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We study how the informativeness of stock prices changes with the presence of high-frequency trading (HFT). Our estimate is based on the staggered start of HFT participation in a panel of international exchanges. With HFT presence, market prices are a less reliable predictor of future cash flows and investment, even more so for longer horizons. Further, firm-level idiosyncratic volatility decreases, and the holdings and trades by institutional investors deviate less from the market-capitalization weighted portfolio as a benchmark. Our results document that the informativeness of prices decreases subsequent to the start of HFT. These findings are consistent with theoretical models of HFTs' ability to anticipate informed order flow, resulting in decreased incentives to acquire fundamental information.
In this note, we first highlight different developments for banks under direct ECB supervision within the SSM that may prompt further investigation by supervisors. We find that banks that were weakly capitalized at the start of direct ECB supervision (1) still face elevated levels of non-performing loans, (2) are less cost-efficient and (3) reduced their share of subordinated debt financing over the last years. We then stress the importance of continuous and ongoing cost-benefit analysis regarding banking supervision in Europe. We also encourage processes to question existing supervisory practices to ensure a lean and efficient banking supervision. Finally, we underline the need of continuous and intensified coordination among regulatory bodies in the Banking Union since the efficacy of European bank supervision rests on its interplay with many different institutions.
This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. It was originally published on the European Parliament’s webpage.
Nach der 2008 startenden Finanzmarktkrise sind Maßnahmen zur Regulierung und Stabilisierung der Finanzmärkte in das Zentrum der politischen und der gesellschaftlichen Aufmerksamkeit gerückt. Insbesondere die hohen fiskalischen Kosten der Staaten zur Stützung ihrer Bankensysteme sowie die volkswirtschaftlichen Kosten infolge des Einbruchs des Wirtschaftswachstums in den Jahren nach der Insolvenz der US Investmentbank Lehman Brothers hatten einen globalen Konsens über die Notwendigkeit neuer Regulierungsmaßnahmen zur Folge. Im Ergebnis wurden das internationale Regulierungswerk Basel III sowie weitere nationale Maßnahmen zur Stabilisierung des Finanzsektors neu konzipiert und in Europa im Wege einer in nationales Recht umzusetzenden Richtlinie (die Capital Require-ments Directive IV - CRD IV) sowie einer Verordnung (die Capital Requirements Regulation CRR, welche unmittelbar geltendes Recht darstellt) eingeführt.
Vor diesem Hintergrund analysiert das vorliegende interdisziplinäre Gutachten die Auswirkungen der Regulierungsmaßnahmen, die zwischen 2008 bis zu Beginn des Jahres 2018 umgesetzt wurden auf dem deutschen Finanzsektor.
In diesem explorativen Beitrag machen wir uns Gedanken über die Zukunft von Deutscher Bank und Commerzbank und entwickeln einen neuen Zugang zu dem Thema: Statt einer Fusion von DB und CB schlagen wir eine Teilfusion nur der Datenzentren vor – es entsteht auf diese Weise die Grundlage für eine Open Banking Plattform als „utility“, also als Betrieb im Eigentum der Nutzer, an der perspektivisch weitere Finanzinstitute teilnehmen können. Die über die Daten kooperierenden Institute bleiben mit Blick auf Produkte und Dienstleistungen unverändert Konkurrenten – „national champions“ entstehen auf diese Weise nicht. Aber es wird damit in Europa die Basis für einen erfolgversprechenden Wettbewerb mit den großen Datenplattformen aus USA und China (Facebook, Amazon, Alipay) gelegt, die früher oder später in den Finanzmarkt eindringen werden. Das von uns vorgeschlagene Modell einer offenen Datenplattform für Banken verhindert das Entstehen von „national champions“ und schützt damit auch das Kernanliegen der Bankenunion: Die Schaffung eines Finanzsystems, dessen Banken jede für sich ausscheiden können ohne eine systemische Krise auszulösen, und ohne den Steuerzahler zu einer Rettungsaktion zu zwingen
Do competition and incentives offered to designated market makers (DMMs) improve market liquidity? Using data from NYSE Euronext Paris, we show that an exogenous increase in competition among DMMs leads to a significant decrease in quoted and effective spreads, mainly through a reduction in adverse selection costs. In contrast, changes in incentives, through small changes in rebates and requirements for DMMs, do not have any tangible effect on market liquidity. Our results are of relevance for designing optimal contracts between exchanges and DMMs and for regulatory market oversight.
We show that banks that are facing relatively high locally non-diversifiable risks in their home region expand more across states than banks that do not face such risks following branching deregulation in the 1990s and 2000s. These banks with high locally non-diversifiable risks also benefit relatively more from deregulation in terms of higher bank stability. Further, these banks expand more into counties where risks are relatively high and positively correlated with risks in their home region, suggesting that they do not only diversify but also build on their expertise in local risks when they expand into new regions.
Self-control failure is among the major pathologies (Baumeister et al. (1994)) affecting individual investment decisions which has hardly been measurable in empirical research. We use cigarette addiction identified from checking account transactions to proxy for low self-control and compare over 5,000 smokers to 14,000 nonsmokers. Smokers self-directing their investment trade more frequently, exhibit more biases and achieve lower portfolio returns. We also find that smokers, some of which might be aware of their limited levels of self-control, exhibit a higher propensity than nonsmokers to delegate decision making to professional advisors and fund managers. We document that such precommitments work successfully.
Recently, Fuest and Sinn (2018) have demanded a change of rules for the Eurozone’s Target 2 payment system, claiming it would violate the Statutes of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. The authors present a stylized model based on a set of macro-economic assumptions, and show that Target 2 may lead to loss sharing among national central banks (NCBs), thus violating the no risk-sharing requirement laid out by the Eurosystem Statutes.
In this note, I present an augmented model that incorporates essential features of the micro- and macroprudential regulatory and supervisory regime that today is hard-wired into Europe’s banking system. The model shows that the original no-risk-sharing principle is not necessarily violated during a financial crisis of a member state. Moreover, it shows that under a banking union regime, financial crisis asset value losses at or below the 99.9th percentile are borne by private investors, not by taxpayers, and particularly not by central banks.
Therefore, policy conclusions from the micro-founded model differ significantly from those suggested by Fuest and Sinn (2018).
n der Literatur wird oftmals angeführt, dass die Grunderwerbsteuer weder aus Sicht des Äquivalenzprinzips noch aus Sicht des Leistungsfähigkeitsprinzips zu rechtfertigen ist und daher in einem modernen Steuersystem nichts verloren hätte. Das vorliegende Papier weist darauf hin, dass die Grunderwerbsteuer Parallelen zur Grundsteuer aufweist und sich, zumindest aus ökonomischer Sicht, in eine Grundsteuer umbauen ließe. Dies könnte insbesondere dann interessant sein, wenn die derzeitige deutsche Grundsteuer in eine reine Flächensteuer umgebaut wird, die den Wert der Bebauung unbesteuert lässt. Ein Umbau der Grunderwerbsteuer, bei der der Kaufpreis dynamisiert wird und dann einer jährlichen Steuer unterworfen wird, hat einige Vorteile. Diese resultieren daraus, dass der negative Effekt auf die Zahl der Immobilientransaktionen (Lock-in-Effekt) abgemildert würde. Könnte die Dynamisierung treffsicher an die regionale Immobilienpreisentwicklung angepasst werden, entfällt der Lock-in-Effekt für Immobilien, die bereits einmal der dynamisierten Grunderwerbsteuer unterworfen waren, sogar komplett. Dies hat nicht nur positive Effekte auf das Funktionieren des Wohnungs- und Arbeitsmarktes, sondern kann auch dem Problem der Share Deals entgegen wirken.
We propose a shrinkage and selection methodology specifically designed for network inference using high dimensional data through a regularised linear regression model with Spike-and-Slab prior on the parameters. The approach extends the case where the error terms are heteroscedastic, by adding an ARCH-type equation through an approximate Expectation-Maximisation algorithm. The proposed model accounts for two sets of covariates. The first set contains predetermined variables which are not penalised in the model (i.e., the autoregressive component and common factors) while the second set of variables contains all the (lagged) financial institutions in the system, included with a given probability. The financial linkages are expressed in terms of inclusion probabilities resulting in a weighted directed network where the adjacency matrix is built “row by row". In the empirical application, we estimate the network over time using a rolling window approach on 1248 world financial firms (banks, insurances, brokers and other financial services) both active and dead from 29 December 2000 to 6 October 2017 at a weekly frequency. Findings show that over time the shape of the out degree distribution exhibits the typical behavior of financial stress indicators and represents a significant predictor of market returns at the first lag (one week) and the fourth lag (one month).