Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (3389) (remove)
Language
- English (2353)
- German (1016)
- Spanish (8)
- French (7)
- Multiple languages (2)
Keywords
- Deutschland (223)
- USA (64)
- Corporate Governance (53)
- Geldpolitik (53)
- Schätzung (52)
- Europäische Union (51)
- monetary policy (47)
- Bank (41)
- Sprachtypologie (34)
- Monetary Policy (31)
Institute
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (1498)
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (1471)
- Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) (805)
- House of Finance (HoF) (665)
- Rechtswissenschaft (402)
- Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS) (214)
- Informatik (119)
- Exzellenzcluster Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen (75)
- Gesellschaftswissenschaften (75)
- Geographie (64)
Life insurance convexity
(2023)
Life insurers sell savings contracts with surrender options, which allow policyholders to prematurely receive guaranteed surrender values. These surrender options move toward the money when interest rates rise. Hence, higher interest rates raise surrender rates, as we document empirically by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in monetary policy. Using a calibrated model, we then estimate that surrender options would force insurers to sell up to 2% of their investments during an enduring interest rate rise of 25 bps per year. We show that these fire sales are fueled by surrender value guarantees and insurers’ long-term investments.
Life insurance convexity
(2021)
Life insurers massively sell savings contracts with surrender options which allow policyholders to withdraw a guaranteed amount before maturity. These options move toward the money when interest rates rise. Using data on German life insurers, we estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in interest rates raises surrender rates by 17 basis points. We quantify the resulting liquidity risk in a calibrated model of surrender decisions and insurance cash flows. Simulations predict that surrender options can force insurers to sell up to 3% of their assets, depressing asset prices by 90 basis points. The effect is amplified by the duration of insurers' investments, and its impact on the term structure of interest rates depends on life insurers' investment strategy.
This paper documents that the bond investments of insurance companies transmit shocks from insurance markets to the real economy. Liquidity windfalls from household insurance purchases increase insurers' demand for corporate bonds. Exploiting the fact that insurers persistently invest in a small subset of firms for identification, I show that these increases in bond demand raise bond prices and lower firms' funding costs. In response, firms issue more bonds, especially when their bond underwriters are well connected with investors. Firms use the proceeds to raise investment rather than equity payouts. The results emphasize the significant impact of investor demand on firms' financing and investment activities.
Common systemic risk measures focus on the instantaneous occurrence of triggering and systemic events. However, systemic events may also occur with a time-lag to the triggering event. To study this contagion period and the resulting persistence of institutions' systemic risk we develop and employ the Conditional Shortfall Probability (CoSP), which is the likelihood that a systemic market event occurs with a specific time-lag to the triggering event. Based on CoSP we propose two aggregate systemic risk measures, namely the Aggregate Excess CoSP and the CoSP-weighted time-lag, that reflect the systemic risk aggregated over time and average time-lag of an institution's triggering event, respectively. Our empirical results show that 15% of the financial companies in our sample are significantly systemically important with respect to the financial sector, while 27% of the financial companies are significantly systemically important with respect to the American non-financial sector. Still, the aggregate systemic risk of systemically important institutions is larger with respect to the financial market than with respect to non-financial markets. Moreover, the aggregate systemic risk of insurance companies is similar to the systemic risk of banks, while insurers are also exposed to the largest aggregate systemic risk among the financial sector.
A tontine provides a mortality driven, age-increasing payout structure through the pooling of mortality. Because a tontine does not entail any guarantees, the payout structure of a tontine is determined by the pooling of individual characteristics of tontinists. Therefore, the surrender decision of single tontinists directly affects the remaining members' payouts. Nevertheless, the opportunity to surrender is crucial to the success of a tontine from a regulatory as well as a policyholder perspective. Therefore, this paper derives the fair surrender value of a tontine, first on the basis of expected values, and then incorporates the increasing payout volatility to determine an equitable surrender value. Results show that the surrender decision requires a discount on the fair surrender value as security for the remaining members. The discount intensifies in decreasing tontine size and increasing risk aversion. However, tontinists are less willing to surrender for decreasing tontine size and increasing risk aversion, creating a natural protection against tontine runs stemming from short-term liquidity shocks. Furthermore we argue that a surrender decision based on private information requires a discount on the fair surrender value as well.
Under Solvency II, corporate governance requirements are a complementary, but nonetheless essential, element to build a sound regulatory framework for insurance undertakings, also to address risks not specifically mitigated by the sole solvency capital requirements. After recalling the provisions of the second pillar concerning the system of governance, the paper is devoted to highlight the emerging regulatory trends in the corporate governance of insurance firms. Among others, it signals the exceptional extension of the duties and responsibilities assigned to the Board of directors, far beyond the traditional role of both monitoring the chief executive officer, and assessing the overall direction and strategy of the business. However, a better risk governance is not necessarily built on narrow rule-based approaches to corporate governance.
Depending on the point of time and location, insurance companies are subject to different forms of solvency regulation. In modern regulation regimes, such as the future standard Solvency II in the EU, insurance pricing is liberalized and risk-based capital requirements will be introduced. In many economies in Asia and Latin America, on the other hand, supervisors require the prior approval of policy conditions and insurance premiums, but do not conduct risk-based capital regulation. This paper compares the outcome of insurance rate regulation and riskbased capital requirements by deriving stock insurers’ best responses. It turns out that binding price floors affect insurers’ optimal capital structures and induce them to choose higher safety levels. Risk-based capital requirements are a more efficient instrument of solvency regulation and allow for lower insurance premiums, but may come at the cost of investment efforts into adequate risk monitoring systems. The paper derives threshold values for regulator’s investments into risk-based capital regulation and provides starting points for designing a welfare-enhancing insurance regulation scheme.
We study the impact of estimation errors of firms on social welfare. For this purpose, we present a model of the insurance market in which insurers face parameter uncertainty about expected loss sizes. As consumers react to under- and overestimation by increasing and decreasing demand, respectively, insurers require a safety loading for parameter uncertainty. If the safety loading is too small, less risk averse consumers benefit from less informed insurers by speculating on them underestimating expected losses. Otherwise, social welfare increases with insurers’ information. We empirically estimate safety loadings in the US property and casualty insurance market, and show that these are likely to be sufficiently large for consumers to benefit from more informed insurers.
Tail-correlation matrices are an important tool for aggregating risk measurements across risk categories, asset classes and/or business segments. This paper demonstrates that traditional tail-correlation matrices—which are conventionally assumed to have ones on the diagonal—can lead to substantial biases of the aggregate risk measurement’s sensitivities with respect to risk exposures. Due to these biases, decision-makers receive an odd view of the effects of portfolio changes and may be unable to identify the optimal portfolio from a risk-return perspective. To overcome these issues, we introduce the “sensitivity-implied tail-correlation matrix”. The proposed tail-correlation matrix allows for a simple deterministic risk aggregation approach which reasonably approximates the true aggregate risk measurement according to the complete multivariate risk distribution. Numerical examples demonstrate that our approach is a better basis for portfolio optimization than the Value-at-Risk implied tail-correlation matrix, especially if the calibration portfolio (or current portfolio) deviates from the optimal portfolio.
Historical evidence like the global financial crisis from 2007-09 highlights that sector concentration risk can play an important role for the solvency of insurers. However, current microprudential frameworks like the US RBC framework and Solvency II consider only name concentration risk explicitly in their solvency capital requirements for asset concentration risk and neglect sector concentration risk. We show by means of US insurers’ asset holdings from 2009 to 2018 that substantial sectoral asset concentrations exist in the financial, public and real estate sector, and find indicative evidence for a sectoral search for yield behavior. Based on a theoretical solvency capital allocation scheme, we demonstrate that the current regulatory approaches can lead to inappropriate and biased levels of solvency capital for asset concentration risk, and should be revised. Our findings have also important implications on the ongoing discussion of asset concentration risk in the context of macroprudential insurance regulation.