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Universal banking means that banks are permitted to offer all of the various kinds of financial services. This includes classical banking activities like the credit and deposit business, as well as investment services, placement and brokerage of securities, and even insurance activities, trading in real estate and others. German universal banks also hold stock in nonfinancial firms and offer to vote their clients' shares in other firms. This paper deals with universal banks and their role in the investment business, more specifically, their links with investment companies and their various roles as shareholders and providers of financial services to such companies. Banks and investment companies have, as financial intermediaries, one trait in common: they both transform capital of investors (depositors and shareholders of investment funds, respectively) into funds (loans and equity or debt securities, respectively) that are channeled to other firms. So why should a regulation forbid to combine these transformation tasks in one institution or group, and why should the law not allow banks to establish investment companies and provide all kinds of financial services to them in addition to their banking services? German banking and investment company law have answered these questions in the affirmative. This paper argues that the existing regulation is not a sound and recommendable one. The paper is organized as follows: Sections II - V identify four areas where the combination of banking and investment might either harm the shareholders of the investment funds and/or negatively affect other constituencies such as the shareholders of the banking institution. These sections will at the same time explore whether there are institutional or regulatory provisions in place or market forces at work that adequately protect investors and the other constituencies in question. Concluding remarks follow (VI.).
Technologies carry politics since they embed values. It is therefore surprising that mainstream political and legal theory have taken the issue so lightly. Compared to what has been going on over the past few decades in the other branches of practical thought, namely ethics, economics and the law, political theory lags behind. Yet the current emphasis on Internet politics that polarizes the apologists holding the web to overcome the one-to-many architecture of opinion-building in traditional representative democracy, and the critics that warn cyber-optimism entails authoritarian technocracy has acted as a wake up call. This paper sets the problem – “What is it about ICTs, as opposed to previous technical devices, that impact on politics and determine uncertainty about democratic matters?” – into the broad context of practical philosophy, by offering a conceptual map of clusters of micro-problems and concrete examples relating to “e-democracy”. The point is to highlight when and why the hyphen of e-democracy has a conjunctive or a disjunctive function, in respect to stocktaking from past experiences and settled democratic theories. My claim is that there is considerable scope to analyse how and why online politics fails or succeeds. The field needs both further empirical and theoretical work.
The essay argues that anti-suit injunctions granted in disputes on standard-essential patents are inconsistent with the general standards governing anti-suit injunctions. The section on anti-suit injunction demonstrates that the case law on anti-suit injunctions is not comparable to disputes over standard essential patents. In contrast, anti-anti-suit injunctions are a legitimate response to an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction by foreign courts. Under EU law, the courts of member states might even be required to issue anti-anti-suit injunctions to protect their exclusive jurisdiction over patents.
When parties present divergent econometric evidence, the court may view such evidence as contradictory and thus ignore it completely, without conducting closer analysis. We develop a simple method for distinguishing between actual and merely apparent contradiction based on the statistical concept of the “severity” of the furnished evidence. Again using “severity”, we also propose a method for reconciling divergent findings in instances of mere seeming contradiction. Our chosen application is that of damage estimation in follow-on cases.
In a tribute to Hon. Justice Iorhemen Hwande CFR, Chief Judge of Benue State this book includes contributions from a variety of scholars from Nigeria. 14 essays cover a wide range of topics such as: Insider Dealing by Company Directors and the Nigerian Capital Market; United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea as a Tool for the Resolution of Climate Change Disputes; Is a Practicing Christian Lawyer/Judge in Nigeria an Anachronism?; The Justiciability and Enforcement of Social Rights; and International Economic Law and Development.
In the early Nineties the Hague Conference on International Private Law on initiative of the United States started negotiations on a Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the "Hague Convention"). In October 1999 the Special Commission on duty presented a preliminary text, which was drafted quite closely to the European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the "Brussels Convention"). The latter was concluded between the then 6 Member States of the EEC in Brussels in 1968 and amended several times on occasion of the entry of new Member States. In 2000, after the Treaty of Amsterdam altered the legal basis for judicial co-operation in civil matters in Europe, it was transformed into an EC Regulation (the "Brussels I Regulation"). The 1999 draft of the Hague Convention was heavily criticized by the USA and other states for its European approach of a double convention, regulating not only the recognition and enforcement of judgments, but at the same time the extent of and the limits to jurisdiction to adjudicate in international cases. During a diplomatic conference in June 2001 a second draft was presented which contained alternative versions of several articles and thus resembled more the existing dissent than a draft convention would. Difficulties to reach a consensus remained, especially with regard to activity based jurisdiction, intellectual property, consumer rights and employee rights. In addition, the appropriateness of the whole draft was questioned in light of the problems posed by the de-territorialization of relevant conduct through the advent of the Internet. In April 2002 it was decided to continue negotiations on an informal level on the basis of a nucleus approach. The core consensus as identified by a working group, however, was not very broad. The experts involved came to the conclusion that the project should be limited to choice of court agreements. In March 2004 a draft was presented which sets out its aims as follows: "The objective of the Convention is to make exclusive choice of court agreements as effective as possible in the context of international business. The hope is that the Convention will do for choice of court agreements what the New York Convention of 1958 has done for arbitration agreements." In April 2004 the Special Commission of the Hague Conference adopted a Draft "Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements", which according to its Art. 2 No. 1 a) is not applicable to choice of court agreements, to which a natural person acting primarily for personal, family or household purposes (a consumer) is a party". The broader project of a global judgments convention thus seems to be abandoned, or at least to be postponed for an unlimited time period. There are - of course - several reasons why the Hague Judgments project failed. Samuel Baumgartner has described an important one as the "Justizkonflikt" between the United States and Europe or, more specifically Germany. Within the context of the general topic of this conference, that is (international) jurisdiction for human rights, in the remainder of this presentation I shall elaborate on the socio-cultural aspects of the impartiality of judgments and their enforcement on a global scale.
Sudden cardiac death (SCD) in adolescents and young adults may be the first manifestation of an inherited arrhythmic syndrome. Thus identification of a genetic origin in sudden death cases deemed inconclusive after a comprehensive autopsy and may help to reduce the risk of lethal episodes in the remaining family. Using next-generation sequencing (NGS), a large number of variants of unknown significance (VUS) are detected. In the majority of cases, there is insufficient evidence of pathogenicity, representing a huge dilemma in current genetic investigations. Misinterpretation of such variants may lead to inaccurate genetic diagnoses and/or the adoption of unnecessary and/or inappropriate therapeutic approaches. In our study, we applied current (ACMG) recommendations for variant classification in post-mortem genetic screening of a cohort of 56 SCD victims. We identified a total 53 rare protein-altering variants (MAF < 0.2%) classified as VUS or worse. Twelve percent of the cases exhibited a clinically actionable variant (pathogenic, likely pathogenic or VUS – potentially pathogenic) that would warrant cascade genetic screening in relatives. Most of the variants detected by means of the post-mortem genetic investigations were VUS. Thus, genetic testing by itself might be fairly meaningless without supporting background data. This data reinforces the need for an experienced multidisciplinary team for obtaining reliable and accountable interpretations of variant significance for elucidating potential causes for SCDs in the young. This enables the early identification of relatives at risk or excludes family members as genetic carriers. Also, development of adequate forensic guidelines to enable appropriate interpretation of rare genetic variants is fundamental.
The venture capital industry holds relevance for entrepreneurs looking for money to finance an innovative project, investors seeking to make money by investing in entrepreneurial firms and governments trying to promote innovation and entrepreneurship. Venture capital investment could facilitate innovation and thus a better economy.
Venture capital has enabled the U.S. to support its entrepreneurial talent by turning ideas into world-famous products and services, building companies from mere business plans to mature and powerful organizations. Three of the five largest U.S. public companies by market capitalization – Apple, Google and Microsoft – received most of their early external funding from venture capital. Having its ups and downs, venture capital investment in the U.S. expanded from virtually zero in the mid-1970s to $8 billion in 1995 and $49.3 billion in 2014. Venture backed companies have been a prime driver of economic growth in the U.S.Across the pacific, venture capital investment in China has grown out of the transition from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy over the past three decades, becoming an important pillar supporting China’s innovation system. In 2015, a total of 2,824 venture capital investment deals provided an aggregate investment of $36.9 billion. Venture capital has long been a hot topic in China’s capital market, particularly since the government decided to boost “mass entrepreneurship and innovation” in 2014.
In the U.S., most venture capital firms are organized as limited partnerships, with the venture capitalists being general partners and the investors limited partners. Studies have shown that investors choose to invest through venture funds as an intermediary rather than placing their investments directly with the entrepreneurs; because of the high risk nature of the entrepreneur’s business, it is hard for them to get bank loans or direct equity investments. Conflicts may also arise, however, between the venture capitalists acting as agents and the investors as principals.5 This agency problem maybe particularly severe, since venture capital provides money for businesses with high potential and high risk, although the limited partnership has certain merits and is still most commonly chosen as the business form for venture capital funds.6 At the same time, the fact that general partners have total control of the partnership business necessitates that the agency problem is addressed by legal rules, contracts and other mechanisms.
Meanwhile, despite the rapid growth of venture capital investments in China, little attention has been paid to the organizational form of venture capital funds. In contrast to the U.S., most Chinese venture funds have been structured as corporations. One may argue that it was due to legislative reasons: that the limited partnership was not recognized by Chinese law when venture capital first appeared in China. However, after adopted a chapter was adopted in the Partnership Enterprise Law (PEL) governing limited partnerships in 2007, most of the venture funds abided by their choice, while those opting for the limited partnership have encountered difficulties: the limited partners are having trouble trusting the general partners with their money and are therefore interfering with the operation of the partnership business, which may lead to dissolution of the partnership.
This thesis applies transaction cost theory to explain the benefits and costs of choosing the limited partnership as a business form in the special context of venture capital investments, showing that the potential agency conflict between the general partners and the limited partners have been mitigated by legal and other mechanismsin the United States, and that the U.S. investors could therefore exploit the merit of the limited partnership form in venture capital financing. In China, investors have different answers to the agency problem. Similarly to the situation in the U.S., Chinese partners also employ contract terms to deal with agency problems, and the legislators enact laws that aim at regulating the limited partnership form; some legislation was even transplanted from the U.S., such as that part of the PEL which governs limited partnerships. It seems, then, that similar mechanisms that deal with agency problems also exist in China. However, given the unique history of the development of China’s innovation system and venture capital market, the effectiveness of these constraints is questionable. Chinese venture capital investors have therefore characteristically behaved differently to U.S. investors. Rather than relying on these questionable mechanisms, Chinese investors as well as the Chinese government have developed different approaches to addressing these agency problems.
Venture capital-backed firms, unavoidable value-destroying trade sales, and fair value protections
(2021)
This paper investigates the implications of the fair value protections contemplated by the standard corporate contract (i.e., the standard contract form for which corporate law provides) for the entrepreneur–venture capitalist relationship, focusing, in particular, on unavoidable value-destroying trade sales. First, it demonstrates that the typical entrepreneur–venture capitalist contract does institutionalize the venture capitalist’s liquidity needs, allowing, under some circumstances, for counterintuitive instances of contractually-compliant value destruction. Unavoidable value-destroying trade sales are the most tangible example. Next, it argues that fair value protections can prevent the entrepreneur and venture capitalist from allocating the value that these transactions generate as they would want. Then, it shows that the reality of venture capital-backed firms calls for a process of adaptation of the standard corporate contract that has one major step in the deactivation or re-shaping of fair value protections. Finally, it argues that a standard corporate contract aiming to promote social welfare through venture capital should feature flexible fair value protections.
Venture capital-backed firms, unavoidable value-destroying trade sales, and fair value protections
(2020)
This paper investigates the implications of the fair value protections contemplated by the standard corporate contract (i.e., the standard contract form for which corporate law provides) for the entrepreneur–venture capitalist relationship, focusing, in particular, on unavoidable value-destroying trade sales. First, it demonstrates that the typical entrepreneur–venture capitalist contract does institutionalize the venture capitalist’s liquidity needs, allowing, under some circumstances, for counterintuitive instances of contractually-compliant value destruction. Unavoidable value-destroying
trade sales are the most tangible example. Next, it argues that fair value protections can prevent the entrepreneur and venture capitalist from allocating the value that these transactions generate as they would want. Then, it shows that the reality of venture capital-backed firms calls for a process of adaptation of the standard corporate contract that has one major step in the deactivation or re-shaping of fair value protections. Finally, it argues that a standard corporate contract aiming to promote social welfare through venture capital should feature flexible fair value protections
On the basis of the economic theory of network effects, this article provides a novel explanation of the so-called patent paradox, i.e. the question why the propensity to patent is so strong when the expected average value of most patents is low. It demonstrates that the patent system of a country resembles a telephone network or a social media platform. Patents are perceived as nodes in a virtual network that, as a whole, exhibits network effects. It is explained why patents are not independent of other patents but that they complement each other in several ways both within and beyond markets and fields of technology, and that patents thus create synchronization value over and above individual interests of patent holders in exclusivity. As a consequence, the more patents there are, the more valuable it is to also seek patents, and vice versa. Since patents thus display increasing returns to adoption, the willingness to pay for the next patent slopes upwards. This explains why, after a phase of early instability and a certain tipping point, many countries’ patent systems expanded quickly and eventually became a rigid standard (“lock-in”). The concluding section raises the question what regulatory measures are suitable to effectively address the ensuing anticommons effects.
Virtuous democrats, liberal aristocrats : political discourse and the Pennsylvania Constitution
(2001)
The study of civilization is one of the core subjects of international legal history. This is no recent development. Jörg Fisch published his seminal work "Die Europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht" in 1984, the same year in which Gerrit W. Gong presented his renowned "Standard of Civilization". Today, the more recent works by Martti Koskenniemi and Antony Anghie probably represent the most influential research in this field. What all these path breaking works have in common is that they discuss concepts of civilization in international law especially with regard to its function as providing justification narratives for the European/non-European unequal relations, in particular in the 19th century. ...
How to write (international) legal histories that would be true to their protagonists while simultaneously relevant to present audiences? Most of us would also want to write "critically" – that is to say, at least by aiming to avoid Eurocentrism, hagiography and commitment to an altogether old-fashioned view of international law as an instrument of progress. Hence we write today our histories "in context". But this cannot be all. Framing the relevant "context" is only possible by drawing upon more or less conscious jurisprudential and political preferences. Should attention be focused on academic debates, military power, class structures or assumptions about the longue durée? Such choices determine for us what we think of as relevant "contexts", and engage us as participants in large conversations about law and power that are not only about what once "was" but also what there will be in the future.
Variations and disparities between von Hayek and Ordoliberalism can be detected on diverse levels: 1. philosophy of science; 2. setting dissimilar priorities; 3. social philosophy; 4. genesis of norms; and, 5. notion of freedom. Therefore, it is possible to make an important distinction within neoliberalism itself, which contains at least two factions: von Hayek’s evolutionary liberalism, and German Ordoliberalism. The following essay not only takes the neoliberal separation of different varieties as granted; it proceeds further. It focuses on the topic of justice and elaborates the (slightly) differing conceptions of justice within neoliberalism. Thus, the specific contribution of the paper is that it adds a sixth dimension of differences (which is highly interconnected with the differing conceptions of genesis of norms). In this paper, I emphasize the (often neglected) subtle differences between von Hayek, Eucken, Röpke, and Rüstow, with special emphasis on their theories of justice. In this regard, I focus not only on Eucken and von Hayek; in addition, I include the concepts of justice developed by Rüstow and Röpke, as well, and, in consequence, broaden the perspective incorporating Eucken as a member of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics, and Rüstow and Röpke as representatives of Ordoliberalism in the wider sense. The paper tackles these topics in three steps. After briefly examining and discussing the existing literature and providing a literature overview on the decade-long debate on von Hayek and Ordoliberalism, I then describe von Hayek’s conception of commutative justice; particularly, justice of rules and procedures (rather than end-state justice). Then, I examine Eucken’s, Rüstow’s, and Röpke’s theories of justice, which consist of a mixture of commutative and distributive justice. Then, I draw a comparison between the ideas of justice developed by Eucken, Röpke, Rüstow, and von Hayek. The essay ends with a summary of my main findings.
In response to recent developments in the financial markets and the stunning growth of the hedge fund industry in the United States, policy makers, most notably the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), are turning their attention to the regulation, or lack thereof, of hedge funds. U.S. regulators have scrutinized the hedge fund industry on several occasions in the recent past without imposing substantial regulatory constraints. Will this time be any different? The focus of the regulators’ interest has shifted. Traditionally, they approached the hedge fund industry by focusing on systemic risk to and integrity of the financial markets. The current inquiry is almost exclusively driven by investor protection concerns. What has changed? First, since 2000, new kinds of investors have poured capital into hedge funds in the United States, facilitated by the “retailization” of hedge funds through the development of funds of hedge funds and the dismal performance of the stock market. Second, in a post-Enron era, regulators and policy makers are increasingly sensitive to investor protection concerns. On May 14 and 15, 2003, the SEC held for the first time a public roundtable discussion on the single topic of hedge funds. Among the investor protection concerns highlighted were: an increase in incidents of fraud, inadequate suitability determinations by brokers who market hedge fund interests to individual investors, conflicts of interest of managers who manage mutual funds and hedge funds side-by-side, a lack of transparency that hinders investors from making informed investment decisions, layering of fees, and unbounded discretion by managers in pricing private hedge fund securities. Although there has been discussion about imposing wide-ranging restrictions onhedge funds, such as reining in short selling, requiring disclosure of long/short positions and limiting leverage, such a response would be heavy-handed and probably unnecessary. The existing regulatory regime is largely adequate to address the most flagrant abuses. Moreover, as the hedge fund market further matures, it is likely that institutional investors will continue to weed out weak performers and mediocre or dishonest hedge fund managers. What is likely to emerge from the newest regulatory focus on investor protection is a measured response that would enhance the SEC’s enforcement and inspection authority, while leaving hedge funds’ inherent investment flexibility largely unfettered. A likely scenario, for example, might be a requirement that some, or possibly all, hedge fund sponsors register with the SEC as investment advisers. Today, most are exempt from registration, although more and more are registering to provide advice to public hedge funds and attract institutions. Registration would make it easier for the SEC to ferret out potential fraudsters in advance by reviewing the professional history of hedge fund operators, allow the SEC to bring administrative proceedings against hedge fund advisers for statutory violations and give the agency access to books and records that it does not have today. Other possible initiatives, including additional disclosure requirements for publicly offered hedge funds, are discussed below. This article addresses the question whether U.S. regulation of hedge funds is really taking a new direction. It (i) provides a brief overview of the current U.S. regulatory scheme, from which hedge funds are generally exempt, (ii) describes recent events in the United States that have contributed to regulators’ anxiety, (iii) examines the investor protection rationale for hedge fund regulation and considers whether these concerns do, in fact, merit increased regulation of hedge funds at this time, and (iv) considers the likelihood and possible scope of a potential regulatory response, principally by the SEC.
As recent newspaper headlines show the topic of patents/patent laws is still heavily disputed. In this paper I will approach this topic from a theoretical-historical and history of economic thought-perspective. In this regard I will link the patent controversy of the nineteenth century with Walter Eucken’s Ordoliberalism – a German version of neoliberalism. My paper is structured as follows: The second chapter provides the reader with a historical introduction. At the heart of this paragraph are the controversy and discourse on patent laws in nineteenth century Europe as well as the pro and contra arguments presented by the anti-patent/free-trade movement respectively by the advocates of patent protection. The focus of my paper is on the struggle for the protection of inventions and innovations in nineteenth century Germany, since Walter Eucken, main representative of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics, picks up the counter-arguments presented in the national debate and in particular by the Kongress deutscher Volkswirthe. The third chapter deals intensively with the question whether patent laws are just ‘nonsense upon stilts’ from an ordoliberal perspective. Here, Eucken’s arguments against the current patent system are elaborated in great detail. The paper ends with a summary of my main findings.
What happened to the tremendous legacy of juridical knowledge left behind in Italy in the 6th century? Into what labyrinth did it plunge only to re-emerge after the silent age of the early Middle Ages into the light of day, and effectively come to shape the renewal of the jurisprudence at the beginning of the 12th century? One-and-a-half centuries after the fanciful writings of Hermann Fitting, legal historians are still looking for the answers to these questions. Considering the new information we have (especially coming from the paleographical research), this paper re-examines the existence as well as the activities of the school of Rome both during the Justinian Age and in the two centuries thereafter. The aim of this essay is to verify whether Rome, during the very early Middle Ages, continued to represent a centre of juridical culture. According to the hypothesis developed in this contribution, Rome – at that time – not only played a very important role with regard to the material conservation of the Justinian’s libri legales, but also in the initial establishment of the new (i. e., Justinian) imperial law in the West and creation of its image as a significant juridical centre. The absence of such a centre as well as its wide-spread image would truly make the Bolognese renovatio appear "miraculous" and very difficult to explain.
After Justinian, the 7th and 8th centuries can truly be characterised as "silent" in the history of Roman law in the West. However, by studying the medieval manuscript tradition, in particular, that of the Institutiones and the Novellae, we can gather together a series of elements helping us to clarify the situation. Also quite useful is an examination of the manuscript tradition of the Collatio legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum. Through the spread and use of these Late Antique works, we can see how – in conjunction with the actions of the papacy – Rome, toward the end of the 8th century, returned to being a centre of world politics and – given that law follows politics – of the legal culture.
The health and genetic data of deceased people are a particularly important asset in the field of biomedical research. However, in practice, using them is compli- cated, as the legal framework that should regulate their use has not been fully developed yet. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is not applicable to such data and the Member States have not been able to agree on an alternative regulation. Recently, normative models have been proposed in an attempt to face this issue. The most well- known of these is posthumous medical data donation (PMDD). This proposal supports an opt-in donation system of health data for research purposes. In this article, we argue that PMDD is not a useful model for addressing the issue at hand, as it does not consider that some of these data (the genetic data) may be the personal data of the living relatives of the deceased. Furthermore, we find the reasons supporting an opt-in model less convincing than those that vouch for alternative systems. Indeed, we propose a normative framework that is based on the opt-out system for non-personal data combined with the application of the GDPR to the relatives’ personal data.
In this article I advance an account of human rights as individual claims that can be justified within the conceptual framework of social contract theories. The contractarian approach at issue here aims, initially, at a justification of morality at large, and then at the specific domain of morality which contains human rights concepts. The contractarian approach to human rights has to deal with the problem of universality, i.e. how can human rights be ‘universal’? I deal with this problem by examining the relationship between moral dispositions and what I call ‘diffuse legal structure’.
This article analyzes how cultural translation was carried out in Manuel Quintín Lame’s interpretation of Law 89 of 1980 during the indigenous revolt that took place in Tierradentro – Cauca (Colombia) between 1914 and 1916: riots that were popularly referred to as La Quintiada. The main focus here is on Lame and his contemporaries’ visions of justice regarding the possession of the land as a way to account for the richness and complexity of the »cultural baggage« behind legal transfer processes. The purpose of this exercise is to detail the extrajuridical elements involved in legal transfers and the opportunities that a cultural translation of law approach can bring in order to understand this process.
The ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program, launched in summer 2012, indirectly recapitalized periphery country banks through its positive impact on the value of sovereign bonds. However, the regained stability of the European banking sector has not fully transferred into economic growth. We show that zombie lending behavior of banks that still remained undercapitalized after the OMT announcement is an important reason for this development. As a result, there was no positive impact on real economic activity like employment or investment. Instead, firms mainly used the newly acquired funds to build up cash reserves. Finally, we document that creditworthy firms in industries with a high prevalence of zombie firms suffered significantly from the credit misallocation, which slowed down the economic recovery.
In its admissibility decision in the Al-Saadoon case the ECtHR held that the United Kingdom had jurisdiction over the applicants, who had been arrested by British forces and kept in a British-run military prison in Iraq. Just before the respective mandate of the Security Council expired on 31 December 2008, the applicants were transferred to Iraqi custody at Iraqi request and thereby exposed to the risk of an unfair trial followed by capital punishment. In this respect, the case resembles the Soering case, although the applicants were, unlike Soering, not on British territory but on occupied Iraqi soil before they were handed over. This aspect raises the question of Iraqi sovereignty as a norm competing with the UK's human rights obligations. The authors trace back the ECtHR's case law concerning the extraterritorial application of the Convention and analyse the UK judgments and the ECtHR's admissibility decision in the Al-Saadoon affair from this angle. Furthermore they consider the doctrinal consequences of the ECHR's extraterritorial effect in cases like Soering and Al-Saadoon, where contracting parties violate guarantees of the Convention by exposing a person within their jurisdiction to a risk of a treatment contrary to these guarantees by a third state. Finally, they test the argument brought forward by the UK that not transferring the applicants would have violated Iraqi sovereignty and establish patterns how the ECtHR and the UK Courts did cope in the past with international law norms potentially competing with the Convention.
I analyze the most powerful shareholders in Germany to illustrate the concentration of control over listed corporations. Compared to other developed economies, the German stock market is dominated by large shareholders. I show that 77% of the median firm’s voting rights arecontrolled by large blockholders. This corresponds to 47% of the market value of all firms listed in Germany’s official markets. About two thirds of this amount is controlled by banks, industrial firms, holdings, and insurance companies. I show that due to current legislation it is clear for neither group who ultimate exerts control over the shareholding firm itself. For the remaining blockholders, only blocks controlled by voting pools and individuals can be traced back to the highest level of ownership. In the aggregate, both groups control only 5.6% of all reported blocks. The German government controls 8%, and it is not clear who ultimately is responsible for the consequences of decisions.
This paper uses a novel account of non-ideal political action that can justify radical responses to severe climate injustice, including and especially deliberate attempts to engineer the climate system in order reflect sunlight into space and cooling the planet. In particular, it discusses the question of what those suffering from climate injustice may do in order to secure their fundamental rights and interests in the face of severe climate change impacts. Using the example of risky geoengineering strategies such as sulfate aerosol injections, I argue that peoples that are innocently subject to severely negative climate change impacts may have a special permission to engage in large-scale yet risky climate interventions to prevent them. Furthermore, this can be true even if those interventions wrongly harm innocent people.
We present novel evidence on the value of cross-border political access. We analyze data on meetings of US multinational enterprises (MNEs) with European Commission (EC) policymakers. Meetings with Commissioners are associated with positive abnormal equity returns. We study channels of value creation through political access in the areas of regulation and taxation. US enterprises with EC meetings are more likely to receive favorable outcomes in their European merger decisions and have lower effective tax rates on foreign income than their peers without meetings. Our results suggest that access to foreign policymakers is of substantial value for MNEs.
This paper makes a case for the future development of European corporate law through regulatory competition rather than EC legislation. It is for the first time becoming legally possible for firms within the EU to select the national company law that they wish to govern their activities. A significant number of firms can be expected to exercise this freedom, and national legislatures can be expected to respond by seeking to make their company laws more attractive to firms. Whilst the UK is likely to be the single most successful jurisdiction in attracting firms, the presence of different models of corporate governance within Europe make it quite possible that competition will result in specialisation rather than convergence, and that no Member State will come to dominate as Delaware has done in the US. Procedural safeguards in the legal framework will direct the selection of laws which increase social welfare, as opposed simply to the welfare of those making the choice. Given that European legislators cannot be sure of the ‘optimal’ model for company law, the future of European company law-making would better be left with Member States than take the form of harmonized legislation.
We show strong overall and heterogeneous economic incidence effects, as well as distortionary effects, of only shifting statutory incidence (i.e., the agent on which taxes are levied), without any tax rate change. For identification, we exploit a tax change and administrative data from the credit market: (i) a policy change in 2018 in Spain shifting an existing mortgage tax from being levied on borrowers to being levied on banks; (ii) some areas, for historical reasons, were exempt from paying this tax (or have different tax rates); and (iii) an exhaustive matched credit register. We find the following robust results: First, after the policy change, the average mortgage rate increases consistently with a strong – but not complete – tax pass-through. Second, there is a large heterogeneity in such pass-through: larger for borrowers with lower income, a smaller number of lending relationships, not working for the lender, or facing less banks in their zip-code, thereby suggesting a bargaining power mechanism at work. Third, despite no variation in the tax rate, and consistent with the non-full tax pass-through, the tax shift increases banks’ risk-taking. More affected banks reduce costly mortgage insurance in case of loan default (especially so if banks have weaker ex-ante balance sheets) and expand into non-affected but (much) ex-ante riskier consumer lending, experiencing even higher ex-post defaults within consumer loans.
In this article, I question the use of the notion of ‘constituent power’ as a tool for the democratization of the European Union (EU). Rather than seeing the absence of a transnational constituent power as a cause of the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’, I identify it as an opportunity for unfettered democratic participation. Against the reification of power-in-action into a power-constituted-in-law, I argue that the democratization of the EU can only be achieved through the multiplication of ‘constituent moments’. I begin by deconstructing the normative justifications surrounding the concept of constituent power. Here I analyze the structural aporia of constituent power and question the autonomous and emancipatory dimension of this notion. I then test the theoretical hypothesis of this structural aporia of the popular constituent power by comparing it with the historical experiments of a European popular constituent power. Finally, based on these theoretical and empirical observations, I propose to replace the ambivalence of the concept of popular constituent power with a more cautious approach to the bottom-up democratization of European integration: that of a multiplication of transnational constituent moments.
The article presents a brief overview of research and publication in the history of international law in Europe today. The upsurge of interest in historical studies is traced back to a sense of present transformation, with historical studies seeking to explore both aspects of continuity and change in the international legal system. The article outlines three tasks for the discipline in the future: to begin work for international law’s Ideengeschichte, to focus on the relationship between the West and its "Other", and to undertake studies in the historical sociology of international law.
A link between populism and social media is often suspected. This paper spells out a set of possible mechanisms underpinning this link: that social media changes the communication structure of the public sphere, making it harder for citizens to obtain evidence that refutes populist assumptions. By developing a model of the public sphere, four core functions of the public sphere are identified: exposing citizens to diverse information, promoting equality of deliberative opportunity, creating deliberative transparency, and producing common knowledge. A wellworking public sphere allows citizens to learn that there are genuine disagreements among citizens that are held in good faith. Social media makes it harder to gain this insight, opening the door for populist ideology.
This article provides an overview and critical assessment of WIPO ALERT. It locates this initiative in the broader context of transnational IP enforcement schemes on the Internet. These initiatives are classified into two categories according to their point of attachment and geographical effect. Whereas source-related measures (e.g. website takedowns) tend to have a transnational and possibly even a global effect, recipient-related measures (e.g. website and ad blockings) typically mirror the territorially fragmented IPR landscape. This fragmentation is where WIPO ALERT comes into play. It can be understood as a matching service which interconnects holders of information about copyright infringing websites (“Authorized Contributors”) and actors of the online ad industry who want to avoid these outlets (“Authorized Users”). The critical assessment of WIPO ALERT calls for more transparency and the establishment of uniform substantive and procedural standards that have to be met if a new “site of concern” is added to the global ad blacklist.