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This paper investigates the roles psychological biases play in empirically estimated deviations between subjective survival beliefs (SSBs) and objective survival probabilities (OSPs). We model deviations between SSBs and OSPs through age-dependent inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions (PWFs), as documented in experimental prospect theory. Our estimates suggest that the implied measures for cognitive weakness, likelihood insensitivity, and those for motivational biases, relative pessimism, increase with age. We document that direct measures of cognitive weakness and motivational attitudes share these trends. Our regression analyses confirm that these factors play strong quantitative roles in the formation of subjective survival beliefs. In particular, cognitive weakness is an increasingly important contributor to the overestimation of survival chances in old age.
This paper is the national report for Germany prepared for the to the 20th General Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law 2018 and gives an overview of the regulation of crowdfunding in Germany and the typical design of crowdfunding campaigns under this legal framework. After a brief survey of market data, it delineates the classification of crowdfunding transactions in German contract law and their treatment under the applicable conflict of laws regime. It then turns to the relevant rules in prudential banking regulation and capital market law. It highlights disclosure requirements that flow from both contractual obligations of the initiators of campaigns vis-à-vis contributors and securities regulation (prospectus regime). After sketching the most important duties of the parties involved in crowdfunding, the report also looks at the key features of the respective transactions’ tax treatment.
This paper revisits the macroeconomic effects of the large-scale asset purchase programmes launched by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England from 2008. Using a Bayesian VAR, we investigate the macroeconomic impact of shocks to asset purchase announcements and assess changes in their effectiveness based on subsample analysis. The results suggest that the early asset purchase programmes had significant positive macroeconomic effects, while those of the subsequent ones were weaker and in part not significantly different from zero. The reduced effectiveness seems to reflect in part better anticipation of asset purchase programmes over time, since we find significant positive macroeconomic effects when we consider shocks to survey expectations of the Federal Reserve’s last asset purchase programme. Finally, in all estimations we find a significant and persistent positive impact of asset purchase shocks on stock prices.
Coordination of circuit breakers? Volume migration and volatility spillover in fragmented markets
(2018)
We study circuit breakers in a fragmented, multi-market environment and investigate whether a coordination of circuit breakers is necessary to ensure their effectiveness. In doing so, we analyze 2,337 volatility interruptions on Deutsche Boerse and research whether a volume migration and an accompanying volatility spillover to alternative venues that continue trading can be observed. Different to prevailing theoretical rationale, trading volume on alternative venues significantly decreases during circuit breakers on the main market and we do not find any evidence for volatility spillover. Moreover, we show that the market share of the main market increases sharply during a circuit breaker. Surprisingly, this is amplified with increasing levels of fragmentation. We identify high-frequency trading as a major reason for the vanishing trading activity on the alternative venues and give empirical evidence that a coordination of circuit breakers is not essential for their effectiveness as long as market participants shift to the dominant venue during market stress.
We investigate different designs of circuit breakers implemented on European trading venues and examine their effectiveness to manage excess volatility and to preserve liquidity. Specifically, we empirically analyze volatility and liquidity around volatility interruptions implemented on the German and Spanish stock market which differ regarding specific design parameters. We find that volatility interruptions in general significantly decrease volatility in the post interruption phase. Unfortunately, this decrease in volatility comes at the cost of decreased liquidity. Regarding design parameters, we find tighter price ranges and shorter durations to support volatility interruptions in achieving their goals.
Passt das deutsche Dreisäulensystem in eine zunehmend harmonisierte Bankenstruktur für Europa?
(2018)
Das deutsche Bankensystem ruht seit Jahrzehnten auf drei Säulen: den privaten Kreditbanken, einschließlich der großen Banken in Aktionärsbesitz, den öffentlichen Banken und den Genossenschaftsbanken. Fast nirgendwo anders in Europa hat ein solches Dreisäulensystem überlebt. Passt es also noch in ein Europa, in dem die Bankpolitik, die Regulierung und die Aufsicht inzwischen weitgehend in die Zuständigkeit der EU fallen? Für eine Bewahrung des Systems sprechen vor allem Gesichtspunkte der Stabilität. Angesichts ihrer Gruppenzugehörigkeit sind die deutschen "stakeholder-value-orientierten" Banken der Säulen 2 und 3 finanziell keineswegs weniger erfolgreich, sogar ein wenig erfolgreicher als die "shareholder-value-orientierten" Großbanken der Säule 1. Insbesondere schwanken ihre Geschäftszahlen deutlich weniger als jene der Großbanken, die in der Regel ein riskanteres Geschäftsmodell verfolgen. In vielen Privatbanken ist die Gewinnorientierung und damit auch die Bereitschaft, hohe Risiken einzugehen, aus ordnungspolitischer Sicht zu hoch, was die Systemstabilität tendenziell gefährdet. Zudem erfüllen die Genossenschaftsbanken und Sparkassen eine regionalpolitische Ausgleichsfunktion und haben eine gesamtwirtschaftlich stabilisierende Wirkung.
Deutschland und Europa
(2018)
Otmar Issing erörtert die Reaktionen in Deutschland auf die Pläne des französischen Präsidenten Macron aus dessen viel beachteter Rede zur Zukunft Europas an der Pariser Sorbonne. Issing wertet das Ergebnis der Sondierungsgespräche zwischen CDU/CSU und SPD als Abschied von der Vorstellung einer auf Stabilität gerichteten europäischen Gemeinschaft und mahnt an, den einheitlichen Markt und die damit verbundenen Freiheiten nicht durch überzogene Ambitionen zu gefährden und damit zunehmendes Misstrauen gegenüber Europa zu fördern.
Insbesondere in der geplanten Weiterentwicklung des ESM zu einem im Unionsrecht verankerten Europäischen Währungsfonds sieht Issing die Auslieferung der durch den Fonds zur Verfügung gestellten Mittel an eine politische Mehrheit. Zudem führe die Bestellung eines europäischen Finanzministers zur Schaffung einer die Währungsunion ergänzenden Fiskalunion und damit zur Verlagerung finanzpolitischer Kompetenz von der nationalen auf die europäische Ebene. In letzter Konsequenz bedeute dies eine Aufgabe des grundlegenden Prinzips der demokratischen Legitimierung und Kontrolle finanzpolitischer Entscheidungen.
Das Ergebnis der Sondierungsgespräche muss man als Abschied von der Vorstellung einer auf Stabilität gerichteten europäischen Gemeinschaft verstehen. Damit werden die Versprechen gebrochen, die man den Bürgern in Deutschland vor der Einführung des Euros gegeben hat.
I present a new business cycle model in which decision making follows a simple mental process motivated by neuroeconomics. Decision makers first compute the value of two different options and then choose the option that offers the highest value, but with errors. The resulting model is highly tractable and intuitive. A demand function in level replaces the traditional Euler equation. As a result, even liquid consumers can have a large marginal propensity to consume. The interest rate affects consumption through the cost of borrowing and not through intertemporal substitution. I discuss the implications for stimulus policies.
This paper analyses whether the post-crisis regulatory reforms developed by global-standard-setting bodies have created appropriate incentives for different types of market participants to centrally clear Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivative contracts. Beyond documenting the observed facts, we analyze four main drivers for the decision to clear: 1) the liquidity and riskiness of the reference entity; 2) the credit risk of the counterparty; 3) the clearing member’s portfolio net exposure with the Central Counterparty Clearing House (CCP) and 4) post trade transparency. We use confidential European trade repository data on single-name Sovereign Credit Derivative Swap (CDS) transactions, and show that for all the transactions reported in 2016 on Italian, German and French Sovereign CDS 48% were centrally cleared, 42% were not cleared despite being eligible for central clearing, while 9% of the contracts were not clearable because they did not satisfy certain CCP clearing criteria. However, there is a large difference between CCP clearing members that clear about 53% of their transactions and non-clearing members, even those that are subject to counterparty risk capital requirements, that almost never clear their trades. Moreover, we find that diverse factors explain clearing members’ decision to clear different CDS contracts: for Italian CDS, counterparty credit risk exposures matter most for the decision to clear, while for French and German CDS, margin costs are the most important factor for the decision. Clearing members use clearing to reduce their exposures to the CCP and largely clear contracts when at least one of the traders has a high counterparty credit risk.