Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting
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204
This paper investigates the impact of IT standardization on bank performance based on a panel of 457 German savings banks over the period from 1996 to 2006. We measure IT standardization as the fraction of IT expenses for centralized services over banks' total IT expenses. Bank efficiency, in turn, is measured by traditional accounting performance indicators as well as by cost and profit efficiencies that are estimated by a stochastic frontier approach. Our results suggest that IT standardization is conducive to cost efficiency. The relation is positive and robust for small and medium-sized banks but vanishes for very large banks. Furthermore, our study confirms the often cited computer paradox by showing that total IT expenditures negatively impact cost efficiency and have no influence on bank profits. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is first to empirically explore whether IT standardization enhances efficiency by employing genuine data of banks' IT expenditures. JEL Classification: C23, G21 Keywords: IT standardization, cost and profit efficiency, savings banks
201
In this paper, we analyze economies of scale for German mutual fund complexes. Using 2002-2005 data of 41 investment management companies, we specify a hedonic translog cost function. Applying a fixed effects regression on a one-way error component model there is clear evidence of significant overall economies of scale. On the level of individual mutual fund complexes we find significant economies of scale for all of the companies in our sample. With regard to cost efficiency, we find that the average mutual fund complexes in all size quartiles deviate considerably from the best practice cost frontier. JEL Classification: G2, L25 Keywords: mutual fund complex, investment management company, cost efficiency, economies of scale, hedonic translog cost function, fixed effects regression, one-way error component model
200
Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht, ob der Mehrheitsaktionär einer Gesellschaft im Vorfeld eines Zwangsausschlusses von Minderheitsaktionären (sog. Squeeze-Out) versucht, die Kapitalmarkterwartungen negativ zu beeinflussen. Ein solches "manipulatives" Verhalten wird häufig in der juristischen wie betriebswirtschaftlichen Literatur unterstellt, da der Aktienkurs fü die Abfindungshöhe die Wertuntergrenze bildet. Unsere empirische Untersuchung der Bilanz- und Pressemitteilungspolitik von Squeeze-Out-Unternehmen im Vorfeld der Ankündigung einer solchen Maßnahme am deutschen Kapitalmarkt zeigt, dass in diesem Zeitraum tatsächlich ein signifikanter Anstieg (Rückgang) der im Ton pessimistischen (optimistischen) Pressemitteilungen feststellbar ist. Allerdings zeigt sich weiter, dass die Aktien der Squeeze-Out-Kandidaten bereits im Vorfeld und am Tag der Ankündigung so hohe positive Überrenditen erzielen, dass der von uns quantifizierte kumulierte Effekt der Informationspolitik auf die Börsenbewertung einen insgesamt nur sehr geringen Einfluss ausübt und von anderen Faktoren (z.B. Abfindungsspekulationen) dominiert wird. JEL: M41, M40, G14, K22
193
In this paper, we examine the impact of mergers among German savings banks on the extent to which these savings banks engage in small business lending. The ongoing consolidation in the banking industry has sparked concerns about the continuous availability of credit to small businesses which has been further fueled by empirical studies that partly confirm a reduction in small business lending in the aftermath of mergers. However, using a proprietary data set of German savings banks we find strong evidence that in Germany merging savings banks do not significantly change the extent to which they lend to small businesses compared to prior to the merger or compared to the contemporaneous lending by non-merging banks. We investigate the merger related effects on small business lending in Germany from a bank-level perspective. Furthermore, we estimate small business lending and its continuous adjustment process simultaneously using recent General Method of Moments (GMM) techniques for panel data as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
186
Sowohl die Diversifikation als auch die Fokussierung von Unternehmensaktivitäten werden häufig mit der Maximierung des Unternehmenswertes begründet. Wir untersuchen die Auswirkungen auf den Aktienkurs für 184 Akquisitionen sowie 139 Desinvestitionen deutscher Konzerne im Zeitraum von 1996-2005. Unternehmensdiversifikationen üben, entgegen der oft geäußerten Kritik, keinen signifikant negativen Einfluss auf den Marktwert aus. Fokussierende Unternehmensakquisitionen hingegen sind mit einem signifikanten Wertaufschlag verbunden. Der Verkauf von Unternehmensteilen führt generell zu einer Marktwertsteigerung. Dabei führen Abspaltungen außerhalb des Kerngeschäfts zu einer – allerdings insignifikant – höheren Wertsteigerung als Desinvestitionen von Kerngeschäftsaktivitäten. Statt eines systematischen Diversifikationsabschlags finden wir somit einen „Fokussierungsaufschlag“ für den deutschen Markt.
185
The introduction of a common currency as well as the harmonization of rules and regulations in Europe has significantly reduced distance in all its guises. With reduced costs of overcoming space, this emphasizes centripetal forces and it should foster consolidation of financial activity. In a national context, as a rule, this led to the emergence of one financial center. Hence, Europeanization of financial and monetary affairs could foretell the relegation of some European financial hubs such as Frankfurt and Paris to third-rank status. Frankfurt’s financial history is interesting insofar as it has lost (in the 1870s) and regained (mainly in the 1980s) its preeminent place in the German context. Because Europe is still characterized by local pockets of information-sensitive assets as well as a demand for variety the national analogy probably does not hold. There is room in Europe for a number of financial hubs of an international dimension, including Frankfurt.
182
Acquiring foreign firms far away might be hazardous to your share price: evidence from Germany
(2007)
This paper examines shareholder wealth effects of cross-border acquisitions. In a sample of 155 large acquisitions by German corporations from 1985–2006 international transactions in total do not lead to significant announcement returns. Geography, however, makes a difference: Shareholders of acquiring firms gain 6.5% in cross-border transactions into countries that have a common border with Germany but lose 4.4% in other international transactions. We find proximity to be one of the most important success factors in cross-border mergers and acquisitions, even when we control for firm, deal and country characteristics.
178
Public employee pension systems throughout the developed world have traditionally been of the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) defined benefit (DB) variety, where pensioner payments are financed by taxes (contributions) levied on the working generation. But as the number of retirees rises relative to the working-age group, such systems have begun to face financial distress. This trend has been exacerbated in many countries, among them Germany, by high unemployment rates producing further deterioration of the contribution base. In the long run, public sector pension benefits will have to be cut or contributions increased, if the systems are to be maintained. An alternative path sometimes offered to ease the crunch of paying for public employee pensions is to move toward funding: here, plan assets are gradually built up, invested, and enhanced returns devoted to partly defray civil servants’ pension costs. In this study, we evaluate the impact of introducing partial prefunding, paired with a strategic investment policy for the German federal state of Hesse. The analysis assesses the impact of introducing a supplementary tax-sponsored pension fund whose contributions are invested in the capital market and used to relieve the state budget from (some) pension payments. Our model determines the expectation and the Conditional Value-at-Risk of economic pension costs using a stochastic simulation process for pension plan assets. This approach simultaneously determines the optimal contribution rate and asset allocation that controls the expected economic costs of providing the promised pensions, while at the same time controlling investment risk. Specifically, we offer answers to the following questions: 1. How can the plan be designed to control cash-flow shortfall risk, so as to mitigate the potential burden borne by future generations of taxpayers? 2. What is the optimal asset allocation for this fund as it is built up, to generate a maximum return while simultaneously restricting capital market and liability risk? 3. What are reasonable combinations of annual contribution rates and asset allocation to a state-managed pension fund, which will limit costs of providing promised public sector pensions? We anticipate that this research will interest several sorts of policymaker groups. First, focusing on the German case, the state and Federal governments should find it relevant, as these entities face considerable public sector pension liabilities. Second, our findings will also be of interest to other European countries, as most have substantial underfunded defined benefit plans for civil servants. In what follows, we first offer a brief description of the structure of civil servant pensions in Germany, focusing on their benefit formulas, their financing, and the resulting current as well as future plan obligations for taxpayers. Next, we turn to an analysis of the actuarial status of the Hesse civil servants’ pension plan and evaluate how much would have to be contributed to fund this plan in a nonstochastic context. Subsequently we evaluate the asset-liability and decision-making process from the viewpoint of the plan sponsor, to determine sensible plan asset allocation behavior. A final section summarizes findings and implications.
177
This paper traces the location of foreign banks in Germany from 1949 to 2006. As suggested by new economic geography models we find a ‘u’-shaped concentration of foreign banks in Germany. Only after a competition between several cities, Frankfurt has emerged as the pre-eminent financial centre, triggered by the ‘historical event’ of setting up the German central bank in Frankfurt. After a strong increase, Frankfurt’s share in the location of foreign banks in Germany decreases slowly but significantly since the mid 1980’s. We conclude that there will be a lesser role in Europe for secondtier financial centres in the future.
172
Wir untersuchen, in welchem Ausmaß die Aktien deutscher Unternehmen im Zeitverlauf an ausländischen Börsen gehandelt werden. Es zeigt sich – nach anfänglich bedeutsamer Handelsaktivität im Ausland – ein ausgeprägter Rückfluss-Effekt nach Deutschland. Zweitnotierungen an ausländischen Börsen dienen der Verbreiterung der Aktionärsbasis und somit der Senkung der Kapitalkosten und letztendlich der Steigerung des Unternehmenswertes. Dazu ist ein ausreichendes Handelsvolumen an der ausländischen Börse unabdinglich. Daran gemessen sind die Auslandsnotierungen deutscher Unternehmen nicht erfolgreich. Dies ist jedoch nicht im gleichen Ausmaß für alle Unternehmen der Fall. Kleinere, wachsende Unternehmen und Unternehmen mit höherem Anteil des Auslandsumsatzes am Gesamtumsatz werden relativ stärker im Ausland gehandelt.
162
Stakeholderorientierung, Systemhaftigkeit und Stabilität der Corporate Governance in Deutschland
(2006)
Since the time of Germany’s belated industrialisation, corporate governance in Germany has been stakeholder oriented in the dual sense of attaching importance to the interests of stakeholders who are not at the same time shareholders, and of providing certain opportunities for these stakeholders to influence corporate decisions. Corporate governance is also systemic. It is a system of elements that are complementary to each other, and also consistent. In other word, it is composed of elements for which it is important that they fit together well, and in the German case these elements did fit together well until quite recently. Corporate governance as a system is itself an element of the German bank-based financial system at large and possibly even of the entire German business and economic system. Stakeholder orientation of governance is consistent with the general structure this system, and even represents one of its central elements. In retrospect, German corporate governance has also proved to be surprisingly stable. Its fundamental traits date back to the turn from the 19th to the 20th century. There are strong reasons to assume that the systemic features, that is, its complementarity and consistency, have greatly contributed to its past stability. Since about ten years now, there are growing tendencies to question the viability and stability of the German corporate governance system and even the financial system as a whole. One of the central topics in the new debate concerns the stakeholder orientation of the system, which some observers and critics consider as the main weakness of the “German model” under the increasing pressures of globalisation and European integration. As far as their development over time is concerned, systems of complementarity elements exhibit certain peculiarities: (1) They do not adjust easily to changing circumstances. (2) Changes concerning important individual elements, such as the stakeholder orientation of governance, tend to jeopardize the viability and the stability of the entire system. (3) While they appear to be stable, systems shaped by complementary may simply be rigid and tend to break under strong external pressure. “Breaking” means that a system undergoes a fundamental transformation. It seems plausible to assume that the German financial system is already in the middle of such a transformation. It is yet another consequence of its systemic character that this transformation is not likely to be a smooth and gradual process and that it will not lead to a “mixed model” but rather to the adoption of a capital market-based financial system as it prevails in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In such a system, corporate governance cannot be geared to catering to the interests of stakeholders, and an active role for them would not even make any economic sense.
156
This article presents an overview of the contemporary German insurance market, its structure, players, and development trends. First, brief information about the history of the insurance industry in Germany is provided. Second, the contemporary market is analyzed in terms of its legal and economic structure, with statistics on the number of companies, insurance density and penetration, the role of insurers in the capital markets, premiums split, and main market players and their market shares. Furthermore, the three biggest insurance lines—life, health, and property and casualty—are considered in more detail, such as product range, country specifics, and insurance and investment results. A section on regulation outlines its implementation in the insurance sector, offering information on the underlying legislative basis, supervisory body, technical procedures, expected developments, and sources of more detailed information.
146
The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of the big universal banks in the governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market-based system could be in the offing.
145
This paper examines intraday stock price effects and trading activity caused by ad hoc disclosures in Germany. The evidence suggests that the observed stock prices react within 90 minutes after the ad hoc disclosures. Trading volumes take even longer to adjust. We find no evidence for abnormal price reactions or abnormal trading volume before announcements. The bigger the company that announces an ad hoc disclosure, the less severe is the abnormal price effect following the announcement. The number of analysts is negatively correlated to the trading volume effect before the ad hoc disclosure. The higher the trading volume on the last trading day before the announcement, the greater is the price effect after the ad hoc disclosures and the greater the trading volume effect. Keywords: ad hoc disclosure rules, intraday stock price adjustments, market efficiency.
137
This paper suggests a motive for bank mergers that goes beyond alleged and typically unverifiable scale economies: preemtive resolution of banks´ financial distress. Such "distress mergers" can be a significant motivation for mergers because they can foster reorganizations, realize diversification gains, and avoid public attention. However, since none of these potential benefits comes without a cost, the overall assessment of distress mergers is unclear. We conduct an empirical analysis to provide evidence on consequences of distress mergers. The analysis is based on comprehensive data from Germany´s savings and cooperatives banks sectors over the period 1993 to 2001. During this period both sectors faced significant structural problems and superordinate institutions (associations) presumably have engaged in coordinated actions to manage distress mergers. The data comprise 3640 banks and 1484 mergers. Our results suggest that bank mergers as a means of preemtive distress resolution have moderate costs in terms of the economic impact on performance. We do find strong evidence consistent with diversification gains. Thus, distress mergers seem to have benefits without affecting systematic stability adversely.
128
This paper investigates the magnitude and the main determinants of share price reactions to buy-back announcements of German corporations. For our comprehensive sample of 224 announcements that took place between May 1998 and April 2003 we find average cumulative abnormal returns around -7.5% for the thirty days preceding the announcement and around +7.0 % for the ten days following the announcement. We regress post-announcement abnormal returns with multiple firm characteristics and provide evidence which supports the undervaluation signaling hypothesis but not the excess cash hypothesis or the tax-efficiency hypothesis. In extending prior empirical work, we also analyze price effects from initial statements of firms that they intend to seek shareholder approval for a buy-back plan. Observed cumulative abnormal returns on this initial date are in excess of 5% implying a total average price effect between 12% and 15% from implementing a buy-back plan. We conjecture that the German regulatory environment is the main reason why market variations to buy-back announcements are much stronger in Germany than in other countries and conclude that initial statements by managers to seek shareholders’ approval for a buy-back plan should also be subject to legal ad-hoc disclosure requirements.
125
A widely recognized paper by Colin Mayer (1988) has led to a profound revision of academic thinking about financing patterns of corporations in different countries. Using flow-of-funds data instead of balance sheet data, Mayer and others who followed his lead found that internal financing is the dominant mode of financing in all countries, that financing patterns do not differ very much between countries and that those differences which still seem to exist are not at all consistent with the common conviction that financial systems can be classified as being either bank-based or capital market-based. This leads to a puzzle insofar as it calls into question the empirical foundation of the widely held belief that there is a correspondence between the financing patterns of corporations on the one side, and the structure of the financial sector and the prevailing corporate governance system in a given country on the other side. The present paper addresses this puzzle on a methodological and an empirical basis. It starts by comparing and analyzing various ways of measuring financial structure and financing patterns and by demonstrating that the surprising empirical results found by studies that relied on net flows are due to a hidden assumption. It then derives an alternative method of measuring financing patterns, which also uses flow-of-funds data, but avoids the questionable assumption. This measurement concept is then applied to patterns of corporate financing in Germany, Japan and the United States. The empirical results, which use an estimation technique for determining gross flows of funds in those cases in which empirical data are not available, are very much in line with the commonly held belief prior to Mayer’s influential contribution and indicate that the financial systems of the three countries do indeed differ from one another in a substantial way, and moreover in a way which is largely in line with the general view of the differences between the financial systems of the countries covered in the present paper.
124
In this study, we develop a technique for estimating a firm’s expected cost of equity capital derived from analyst consensus forecasts and stock prices. Building on the work of Gebhardt/Lee/-Swaminathan (2001) and Easton/Taylor/Shroff/Sougiannis (2002), our approach allows daily estimation, using only publicly available information at that date. We then estimate the expected cost of equity capital at the market, industry and individual firm level using historical German data from 1989-2002 and examine firm characteristics which are systematically related to these estimates. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of the concept in a contemporary case study for DaimlerChrysler and the European automobile industry.
118
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions.
115
Under a new Basel capital accord, bank regulators might use quantitative measures when evaluating the eligibility of internal credit rating systems for the internal ratings based approach. Based on data from Deutsche Bundesbank and using a simulation approach, we find that it is possible to identify strongly inferior rating systems out-of time based on statistics that measure either the quality of ranking borrowers from good to bad, or the quality of individual default probability forecasts. Banks do not significantly improve system quality if they use credit scores instead of ratings, or logistic regression default probability estimates instead of historical data. Banks that are not able to discriminate between high- and low-risk borrowers increase their average capital requirements due to the concavity of the capital requirements function.