Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting
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132
This paper compares the accuracy of credit ratings of Moody s and Standard&Poors. Based on 11,428 issuer ratings and 350 defaults in several datasets from 1999 to 2003 a slight advantage for the rating system of Moody s is detected. Compared to former research the robustness of the results is increased by using nonparametric bootstrap approaches. Furthermore, robustness checks are made to control for the impact of Watchlist entries, staleness of ratings and the effect of unsolicited ratings on the results.
21
Discretionary disclosure theory suggests that firms' incentives to provide proprietary versus nonproprietary information differ markedly. To test this conjecture, the paper investigates the incentives of German firms to voluntarily disclose business segment reports and cash flow statements in their annual financial reports. While the former is likely to reveal proprietary information to competitors, the latter is less proprietary in nature. Using these proxies for proprietary and non-proprietary disclosures, respectively, I find that the determinants or at least their relative magnitudes differ in a way consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis. That is, cash flow statement disclosures appear to be governed primarily by capital-market considerations, whereas segment disclosures are more strongly associated with proxies for product-market and proprietary-cost considerations.
111
What constitutes a financial system in general and the German financial system in particular?
(2003)
This paper is one of the two introductory chapters of the book "The German Financial System". It first discusses two issues that have a general bearing on the entire book, and then provides a broad overview of the German financial system. The first general issue is that of clarifying what we mean by the key term "financial system" and, based on this definition, of showing why the financial system of a country is important and what it might be important for. Obviously, a definition of its subject matter and an explanation of its importance are required at the outset of any book. As we will explain in Section II, we use the term "financial system" in a broad sense which sets it clearly apart from the narrower concept of the "financial sector". The second general issue is that of how financial systems are described and analysed. Obviously, the definition of the object of analysis and the method by which the object is to be analysed are closely related to one another. The remainder of the paper provides a general overview of the German financial system. In addition, it is intended to provide a first indication of how the elements of the German financial system are related to each other, and thus to support our claim from Section II that there is indeed some merit in emphasising the systemic features of financial systems in general and of the German financial system in particular. The chapter concludes by briefly comparing the general characteristics of the German financial system with those of the financial systems of other advanced industrial countries, and taking a brief look at recent developments which might undermine the "systemic" character of the German financial system.
198
Stocks are exposed to the risk of sudden downward jumps. Additionally, a crash in one stock (or index) can increase the risk of crashes in other stocks (or indices). Our paper explicitly takes this contagion risk into account and studies its impact on the portfolio decision of a CRRA investor both in complete and in incomplete market settings. We find that the investor significantly adjusts his portfolio when contagion is more likely to occur. Capturing the time dimension of contagion, i.e. the time span between jumps in two stocks or stock indices, is thus of first-order importance when analyzing portfolio decisions. Investors ignoring contagion completely or accounting for contagion while ignoring its time dimension suffer large and economically significant utility losses. These losses are larger in complete than in incomplete markets, and the investor might be better off if he does not trade derivatives. Furthermore, we emphasize that the risk of contagion has a crucial impact on investors' security demands, since it reduces their ability to diversify their portfolios.
138
This paper deals with the superhedging of derivatives and with the corresponding price bounds. A static superhedge results in trivial and fully nonparametric price bounds, which can be tightened if there exists a cheaper superhedge in the class of dynamic trading strategies. We focus on European path-independent claims and show under which conditions such an improvement is possible. For a stochastic volatility model with unbounded volatility, we show that a static superhedge is always optimal, and that, additionally, there may be infinitely many dynamic superhedges with the same initial capital. The trivial price bounds are thus the tightest ones. In a model with stochastic jumps or non-negative stochastic interest rates either a static or a dynamic superhedge is optimal. Finally, in a model with unbounded short rates, only a static superhedge is possible.
91
Who knows what when? : The information content of pre-IPO market prices : [Version March/June 2002]
(2002)
To resolve the IPO underpricing puzzle it is essential to analyze who knows what when during the issuing process. In Germany, broker-dealers make a market in IPOs during the subscription period. We examine these pre-issue prices and find that they are highly informative. They are closer to the first price subsequently established on the exchange than both the midpoint of the bookbuilding range and the offer price. The pre-issue prices explain a large part of the underpricing left unexplained by other variables. The results imply that information asymmetries are much lower than the observed variance of underpricing suggests.