopted to further strengthen the EPs framework? Can the EPs be regarded as a role model in the field of sustainable finance and CSR? The first part explains the term EPs and introduces the keywords related to the EPs framework. The second part summarises the main characteristics of the newly-released third generation of the EPs. The third part critically evaluates EP III from an economic ethical and business ethics perspective. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main findings.
Die Macht der Ratingagenturen beruht auch auf den vielen Gesetzen und Verordnungen, die eine Orientierung an den Ratings der drei großen Agenturen vorschreiben, sagt Wirtschaftsprofessor Reinhard Schmidt. Um die Macht der Ratingagenturen zu begrenzen, empfiehlt er viele dieser Regeln ersatzlos zu streichen.