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Continuadores posteriores de la teoría crítica de la sociedad han cuestionado a Adorno por caer en una lógica de la emancipación frustrada aparentemente contradictoria, que reflexiona sobre la dominación social en condiciones bajo las cuales, empero, se declaran cerradas las posibilidades de transformación histórica. Sin embargo, sostengo que su teoría social remite también a un concepto novedoso de la emancipación sin totalidad, relevante para la reconstrucción de la teoría crítica ante los cuestionamientos pluralistas lanzados hacia el concepto de “totalidad”.
O objetivo do presente texto é repensar a aporia pela qual o livro “Dialética do Esclarecimento” é anunciado, a saber, a autodestruição do esclarecimento ou a procura da liberdade pela racionalidade, mas que culmina em uma regressão. Nossa argumentação perfaz dois caminhos: primeiramente, apresentamos a relação existente na obra entre um tipo de antropologia com bases freudianas e uma leitura da sociologia de Marx. Concebemos a noção de uma estrutura psíquica permeável às condições sócio-históricas do ser humano ocidental. Tal condição é imprescindível para a saída da aporia intimamente relacionada a uma antropologia psíquica ligada a um modo histórico da cultura e sociedade. Na sequência, propomos ainda um paralelo entre a possibilidade de um esclarecimento efetivo por meio do resíduo mítico presente na racionalidade técnica apresentada por Horkheimer e Adorno e a assunção da situação humana de desamparo na visão de mundo religiosa, modo freudiano para se alcançar uma posição mais “científica” em relação à realidade. Nesse contexto, utilizaremos rapidamente parte da teoria de Weber como meio para relacionarmos o esclarecimento à religião no que ambos têm em comum, isto é, a defesa contra o sofrimento, a angústia e o desamparo. Talvez seja por meio da assunção do desamparo na racionalidade situada na visão religiosa de mundo, ou ainda, a assunção do mito na racionalidade técnica do esclarecimento, que permitirá o futuro desenvolvimento de uma “antropologia dialética”, o que resultaria na saída da aporia enquanto condição histórica da racionalidade humana.
The concept of freedom as non-domination that is associated with neo-republican theory provides a guiding ideal in the global, not just the domestic arena, and does so even on the assumption that there will continue to be many distinct states. It argues for a world in which states do not dominate members of their own people and, considered as a corporate body, no people is dominated by other agencies: not by other states and not, for example, by any international agency or multi-national corporation. This ideal is not only attractive in the abstract, it also supports a concrete range of sensible, if often radical international policies.
The article aims to sharpen the neo-republican contribution to international political thought by challenging Pettit’s view that only representative states may raise a valid claim to non-domination in their external relations. The argument proceeds in two steps: First I show that, conceptually speaking, the domination of states, whether representative or not, implies dominating the collective people at least in its fundamental, constitutive power. Secondly, the domination of states – and thus of their peoples – cannot be justified normatively in the name of promoting individual non-domination because such a compensatory rationale misconceives the notion of domination in terms of a discrete exercise of power instead of as an ongoing power relation. This speaks in favour of a more inclusive law of peoples than Pettit (just as his liberal counterpart Rawls) envisages: In order to accommodate the claim of collective peoples to non-domination it has to recognize every state as a member of the international order.
It is widely thought that the international community, taken as a whole, is required to take action to prevent terrorism. Yet, what each state is required to do in this project is unclear and contested. This article examines a number of bases on which we might assign responsibilities to conduct counterterrorist operations to states. I argue that the ways in which other sorts of responsibilities have been assigned to states by political philosophers will face significant limitations when used to assign the necessary costs of preventing terrorism. I go on to suggest that appealing to the principle of fairness—which assigns obligations on the basis of benefits received from cooperative endeavours—may be used to make up the shortfall, despite this principle having received relatively little attention in existing normative accounts of states’ responsibilities.
In modern welfare states, family policies may resolve the tension between employment and care-focused demands. However these policies sometimes have adverse consequences for distinct social groups. This study examined gender and educational differences in working parents’ perceived work–family conflict and used a comparative approach to test whether family policies, in particular support for child care and leave from paid work, are capable of reducing work–family conflict as well as the gender and educational gaps in work–family conflict. We use data from the European Social Survey 2010 for 20 countries and 5296 respondents (parents), extended with information on national policies for maternity and parental leave and child care support from the OECD Family Database. Employing multilevel analysis, we find that mothers and the higher educated report most work–family conflict. Policies supporting child care reduce the level of experienced work–family conflict; family leave policy appears to have no alleviating impact on working parents’ work–family conflict. Our findings indicate that family policies appear to be unable to reduce the gender gap in conflict perception and even widen the educational gap in work–family conflict.
As contendas filosóficas acerca da definição e da aplicação da ‘verdade’ desenvolvem-se desde a antiguidade até os dias atuais. O questionamento sobre as condições ideais para se alcançar a verdade e se estas condições podem ser satisfeitas, se a realidade pode ser conhecida com ela é ou se apenas podemos conhecer sua forma apresentada, todas estas indagações, ocuparam também o pragmatista e o neo-pragmatista Jürgen Habermas e Richard Rorty, respectivamente. Enquanto Richard Rorty, motivado pela Virada Linguística, pretende seguir o caminho oposto ao da Metafísica, substituindo a noção de verdade enquanto “descoberta” por verdade enquanto “construção”, Habermas sugere que existem condições de validação para aquilo que chamamos ‘verdadeiro’, que já encontram-se previamente estabelecidas no contexto de argumentação e que devem ser satisfeitas. Com o objetivo de analisar as posições de ambos os filósofos citados, apresentaremos de forma sucinta a visão de cada um acerca do debate sobre a verdade e a crítica que Habermas tece a respeito da interpretação que Rorty fornece.
Contemporary liberalism and republicanism present clearly distinct programs for domestic politics, but the same cannot be said when it comes to global politics: the burgeoning literature on global republicanism has reproduced the divide between cosmopolitan and associational views familiar from long-standing debates among liberal egalitarians. Should republicans be cosmopolitans? Despite presence of a range of views in the literature, there is an emerging consensus that the best answer is no. This paper aims to resist the emerging consensus, arguing that republicans should be cosmopolitans. The considerations offered against cosmopolitanism generally rest on an incomplete understanding of the relationship between economic inequality or poverty on the one hand, and domination on the other. Insofar as republicans agree that promoting freedom from domination should be our central political aim, they should regard the reduction of economic inequality and poverty at home and abroad as equally pressing.
Populism is widely thought to be in tension with liberal democracy. This article clarifies what exactly is problematic about populism from a liberal–democratic point of view and goes on to develop normative standards that allow us to distinguish between more and less legitimate forms of populism. The point of this exercise is not to dismiss populism in toto; the article strives for a more subtle result, namely, to show that liberal democracy can accommodate populism provided that the latter conforms to particular discursive norms. What the article calls a ‘liberal ethics of populism’ turns out to be closely bound up with a broader ethics of peoplehood, understood as a way of articulating who ‘the people’ are in a way that is compatible with liberal–democratic principles of political justification. Such an ethics, concludes the article, inevitably has a much wider audience than populist political actors: its addressees are all those who seek legitimately to exercise power in the name of the people.