Arbeitspapiere / Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaft, Goethe-Universität = Research paper / Faculty of Law, Goethe University
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2017, 5
The EU Collective Redress Recommendation has invited Member States to introduce collective redress mechanisms by 26 July 2015. The well-known reservations claim potentially abusive litigation and potential settlement of not well-founded claims resulting from controversial funding of cases by means of contingency fees and from ‘opt-out’ class action procedures. The paper posits that there may also be some fear that the European Commission may try to pursue the enforcement of its regulatory agenda in this way at the expense of individual claimants’ interests. Therefore a comparative analysis is carried out to see to what extent concerns about individual rights as opposed to regulatory goals are reflected in the different newly revised systems in place across Europe. As an iterim result the Dutch settlement procedure for mass damage claims, the English Group Litigation Order and the German test case procedure turn out to be relatively well-suited to deal with mass damage claims. At the same time, none of them can quite reach an optimal balance between individual rights and regulatory goals and therefore each of them is subject to criticism. That is why the further question is raised in how far these procedures could complement each other, thus contributing to the enforcement of individual rights without overregulating markets in Europe.
2013, 9
The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) and its amendment of 2012 highlight some fundamentals of collective redress in civil law countries at the example of model case procedures in the field of investor protection. That is why a survey of the ongoing activities of the European Union in the area of collective redress and of its repercussions on the member state level forms a suitable basis for the following analysis of the 2012 amendment of the KapMuG. It clearly brings into focus a shift from sector-specific regulation with an emphasis on the cross-border aspect of protecting consumers towards a “coherent approach” strengthening the enforcement of EU law. As a result, regulatory policy and collective redress are two sides of the same coin today. With respect to the KapMuG such a development brings about some tension between its aim to aggregate small individual claims as efficiently as possible and the dominant role of individual procedural rights in German civil procedure. This conflict can be illustrated by some specific rules of the KapMuG: its scope of application, the three-tier procedure of a model case procedure, the newly introduced notification of claims and the new opt-out settlement under the amended §§ 17-19.
2013, 1
Die Frage nach den Zusammenhängen zwischen Normanerkennung und ökonomischem Verhalten lassen sich anhand der Wirkung von Corporate Governance Kodizes schlaglichtartig beleuchten. Der vorliegende Beitrag liefert erste theoretische Bausteine zum Zusammenwirken von Corporate Governance Kodizes und verbindlichen gesetzlichen Normen auf der Grundlage des Comply or Explain-Grundsatzes, indem er zunächst die Wirkungsweise des Kapitalmarktes, wie sie von der ökonomisch fundierten Gesellschaftsrechtstheorie vorausgesetzt wird, dem Mechanismus des Comply or Explain gegenüberstellt. Die empirischen Studien zur Wirksamkeit des Kapitalmarktes bei der Durchsetzung des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex im Wege des Comply or Explain lassen Raum für weitere Normanerkennungs- und –befolgungsmechanismen, die sich in Parallele zur Diskussion im Bereich der Corporate Social Responsibility und den sogenannten „business cases“ hierfür verdeutlichen lassen. Die dabei aufscheinenden Berührungspunkte ökonomischer Motivation mit sozialen Interessen geben Gelegenheit, auf Fairnessnormen als Grenzen des traditionellen Rationalmodells einzugehen. Ein ähnliches Nebeneinander und Ineinandergreifen von Eigennutzinteresse und intrinsischer Motivation lässt sich anhand der Anreizwirkung bei der Managervergütung veranschaulichen. Ihre gesetzliche Regelung im VorstAG lässt zum Teil eine empirische Absicherung vermissen. Damit schließt sich der Kreis der Analyse der Verbindlichkeitsstrukturen im Wirtschaftsrecht, nach der sich diese einem einheitlichen theoretischen Modell entziehen und deren empirische Grundlagen noch nicht zweifelsfrei geklärt sind.