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The term 'financialization' describes the phenomenon that commodity contracts are traded for purely financial reasons and not for motives rooted in the real economy. Recently, financialization has been made responsible for causing adverse welfare effects especially for low-income and low-wealth agents, who have to spend a large share of their income for commodity consumption and cannot participate in financial markets. In this paper we study the effect of financial speculation on commodity prices in a heterogeneous agent production economy with an agricultural and an industrial producer, a financial speculator, and a commodity consumer. While access to financial markets is always beneficial for the participating agents, since it allows them to reduce their consumption volatility, it has a decisive effect with respect to overall welfare effects who can trade with whom (but not so much what types of instruments can be traded).
Common systemic risk measures focus on the instantaneous occurrence of triggering and systemic events. However, systemic events may also occur with a time-lag to the triggering event. To study this contagion period and the resulting persistence of institutions' systemic risk we develop and employ the Conditional Shortfall Probability (CoSP), which is the likelihood that a systemic market event occurs with a specific time-lag to the triggering event. Based on CoSP we propose two aggregate systemic risk measures, namely the Aggregate Excess CoSP and the CoSP-weighted time-lag, that reflect the systemic risk aggregated over time and average time-lag of an institution's triggering event, respectively. Our empirical results show that 15% of the financial companies in our sample are significantly systemically important with respect to the financial sector, while 27% of the financial companies are significantly systemically important with respect to the American non-financial sector. Still, the aggregate systemic risk of systemically important institutions is larger with respect to the financial market than with respect to non-financial markets. Moreover, the aggregate systemic risk of insurance companies is similar to the systemic risk of banks, while insurers are also exposed to the largest aggregate systemic risk among the financial sector.
Jan Pieter Krahnen empfiehlt in Börsenzeitung eine zentrale europäische Aufsicht.
Würde der Zusammenbruch einiger Clearinghäuser die Stabilität des Finanzsystems gefährden? Und wie lässt sich Europas fragmentierter Clearingmarkt regulieren? Diese Fragen werden in Politik und Wissenschaft kontrovers diskutiert.
Jan Pieter Krahnen, Direktor des Forschungszentrums SAFE und Professor für Finanzen an der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, fordert in der Börsenzeitung vom 1. Februar eine zentrale europäische Aufsicht für den fragmentierten europäischen Clearingmarkt. Eine gemeinsame Überwachungsinstanz könne die Gesamtmarktlage überblicken und eingreifen, wenn die Systemstabilität gefährdet sei...