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Interrogando-se sobre o lugar da filosofia de Theodor W. Adorno no âmbito do pensamento crítico contemporâneo, o presente artigo procura dar conta dos revezes da recepção político-filosófica da dialéctica negativa (das posturas críticas de Habermas, Lyotard ou Agamben às mais favoráveis de Jameson e Holloway) e discutir a sua relevância actual. Defender-se-á que a politização do pensamento adorniano é possível, muito embora as suas valências críticas não se restrinjam a essa possibilidade. Hoje, a dialéctica negativa funcionaria também como antídoto contra os atalhos tomados pelas correntes "voluntarista" (Peter Hallward), "messiânica" (Agamben) e "ontológica" (realismo especulativo) da filosofia, à entrada do século XXI. Contudo, atendendo a que a relação entre teoria e prática é complexa em Adorno, a sua relevância actual ressaltaria em relação com as reacções críticas que o movimento do "realismo especulativo" tem suscitado. Em diálogo com alguns dos seus interlocutores (Markus Gabriel e Adrian Johnston), sugere-se que o desenvolvimento de uma "dialéctica constelar" depende da introdução de um elemento destotalizador no seio do diagnóstico radical - a um só tempo materialista e transcendental - da dialéctica negativa.
This paper analyzes two contemporary, „third-generation“ perspectives within critical theory - Nancy Fraser’s and Axel Honneth’s - with the aim of examining the degree to which the two authors succeed in grounding the normative criteria of social critique in the perspectives of ’ordinary’ social actors, as opposed to speculative social theory. To that end, the author focuses on the influential debate between Fraser and Honneth Redistribution or Recognition? which concerns the appropriate normative foundations of a „post-metaphysical“ critical theory, and attempts to reconstruct the fundamental 29 disagreements between Fraser and Honneth over the meaning and tasks of critical theory. The author concludes that both critical theorists ultimately secure the normative foundations of critique through substantive theorizations of the social, which frame the two authors’ „reconstructions“ of the normativity of everyday social action, but argues that post-metaphysical critical theory does not have to abandon comprehensive social theory in order to be epistmologically „non-authoritarian“.
Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in Marcuse's critical theory. This can be partly ascribed to Marcuse's interdisciplinary approach to humanities and social sciences. Many of Marcuse's ideas and concepts are tacitly present in contemporary social and ecological movements. Contemporary literature on Marcuse is positively inclined to his theory while the critique of Marcuse dates back to the '70s, and remains largely unimpaired. This fact poses significant challenges to the revival of Marcuse's critical theory. This study sets out to report on current interest in Marcuse's critical theory trying to correct "past injustices" by responding to negative criticism. The main flaw of such criticism - as we see it - is in failing to perceive interdisciplinary character of Marcuse's critical theory. Marcuse's renaissance cannot be complete without, to use dialectical term, sublating the history of negative criticism.
Este artículo presenta una lectura crítica de un trabajo central de Axel Honneth desde la teoría de la sujeción de Judith Butler. Intenta mostrar que, por la ausencia en su escrito de una consideración sobre el poder, el pensador alemán no logra cumplir satisfactoriamente su objetivo propuesto de enfrentar las posturas que cuestionan el potencial crítico del reconocimiento. La hipótesis que aquí se maneja es que esa ausencia está ligada a su definición del reconocimiento como lo contrario de las prácticas de dominio o sometimiento. Ahora bien, Honneth afirma que el escepticismo de esas posturas respecto del reconocimiento se basa en la idea de que toda praxis recognoscente reproduce de alguna manera el orden social dominante. El presente trabajo se propone entonces, cuestionar esta aseveración del autor advirtiendo que un análisis sobre el modo en que el poder actúa en las prácticas cotidianas de reconocimiento no necesariamente conlleva una renuncia de la función crítica del concepto para la teoría social. Más bien, como sugiere la noción butleriana (y foucaultiana) de crítica, sólo enmarcando al reconocimiento en el horizonte normativo que lo delimita puede convertirse en la base de la indagación social.
Critique, and especially radical critique of reason, is under pressure from two opponents. Whereas the proponents of "post-critical" or "acritical" thinking denounce critique as an empty and self-righteous repetition of debunking, the decriers of "post-truth" accuse critique of having helped to bring about our current "post-truth" politics. Both advocate realism as a limit critique must respect, but Vogelmann defends the claim that we urgently need radical critiques of reason because they offer a more precise diagnosis of the untruths in politics the two opponents of critique are rightfully worried about. Radical critiques of reason are possible, he argues, if we turn our attention to the practices of criticizing, if we refrain from a sovereign epistemology, and if we pluralize reason without trivializing it. In order to demonstrate the diagnostic advantage of radical critiques of reason, he briefly analyzes the political and epistemic strategy at work in two exemplary untruths in politics.