Filtern
Erscheinungsjahr
- 2012 (40) (entfernen)
Dokumenttyp
- Wissenschaftlicher Artikel (40) (entfernen)
Sprache
- Portugiesisch (12)
- Englisch (10)
- Deutsch (6)
- Italienisch (4)
- Spanisch (4)
- Französisch (2)
- Mehrsprachig (2)
Volltext vorhanden
- ja (40)
Gehört zur Bibliographie
- nein (40)
Schlagworte
- Adorno (6)
- Axel Honneth (4)
- global justice (3)
- migration (3)
- Reconhecimento (2)
- Reificação (2)
- Teoria Crítica (2)
- América Latina (1)
- Approximation (1)
- Aproximação (1)
Institut
- Gesellschaftswissenschaften (40) (entfernen)
This paper explores the implications of empirical theories of migration for normative accounts of migration and distributive justice. It examines neo-classical economics, world-systems theory, dual labor market theory, and feminist approaches to migration and contends that neo-classical economic theory in isolation provides an inadequate understanding of migration. Other theories provide a fuller account of how national and global economic, political, and social institutions cause and shape migration flows by actively affecting people's opportunity sets in source countries and by admitting people according to social categories such as class and gender. These empirical theories reveal the causal impact of institutions regulating migration and clarify moral obligations frequently overlooked by normative theorists.
The paper examines obligations towards bearers of the right to asylum in circumstances of partial compliance. Who should bear the burdens when a state responsible for assisting bearers of the right to asylum fails to comply with the requirements of justice and unjustly defaults on its responsibilities? Are the complying states obligated to ‘take up the slack’ and assist the bearers of the right to asylum, or are they obligated to bear only their ‘fair share’ of burdens in the global protection of the right to asylum? The paper argues that the complying states with the capacity to assist can have an obligation of justice to assist bearers of the right to asylum when other states unjustly default on their responsibilities.
This article critically discusses the role and place of migrants' rights in the EU’s evolving migration and development policy under the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) pursued by the EU.1 The GAMM, which aims to govern migration flows from outside of the EU more effectively, incorporates the field of migration and development as one of four pillars. Only in November of 2011, however, the human rights of migrants were explicitly acknowledged as a cross-cutting theme within the GAMM, which before paid little attention – not to say neglected – the protection of such rights. This contribution analyses how the linkage between migration and development evolved on the international and European level, highlights the EU’s interests in such a policy, and explains the pitfalls of disregarding the protection of migrants’ rights in this context. The article argues that the ‘development burden’ should not be placed on immigrant populations without guaranteeing their secure legal status in the host countries.
The present contribution defends that remittances should be taken into account and integrated into an ethical framework on migration. This main thesis is two-fold. First, we argue that if a normative approach to migration is to claim practical relevance, it should integrate remittances as a relevant empirical parameter into an ethical framework. The empirical assessment of the scientific evidence available on remittances therefore proves to be extremely important. Secondly, assuming that remittances have to be taken seriously, we consider their positive and negative impacts against two backgrounds. First, we emphasize the increased autonomy of persons who pull themselves and their dependents out of economic hardship. Second, affluent states who enable this process through their labor legislation contribute to the fulfillment of their duty of assistance. In this respect, our thesis is to claim that remittances should be considered as an amplifying factor for normative arguments in favor of a liberalization of labor migration. Remittances stand for a liberal way of fulfilling a responsibility to help, namely through the elimination of obstacles which in turn allow people to support themselves and lead an autonomous life.
Starting from the observation that substantively free migration is impossible in a world where millions lack the resources to move country, this article evaluates two contenders for the second-best alternative. On the face of it, arguments from freedom of association and material inequality appear to commend formally open borders, while those from liberty and equality of opportunity seem to favour a migration lottery. However, the argument from liberty gives us only a presumption in favour of freedom of movement, rather than an equal human right. This is not enough to make a compelling case for a migration lottery. Moreover, the idea that equality of opportunity requires a migration lottery rests on the belief that this will facilitate self-realisation. Yet it is free movement which better promotes self-realisation. Therefore, it is concluded that the case for a migration lottery is ultimately unpersuasive.
Migration and global justice
(2012)
Geld allein macht nicht (un)glücklich : was Mitarbeiter der Goethe-Universität zufrieden macht
(2012)
In der Art und Weise, wie wir mit Geld umgehen, kommt unsere Persönlichkeit mit allen unbewältigten lebensgeschichtlichen Traumata und Konflikten zum Ausdruck. Und deshalb lässt Geld uns nicht kalt, ganz gleich, wie viel uns davon zur Verfügung steht. Geldstile sind relativ stabil; sie lassen sich auch dann nicht leicht verändern, wenn sie zu negativen Ergebnissen führen. Paare unterschätzen oft, dass über Geld latente Beziehungsprobleme ausgetragen werden.
My contribution focuses on the relationship between theory and praxis, since the task of a “critical archaeology” is to mediate between these two spheres. Its target audience is the public, not other scholars. Critical archaeology is not part of scientific practice, but rather is part of intellectual reasoning that is both value-laden and that exercises practical critique. Respect for the specific logics of theory and praxis is crucial for its success. A “critical archaeology” that merits its name must steer its way between the Scylla of a technocratic paternalism that limits praxis and the Charybdis of submission to theory under the presumption of the “relevance of praxis.”