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Using granular supervisory data from Germany, we investigate the impact of unconventional monetary policies via central banks’ purchase of corporate bonds. While this policy results in a loosening of credit market conditions as intended by policy makers, we document two unintended side effects. First, banks that are more exposed to borrowers benefiting from the bond purchases now lend more to high-risk firms with no access to bond markets. Since more loan write-offs arise from these firms and banks are not compensated for this risk by higher interest rates, we document a drop in bank profitability. Second, the policy impacts the allocation of loans among industries. Affected banks reallocate loans from investment grade firms active on bond markets to mainly real estate firms without investment grade rating. Overall, our findings suggest that central banks’ quantitative easing via the corporate bond markets has the potential to contribute to both banking sector instability and real estate bubbles.
Die notwendige ökologische Transformation aber auch darüberhinausgehend die zunehmenden Erwartungen, die Gesellschaft und Politik an die Wirtschaft stellen, erfordern eine Prüfung des Wettbewerbsrechts und seiner Durchsetzung, insbesondere auch der dabei verwendeten (ökonomischen) Konzepte und Methoden, dahingehend, ob die aktuelle Praxis nicht einer stärkeren Berücksichtigung von Nachhaltigkeitszielen in unbegründeter Weise im Wege steht. Auf europäischer Ebene hat der Diskurs darüber im Jahr 2021 erheblich an Fahrt gewonnen. Wir stellen wesentliche Initiativen dar. Dabei zeigt sich unseres Erachtens allerdings auch, dass für eine konstruktive Weiterentwicklung noch die nötigen konzeptionellen und methodischen Grundlagen fehlen.
Are we in a new “Polanyian moment”? If we are, it is essential to examine how “spontaneous” and punctual expressions of discontent at the individual level may give rise to collective discourses driving social and political change. It is also important to examine whether and how the framing of these discourses may vary across political economies. This paper contributes to this endeavor with the analysis of anti-finance discourses on Twitter in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK between 2019 and 2020. This paper presents three main findings. First, the analysis shows that, more than ten years after the financial crisis, finance is still a strong catalyzer of political discontent. Second, it shows that there are important variations in the dominant framing of public anti-finance discourses on social media across European political economies. If the antagonistic “us versus them” is prominent in all the cases, the identification of who “us” and “them” are, vary significantly. Third, it shows that the presence of far-right tropes in the critique of finance varies greatly from virtually inexistent to a solid minority of statements.
In times of increased political polarization, the continuing existence of a deliberative arena where people with antagonistic views may engage with each other in non-violent ways is critical for democracy to live on. Social media are usually not conceived as such arenas. On the contrary, there has been widespread worry about their role in increasing polarization and political violence. This paper suggests a more positive impact of social media on democracy. Our analysis focuses on the subreddit “r/WallStreetBets” (r/WSB) - a finance-related forum that came under the spotlight when its users coordinated a financial attack on hedge funds during the Gamestop saga in early 2021. Based on an original method attributing partisanship scores to users, we present a network analysis of interactions between users at the opposite sides of the political spectrum on r/WSB. We then develop a content analysis of politically relevant threads in which polarized users participate. Our analyses show that r/WSB provides a rare space where users with antagonistic political leanings engage with each other, debate, and even cooperate.
In more and more situations, artificially intelligent algorithms have to model humans’ (social) preferences on whose behalf they increasingly make decisions. They can learn these preferences through the repeated observation of human behavior in social encounters. In such a context, do individuals adjust the selfishness or prosociality of their behavior when it is common knowledge that their actions produce various externalities through the training of an algorithm? In an online experiment, we let participants’ choices in dictator games train an algorithm. Thereby, they create an externality on future decision making of an intelligent system that affects future participants. We show that individuals who are aware of the consequences of their training on the pay- offs of a future generation behave more prosocially, but only when they bear the risk of being harmed themselves by future algorithmic choices. In that case, the externality of artificially intelligence training induces a significantly higher share of egalitarian decisions in the present.
In a parsimonious regime switching model, we find strong evidence that expected consumption growth varies over time. Adding inflation as a second variable, we uncover two states in which expected consumption growth is low, one with high and one with negative expected inflation. Embedded in a general equilibrium asset pricing model with learning, these dynamics replicate the observed time variation in stock return volatilities and stock- bond return correlations. They also provide an alternative derivation for a measure of time-varying disaster risk suggested by Wachter (2013), implying that both the disaster and the long-run risk paradigm can be extended towards explaining movements in the stock-bond correlation.
This article compares the three initial safety nets spanned by the European Union in response to the Covid-19 crisis: SURE, the Pandemic Crisis Support, and the European Guarantee Fund. It compares their design regarding scope, generosity, target groups, implementation, the types of solidarity and conditionality, and asks how they reflect on core-periphery relations in the EU. The article finds that the most important factor in all three instruments is risk-sharing between member states, even though SURE and the EGF display elements of fiscal solidarity. Finally, the article shows that Euro crisis countries from the South are the main recipients of financial aid, while Central and East European countries receive significantly less assistance and core countries in the North and West have no need for them.