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This Paper will look at the changing nature of asset management, and will examine the nature of the European framework for collective investment undertakings, enshrined in the UCITS Directive2 in that light. This question whether the UCITS Directive in its current form remains an appropriate European response to the changing investment management landscape is an issue with which the European Commission is actively engaging through its Green Paper on the Enhancement of the EU Framework for Investment Funds, published in July 2005.3 But before considering these important questions, it is necessary to begin with an idea of what a collective investment, more specifically a UCITS actually is and how it fits conceptually in the broader world of pooled investments.....
This paper makes a case for the future development of European corporate law through regulatory competition rather than EC legislation. It is for the first time becoming legally possible for firms within the EU to select the national company law that they wish to govern their activities. A significant number of firms can be expected to exercise this freedom, and national legislatures can be expected to respond by seeking to make their company laws more attractive to firms. Whilst the UK is likely to be the single most successful jurisdiction in attracting firms, the presence of different models of corporate governance within Europe make it quite possible that competition will result in specialisation rather than convergence, and that no Member State will come to dominate as Delaware has done in the US. Procedural safeguards in the legal framework will direct the selection of laws which increase social welfare, as opposed simply to the welfare of those making the choice. Given that European legislators cannot be sure of the ‘optimal’ model for company law, the future of European company law-making would better be left with Member States than take the form of harmonized legislation.
Plenarvortrag Weltkongress der Rechtsphilosophie und Sozialphilosophie, 24.-29. Mai, Granada 2005. S.a. die deutsche Fassung: "Die anonyme Matrix: Menschenrechtsverletzungen durch "private" transnationale Akteure". Spanische Fassung: Sociedad global, justicia fragmentada: sobre la violatión de los derechos humanos por actores transnacionales 'privados'. In: Manuel Escamilla and Modesto Saavedra (eds.), Law and Justice in a global society, International Association for philosophy of law and social philosophy, Granada 2005, S. 547-562 und in "Anales de öa Catedra Francisco Suarez 2005". S.a. Teubner, Gunther: Globalized Justice - Fragmented Justice. Human Rights Violations by "Private" Transnational Actors
Dt. Fassung: Der Umgang mit Rechtsparadoxien: Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter. In: Christian Joerges und Gunther Teubner (Hg.) Rechtsverfassungsrecht: Recht-Fertigungen zwischen Sozialtheorie und Privatrechtsdogmatik. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2003, 249-272.
In the current globalization debate the law appears to be entangled in economic and political developments which move into a new dimension of depoliticization, de-centralization and de-individualization. For all the correct observations in detail, though, this debate is bringing about a drastic (polit)economic reduction of the role of law in the globalization process that I wish to challenge in this paper. Here one has to take on Wallerstein’s misconception of “worldwide economies” according to which the formation of the global society is seen as a basically economic process. Autonomous globalization processes in other social spheres running parallel to economic globalization need to be taken seriously. In protest against such (polit)economic reductionism several strands of the debate, among them the neo-institutionalist theory of “global culture”, post-modern concepts of global legal pluralism, systems theory studies of differentiated global society and various versions of “global civil society” have shaped a concept of a polycentric globalization. From these angles the remarkable multiplicity of the world society, in which tendencies to re-politicization, re-regionalization and re-individualization are becoming visible at the same time, becomes evident. I shall contrast two current theses on the globalization of law with two less current counter-theses: First thesis: globalization is relevant for law because the emergence of global markets undermines the control potential of national policy, and therefore also the chances of legal regulation. First counter-thesis: globalization produces a set of problems intrinsic to law itself, consisting in a change to the dominant lawmaking processes. Second thesis: globalization means that the law institutionalizes the worldwide shift in power from governmental actors to economic actors. Second counter-thesis: globalization means that the law has a chance of contributing to a dual constitution of autonomous sectors of world society.
s.a.: Das Recht hybrider Netzwerke. Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht 165, 2001, 550-575.. Italienische Fassung: Diritti ibridi: la costituzionalizzazione delle reti private di governance. In: Gunther Teubner, Costituzionalismo societario. Armando, Roma 2004 (im Erscheinen).
Deutsche Fassung: Rechtsentfremdungen: Zum gesellschaftlichen Mehrwert des zwölften Kamels. Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 21, 2000, 189-215 und in Gunther Teubner (Hg.) Die Rückgabe des zwölften Kamels: Niklas Luhmann in der Diskussion über Gerechtigkeit. Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart 2000, 189-215. Französische Fassung: Les multiples aliénations du droit : Sur la plus-value sociale du douzième chameau. Droit et Société 47, 2001, 75-100. Polnische Fassung: Sprawiedliwosc alienujaca : O dodatkowej wartosci dwunastego wielblada. Ius et Lex 1, 2002, 109-132. Italienische Fassung: Le molteplici alienazioni del diritto : Sul plusvalore sociale del dodicesimo camello. In: Annamaria Rufino und Gunther Teubner, Il diritto possibile: Funzioni e prospettive del medium giuridico. Guerini, Milano, 2005, 93-130.
Deutsche Fassung: Die Episteme des Rechts. Zu den erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen des reflexiven Rechts. In: Dieter Grimm (Hg.) Steigende Staatsaufgaben - sinkende Steuerungsfähigkeit des Rechts. Nomos, Baden-Baden 1990, 115-154. Französische Fassung: Pour une épistémologie constructiviste du droit. In Gunther Teubner, Droit et réflexivité. Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris 1994, 171-204. Veränderte Fassung in: Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations 1992, Paris, 1149-1169. Italienische Fassung: Il diritto come soggetto epistemico: Per una epistemologie giuridica "costruttivista," Rivista critica del diritto privato 8, 1990, 287-326.
By order of 29 November 1999 the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC two questions regarding the interpretation of the "doorstep-selling directive", and the "consumer credit directive", which arose in the course of proceedings involving Mr and Mrs Heininger, who took out from the Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG bank a loan to purchase a flat, secured by a charge on the property (Grundschuld). Five years later they sought to cancel the credit agreement, maintaining that an estate agent had called uninvited at their home and induced them to purchase the flat in question and - at the same time acting on a self-employed basis as agent for the bank - to enter into the loan agreement, without informing them of their right of cancellation. Article 1 para. 1 of the doorstep-selling directive provides that it applies to contracts under which a trader supplies goods or services to a consumer and which are concluded during a visit by a trader to the consumer's home where the visit does not take place at the express request of the consumer'. Article 3 para. 2 a) of that directive provides that the directive shall not apply to contracts for the construction, sale and rental of immovable property or contracts concerning other rights relating to immovable property. Article 4 of the directive provides that traders shall be required to give consumers written notice of their right of cancellation. Article 5 provides that the consumer shall have the right to cancel the contract within seven days from receipt by the consumer of the notice. Article 2 of the consumer credit directive provides that it shall not apply to credit agreements intended primarily for the purpose of acquiring or retaining property rights in land or in an existing or projected building, and that Article 1 a) and Articles 4 to 12 of the directive shall not apply to credit agreements, secured by mortgage on immovable property. The German legislation transposing the doorstep-selling directive (the "HWiG") provides for a right of cancellation by the consumer within a period of one week, if a transaction is entered into away from the trader's business premises. The cooling-off period does not start to run until the customer receives a notice in writing containing information on this right and if that notice is not given, the right of cancellation will not lapse until one month after both parties have performed their obligations under the agreement in full. Section 5 para. 2 of the HwiG provides that where the transaction also falls within the scope of the legislation transposing the consumer credit directive (the "VerbrKrG"), only the provisions of the latter are to apply. Section 3 para. 2 of the VerbrKrG, in setting out the exceptions to the scope of that law, provides that inter alia Section 7 (right of cancellation) shall not apply to credit agreements in which credit is subject to the giving of security by way of a charge on immovable property, and is granted on usual terms for credits secured by a charge on immovable property and the intermediate financing of the same. Given this legal framework it is obvious that the Heiningers could not cancel the credit agreement according to the VerbrKrG. Although the agreement constitutes a consumer credit under section 1 VerbrKrG, the right of revocation is excluded by section 3 para. 2 VerbrKrG, the exclusion of which is backed by the consumer credit directive. Although the credit agreement was entered into away from the banks business premises, they as well could not cancel it under the HWiG since this law is not applicable to consumer credit agreements. Thus, the claim of the Heiningers was denied by German courts until the Federal Court of Justice raised the question, if the subsidiarity clause in section 5 para. 2 of the HWiG constitutes a contradiction to the provisions of the door step selling directive.
In the early Nineties the Hague Conference on International Private Law on initiative of the United States started negotiations on a Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the "Hague Convention"). In October 1999 the Special Commission on duty presented a preliminary text, which was drafted quite closely to the European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the "Brussels Convention"). The latter was concluded between the then 6 Member States of the EEC in Brussels in 1968 and amended several times on occasion of the entry of new Member States. In 2000, after the Treaty of Amsterdam altered the legal basis for judicial co-operation in civil matters in Europe, it was transformed into an EC Regulation (the "Brussels I Regulation"). The 1999 draft of the Hague Convention was heavily criticized by the USA and other states for its European approach of a double convention, regulating not only the recognition and enforcement of judgments, but at the same time the extent of and the limits to jurisdiction to adjudicate in international cases. During a diplomatic conference in June 2001 a second draft was presented which contained alternative versions of several articles and thus resembled more the existing dissent than a draft convention would. Difficulties to reach a consensus remained, especially with regard to activity based jurisdiction, intellectual property, consumer rights and employee rights. In addition, the appropriateness of the whole draft was questioned in light of the problems posed by the de-territorialization of relevant conduct through the advent of the Internet. In April 2002 it was decided to continue negotiations on an informal level on the basis of a nucleus approach. The core consensus as identified by a working group, however, was not very broad. The experts involved came to the conclusion that the project should be limited to choice of court agreements. In March 2004 a draft was presented which sets out its aims as follows: "The objective of the Convention is to make exclusive choice of court agreements as effective as possible in the context of international business. The hope is that the Convention will do for choice of court agreements what the New York Convention of 1958 has done for arbitration agreements." In April 2004 the Special Commission of the Hague Conference adopted a Draft "Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements", which according to its Art. 2 No. 1 a) is not applicable to choice of court agreements, to which a natural person acting primarily for personal, family or household purposes (a consumer) is a party". The broader project of a global judgments convention thus seems to be abandoned, or at least to be postponed for an unlimited time period. There are - of course - several reasons why the Hague Judgments project failed. Samuel Baumgartner has described an important one as the "Justizkonflikt" between the United States and Europe or, more specifically Germany. Within the context of the general topic of this conference, that is (international) jurisdiction for human rights, in the remainder of this presentation I shall elaborate on the socio-cultural aspects of the impartiality of judgments and their enforcement on a global scale.
In April 2003 I commented on the European Commission’s Action Plan on a More Coherent European Contract Law [COM(2003) 68 final] and the Green Paper on the Modernisation of the 1980 Rome Convention [COM(2002) 654 final].1 While the main argument of that paper, i.e. the common neglect of the inherent interrelation between both the further harmonisation of substantive contract law by directives or through an optional European Civil Code on the one hand and the modernisation of conflict rules for consumer contracts in Art. 5 Rome Convention on the other hand, remain pressing issues, and as the German Law Journal continues its efforts in offering timely and critical analysis on consumer law issues,2 there is a variety of recent developments worth noting.
Reflexive transnational law : the privatisation of civil law and the civilisation of private law
(2002)
The author examines the emergence of a transnational private law in alternative dispute resolution bodies and private norm formulating agencies from a reflexive law perspective. After introducing the concept of reflexive law he applies the idea of law as a communicative system to the ongoing debate on the existence of a New Law Merchant or lex mercatoria. He then discusses some features of international commercial arbitration (e.g. the lack of transparency) which hinder self-reference (autopoiesis) and thus the production of legal certainty in lex mercatoria as an autonomous legal system. He then contrasts these findings with the Domain Name Dispute Resolution System, which as opposed to Lex Mercatoria was rationally planned and highly formally organised by WIPO and ICANN, and which is allowing for self-reference and thus is designed as an autopoietic legal system, albeit with a very limited scope, i.e. the interference of abusive domain name registrations with trademarks (cybersquatting). From the comparison of both examples the author derives some preliminary ideas regarding a theory of reflexive transnational law, suggesting that the established general trend of privatisation of civil law need to be accompanied by a civilisation of private law, i.e. the constitutionalization of transnational private regimes by embedding them into a procedural constitution of freedom.
S.a. Deutsche Fassung: Ökonomie der Gabe - Positivität der Gerechtigkeit: Gegenseitige Heimsuchungen von System und différance. In: Albrecht Koschorke und Cornelia Vismann (Hg.) System - Macht - Kultur: Probleme der Systemtheorie. Akademie, Berlin 1999, 199-212. Auch auf unserem Server vorhanden. * Italienische Fassung: Economia del dono, positività della giustizia: la reciproca paranoia di Jacques Derrida e Niklas Luhmann. Sociologia e politiche sociali 6, 2003, 113-130. Portugiesische Fassung: Economia da dádiva ? posividade da rustica; ?assombracao?? mutua entre sistema e différance. In: Gunther Teubner, Direito, Sistema, Policontexturalidade, Editora Unimep, Piracicaba Sao Paolo, Brasil 2005, 55-78.
Globalized justice - fragmented justice. Human rights violations by "private" transnational actors
(2005)
Plenarvortrag Weltkongress der Rechtsphilosophie und Sozialphilosophie, 24.-29. Mai, Granada 2005. S.a. die deutsche Fassung: "Die anonyme Matrix: Menschenrechtsverletzungen durch "private" transnationale Akteure". Spanische Fassung: Sociedad global, justicia fragmentada: sobre la violatión de los derechos humanos por actores transnacionales 'privados'. In: Manuel Escamilla and Modesto Saavedra (eds.), Law and Justice in a global society, International Association for philosophy of law and social philosophy, Granada 2005, S. 529-546.
Deutsche Fassung: Expertise als soziale Institution: Die Internalisierung Dritter in den Vertrag. In: Gert Brüggemeier (Hg.) Liber Amicorum Eike Schmidt. Müller, Heidelberg, 2005, 303-334.
Deutsche Fassung: Vertragswelten: Das Recht in der Fragmentierung von private governance regimes. Rechtshistorisches Journal 17, 1998, 234-265. Italienische Fassung: Mondi contrattuali. Discourse rights nel diritto privato. In: Gunther Teubner, Diritto policontesturale: Prospettive giuridiche della pluralizzazione dei mondi sociali. La città del sole, Neapel 1999, 113-142. Portugiesische Fassung: Mundos contratuais: o direito na fragmentacao de regimes de private governance. In: Gunther Teubner, Direito, Sistema, Policontexturalidade, Editora Unimep, Piracicaba Sao Paolo, Brasil 2005, 269-298.
s.a. Deutsche Fassung: Rechtshistorisches Journal 15, 1996, 255-290 und in: Eric Schwarz (Hg.) La théorie des systèmes: une approche inter- et transdisciplinaire. Bösch, Sion 1996, 101-119. Italienische Fassung: La Bukowina globale: il pluralismo giuridico nella società mondiale. Sociologic a politiche sociali 2, 1999, 49-80. Portugiesische Fassung: Bukowina global sobre a emergência de um pluralismo jurídico transnacional. Impulso: Direito e Globalização 14, 2003. Georgische Fassung: Globaluri bukovina: samarTlebrivi pluralizmi msoflio sazogadoebaSi. Journal of the Institute of State and Law of the Georgian Academy of Sciences 2005 (im Erscheinen)
s.a. Deutsche Fassung: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie. Beiheft 65, 1996, 199-220. Italienische Fassung: Altera pars audiatur: Il diritto nella collisione dei discorsi. In: Gunther Teubner, Diritto policontesturale: Prospettive giuridiche della pluralizzazione dei mondi sociali. La città del sole, Neapel 1999, 27-70. Französische Fassung: Altera pars audiatur: le droit dans la collision des discours. Droit et Société 35, 1997, 99-123. Portugiesische Fassung: Altera pars audiatur: o direito na colisao de disursos. In: J.A. Lindgren Alves, Gunther Teubner, Joaquim Leonel de Rezende Alvim, Dorothe Susanne Rüdiger, Direito e Cidadania na Pos-Modernidade. Editora Unimep, Piracicaba, Brasilia 2002; 93-129.
Reflexives Recht. Entwicklungsmodelle des Rechts in vergleichender Perspektive (EUI Working Paper 1982/13). Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 68, 1982, 13-59, und in: Werner Maihofer (Hg.), Noi si Mura, Schriftenreihe des Europäischen Hochschulinstituts, Florenz 1986, 290-340. Englische Fassung: Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law. (EUI Working Paper 1982/14). Law and Society Review 17, 1983, 239-285 und in: Kahei Rokumoto (Hg.) Sociological Theories of Law. Dartmouth, Aldershot 1994, 415-462. Neuabdruck in: Carroll Seron, The Law and Society Canon, Ashgate, Aldershot 2005 (im Erscheinen). Französische Fassung: Eléments 'substantifs' et 'réflexifs' dans le droit moderne. L'Interdit. Revue de Psychanalyse Institutionelle, 1984, 129-132, und Droit et réflexivité: une perspective comparative sur des modèles d'évolution juridique in: Gunther Teubner, Droit et réflexivité. Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris 1994, 3-50. Dänische Fassung: Refleksiv Ret: Udviklingsmodeller i sammenlignende perspektiv. In: Asmund Born, Nils Bredsdorff, Leif Hansen and Finn Hansson (Hg.) Refleksiv Ret. Publication Series of the Institut for Organisation og Arbeidssociologi. Nytfrasamfundsvidenskaberne, Kopenhagen 1988, 21-79.
This paper has shown that some of the principal arguments against shareholder voice are unfounded. It has shown that shareholders do own corporations, and that the nature of their property interest is structured to meet the needs of the relationships found in stock corporations. The paper has explained that fiduciary and other duties restrain the actions of shareholders just as they do those of management, and that critics cannot reasonably expect court-imposed fiduciary duties to extend beyond the actual powers of shareholders. It has also illustrated how, although corporate statutes give shareholders complete power to structure governance as they will, the default governance structures of U.S. corporations leaves shareholders almost powerless to initiate any sort of action, and the interaction between state and federal law makes it almost impossible for shareholders to elect directors of their choice. Lastly, the paper has recalled how the percentage of U.S. corporate equities owned by institutional investors has increased dramatically in recent decades, and it has outlined some of the major developments in shareholder rights that followed this increase. I hope that this paper deflated some of the strong rhetoric used against shareholder voice by contrasting rhetoric to law, and that it illustrated why the picture of weak owners painted in the early 20th century should be updated to new circumstances, which will help avoid projecting an old description as a current normative model that perpetuates the inevitability of "managerialsm", perhaps better known as "dirigisme".
"In this paper, I analyse the conduct of business rules included in the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID) which has replaced the Investment Services Directive (ISD). These rules, in addition to being part of the regulation of investment intermediaries, operate as contractual standards in the relationships between intermediaries and their clients. While the need to harmonise similar rules is generally acknowledged, in the present paper I ask whether the Lamfalussy regulatory architecture, which governs securities lawmaking in the EU, has in some way improved regulation in this area. In section II, I examine the general aspects of the Lamfalussy process. In section III, I critically analyse the MiFID s provisions on conduct of business obligations, best execution of transactions and client order handling, taking into account the new regime of trade internalisation by investment intermediaries and the ensuing competition between these intermediaries and market operators. In sectionIV, I draw some general conclusions on the re-regulation made under the Lamfalussy regulatory structure and its limits. In this section, I make a few preliminary comments on the relevance of conduct of business rules to contract law, the ISD rules of conduct and the role of harmonisation."
This Article concerns the duty of care in American corporate law. To fully understand that duty, it is necessary to distinguish between roles, functions, standards of conduct, and standards of review. A role consists of an organized and socially recognized pattern of activity in which individuals regularly engage. In organizations, roles take the form of positions, such as the position of the director. A function consists of an activity that an actor is expected to engage in by virtue of his role or position. A standard of conduct states the way in which an actor should play a role, act in his position, or conduct his functions. A standard of review states the test that a court should apply when it reviews an actor’s conduct to determine whether to impose liability, grant injunctive relief, or determine the validity of his actions. In many or most areas of law, standards of conduct and standards of review tend to be conflated. For example, the standard of conduct that governs automobile drivers is that they should drive carefully, and the standard of review in a liability claim against a driver is whether he drove carefully. Similarly, the standard of conduct that governs an agent who engages in a transaction with his principal is that the agent must deal fairly, and the standard of review in a claim by the principal against an agent, based on such a transaction, is whether the agent dealt fairly. The conflation of standards of conduct and standards of review is so common that it is easy to overlook the fact that whether the two kinds of standards are or should be identical in any given area is a matter of prudential judgment. In a corporate world in which information was perfect, the risk of liability for assuming a given corporate role was always commensurate with the incentives for assuming the role, and institutional considerations never required deference to a corporate organ, the standards of conduct and review in corporate law might be identical. In the real world, however, these conditions seldom hold, and in American corporate law the standards of review pervasively diverge from the standards of conduct. Traditionally, the two major areas of American corporate law that involved standards of conduct and review have been the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does involve his own self-interest. The duty of care concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does not involve his own self-interest.
Revised Draft: January 2005, First Draft: December 8, 2004 The picture of dispersed, isolated and uninterested shareholders so graphically drawn by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in 19321 is for the most part no longer accurate in today's market, although their famous observations on the separation of control and ownership of public corporations remain true.
Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany
(2003)
The attitude expressed by Carl Fuerstenberg, a leading German banker of his time, succinctly embodies one of the principal issues facing the large enterprise – the divergence of interest between the management of the firm and outside equity shareholders. Why do, or should, investors put some of their savings in the hands of others, to expend as they see fit, with no commitment to repayment or a return? The answers are far from simple, and involve a complex interaction among a number of legal rules, economic institutions and market forces. Yet crafting a viable response is essential to the functioning of a modern economy based upon technology with scale economies whose attainment is dependent on the creation of large firms.
With the Council regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, that came into effect May 31, 2002 the European Union has introduced a legal framework for dealing with cross-border insolvency proceedings. In order to achieve the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of insolvency proceedings having cross-border effects within the European Community, the provisions on jurisdiction, recognition and applicable law in this area are contained in a Regulation, a Community law measure which is binding and directly applicable in Member States. The goals of the Regulation, with 47 articles, are to enable cross-border insolvency proceedings to operate efficiently and effectively, to provide for co-ordination of the measures to be taken with regard to the debtor’s assets and to avoid forum shopping. The Insolvency Regulation, therefore, provides rules for the international jurisdiction of a court in a Member State for the opening of insolvency proceedings, the (automatic) recognition of these proceedings in other Member States and the powers of the ‘liquidator’ in the other Member States. The Regulation also deals with important choice of law (or: private international law) provisions. The Regulation is directly applicable in the Member States3 for all insolvency proceedings opened after 31 May 2002.
Increasingly, alternative investments via hedge funds are gaining importance in Germany. Just recently, this subject was taken up in the legal literature, too; this resulted in a higher product transparency. However, German investment law and, particularly, the special division "hedge funds" is still a field dominated by practitioners. First, the present situation shall be outlined. In addition, a description of the current development is given, in which the practical knowledge of the author is included. Finally, the hedge fund regulation intended by the legislator at the beginning of the year 2004 is legally evaluated against this background.
In response to recent developments in the financial markets and the stunning growth of the hedge fund industry in the United States, policy makers, most notably the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), are turning their attention to the regulation, or lack thereof, of hedge funds. U.S. regulators have scrutinized the hedge fund industry on several occasions in the recent past without imposing substantial regulatory constraints. Will this time be any different? The focus of the regulators’ interest has shifted. Traditionally, they approached the hedge fund industry by focusing on systemic risk to and integrity of the financial markets. The current inquiry is almost exclusively driven by investor protection concerns. What has changed? First, since 2000, new kinds of investors have poured capital into hedge funds in the United States, facilitated by the “retailization” of hedge funds through the development of funds of hedge funds and the dismal performance of the stock market. Second, in a post-Enron era, regulators and policy makers are increasingly sensitive to investor protection concerns. On May 14 and 15, 2003, the SEC held for the first time a public roundtable discussion on the single topic of hedge funds. Among the investor protection concerns highlighted were: an increase in incidents of fraud, inadequate suitability determinations by brokers who market hedge fund interests to individual investors, conflicts of interest of managers who manage mutual funds and hedge funds side-by-side, a lack of transparency that hinders investors from making informed investment decisions, layering of fees, and unbounded discretion by managers in pricing private hedge fund securities. Although there has been discussion about imposing wide-ranging restrictions onhedge funds, such as reining in short selling, requiring disclosure of long/short positions and limiting leverage, such a response would be heavy-handed and probably unnecessary. The existing regulatory regime is largely adequate to address the most flagrant abuses. Moreover, as the hedge fund market further matures, it is likely that institutional investors will continue to weed out weak performers and mediocre or dishonest hedge fund managers. What is likely to emerge from the newest regulatory focus on investor protection is a measured response that would enhance the SEC’s enforcement and inspection authority, while leaving hedge funds’ inherent investment flexibility largely unfettered. A likely scenario, for example, might be a requirement that some, or possibly all, hedge fund sponsors register with the SEC as investment advisers. Today, most are exempt from registration, although more and more are registering to provide advice to public hedge funds and attract institutions. Registration would make it easier for the SEC to ferret out potential fraudsters in advance by reviewing the professional history of hedge fund operators, allow the SEC to bring administrative proceedings against hedge fund advisers for statutory violations and give the agency access to books and records that it does not have today. Other possible initiatives, including additional disclosure requirements for publicly offered hedge funds, are discussed below. This article addresses the question whether U.S. regulation of hedge funds is really taking a new direction. It (i) provides a brief overview of the current U.S. regulatory scheme, from which hedge funds are generally exempt, (ii) describes recent events in the United States that have contributed to regulators’ anxiety, (iii) examines the investor protection rationale for hedge fund regulation and considers whether these concerns do, in fact, merit increased regulation of hedge funds at this time, and (iv) considers the likelihood and possible scope of a potential regulatory response, principally by the SEC.
In an ideal world all investment products, including hedge funds, would be marketable to all investors. In this ideal world, all investors would fully understand the nature of the products and would be able to make an informed choice whether to invest. Of course the ideal world does not exist – the retail investment market is characterised by asymmetries of information. Product providers know most about the products on offer (or at least they should do). Investment advisers often know rather less than the provider but much more than their retail customers. Providers and intermediary advisers are understandably motivated by the desire to sell their products. There is therefore a risk that investment products will be mis-sold by investment advisers or mis-bought by ill-informed investors. This asymmetry of information is dealt with in most countries through regulation. However, the regulatory response in different countries is not necessarily the same. There are various ways in which protections can be applied and it is important to understand that the cultural background and regulatory histories of countries flavours the way regulation has developed. This means (as will be explained in greater detail later) that some countries are better able than others to admit hedge funds to the retail sector. Following this Introduction, Section II looks at some key background issues. Section III then looks at some important questions raised by the retail hedge fund issue. Many of these are questions of balance. Balance lies at the heart of regulation of course – regulation must always balance the needs of investors and with market efficiency. Understanding the “retail hedge fund” question requires particular attention to balance. Section IV then looks at the UK regime and how the FSA has answered the balance question. Section V offers some international perspectives. Section VI concludes. It will be seen that there is no obviously right answer to the question whether hedge fund products should be marketed to retail investors. Each regulator in each jurisdiction needs to make up its own mind on how to deal with the various issues and balances. It is evident, however, that internationally there is a move towards a greater variety of retail funds. There is nothing wrong with that, provided the regulators and the retail customers they protect, understand sufficiently what sort of protection is, or is not, being offered in the regulatory regime.
While hedge funds have been around at least since the 1940's, it has only been in the last decade or so that they have attracted the widespread attention of investors, academics and regulators. Investors, mainly wealthy individuals but also increasingly institutional investors, are attracted to hedge funds because they promise high “absolute” returns -- high returns even when returns on mainstream asset classes like stocks and bonds are low or negative. This prospect, not surprisingly, has increased interest in hedge funds in recent years as returns on stocks have plummeted around the world, and as investors have sought alternative investment strategies to insulate them in the future from the kind of bear markets we are now experiencing. Government regulators, too, have become increasingly attentive to hedge funds, especially since the notorious collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in September 1998. Over the course of only a few months during the summer of 1998 LTCM lost billions of dollars because of failed investment strategies that were not well understood even by its own investors, let alone by its bankers and derivatives counterparties. LTCM had built up huge leverage both on and off the balance sheet, so that when its investments soured it was unable to meet the demands of creditors and derivatives counterparties. Had LTCM’s counterparties terminated and liquidated their positions with LTCM, the result could have been a severe liquidity shortage and sharp changes in asset prices, which many feared could have impaired the solvency of other financial institutions and destabilized financial markets generally. The Federal Reserve did not wait to see if this would happen. It intervened to organize an immediate (September 1998) creditor-bailout by LTCM’s largest creditors and derivatives counterparties, preventing the wholesale liquidation of LTCM’s positions. Over the course of the year that followed the bailout, the creditor committee charged with managing LTCM’s positions effected an orderly work-out and liquidation of LTCM’s positions. We will never know what would have happened had the Federal Reserve not intervened. In defending the Federal Reserve’s unusual actions in coming to the assistance of an unregulated financial institutions like a hedge fund, William McDonough, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stated that it was the Federal Reserve’s judgement that the “...abrupt and disorderly close-out of LTCM’s positions would pose unacceptable risks to the American economy. ... there was a likelihood that a number of credit and interest rate markets would experience extreme price moves and possibly cease to function for a period of one or more days and maybe longer. This would have caused a vicious cycle: a loss of investor confidence, lending to further liquidations of positions, and so on.” The near-collapse of LTCM galvanized regulators throughout the world to examine the operations of hedge funds to determine if they posed a risk to investors and to financial stability more generally. Studies were undertaken by nearly every major central bank, regulatory agency, and international “regulatory” committee (such as the Basle Committee and IOSCO), and reports were issued, by among others, The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Many of these studies concluded that there was a need for greater disclosure by hedge funds in order to increase transparency and enhance market discipline, by creditors, derivatives counterparties and investors. In the Fall of 1999 two bills were introduced before the U.S. Congress directed at increasing hedge fund disclosure (the “Hedge Fund Disclosure Act” [the “Baker Bill”] and the “Markey/Dorgan Bill”). But when the legislative firestorm sparked by the LTCM’s episode finally quieted, there was no new regulation of hedge funds. This paper provides an overview of the regulation of hedge funds and examines the key regulatory issues that now confront regulators throughout the world. In particular, two major issues are examined. First, whether hedge funds pose a systemic threat to the stability of financial markets, and, if so, whether additional government regulation would be useful. And second, whether existing regulation provides sufficient protection for hedge fund investors, and, if not, what additional regulation is needed.
Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany
(2003)
The paper undertakes a comparative study of the set of laws affecting corporate governance in the United States and Germany, and an evaluation of their design if one assumes that their objective were the protection of the interests of minority outside shareholders. The rationale for such an objective is reviewed, in terms of agency cost theory, and then the institutions that serve to bound agency costs are examined and critiqued. In particular, there is discussion of the applicable legal rules in each country, the role of the board of directors, the functioning of the market for corporate control, and (briefly) the use of incentive compensation. The paper concludes with the authors views on what taking shareholder protection seriously, in each country s legal system, would require.
This memorandum describes the approach of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") in monitoring and, where appropriate, regulating the use of research reports by investment banking firms in connection with securities transactions. The memorandum addresses the historical system of regulation, which continues in large measure to apply. It also examines the new initiatives taken, following a number of prominent corporate, accounting and banking scandals and a significant decline in U.S. and international capital markets, to supplement the current system in what some have dubbed the "post-Enron era".
Recent empirical work shows that a better legal environment leads to lower expected rates of return in an international cross-section of countries. This paper investigates whether differences in firm-specific corporate governance also help to explain expected returns in a cross-section of firms within a single jurisdiction. Constructing a corporate governance rating (CGR) for German firms, we document a positive relationship between the CGR and firm value. In addition, there is strong evidence that expected returns are negatively correlated with the CGR, if dividend yields and price-earnings ratios are used as proxies for the cost of capital. Most results are robust for endogeneity, with causation running from corporate governance practices to firm fundamentals. Finally, an investment strategy that bought high-CGR firms and shorted low-CGR firms would have earned abnormal returns of around 12 percent on an annual basis during the sample period. We rationalize the empirical evidence with lower agency costs and/or the removal of certain governance malfunctions for the high-CGR firms.
The corporate convergence debate is usually presented in terms of competing efficiency and political claims. Convergence optimists assert that an economic logic will promote convergence on the most efficient form of economic organization, usually taken to be the public corporation governed under rules designed to maximize shareholder value. Convergence skeptics counterclaim that organizational diversity is possible, even probable, because of path dependent development of institutional complementarities whose abandonment is likely to be inefficient. The skeptics also assert that existing elites will use their political and economic advantages to block reform; the optimists counterclaim that the spread of shareholding will reshape politics.
The venture capital market and firms whose creation and early stages were financed by venture capital are among the crown jewels of the American economy. Beyond representing an important engine of macroeconomic growth and job creation, these firms have been a major force in commercializing cutting edge science, whether through their impact on existing industries as with the radical changes in pharmaceuticals catalyzed by venture-backed firms commercialization of biotechnology, or by the their role in developing entirely new industries as with the emergence of the internet and world wide web. The venture capital market thus provides a unique link between finance and innovation, providing start-up and early stage firms - organizational forms particularly well suited to innovation - with capital market access that is tailored to the special task of financing these high risk, high return activities.
This article presents a structural overview of corporate disclosure in Germany against the background of a rapidly evolving European market. Professor Baums first makes the theoretical case for mandatory disclosure and outlines the standard, regulatory elements of market transparency. He then turns to German law and illustrates both how it attempts to meet the principle, theoretical demands of disclosure and how it should be improved. The article also presents in some detail the actual channels of corporate disclosure used in Germany and the manner in which German law now fits into the overall development of the broader, European Community scheme, as well as the contemplated changes and improvements both at the national and the supranational level.
The paper was submitted to the conference on company law reform at the University of Cambridge, July 4th, 2002. Since the introduction of corporation laws in the individual German states during the first half of the 19th century, Germany has repeatedly amended and reformed its company law. Such reforms and amendments were prompted in part by stock exchange fraud and the collapse of large corporations, but also by a routine adjustment of law to changing commercial and societal conditions. During the last ten years, a series of significant changes to German company law led one commentator to speak from a "company law in permanent reform". Two years ago, the German Federal Chancellor established a Regierungskommission Corporate Governance ("Government Commission on Corporate Governance") and instructed it to examine the German Corporate Governance system and German company law as a whole, and formulate recommendations for reform.
On April 24, 2001 the European Commission presented a proposal for a Directive1 introducing supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates (the Proposed Directive). The Proposed Directive requires a closer coordination among supervisory authorities of different sectors of the financial industry and leads to changes in the number of existing Directives relating to the supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms.
It is an established policy in the United States to separate commercial banking (the business of taking deposits and making commercial loans) from other commercial activities. The separation of banking and commercial activities is achieved by federal and state banking laws, which enumerate the powers that banks may exercise, the activities that banks may engage in, and the investments that banks may lawfully make, and expressly exclude banks from certain activities or relationships. Some of these provisions could be circumvented if a nonbank company could carry on banking activities through a banking subsidiary and nonbanking activities either itself or through a nonbanking subsidiary.