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- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (18) (remove)
We show that High Frequency Traders (HFTs) are not beneficial to the stock market during flash crashes. They actually consume liquidity when it is most needed, even when they are rewarded by the exchange to provide immediacy. The behavior of HFTs exacerbate the transient price impact, unrelated to fundamentals, typically observed during a flash crash. Slow traders provide liquidity instead of HFTs, taking advantage of the discounted price. We thus uncover a trade-o↵ between the greater liquidity and efficiency provided by HFTs in normal times, and the disruptive consequences of their trading activity during distressed times.
We analyze the ESG rating criteria used by prominent agencies and show that there is a lack of a commonality in the definition of ESG (i) characteristics, (ii) attributes and (iii) standards in defining E, S and G components. We provide evidence that heterogeneity in rating criteria can lead agencies to have opposite opinions on the same evaluated companies and that agreement across those providers is substantially low. Those alternative definitions of ESG also a↵ect sustainable investments leading to the identification of di↵erent investment universes and consequently to the creation of di↵erent benchmarks. This implies that in the asset management industry it is extremely dicult to measure the ability of a fund manager if financial performances are strongly conditioned by the chosen ESG benchmark. Finally, we find that the disagreement in the scores provided by the rating agencies disperses the e↵ect of preferences of ESG investors on asset prices, to the point that even when there is agreement, it has no impact on financial performances.
The spreading of the Covid-19 virus causes a reduction in economic activity worldwide and may lead to new risks to financial stability. The authors draw attention to the urgency of the targeted mitigation strategies on the European level and suggest taking coordinated action on the fiscal side to provide liquidity to affected firms in the corporate sector. Otherwise, virus-related cashflow interruptions could lead to a new full-blown banking crisis. Monetary policy measures are unlikely to mitigate cash liquidity shortages at the level of individual firms. Coordinated action at European level is decisive to prevent markets from losing confidence in the resilience of banks, particularly in countries with limited fiscal capacity. In contrast to the euro crisis of 2011, the cause of the current crisis does not lie in the financial markets; therefore, the risk of moral hazard for banks or states is low.
This Policy Letter presents a proposal for designing a program of government assistance for firms hurt by the Coronavirus crisis in the European Union (EU). In our recent Policy Letter 81, we introduced a new, equity-type instrument, a cash-against-tax surcharge scheme, bundled across firms and countries in a European Pandemic Equity Fund (EPEF). The present Policy Letter 84 focuses on the principles and conditions relevant for the operationalization of a EPEF. Our proposal has several desirable features. It: a) offers better risk sharing opportunities, augmenting the resilience of businesses and EU economies; b) is need-based, thereby contributing to an effective use of resources; c) builds on conditions and credible controls, addressing adverse selection and moral hazard; d) is accessible to smaller and medium-sized firms, the backbone of Europe’s economy; e) applies Europe-wide uniform eligibility criteria, strengthening support among member states; f) is a scheme of limited duration, reducing (perceived) government interference in businesses; g) creates a template for a growth-oriented public policy, aligning public and private sector interests; and h) builds on the existing institutional infrastructure and requires minimal legislative adjustments.
This policy letter adds to the current discussion on how to design a program of government assistance for firms hurt by the Coronavirus crisis. While not pretending to provide a cure-all proposal, the advocated scheme could help to bring funding to firms, even small firms, quickly, without increasing their leverage and default risk. The plan combines outright cash transfers to firms with a temporary, elevated corporate profit tax at the firm level as a form of conditional payback. The implied equity-like payment structure has positive risk-sharing features for firms, without impinging on ownership structures. The proposal has to be implemented at the pan-European level to strengthen Euro area resilience.
We show that FED policy announcements lead to a significant increase in international comovements in the cross-section of equity and in particular sovereign CDS markets. The relaxation of unconventionary monetary policies is felt strongly by emerging markets, and by countries that are open to the trading of goods and flows, even in the presence of floating exchange rates. It also impacts closed economies whose currencies are pegged to the dollar. This evidence is consistent with recent theories of a global financial cycle and the pricing of a FED’s put. In contrast, ECB announcements hardly affect comovements, even in the Eurozone.
We employ a representative sample of 80,972 Italian firms to forecast the drop in profits and the equity shortfall triggered by the COVID-19 lockdown. A 3-month lockdown generates an aggregate yearly drop in profits of about 10% of GDP, and 17% of sample firms, which employ 8.8% of the sample’s employees, become financially distressed. Distress is more frequent for small and medium-sized enterprises, for firms with high pre-COVID-19 leverage, and for firms belonging to the Manufacturing and Wholesale Trading sectors. Listed companies are less likely to enter distress, whereas the correlation between distress rates and family firm ownership is unclear.
(JEL G01, G32, G33)