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The European Union is currently challenged by right-wing populism and economic stress. To understand the nature of these challenges, we need to take an interdisciplinary approach in which empirical studies of politics are combined with studies of the normative implications of European policy-making. To this end, I draw attention to the right to free movement, which is pivotal both for European politics and liberal political philosophy. I show that even though transnational rights, such as the free movement for people, products and money, are normatively sound and desirable, enhancement of free movement may challenge the heterogeneity among the national models of rights and societal commitments. The risk is that the national institutions as a political arena face difficulties in coping with current political challenges such as right-wing radicalism, social inequality, environmental regulation, immigration and financial insecurity. On the other hand, I argue that we should be aware that the transnational rights might in some countries enhance human rights, which national parliaments have not been able to accommodate.
The paper examines obligations towards bearers of the right to asylum in circumstances of partial compliance. Who should bear the burdens when a state responsible for assisting bearers of the right to asylum fails to comply with the requirements of justice and unjustly defaults on its responsibilities? Are the complying states obligated to ‘take up the slack’ and assist the bearers of the right to asylum, or are they obligated to bear only their ‘fair share’ of burdens in the global protection of the right to asylum? The paper argues that the complying states with the capacity to assist can have an obligation of justice to assist bearers of the right to asylum when other states unjustly default on their responsibilities.
Brock and justification
(2011)
In this article I consider Thomas Pogge’s thesis that affluent countries are violating the human rights of the global poor by contributing support to the current global institutional order. My claim is that affluent countries are not violating the human rights of the global poor in the ways suggested by Pogge. I start by defining a set of conditions that ought to obtain in order to say that a human rights violation has taken place. Then I consider two possible interpretations of Pogge’s thesis and argue that none of them fulfills the conditions required to speak of a human rights violation. On my view, as long as domestic states have the capacity to fulfill the human rights of their own people, poverty constitutes a domestic human rights violation even if the international institutional order somehow contributes to creating this state of affairs. Finally, I examine what transnational duties human rights entail and claim that affluent countries must contribute to the creation of an international order providing domestic states accurate background conditions for the promotion of human rights at the domestic level.
The paper argues that the current global market is organized by a system of transnational law whose development is best characterized as ambivalent. On the one side, legal juridification can lead to a hegemonic system of international law that lacks legitimacy, paradoxically creates extralegal spheres, promotes the ‘privatization’ of political areas, and, thereby, reduces the competences of states. On the other side, legal codification can also function as an engine of transnational democratization and as a barrier to an unhampered growth of transnational administrative and executive power. Scholarship on the idea of legitimacy in law and transnational governance in political and legal theory has to reflect these aspects of juridification on a world scale. Most approaches to the issue, however, have serious flaws: they neither offer an adequate empirical diagnosis of the de-embedding of international economic and legal processes, nor do they provide convincing proposals as to how such processes could be domesticated. Against this background, the paper lays out a critical analysis of legal codification processes as well as proposing an account of democratic governance, based on a realistic conception of deliberative democracy.
G. A. Cohen argues that John Rawls’s focus on the basic structure of society as the exclusive subject of social justice is misguided. I argue that two understandings of the notion of basic structure seem to be present in the literature, either in implicit or in explicit terms. (1) According to the first, the basic structure is to be equated with a given set of institutions: if they endorse the right principles of justice, the basic structure of society is just; (2) According to the second, a society has a just basic structure if and only if its institutional web manages to realize the relevant principles of justice as well it can. In (2), the institutional structure is not a given: different social circumstances call for different institutional solutions in order to achieve a just basic structure overall. The first part of the paper make a case for (2), and explores some of its normative implications. The second part asks which consequences this understanding may have for the idea of a global basic structure.
Rhetoric and global justice
(2008)
Activists have long recognized the importance of rhetoric and emotional appeal in building support for the global justice movement. However, many political theorists worry that the use of rhetoric may obstruct clear presentation of the issues at stake, and may result in our policies being determined by where the sympathies of the best rhetoricians lie. In this article I examine the ways in which contemporary theorists try to accommodate the need for rhetoric and emotional appeal, and I argue that their attempts are unsatisfactory because they view rhetoric as a tool or skill that can be used to manipulate people to support any position. Yet if we question the sharp separation between rhetoric and reason, then the aims of building support for a cause, identifying the causes we ought to support, and treating others with respect need no longer conflict. Re-examining the radical liberal theories of J.S. Mill, L.T. Hobhouse and J.A. Hobson, will help us to see how this separation might be questioned and rhetoric recovered as a respectful and respectable form of argument.
The origin and justification of human rights, whether anchored in biological theory, natural law theory, or interests theory, as well as their cultural specificity and actual value as international legal instruments are subject to ongoing lively debates. As theoretical and rhetorical discourses challenge and enrich current understanding of the value of human rights and their relevance to democratic governance, they have found their way into public health in recent decades and play today an increasing role in the shaping of health policies, programs and practice. Human rights define the obligations of states to their people and towards each other, create grounds for governmental accountability and inspire recognition of, and action on, factors influencing people’s attainment of the highest possible standard of health. This article highlights the evolution that has brought health and human rights together in mutually reinforcing ways. It draws from the experience gained in the global response to HIV/AIDS, summarizes key dimensions of public health and of human rights and suggests a manner in which these dimensions intersect in a framework for analysis and action.
"Entre direitos iguais, a força decide", proferiu karl marx ao descrever a antinomia do direito em situações antagônicas das relações de produção capitalistas, em que "o direito [oferece resistência] ao direito" nesse ponto, marx aborda uma questão que se situa no centro de todas as teorias jurídicas críticas: que tipo de violência é velada por meio do mecanismo de ocultação denominado "direito"? Para responder a esta questão, tentar-se-á, a seguir, tornar a teoria da hegemonia de antonio gramsci e seu modelo de direito hegemônico produtivos para o campo da teoria do direito. Tal tarefa tem de lidar com a dupla dificuldade de que, por um lado, gramsci não foi um teórico do direito no sentido mais estrito, razão pela qual o potencial de sua teoria para uma análise do direito raramente foi utilizada. Por outro lado, sua abordagem só pode ser empregada por meio de uma crítica às restrições relacionadas a seu tempo. isso se aplica especialmente à sua concepção de economia como a base e a núcleo essencialista oculto (laclau; mouffe, 2001:69), assim como à sua ideia de 'classismo' sob a forma de um enfoque unilateral das classes, em que há preferencialmente mais de um "pluralismo de poder" e inúmeras lutas (litowitz, 2000: 536). Recuperar-se-á, consequentemente, argumentos-chave, ampliando-os pela utilização das recentes descobertas feitas pelas abordagens feminista e neomaterialista da teoria jurídica, bem como as análises de foucault acerca das tecnologias de poder. por fim, uma interpretação da teoria sistêmica das autonomizações comunicativas.