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This paper describes the development of a typesetting program for music in the lazy functional programming language Clean. The system transforms a description of the music to be typeset in a dvi-file just like TEX does with mathematical formulae. The implementation makes heavy use of higher order functions. It has been implemented in just a few weeks and is able to typeset quite impressive examples. The system is easy to maintain and can be extended to typeset arbitrary complicated musical constructs. The paper can be considered as a status report of the implementation as well as a reference manual for the resulting system.
The extraction of strictness information marks an indispensable element of an efficient compilation of lazy functional languages like Haskell. Based on the method of abstract reduction we have developed an e cient strictness analyser for a core language of Haskell. It is completely written in Haskell and compares favourably with known implementations. The implementation is based on the G#-machine, which is an extension of the G-machine that has been adapted to the needs of abstract reduction.
This paper describes context analysis, an extension to strictness analysis for lazy functional languages. In particular it extends Wadler's four point domain and permits in nitely many abstract values. A calculus is presented based on abstract reduction which given the abstract values for the result automatically finds the abstract values for the arguments. The results of the analysis are useful for veri fication purposes and can also be used in compilers which require strictness information.
A partial rehabilitation of side-effecting I/O : non-determinism in non-strict functional languages
(1996)
We investigate the extension of non-strict functional languages like Haskell or Clean by a non-deterministic interaction with the external world. Using call-by-need and a natural semantics which describes the reduction of graphs, this can be done such that the Church-Rosser Theorems 1 and 2 hold. Our operational semantics is a base to recognise which particular equivalencies are preserved by program transformations. The amount of sequentialisation may be smaller than that enforced by other approaches and the programming style is closer to the common one of side-effecting programming. However, not all program transformations used by an optimising compiler for Haskell remain correct in all contexts. Our result can be interpreted as a possibility to extend current I/O-mechanism by non-deterministic deterministic memoryless function calls. For example, this permits a call to a random number generator. Adding memoryless function calls to monadic I/O is possible and has a potential to extend the Haskell I/O-system.
Automatic termination proofs of functional programming languages are an often challenged problem Most work in this area is done on strict languages Orderings for arguments of recursive calls are generated In lazily evaluated languages arguments for functions are not necessarily evaluated to a normal form It is not a trivial task to de ne orderings on expressions that are not in normal form or that do not even have a normal form We propose a method based on an abstract reduction process that reduces up to the point when su cient ordering relations can be found The proposed method is able to nd termination proofs for lazily evaluated programs that involve non terminating subexpressions Analysis is performed on a higher order polymorphic typed language and termi nation of higher order functions can be proved too The calculus can be used to derive information on a wide range on di erent notions of termination.
We consider unification of terms under the equational theory of two-sided distributivity D with the axioms x*(y+z) = x*y + x*z and (x+y)*z = x*z + y*z. The main result of this paper is that Dunification is decidable by giving a non-deterministic transformation algorithm. The generated unification are: an AC1-problem with linear constant restrictions and a second-order unification problem that can be transformed into a word-unification problem that can be decided using Makanin's algorithm. This solves an open problem in the field of unification. Furthermore it is shown that the word-problem can be decided in polynomial time, hence D-matching is NP-complete.
We consider the problem of unifying a set of equations between second-order terms. Terms are constructed from function symbols, constant symbols and variables, and furthermore using monadic second-order variables that may stand for a term with one hole, and parametric terms. We consider stratified systems, where for every first-order and second-order variable, the string of second-order variables on the path from the root of a term to every occurrence of this variable is always the same. It is shown that unification of stratified second-order terms is decidable by describing a nondeterministic decision algorithm that eventually uses Makanin's algorithm for deciding the unifiability of word equations. As a generalization, we show that the method can be used as a unification procedure for non-stratified second-order systems, and describe conditions for termination in the general case.
Lavater was admired and detested for his unconventional approach to theology and his rediscovery of physiognomy. He was an avid communicator and through his correspondence became known to almost all leading personalities of eighteenth century Europe, such as Goethe, Wieland and Rousseau. The more than 21,000 letters in Lavater's estate in the Zentralbibliothek Zürich display the enormous thematic variety produced during a remarkable forty years of correspondence. This unique source material is now being published for the first time. IDC Publishers makes this collection available for research to such various disciplines as theology, history, literature, arts, humanities and above all, the history of eighteenth century culture. Scope: * 9,121 letters from Lavater * 12,302 letters to Lavater * 1,850 correspondents
This Article concerns the duty of care in American corporate law. To fully understand that duty, it is necessary to distinguish between roles, functions, standards of conduct, and standards of review. A role consists of an organized and socially recognized pattern of activity in which individuals regularly engage. In organizations, roles take the form of positions, such as the position of the director. A function consists of an activity that an actor is expected to engage in by virtue of his role or position. A standard of conduct states the way in which an actor should play a role, act in his position, or conduct his functions. A standard of review states the test that a court should apply when it reviews an actor’s conduct to determine whether to impose liability, grant injunctive relief, or determine the validity of his actions. In many or most areas of law, standards of conduct and standards of review tend to be conflated. For example, the standard of conduct that governs automobile drivers is that they should drive carefully, and the standard of review in a liability claim against a driver is whether he drove carefully. Similarly, the standard of conduct that governs an agent who engages in a transaction with his principal is that the agent must deal fairly, and the standard of review in a claim by the principal against an agent, based on such a transaction, is whether the agent dealt fairly. The conflation of standards of conduct and standards of review is so common that it is easy to overlook the fact that whether the two kinds of standards are or should be identical in any given area is a matter of prudential judgment. In a corporate world in which information was perfect, the risk of liability for assuming a given corporate role was always commensurate with the incentives for assuming the role, and institutional considerations never required deference to a corporate organ, the standards of conduct and review in corporate law might be identical. In the real world, however, these conditions seldom hold, and in American corporate law the standards of review pervasively diverge from the standards of conduct. Traditionally, the two major areas of American corporate law that involved standards of conduct and review have been the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does involve his own self-interest. The duty of care concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does not involve his own self-interest.
Revised Draft: January 2005, First Draft: December 8, 2004 The picture of dispersed, isolated and uninterested shareholders so graphically drawn by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in 19321 is for the most part no longer accurate in today's market, although their famous observations on the separation of control and ownership of public corporations remain true.
Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany
(2003)
The attitude expressed by Carl Fuerstenberg, a leading German banker of his time, succinctly embodies one of the principal issues facing the large enterprise – the divergence of interest between the management of the firm and outside equity shareholders. Why do, or should, investors put some of their savings in the hands of others, to expend as they see fit, with no commitment to repayment or a return? The answers are far from simple, and involve a complex interaction among a number of legal rules, economic institutions and market forces. Yet crafting a viable response is essential to the functioning of a modern economy based upon technology with scale economies whose attainment is dependent on the creation of large firms.
With the Council regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, that came into effect May 31, 2002 the European Union has introduced a legal framework for dealing with cross-border insolvency proceedings. In order to achieve the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of insolvency proceedings having cross-border effects within the European Community, the provisions on jurisdiction, recognition and applicable law in this area are contained in a Regulation, a Community law measure which is binding and directly applicable in Member States. The goals of the Regulation, with 47 articles, are to enable cross-border insolvency proceedings to operate efficiently and effectively, to provide for co-ordination of the measures to be taken with regard to the debtor’s assets and to avoid forum shopping. The Insolvency Regulation, therefore, provides rules for the international jurisdiction of a court in a Member State for the opening of insolvency proceedings, the (automatic) recognition of these proceedings in other Member States and the powers of the ‘liquidator’ in the other Member States. The Regulation also deals with important choice of law (or: private international law) provisions. The Regulation is directly applicable in the Member States3 for all insolvency proceedings opened after 31 May 2002.
Increasingly, alternative investments via hedge funds are gaining importance in Germany. Just recently, this subject was taken up in the legal literature, too; this resulted in a higher product transparency. However, German investment law and, particularly, the special division "hedge funds" is still a field dominated by practitioners. First, the present situation shall be outlined. In addition, a description of the current development is given, in which the practical knowledge of the author is included. Finally, the hedge fund regulation intended by the legislator at the beginning of the year 2004 is legally evaluated against this background.
In response to recent developments in the financial markets and the stunning growth of the hedge fund industry in the United States, policy makers, most notably the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), are turning their attention to the regulation, or lack thereof, of hedge funds. U.S. regulators have scrutinized the hedge fund industry on several occasions in the recent past without imposing substantial regulatory constraints. Will this time be any different? The focus of the regulators’ interest has shifted. Traditionally, they approached the hedge fund industry by focusing on systemic risk to and integrity of the financial markets. The current inquiry is almost exclusively driven by investor protection concerns. What has changed? First, since 2000, new kinds of investors have poured capital into hedge funds in the United States, facilitated by the “retailization” of hedge funds through the development of funds of hedge funds and the dismal performance of the stock market. Second, in a post-Enron era, regulators and policy makers are increasingly sensitive to investor protection concerns. On May 14 and 15, 2003, the SEC held for the first time a public roundtable discussion on the single topic of hedge funds. Among the investor protection concerns highlighted were: an increase in incidents of fraud, inadequate suitability determinations by brokers who market hedge fund interests to individual investors, conflicts of interest of managers who manage mutual funds and hedge funds side-by-side, a lack of transparency that hinders investors from making informed investment decisions, layering of fees, and unbounded discretion by managers in pricing private hedge fund securities. Although there has been discussion about imposing wide-ranging restrictions onhedge funds, such as reining in short selling, requiring disclosure of long/short positions and limiting leverage, such a response would be heavy-handed and probably unnecessary. The existing regulatory regime is largely adequate to address the most flagrant abuses. Moreover, as the hedge fund market further matures, it is likely that institutional investors will continue to weed out weak performers and mediocre or dishonest hedge fund managers. What is likely to emerge from the newest regulatory focus on investor protection is a measured response that would enhance the SEC’s enforcement and inspection authority, while leaving hedge funds’ inherent investment flexibility largely unfettered. A likely scenario, for example, might be a requirement that some, or possibly all, hedge fund sponsors register with the SEC as investment advisers. Today, most are exempt from registration, although more and more are registering to provide advice to public hedge funds and attract institutions. Registration would make it easier for the SEC to ferret out potential fraudsters in advance by reviewing the professional history of hedge fund operators, allow the SEC to bring administrative proceedings against hedge fund advisers for statutory violations and give the agency access to books and records that it does not have today. Other possible initiatives, including additional disclosure requirements for publicly offered hedge funds, are discussed below. This article addresses the question whether U.S. regulation of hedge funds is really taking a new direction. It (i) provides a brief overview of the current U.S. regulatory scheme, from which hedge funds are generally exempt, (ii) describes recent events in the United States that have contributed to regulators’ anxiety, (iii) examines the investor protection rationale for hedge fund regulation and considers whether these concerns do, in fact, merit increased regulation of hedge funds at this time, and (iv) considers the likelihood and possible scope of a potential regulatory response, principally by the SEC.
In an ideal world all investment products, including hedge funds, would be marketable to all investors. In this ideal world, all investors would fully understand the nature of the products and would be able to make an informed choice whether to invest. Of course the ideal world does not exist – the retail investment market is characterised by asymmetries of information. Product providers know most about the products on offer (or at least they should do). Investment advisers often know rather less than the provider but much more than their retail customers. Providers and intermediary advisers are understandably motivated by the desire to sell their products. There is therefore a risk that investment products will be mis-sold by investment advisers or mis-bought by ill-informed investors. This asymmetry of information is dealt with in most countries through regulation. However, the regulatory response in different countries is not necessarily the same. There are various ways in which protections can be applied and it is important to understand that the cultural background and regulatory histories of countries flavours the way regulation has developed. This means (as will be explained in greater detail later) that some countries are better able than others to admit hedge funds to the retail sector. Following this Introduction, Section II looks at some key background issues. Section III then looks at some important questions raised by the retail hedge fund issue. Many of these are questions of balance. Balance lies at the heart of regulation of course – regulation must always balance the needs of investors and with market efficiency. Understanding the “retail hedge fund” question requires particular attention to balance. Section IV then looks at the UK regime and how the FSA has answered the balance question. Section V offers some international perspectives. Section VI concludes. It will be seen that there is no obviously right answer to the question whether hedge fund products should be marketed to retail investors. Each regulator in each jurisdiction needs to make up its own mind on how to deal with the various issues and balances. It is evident, however, that internationally there is a move towards a greater variety of retail funds. There is nothing wrong with that, provided the regulators and the retail customers they protect, understand sufficiently what sort of protection is, or is not, being offered in the regulatory regime.