SAFE working paper
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343
While the COVID-19 pandemic had a large and asymmetric impact on firms, many countries quickly enacted massive business rescue programs which are specifically targeted to smaller firms. Little is known about the effects of such policies on business entry and exit, factor reallocation, and macroeconomic outcomes. This paper builds a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous and financially constrained firms in order to evaluate the short- and long-term consequences of small firm rescue programs in a pandemic recession. We calibrate the stationary equilibrium and the pandemic shock to the U.S. economy, taking into account the factual Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) as a specific grant policy. We find that the policy has only a small impact on aggregate employment because (i) jobs are saved predominately in less productive firms that account for a small share of employment and (ii) the grant induces a reallocation of resources away from larger and less impacted firms. Much of this reallocation happens in the aftermath of the pandemic episode. While a universal grant reduces the firm exit rate substantially, a targeted policy is not only more cost-effective, it also largely prevents the creation of “zombie firms" whose survival is socially inefficient.
342
Global consensus is growing on the contribution that corporations and finance must make towards the net-zero transition in line with the Paris Agreement goals. However, most efforts in legislative instruments as well as shareholder or stakeholder initiatives have ultimately focused on public companies: for example, most disclosure obligations result from the given company’s status of being listed on a stock exchange.
This article argues that such a focus falls short of providing a comprehensive approach to the problem of climate change. In doing so, it examines the contribution of private companies to climate change, the relevance of climate risks for them, as well as the phenomenon of brown-spinning. We show that one cannot afford to ignore private companies in the net-zero transition and climate change adaptation. Yet, private companies lack several disciplining mechanisms available to public companies such as institutional investor engagement, certain corporate governance arrangements, and transparency through regular disclosure obligations. At this stage, only some generic regulatory instruments such as carbon pricing and environmental regulation apply to them. The article closes with a discussion of the main policy implications. Primarily, we propose extending sustainability disclosure requirements to private companies.
Sustainability disclosures aim at promoting a transition to a greener economy, rather than (only) protecting investors by addressing information asymmetry. Therefore, these disclosures should encompass private companies that are of relevance for the net-zero transition. Such disclosures can be a powerful tool in shedding light on the polluting private companies that have so far been in the dark as well as serving as a disciplining mechanism.
341
Joint Institutional Frameworks in bilateral relations are circumscribed in policy scope, can lack adequate instruments for dynamic adaptation and provide limited access to decision-making processes internal to the contracting parties. Informal governance, the involvement of private actors as well as rules such as equivalence provide avenues to remedy these limits in bilateral relations in sectoral governance. Through bilateral agreements, the scope of territorially bound political authority is expanded. The formalised and institutionalised frameworks and bodies established are, however, frequently accompanied by mechanisms of informal cooperation and special rules either to cover policy fields where no contractual relation exists, to provide for flexible solutions where needed, or to involve both public and private actors that otherwise do not have access to formal decision-making bodies. This SAFE working paper conceptualises formal and informal modes of cooperation and varying actor constellations. It discusses their relevance for the case of bilateral relations between the European Union (EU) and Switzerland in sectoral governance. More specifically, it draws lessons from EU-Swiss sectoral governance of financial and electricity markets for the future relations of the EU with the United Kingdom (UK). The findings suggest that there are distinct governance arrangements across sectors, while the patterns of sectoral governance are expected to look very much alike in the United Kingdom and Switzerland in the years to come. The general takeaway is that Brexit will have repercussions for the EU’s external relations with other third countries, putting ever more emphasis on formal and rule-based approaches, while leaving a need for sector-specific cross border co-operation.
340
We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRG), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.
339
There have been numerous attempts to reform the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) after the Great Recession, however the reform success varies greatly among sub-fields. Additionally, the political science research community has engaged a diverse set of theory- driven explanations, causal mechanisms, and variables to explain respective reform success. This article takes stock of reform policies in the EMU from two angles. First, it outlines distinct theoretical approaches that seek to explain success and failure of reform proposals and second, it surveys how they explain policy output and policy outcome in four policy subfields: financial stabilization, economic governance, financial solidarity, and cooperative dissolution. Finally, the article develops a set of explanatory factors from the existing literature that will be used for a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).
338
Are we in a new “Polanyian moment”? If we are, it is essential to examine how “spontaneous” and punctual expressions of discontent at the individual level may give rise to collective discourses driving social and political change. It is also important to examine whether and how the framing of these discourses may vary across political economies. This paper contributes to this endeavor with the analysis of anti-finance discourses on Twitter in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK between 2019 and 2020. This paper presents three main findings. First, the analysis shows that, more than ten years after the financial crisis, finance is still a strong catalyzer of political discontent. Second, it shows that there are important variations in the dominant framing of public anti-finance discourses on social media across European political economies. If the antagonistic “us versus them” is prominent in all the cases, the identification of who “us” and “them” are, vary significantly. Third, it shows that the presence of far-right tropes in the critique of finance varies greatly from virtually inexistent to a solid minority of statements.
337
In times of increased political polarization, the continuing existence of a deliberative arena where people with antagonistic views may engage with each other in non-violent ways is critical for democracy to live on. Social media are usually not conceived as such arenas. On the contrary, there has been widespread worry about their role in increasing polarization and political violence. This paper suggests a more positive impact of social media on democracy. Our analysis focuses on the subreddit “r/WallStreetBets” (r/WSB) - a finance-related forum that came under the spotlight when its users coordinated a financial attack on hedge funds during the Gamestop saga in early 2021. Based on an original method attributing partisanship scores to users, we present a network analysis of interactions between users at the opposite sides of the political spectrum on r/WSB. We then develop a content analysis of politically relevant threads in which polarized users participate. Our analyses show that r/WSB provides a rare space where users with antagonistic political leanings engage with each other, debate, and even cooperate.
336
With Big Data, decisions made by machine learning algorithms depend on training data generated by many individuals. In an experiment, we identify the effect of varying individual responsibility for the moral choices of an artificially intelligent algorithm. Across treatments, we manipulated the sources of training data and thus the impact of each individual’s decisions on the algorithm. Diffusing such individual pivotality for algorithmic choices increased the share of selfish decisions and weakened revealed prosocial preferences. This does not result from a change in the structure of incentives. Rather, our results show that Big Data offers an excuse for selfish behavior through lower responsibility for one’s and others’ fate.
335
In more and more situations, artificially intelligent algorithms have to model humans’ (social) preferences on whose behalf they increasingly make decisions. They can learn these preferences through the repeated observation of human behavior in social encounters. In such a context, do individuals adjust the selfishness or prosociality of their behavior when it is common knowledge that their actions produce various externalities through the training of an algorithm? In an online experiment, we let participants’ choices in dictator games train an algorithm. Thereby, they create an externality on future decision making of an intelligent system that affects future participants. We show that individuals who are aware of the consequences of their training on the pay- offs of a future generation behave more prosocially, but only when they bear the risk of being harmed themselves by future algorithmic choices. In that case, the externality of artificially intelligence training induces a significantly higher share of egalitarian decisions in the present.
334
In a parsimonious regime switching model, we find strong evidence that expected consumption growth varies over time. Adding inflation as a second variable, we uncover two states in which expected consumption growth is low, one with high and one with negative expected inflation. Embedded in a general equilibrium asset pricing model with learning, these dynamics replicate the observed time variation in stock return volatilities and stock- bond return correlations. They also provide an alternative derivation for a measure of time-varying disaster risk suggested by Wachter (2013), implying that both the disaster and the long-run risk paradigm can be extended towards explaining movements in the stock-bond correlation.