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A widely recognized paper by Colin Mayer (1988) has led to a profound revision of academic thinking about financing patterns of corporations in different countries. Using flow-of-funds data instead of balance sheet data, Mayer and others who followed his lead found that internal financing is the dominant mode of financing in all countries, that financing patterns do not differ very much between countries and that those differences which still seem to exist are not at all consistent with the common conviction that financial systems can be classified as being either bank-based or capital market-based. This leads to a puzzle insofar as it calls into question the empirical foundation of the widely held belief that there is a correspondence between the financing patterns of corporations on the one side, and the structure of the financial sector and the prevailing corporate governance system in a given country on the other side. The present paper addresses this puzzle on a methodological and an empirical basis. It starts by comparing and analyzing various ways of measuring financial structure and financing patterns and by demonstrating that the surprising empirical results found by studies that relied on net flows are due to a hidden assumption. It then derives an alternative method of measuring financing patterns, which also uses flow-of-funds data, but avoids the questionable assumption. This measurement concept is then applied to patterns of corporate financing in Germany, Japan and the United States. The empirical results, which use an estimation technique for determining gross flows of funds in those cases in which empirical data are not available, are very much in line with the commonly held belief prior to Mayer’s influential contribution and indicate that the financial systems of the three countries do indeed differ from one another in a substantial way, and moreover in a way which is largely in line with the general view of the differences between the financial systems of the countries covered in the present paper.
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions.
This paper starts out by pointing out the challenges and weaknesses which the German banking systems faces according to the prevailing views among national and international observers. These challenges include a generalproblem of profitability and, possibly as its main reason, the strong role of public banks. These concerns raise the questions whether the facts support this assessment of a general profitability problem and whether there are reasons to expect a fundamental or structural transformation of the German banking system. The paper contains four sections. The first one presents the evidence concerning the profitability problem in a comparative, international perspective. The second section presents information about the so-called three-pillar system of German banking. What might be surprising in this context is that the group of pub lic banks is not only the largest segment of the German banking system, but that the primary savings banks also are its financially most successful part. The German banking system is highly fragmented. This fact suggests to discuss past, present and possible future consolidations in the banking system in the third section. The authors provide evidence to the effect that within- group consolidation has been going on at a rapid pace in the public and the cooperative banking groups in recent years and that this development has not yet come to an end, while within-group consolidation among the large private banks, consolidation across group boundaries at a national level and cross-border or international consolidation has so far only happened at a limited scale, and do not appear to gain momentum in the near future. In the last section, the authors develop their explanation for the fact that large-scale and cross border consolidation has so far not materialized to any great extent. Drawing on the concept of complementarity, they argue that it would be difficult to expect these kinds of mergers and acquisitions happening within a financial system which is itself surprisingly stable, or, as one cal also call it, resistant to change.
„Bedeutende Finanzplätze“ oder Finanzzentren sind eng abgegrenzte Orte mit einer beträchtlichen Konzentration wichtiger professioneller Aktivitäten aus dem Finanzdienstleistungsbereich und der entsprechenden Institutionen. Allerdings: „Finance is a footloose industry“: Die Finanzbranche kann abwandern, ein Finanzzentrum kann sich verlagern, möglicherweise auch einfach auflösen. Die Möglichkeit der Auflösung und der Abwanderung stellt eine Bedrohung dar, die in der Zeit der Globalisierung und der rasanten Fortschritte der Transport- und der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnik ausgeprägter sein dürfte, als sie je war. Frankfurt ist zweifellos ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“, und manchen gilt er auch als bedroht. Allein deshalb ist unser Thema wichtig; und auch wenn die Einschätzungen von Bedeutung und Bedrohtheit keineswegs neu sind, ist es doch aktuell. Der Aspekt der Bedrohtheit prägt, wie wir die Frage im Titel verstehen und diskutieren möchten. Was ist ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“? Selbst wenn man das Attribut „bedeutend“ erst einmal beiseite lässt, ist die Frage keineswegs trivial. Sie zielt ja nicht nur auf eine Begriffsklärung, eine Sprachregelung ab. Hinter dem Begriff steht oft auch eine Vorstellung vom „Wesen“ dessen, was ein Begriff bezeichnet. Also: Was macht einen Finanzplatz aus? Und weiter: Warum gibt es überhaupt Finanzplätze als beträchtliche Konzentrationen von bestimmten wichtigen Aktivitäten und Institutionen? Welche Kräfte führen - oder zumindest führten - zu der räumlichen Konzentration der Aktivitäten und Institutionen, wie wirken diese Kräfte, und wie ändern sie sich gegebenenfalls? Diesen Fragen ist dieser Beitrag im Wesentlichen gewidmet, und sie prägen seinen Aufbau. Im Abschnitt II wird diskutiert, was ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“ ist oder woran man ihn erkennt und „was er braucht“. Im Abschnitt III gehen wir zuerst auf die Frage nach der in letzter Zeit unter dem Stichwort „the end of geography“ heftig diskutierten Vorstellung einer Auflösung oder Virtualisierung der Finanzplätze ein – nicht weil dies die wichtigere Bedrohung wäre, sondern weil es die grundlegendere Frage darstellt. Dann diskutieren wir den Wettbewerb von Finanzplätzen in Europa. Den Abschluss bilden Überlegungen zu den Perspektiven des Finanzplatzes Frankfurt und der möglichen Förderung seiner Entwicklung.
In a series of recent papers, Mark Roe and Lucian Bebchuk have developed further the concept of path dependence, combined it with concepts of evolution and used it to challenge the wide-spread view that the corporate governance systems of the major advanced economies are likely to converge towards the economically best system at a rapid pace. The present paper shares this skepticism, but adds several aspects which strengthen the point made by Roe and Bebchuk. The present paper argues that it is important for the topic under discussion to distinguish clearly between two arguments which can explain path dependence. One of them is based on the role of adjustment costs, and the other one uses concepts borrowed from evolutionary biology. Making this distinction is important because the two concepts of path dependence have different implications for the issue of rapid convergence to the best system. In addition, we introduce a formal concept of complementarity and demonstrate that national corporate governance systems are usefully regarded as – possibly consistent – systems of complementary elements. Complementarity is a reason for path dependence which supports the socio-biological argument. The dynamic properties of systems composed of complementary elements are such that a rapid convergence towards a universally best corporate governance systems is not likely to happen. We then proceed by showing for the case of corporate governance systems shaped by complementarity, that there even is the possibility of a convergence towards a common system which is economically inferior. And in the specific case of European integration, "inefficient convergence" of corporate governance systems is a possible future course of events. First version December 1998, this version March 2000.
Aus dem weiten Spektrum ökonomisch relevanter Fragen, die die europäische Integration und das Gesellschaftsrecht verbinden, soll hier diejenige herausgegriffen werden, ob sich die nationalen Corporate-Governance-Systeme in den großen europäischen Volkswirtschaften Deutschlands, Frankreichs und Großbritanniens unter dem Einfluß der europäischen Integration bereits aneinander angeglichen haben und ob es demnächst zu einer solchen Angleichung kommen wird. Unser Thema deckt nur einen Teil des Gesellschaftsrechts ab und geht zugleich hinsichtlich der angesprochenen rechtlichen Materie über das Gesellschaftsrecht hinaus, denn die Corporate Governance fügt sich nicht einfach in herkömmliche juristische Klassifikationen ein. Unser Vorhaben unterscheidet sich aber vor allem dadurch von einer juristischen Behandlung des Themas, daß primär ökonomische Mechanismen und Zusammenhänge angesprochen werden. Ökonomen betrachten die Corporate Governance im weiteren Kontext des Finanzsystems, denn das Corporate-Governance-System ist ein Teil des Finanzsystems eines Landes. Die Fragen, wie unterschiedlich die nationalen Systeme der Corporate Governance waren, ehe zu Beginn der 80er Jahre der Prozeß der Angleichung in Europa einsetzte, wie unterschiedlich sie heute noch sind, wie sehr sie sich somit bereits angeglichen haben und wie ein möglicher Angleichungsprozeß weitergehen könnte, sind deshalb ein Teil der weiteren Frage nach der Angleichung der Finanzsysteme in Europa. In diesem Beitrag konzentrieren wir uns aber nur auf Entwicklungen der 90er Jahre.
Die Empfehlung, das Shareholder-Value-Konzept zur Grundlage der Unternehmenspolitik zu machen, erscheint um so überzeugender und wird vermutlich um so eher akzeptiert, (1) je lohnender die Shareholder-Value-Orientierung für die Aktionäre ist, (2) je eindeutiger es ist, wie die Empfehlung umgesetzt werden kann und soll, und (3) je problemloser sie aus theoretischen und wohlfahrtsökonomischer Sicht ist. Der Beitrag diskutiert die in Wissenschaft und Praxis verbreiteten Positionen zu diesen drei Aspekten und erläutert, warum sie bzw. die emprischen, praktischen und theoretischen Argumente, durch die sie gestützt werden sollen, auf Mißverständnissen beruhen.
Major differences between national financial systems might make a common monetary policy difficult. As within Europe, Germany and the United Kingdom differ most with respect to their financial systems, the present paper addresses its topic under the assumption that the United Kingdom is already a part of EMU. Employing a comprehensive concept of a financial system, the author shows that there are indeed profound differences between the national financial systems of Germany and the United Kingdom. But he argues that these differences are not likely to create great problems for a common monetary policy. In the context of the present paper, one important difference between the two financial systems refers to the structure of the respective financial sector and, as a consequence, to the strength with which a given monetary policy impulse set by the central bank is passed on to the financial sector. The other important difference refers to the typical relationship between the banks and the business sector in each country which determines to what extent the financial sectors and especially the banks pass on pressure exerted on them by a monetary policy authority to their clients in their national business sector. In Germany, the central bank has a stronger influence on the financial sector than in England, while, for systemic reasons, German banks tend to soften monetary policy pressures on their customers more than British banks do. As far as the transmission of a restrictive monetary policy of the ECB to the real economy is concerned, these two differences tend to offset each other. This is good news for the advocates of a monetary union as it eases the task of the ECB when it comes to determining the strength of its monetary policy measures.
Paper Presented at the Conference on Workable Corporate Governance: Cross-Border Perspectives held in Paris, March 17-19, 1997 To appear in: A. Pezard/J.-M. Thiveaud: Workable Corporate Governance: Cross-Border Perspectives, Montchrestien, Paris 1997. The paper discusses the role of various constituencies in the corporate governance of a corporation from the perspective of incomplete contracts. A strict shareholder value orientation in the sense of a rule that at any time firm decisions should be made strictly in the interest of the present shareholders would make it difficult for the firm to establish long-term relationships as the potential partners would have to fear that, at a later stage of the co-operation, the shareholders or a management acting only on their behalf could exploit them because of the inevitable incompleteness of long-term contracts. One way of mitigating these problems is to put in place a corporate governance system which gives some active role to the other stakeholders or constituencies, or which makes their interests a well-defined element of the objective function of the firm. A commitment not to follow a policy of strict shareholder value maximization ex post can be efficient ex ante. Such a system would clearly differ from what is advocated by proponents of a "stakeholder approach", as it would limit the rights of the other constituencies to those which would have been agreed upon in a constitutional contract concluded between them and the founder of the firm at the time when long-term contracts are first established.
Asset-backed securitization (ABS) has become a viable and increasingly attractive risk management and refinancing method either as a standalone form of structured finance or as securitized debt in Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO). However, the absence of industry standardization has prevented rising investment demand from translating into market liquidity comparable to traditional fixed income instruments, in all but a few selected market segments. Particularly low financial transparency and complex security designs inhibits profound analysis of secondary market pricing and how it relates to established forms of external finance. This paper represents the first attempt to measure the intertemporal, bivariate causal relationship between matched price series of equity and ABS issued by the same entity. In a two-dimensional linear system of simultaneous equations we investigate the short-term dynamics and long-term consistency of daily secondary market data from the U.K. Sterling ABS/MBS market and exchange traded shares between 1998 and 2004 with and without the presence of cointegration. Our causality framework delivers compelling empirical support for a strong co-movement between matched price series of ABS-equity pairs, where ABS markets seem to contribute more to price discovery over the long run. Controlling for cointegration, risk-free interest and average market risk of corporate debt hardly alters our results. However, once we qualify the magnitude and direction of price discovery on various security characteristics, such as the ABS asset class, we find that ABS-equity pairs with large-scale CMBS/RMBS and credit card/student loan ABS reveal stronger lead-lag relationships and joint price dynamics than whole business ABS. JEL Classifications: G10, G12, G24