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China’s law to control international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) has sent shockwaves through international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society and expert communities as the epitome of a worldwide trend of closing civic spaces. Since the Overseas NGO Management Law was enacted in January 2017, its implementation has seen mixed effects and diverging patterns of adaptation among Chinese party-state actors at the central and local levels and among domestic NGOs and INGOs. To capture the formal and informal dynamics underlying their mutual interactions in the longer term, this article employs a theory of institutional change inspired by Elinor Ostrom’s distinction between rules-in-form versus rules-in-use and identifies four scenarios for international civil society in China – “no change,” “restraining,” “recalibrating” and “reorienting.” Based on interviews, participant observation and Chinese policy documents and secondary literature, the respective driving forces, plausibility, likelihood and longer-term implications of each scenario are assessed. It is found that INGOs’ activities are increasingly affected by the international ambitions of the Chinese party-state, which enmeshes both domestic NGOs and INGOs as agents in its diplomatic efforts to redefine civil society participation on a global scale.
The influence and power of some OECD states is under threat but China appears to remain astonishingly flexible, economically potent, and politically strong. How accurate is this view? To answer this question, major aspects of Chinese economic regulation that were adopted in the country’s progress towards capitalist modernization are examined. The analysis requires a historical reconstruction of how China changed the way it intervenes economically and politically, especially with regard to the institutions of the central state. Such a reconstruction reveals that, since the 1990s, the central state has indeed increased its steering capacities. These capacities have a distinctive basis that includes acceptance of a state-centered approach, idiosyncratic innovation policies taking place in the "shadow" of the state’s hierarchy, and the ongoing influence of the communist party. An all-embracing controlling power is, however, not detectable. What does exist in China’s competition-driven system of “statecapitalist” regulation, is a set of limits on the state’s capacity to govern.
This dissertation explores the breadth and variation of authoritarian counter-terrorism strategies and their legitimacy-related origins to challenge prevailing assumptions in Terrorism Studies. Research and analysis are conducted in the form of a Structured Focused Comparison of domestic counter-terrorism strategies in two electoral autocracies. The first case is Russia’s domestic engagement against a mix of ethno-separatist and Islamist terrorism emanating from its North Caucasus republics between 1999 and 2018. The second case is China’s engagement vis-à-vis a similar type of terrorism in its Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region between 1990 and 2018.
The comparison shows that, contrary to prevailing assumptions, the two strategies differ immensely from one another while containing significant if not predominant non-coercive elements. It further shows that the two strategies are closely related to the two states’ sources and resources of legitimacy, both in their original motivation to tackle the terrorist threat and in the design of counter-terrorism strategies. Drawing on David Beetham’s theory of The Legitimation of Power and on the Comparative Politics, Terrorism Studies and Civil War literatures, the dissertation explores the influence of five sources and (re)sources of legitimacy on the two counter-terrorism strategies: responsiveness, performance legitimacy, ideology, discursive power and co-optation. While governmental discursive power is discarded as a source of variation, findings are significant with respect to the influence of ideology and performance legitimacy. Reliance on ideology or related patterns for legitimation raise vulnerability to terrorism and constrain or facilitate the adoption of communicative and preventive measures that accommodate the grievances of potentially defective or even violently terrorist groups. Performance legitimacy is a key motivator in counter-terrorism and an influence on certain types of counter-terrorism policies. Responsiveness and co-optation are identified as potential sources of variation, based on idiosyncratic concurrence with policy choices.
Two decades after the predicted “end of ideology”, we are observing a re-emphasis on party ideology under Hu Jintao. The paper looks into the reasons for and the factors shaping the re-formulation of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ideology since 2002 and assesses the progress and limits of this process. Based on the analysis of recent elite debates, it is argued that the remaking of ideology has been the consequence of perceived challenges to the legitimacy of CCP rule. Contrary to many Western commentators, who see China’s successful economic performance as the most important if not the only source of regime legitimacy, Chinese party theorists and scholars have come to regard Deng Xiaoping’s formula of performance-based legitimacy as increasingly precarious. In order to tackle the perceived “performance dilemma” of party rule, the adaptation and innovation of party ideology is regarded as a crucial measure to relegitimize CCP rule.
For more than two decades, the National Planning Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences (NPOPSS) has been managing official funding of social science research in China under the orbit of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) propaganda system. By focusing on “Major Projects”, the most prestigious and well-funded program initiated by the NPOPSS in 2004, this contribution outlines the political and institutional ramifications of this line of official funding and attempts to identify larger shifts during the past decade in the “ideologics” of official social science research funding – the changing ideological circumscriptions of research agendas in the more narrow sense of echoing party theory and rhetoric and – in the broader sense – of adapting to an increasingly dominant official discourse of cultural and national self-assertion. To conclude, this article offers reflections on the potential repercussions of these shifts for international academic collaboration.
With the current conflict in Gaza going full tilt, the usual questions have popped up: Who is to blame, what is everyone’s motivation and strategy, how to stop the bloodshed, how to end the conflict. And as usual, the two-state solution, i.e. two separate, sovereign states within the borders of the 1949 armistice agreement, keeps popping up as a purported solution. This is especially prominent in the statements of politicians in countries not directly involved in the conflict. Countries that at least claim to want to help end the conflict, be it through mediation or other diplomatic measures. But for those countries, the two-state solution has become an idea to hide behind. It does not help solve the conflict, neither in the short- nor mid-term. Clinging to the idea merely prolongs the status quo. However, it does allow the rest of the world to avoid facing the facts, which would force them to reevaluate their position on who to support and actually do something about the conflict as it currently is. But it’s high time we face the music and admit it: The two-state solution is no longer a viable option when it comes to mediating this conflict...