Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting
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075
Since the beginning of the 1990s, it has been widely expected that the implementation of the European Single Market would lead to a rapid convergence of Europe’s financial systems. In the present paper we will show that at least in the period prior to the introduction of the common currency this expected convergence did not materialise. Our empirical studies on the significance of various institutions within the financial sectors, on the financing patterns of firms in various countries and on the predominant mechanisms of corporate governance, which are summarised and placed in a broader context in this paper, point to few, if any, signs of a convergence at a fundamental or structural level between the German, British and French financial systems. The German financial system continues to appear to be bank-dominated, while the British system still appears to be capital market-dominated. During the period covered by the research, i.e. 1980 – 1998, the French system underwent the most far-reaching changes, and today it is difficult to classify. In our opinion, these findings can be attributed to the effects of strong path dependencies, which are in turn an outgrowth of relationships of complementarity between the individual system components. Projecting what we have observed into the future, the results of our research indicate that one of two alternative paths of development is most likely to materialise: either the differences between the national financial systems will persist, or – possibly as a result of systemic crises – one financial system type will become the dominant model internationally. And if this second path emerges, the Anglo-American, capital market-dominated system could turn out to be the “winner”, because it is better able to withstand and weather crises, but not necessarily because it is more efficient.
23
This paper provides a detailed empirical analysis of the call auction procedure on the German stock exchanges. The auction is conducted by the Makler whose position resembles that of a NYSE specialist. We use a dataset which contains information about all individual orders for a sample of stocks traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE). This sample allows us to calculate the cost of transacting in a call market and compare them to the costs of transacting in a continuous market. We find that transaction costs for small transactions in the call market are lower than the quoted spread in the order book of the continuous market whereas transaction costs for large transactions are higher than the spread in the continuous market.
We further address the question whether active participation of the Makler is advantageous. On the one hand he may accomodate order imbalances, increase the liquidity of the market and stabilize prices. On the other hand, the discretion in price setting gives him an incentive to manipulate prices. This may increase return volatility. Our dataset identifies the trades the Maklers make for their own accounts. We eliminate these trades and determine the price that would have obtained without their participation. Comparing this hypothetical price series to the actual transaction prices, we find that Makler participation tends to reduce return volatility. A further analysis shows that the actual prices are much closer to the surrounding prices of the continuous trading session than the hypothetical prices that would have obtained without Makler participation. These results indicate that the Maklers provide a valuable service to the market. We further calculate the profits associated with the positions taken by the Maklers and find that, on average, they do not earn profits on the positions they take. Their compensation is thus restricted to the commissions they receive.
155
We provide insights into determinants of the rating level of 371 issuers which defaulted in the years 1999 to 2003, and into the leader-follower relationship between Moody’s and S&P. The evidence for the rating level suggests that Moody’s assigns lower ratings than S&P for all observed periods before the default event. Furthermore, we observe two-way Granger causal-ity, which signifies information flow between the two rating agencies. Since lagged rating changes influence the magnitude of the agencies’ own rating changes it would appear that the two rating agencies apply a policy of taking a severe downgrade through several mild down-grades. Further, our analysis of rating changes shows that issuers with headquarters in the US are less sharply downgraded than non-US issuers. For rating changes by Moody’s we also find that larger issuers seem to be downgraded less severely than smaller issuers.
46
The main argument in this paper is that new information and communication technologies (ICT) in the financial industry will increase specialisation and competition within the European financial centre system and thereby lead to a ‘re-bundling’ of functions of the various financial centres. Frankfurt plays an interesting role in this development as it is one of the main development centres for ‘financial technology’. With these technologies, remote access to the Frankfurt stock exchange and inter-bank payment system is now feasible from most European cities. This leads to a reduced need for physical presence, which opens up new possibilities for the financial sector’s spatial organisation. However, as financial production is information- and knowledge-intensive, spatial and other types of proximity between financial actors and clients are still essential in many stages. We examine the value chains of three different products (advisory, lending, trading) with regard to different proximities, in order to identify possible patterns of their spatial (re)organisation. From these findings, inferences are drawn for a ‘new’ role for Frankfurt in the European financial centre system.
074
Structural positions are very common in investment practice. A structural position is defined as a permanent overweighting of a riskier asset class relative to a prespecified benchmark portfolio. The most prominent example for a structural position is the equity bias in a balanced fund that arises by consistently overweighting equities in tactical asset allocation. Another example is the permanent allocation of credit in a fixed income portfolio with a government benchmark. The analysis provided in this article shows that whenever possible, structural positions should be avoided. Graphical illustrations based on Pythagorean theorem are used to make a connection between the active risk/return and the total risk/return framework. Structural positions alter the risk profile of the portfolio substantially, and the appeal of active management – to provide active returns uncorrelated to benchmark returns and hence to shift the efficient frontier outwards – gets lost. The article demonstrates that the commonly used alpha – tracking error criterion is not sufficient for active management. In addition, structural positions complicate measuring managers’ skill. The paper also develops normative implications for active portfolio management. Tactical asset allocation should be based on the comparison of expected excess returns of an asset class to the equilibrium risk premium of the same asset class and not to expected excess returns of other asset classes. For the cases, where structural positions cannot be avoided, a risk budgeting approach is introduced and applied to determine the optimal position size. Finally, investors are advised not to base performance evaluation only on simple manager rankings because this encourages managers to take structural positions and does not reward efforts to produce alpha. The same holds true for comparing managers’ information ratios. Information ratios, in investment practice defined as the ratio of active return to active risk, do not uncover structural positions.
147
This paper starts out by pointing out the challenges and weaknesses which the German banking systems faces according to the prevailing views among national and international observers. These challenges include a generalproblem of profitability and, possibly as its main reason, the strong role of public banks. These concerns raise the questions whether the facts support this assessment of a general profitability problem and whether there are reasons to expect a fundamental or structural transformation of the German banking system. The paper contains four sections. The first one presents the evidence concerning the profitability problem in a comparative, international perspective. The second section presents information about the so-called three-pillar system of German banking. What might be surprising in this context is that the group of pub lic banks is not only the largest segment of the German banking system, but that the primary savings banks also are its financially most successful part. The German banking system is highly fragmented. This fact suggests to discuss past, present and possible future consolidations in the banking system in the third section. The authors provide evidence to the effect that within- group consolidation has been going on at a rapid pace in the public and the cooperative banking groups in recent years and that this development has not yet come to an end, while within-group consolidation among the large private banks, consolidation across group boundaries at a national level and cross-border or international consolidation has so far only happened at a limited scale, and do not appear to gain momentum in the near future. In the last section, the authors develop their explanation for the fact that large-scale and cross border consolidation has so far not materialized to any great extent. Drawing on the concept of complementarity, they argue that it would be difficult to expect these kinds of mergers and acquisitions happening within a financial system which is itself surprisingly stable, or, as one cal also call it, resistant to change.
2
During the last years issues of strategic management accounting have received widespread attention in the accounting literature. Yet the conceptual foundation of most proposals is not clear. This paper presents a theoretical analysis of one of the most prominent approaches of strategic management accounting, i.e., Target Costing. First, the relationship between Target Costing and Life-Cycle-Costing is shown. Secondly, a model based on a mechanism-design-approach is used to answer the question of whether the „Market-into-Company“-method of Target Costing can somehow be endogenized. The model captures problems of asymmetric information, price policy and cost structures (i.e. learning effects etc.). The analysis shows that the more „strategic“ is the firm´s cost function, the less valid is „strategic“ management accounting in terms of the usual way Target Costing is employed.
89
Executive Stock Option Programs (SOPs) have become the dominant compensation instrument for top-management in recent years. The incentive effects of an SOP both with respect to corporate investment and financing decisions critically depend on the design of the SOP. A specific problem in designing SOPs concerns dividend protection. Usually, SOPs are not dividend protected, i.e. any dividend payout decreases the value of a manager’s options. Empirical evidence shows that this results in a significant decrease in the level of corporate dividends and, at the same time, into an increase in share repurchases. Yet, few suggestions have been made on how to account for dividends in SOPs. This paper applies arguments from principal-agent-theory and from the theory of finance to analyze different forms of dividend protection, and to address the relevance of dividend protection in SOPs. Finally, the paper relates the theoretical analysis to empirical work on the link between share repurchases and SOPs.
173
We propose a new approach to measuring the effect of unobservable private information or beliefs on volatility. Using high-frequency intraday data, we estimate the volatility effect of a well identified shock on the volatility of the stock returns of large European banks as a function of the quality of available public information about the banks. We hypothesise that, as the publicly available information becomes stale, volatility effects and its persistence should increase, as the private information (beliefs) of investors becomes more important. We find strong support for this idea in the data. We argue that the results have implications for debate surrounding the opacity of banks and the transparency requirements that may be imposed on banks under Pillar III of the New Basel Accord.