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Through the lens of market participants' objective to minimize counterparty risk, we provide an explanation for the reluctance to clear derivative trades in the absence of a central clearing obligation. We develop a comprehensive understanding of the benefits and potential pitfalls with respect to a single market participant's counterparty risk exposure when moving from a bilateral to a clearing architecture for derivative markets. Previous studies suggest that central clearing is beneficial for single market participants in the presence of a sufficiently large number of clearing members. We show that three elements can render central clearing harmful for a market participant's counterparty risk exposure regardless of the number of its counterparties: 1) correlation across and within derivative classes (i.e., systematic risk), 2) collateralization of derivative claims, and 3) loss sharing among clearing members. Our results have substantial implications for the design of derivatives markets, and highlight that recent central clearing reforms might not incentivize market participants to clear derivatives.
Through the lens of market participants' objective to minimize counterparty risk, we provide an explanation for the reluctance to clear derivative trades in the absence of a central clearing obligation. We develop a comprehensive understanding of the benefits and potential pitfalls with respect to a single market participant's counterparty risk exposure when moving from a bilateral to a clearing architecture for derivative markets. Previous studies suggest that central clearing is beneficial for single market participants in the presence of a sufficiently large number of clearing members. We show that three elements can render central clearing harmful for a market participant's counterparty risk exposure regardless of the number of its counterparties: 1) correlation across and within derivative classes (i.e., systematic risk), 2) collateralization of derivative claims, and 3) loss sharing among clearing members. Our results have substantial implications for the design of derivatives markets, and highlight that recent central clearing reforms might not incentivize market participants to clear derivatives.
By computing a volatility index (CVX) from cryptocurrency option prices, we analyze this market’s expectation of future volatility. Our method addresses the challenging liquidity environment of this young asset class and allows us to extract stable market implied volatilities. Two alternative methods are considered to compute volatilities from granular intra-day cryptocurrency options data, which spans over the COVID-19 pandemic period. CVX data therefore capture ‘normal’ market dynamics as well as distress and recovery periods. The methods yield two cointegrated index series, where the corresponding error correction model can be used as an indicator for market implied tail-risk. Comparing our CVX to existing volatility benchmarks for traditional asset classes, such as VIX (equity) or GVX (gold), confirms that cryptocurrency volatility dynamics are often disconnected from traditional markets, yet, share common shocks.