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- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (1921) (remove)
I analyze a critical illness insurance in a consumption-investment model over the life cycle. I solve a model with stochastic mortality risk and health shock risk numerically. These shocks are interpreted as critical illness and can negatively affect the expected remaining lifetime, the health expenses, and the income. In order to hedge the health expense effect of a shock, the agent has the possibility to contract a critical illness insurance. My results highlight that the critical illness insurance is strongly desired by the agents. With an insurance profit of 20%, nearly all agents contract the insurance in the working stage of the life cycle and more than 50% of the agents contract the insurance during retirement. With an insurance profit of 200%, still nearly all working agents contract the insurance, whereas there is little demand in the retirement stage.
I numerically solve realistically calibrated life cycle consumption-investment problems in continuous time featuring stochastic mortality risk driven by jumps, unspanned labor income as well as short-sale and liquidity constraints and a simple insurance. I compare models with deterministic and stochastic hazard rate of death to a model without mortality risk. Mortality risk has only minor effects on the optimal controls early in the life cycle but it becomes crucial in later years. A diffusive component in the hazard rate of death has no significant impact, whereas a jump component is desired by the agent and influences optimal controls and wealth evolution. The insurance is used to ensure optimal bequest such that there is no accidental bequest. In the absence of the insurance, the biggest part of bequest is accidental.
Die Dissertation besteht aus drei thematisch zusammenhängenden Forschungspapieren, in denen zeitstetige Konsum-, Investment- und Versicherungsprobleme über den Lebenszyklus betrachtet werden. Ein besonderer Fokus liegt auf realistischen Features wie stochastischem Sterberisiko und nicht-replizierbarem Einkommen. In der ersten Forschungsarbeit untersuche ich die Relevanz von stochastischem Sterberisiko. Dabei zeige ich, dass eine Sprungkomponente in der Sterberate die optimalen Entscheidungen der Agenten und das Wohlfahrtslevel signifikant beeinflusst. Eine Diffusionskomponente ist hingegen vernachlässigbar. In dem zweiten Forschungspapier untersuchen wir die Risikolebensversicherungsnachfrage einer Familie, dessen Alleinverdiener stochastischem Sterberisiko ausgesetzt ist. Wir achten insbesondere auf eine realistische Modellierung der Versicherung. Wir zeigen, dass dadurch junge Agenten dem Versicherungsmarkt fern bleiben und die Versicherungsnachfrage mit dem Alter steigt, im Gegensatz zu Modellen mit einfachen stetig-veränderbaren Versicherungen. Weiterhin verstärken langlaufende Versicherungsverträge die negativen Effekte von Einkommensschocks und werden daher von risikoaversen Agenten weniger abgeschlossen. In der dritten Forschungsarbeit untersuche ich die Critical Illness Versicherungsnachfrage eines Agenten in einem Modell mit stochastischem Sterberisiko und Gesundheitsausgaben. Die Versicherung übernimmt dabei die zusätzlichen Gesundheitskosten, die bei einem Sprung entstehen. Fast alle Agenten schließen solch eine Versicherung vor dem Rentenalter ab, selbst wenn diese sehr kostspielig ist. Insbesondere Agenten mit geringen Gesundheitsausgaben und hohem Einkommen haben eine hohe Versicherungsnachfrage.
This paper defends The Transformation of Values into Prices on the Basis of Random Systems, published in EIER, by answering to the Comments made in the same journal by Professors Mori, Morioka and Yamazaki. The clarifications mainly concern the justification of the randomness assumptions, the conditions needed to obtain the equality of total profit with total surplus value in the simplified one-industry system and the invariance of the results to changes in the units of measurement.
The present study investigates the moderating effect of usage intensity of the social networking site (SNS) Instagram (IG) on the influence of advertisement disclosure types on advertising performance. A national sample (N = 566) participated in a randomized online experiment including a real influencer and followers in order to investigate how different advertisement disclosure types affect advertising performance and how usage intensity moderates this effect. We find that disclosing an influencer’s postings with “#ad” increases the trustworthiness of the influencer and the general credibility of the posting for heavy users, but not for light users. Followership of a user has been found to strongly improve all researched variables (attitude toward product placement, trustworthiness of the spokesperson and general credibility of the posting). This study adds to literature the first distinction on heavy and light usage intensity, and on followership of an IG user when regarding the effects of advertisement disclosure types on advertising performance. To conclude, we present a number of recommendations regarding how advertisers, influencers, and SNS providers should develop strategies for monitoring, understanding, and responding to different social media users, e.g., to closely monitor an influencer’s audience to identify heavy users and optimally target them.
Colocation services offered by stock exchanges enable market participants to achieve execution costs for large orders that are substantially lower and less sensitive to transacting against high-frequency traders. However, these benefits manifest only for orders executed on the colocated brokers' own behalf, whereas customers' order execution costs are substantially higher. Analyses of individual order executions indicate that customer orders originating from colocated brokers are less actively monitored and achieve inferior execution quality. This suggests that brokers do not make effective use of their technology, possibly due to agency frictions or poor algorithm selection and parameter choice by customers.
Highlights
• The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act legalized millions of Hispanic migrants.
• The IRCA receive significantly increases state-to-county fiscal transfers.
• Electoral incentives of the state governor drive the fiscal response of the IRCA.
• Legalization increases Hispanic turnout and political engagement.
Abstract
We study the impact of immigrant legalization on fiscal transfers from state to local governments in the United States, exploiting variation in legal status from the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). State governments allocate more resources to IRCA counties, an allocation that is responsive to the electoral incentives of the governor. Importantly, the effect emerges prior to the enfranchisement of the IRCA migrants and we argue it is driven by the IRCA’s capacity to politically empower already legal Hispanic migrants in mixed legal status communities. The IRCA increases turnout in large Hispanic communities as well as Hispanic political engagement, without detectably triggering anti-migrant sentiment.
This paper studies the role of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in the recent US housing boom-bust cycle. Using a difference-in-differences matching estimation, I find that the enhancement of CRA enforcement in 1998 caused a 7.7 percentage points increase in annual growth rate of mortgage lending by CRA-regulated banks to CRA-eligible census tracts relative to a group of similar-income CRA-ineligible census tracts within the same state. Financial institutions which are not subject to the CRA, however, do not show any change in their mortgage supply between these two types of census tracts after 1998. I take advantage of this exogenous shift in mortgage supply within an instrumental variable framework to identify the causal effect of mortgage supply on housing prices. I find that every 1 percentage point higher annual growth rate of mortgage supply leads to 0.3 percentage points higher annual growth rate of housing prices. Reduced form regressions show that CRA-eligible neighborhoods experienced higher house price growth during the boom and sharper decline during the bust period. I use placebo tests to confirm that this effect is in fact channeled through the shift in mortgage supply by CRA-regulated banks and not by unobserved demand factors. Furthermore, my results indicate that CRA-induced mortgages went to borrowers with lower FICO scores, carried higher interest rates, and encountered more frequent delinquencies.