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We study the relevance of signaling and marketing as explanations for the discount control mechanisms that a closed-end fund may choose to adopt in its prospectus. These policies are designed to narrow the potential gap between share price and net asset value, measured by the fund’s discount. The two most common discount control mechanisms are explicit discretion to repurchase shares based on the magnitude of the fund discount and mandatory continuation votes that provide shareholders the opportunity to liquidate the fund. We find very limited evidence that a discount control mechanism serves as costly signal of information. Funds with mandatory voting are not more likely to delist than the rest of the CEFs in general or whenever the fund discount is large. Similarly, funds that explicitly discuss share repurchases as a potential response do not subsequently buy back shares more often when discounts do increase. Instead, the existence of these policies is more consistent with marketing explanations because the policies are associated with an increased probability of issuing more equity in subsequent periods.
The discount control mechanisms that closed-end funds often choose to adopt before IPO are supposedly implemented to narrow the difference between share price and net asset value. We find evidence that non-discretionary discount control mechanisms such as mandatory continuation votes serve as costly signals of information to reveal higher fund quality to investors. Rents of the skill signaled through the announcement of such policies accrue to managers rather than investors as differences in skill are revealed through growing assets under management rather than risk- adjusted performance.
This study examines the recent literature on the expectations, beliefs and perceptions of investors who incorporate Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) considerations in investment decisions with the aim to generate superior performance and also make a societal impact. Through the lens of equilibrium models of agents with heterogeneous tastes for ESG investments, green assets are expected to generate lower returns in the long run than their non- ESG counterparts. However, at the short run, ESG investment can outperform non-ESG investment through various channels. Empirically, results of ESG outperformance are mixed. We find consensus in the literature that some investors have ESG preference and that their actions can generate positive social impact. The shift towards more sustainable policies in firms is motivated by the increased market values and the lower cost of capital of green firms driven by investors’ choices.
We examine whether the uncertainty related to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) regulation developments is reflected in asset prices. We proxy the sensitivity of firms to ESG regulation uncertainty by the disparity across the components of their ESG ratings. Firms with high ESG disparity have a higher option-implied cost of protection against downside tail risk. The impact of the misalignment across the different dimensions of the ESG score is distinct from that of ESG score level itself. Aggregate downside risk bears a negative price for firms with low ESG disparity.
We investigate the effect of overreaction in the fine art market. Using a unique sample of auction prices of modern prints, we define an overvalued (undervalued) print as a print that was bought for a price above (below) its high (low) auction pricing estimate. Based on the overreaction hypothesis, we predict that overvalued (undervalued) prints generate a negative (positive) excess return at a subsequent sale. Our empirical findings confirm our expectations. We report that prints that were bought for a price 10 percent above (below) its high (low) pricing estimate generate a positive (negative) excess return of 12 percent (17 percent) after controlling for the general price movement on the prints market. The price correction for overvalued (undervalued) prints is more pronounced during recessions (expansions).
This paper investigates the impact of news media sentiment on financial market returns and volatility in the long-term. We hypothesize that the way the media formulate and present news to the public produces different perceptions and, thus, incurs different investor behavior. To analyze such framing effects we distinguish between optimistic and pessimistic news frames. We construct a monthly media sentiment indicator by taking the ratio of the number of newspaper articles that contain predetermined negative words to the number of newspaper articles that contain predetermined positive words in the headline and/or the lead paragraph. Our results indicate that pessimistic news media sentiment is positively related to global market volatility and negatively related to global market returns 12 to 24 months in advance. We show that our media sentiment indicator reflects very well the financial market crises and pricing bubbles over the past 20 years.
We show that if an agent is uncertain about the precise form of his utility function, his actual relative risk aversion may depend on wealth even if he knows his utility function lies in the class of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions. We illustrate the consequences of this result for asset allocation: poor agents that are uncertain about their risk aversion parameter invest less in risky assets than wealthy investors with identical risk aversion uncertainty. Keywords: Risk Aversion , Preference Uncertainty , Risk-taking , Asset Allocation JEL Classification: D81, D84, G11 This Version: November 25, 2010
We show that average excess returns during the last two years of the presidential cycle are significantly higher than during the first two years: 9.8 percent over the period 1948 – 2008. This pattern in returns cannot be explained by business-cycle variables capturing time-varying risk premia, differences in risk levels, or by consumer and investor sentiment. In this paper, we formally test the presidential election cycle (PEC) hypothesis as the alternative explanation found in the literature for explaining the presidential cycle anomaly. PEC states that incumbent parties and presidents have an incentive to manipulate the economy (via budget expansions and taxes) to remain in power. We formulate eight empirically testable propositions relating to the fiscal, monetary, tax, unexpected inflation and political implications of the PEC hypothesis. We do not find statistically significant evidence confirming the PEC hypothesis as a plausible explanation for the presidential cycle effect. The existence of the presidential cycle effect in U.S. financial markets thus remains a puzzle that cannot be easily explained by politicians employing their economic influence to remain in power. JEL Classification: E32; G14; P16 Keywords: Political Economy, Market Efficiency, Anomalies, Calendar Effects
This paper sets the background for the Special Issue of the Journal of Empirical Finance on the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. It identifies the channel through which risks in the financial industry leaked into the public sector. It discusses the role of the bank rescues in igniting the sovereign debt crisis and reviews approaches to detect early warning signals to anticipate the buildup of crises. It concludes with a discussion of potential implications of sovereign distress for financial markets.
Euro crash risk
(2015)