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Capital maintenance rules are part of a legal capital regime that consists of rules on raising capital and rules on maintaining it. The function of these rules is the protection of the corporation’s creditors. This is evidenced by the fact that in public as well as private companies the provisions on legal capital are not open to disapplication or variation even with unanimous shareholder consent. Thus, providing the company with a minimum of funding and ensuring equal treatment of shareholders are mere reflexes of creditor protection or, at best, ancillary purposes of legal capital. Legal capital is part of a corporation’s equity. The key feature of equity is that it ranks behind the claims of other stakeholders in the distribution of a corporation’s assets. Consequently, equity will also be the first part of a corporation’s funds to be depleted by losses. Capital maintenance rules seek to enforce this order of priority of different groups of stakeholders by restricting distributions to shareholders. Such restrictions are not unique to legal systems that have adopted a legal capital regime. A prominent example of a statute that has eliminated mandatory legal capital is the Delaware General Corporation Law. § 154 DCGL leaves it up to the directors to decide whether any part of the consideration received by the corporation for its shares shall be attributed to capital. Thus, a Delaware corporation need not have any stated capital. This has significant impact on the funds available for distribution to shareholders. Pursuant to § 170 (a) DGCL dividends may only be paid out of surplus or, in the absence of surplus, out of net profits of the current or the preceding fiscal year. § 154 DGCL defines surplus as the excess of a corporation’s net assets over the amount of its capital, and net assets as the amount by which total assets exceed total liabilities. A corporation without stated capital may, therefore, distribute all of its net assets to its shareholders and continue business without any equity on its balance sheet. This highlights the difference between the different approaches to creditor protection in Germany and the U.S. Both legal systems acknowledge the priority of creditors over shareholders in corporate distributions. However, German law seeks to give creditors additional comfort by requiring companies to raise and maintain additional layers of assets above and beyond those corresponding to the company’s liabilities that may not be depleted by way of distributions to shareholders. While private companies must merely raise and maintain their stated capital, public companies are required to raise and maintain additional equity accounts unavailable for distributions to shareholders such as the share premium account1 and the legal reserve.2
In recent years a number of objections have been raised against this concept of creditor protection. Critics argue that contractual arrangements are a more efficient means for protecting the interests of creditors.3 Capital maintenance does not prevent creditors from negotiating for more stringent protection of their claims such as collateral or financial covenants. It does, however, provide a minimum standard of protection for the benefit of creditors who lack the commercial experience or the bargaining power or who, like tort victims, are simply unable to negotiate for contractual safeguards. Capital maintenance ensures that their protection against excessive distributions does not depend on large creditors who are free to waive covenants that, in effect, benefit all creditors in exchange for individual arrangements that work exclusively in their favour.
This study examines the legal environment of netting agreements covering financial contracts. It concludes that an international instrument should be developed capable of improving the effectiveness of netting agreements in mitigating systemic risk. To this end, two different aspects of the enforceability of netting agreements are considered: (i) the general enforceability of netting, and (ii) the possibility of precluding the operation of netting a mechanism by way of a regulatory moratorium for considerations of systemic stability. The first part of the study presents the use of netting and the various forms it may take before going on to explain the benefits and drawbacks of enforceable netting agreements. Benefits for individual firms consist in lower counterparty risk and more favourable capital requirements. Benefits for the financial market as a whole flow from greater financial market stability since the contagion of systemically relevant institutions by the default or insolvency of another institution is limited, thus helping to avoid systemic effects. Additionally, the use of netting arrangements can improve overall market liquidity. A potential drawback of enforceability of netting, in certain situations, is that the operation of a netting mechanism could actually work against the purpose of systemic stability where the transfer of parts of the business of an insolvent financial institution to a solvent bridge entity would enhance or maintain value to a greater extent than the operation of a netting agreement would. Regulatory authorities are considering under which conditions a moratorium to halt the netting mechanism until the situation is solved could avoid this threat to systemic stability. The second part of the study examines whether there is the potential to support the purpose of enhanced systemic stability by way of international harmonisation of private and insolvency law. As regards the issue of general enforceability, the global picture of netting legislation is heterogeneous. Given the great practical relevance of the matter, an international instrument could be very useful. As to the issue of private law consequences of regulatory moratoria, the absence of a harmonised framework appears to lead to actual cross-border inconsistency and legal uncertainty as regards financial contracts that are governed by a foreign law. Taking these to aspects into account, this paper recommends that work on developing an international instrument be undertaken. The final part of the study suggests a set of preliminary guidelines for the development of suchan instrument. In the light of the findings of the previous sections, a mixed, two-step approach is recommended. First, a non-binding instrument could be developed, serving as a benchmark and reservoir of legal solutions in respect of the relevant issues. Secondly, isolated aspects relating to both the general enforceability of netting and the accommodation of a regulatory moratorium in foreign private and insolvency law could be dealt with in an international Convention, in particular where cross-border situations involving netting require uniformity of applicable legal rules.
Lessons from the crisis
(2009)
A lot happened even before the perceived beginning of this crisis in 2007, so although the events are recent, I will give an overview from a US perspective of the period from 2001 to date, in our search for the lessons to be learned. Much of it is probably familiar, but worth revisiting. I will break this necessarily simplified account into 3 stages: first, a look at the key factors that led to the increasing riskiness of US home mortgages; second, how those risks were transmitted as securities from US housing lenders to institutional investors around the globe; and third, how those risks led to huge losses and created a credit crunch that moved the impact from the financial economy to the real economy and produced a severe recession. Then we will have a factual foundation for deriving the lessons that ought to be taken away from this very expensive experience.