Refine
Year of publication
- 2005 (39) (remove)
Document Type
- Working Paper (24)
- Report (13)
- Conference Proceeding (1)
- Preprint (1)
Language
- English (39) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (39)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (39)
Keywords
- Deutschland (5)
- asymmetric information (4)
- Asymmetrische Information (3)
- Evaluation (3)
- ABS (2)
- Arbeitsmarktpolitik (2)
- Bank (2)
- Corporate Governance (2)
- DEA (2)
- Datenschutz (2)
Institute
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (39) (remove)
Serial correlation in dynamic panel data models with weakly exogenous regressor and fixed effects
(2005)
Our paper wants to present and compare two estimation methodologies for dynamic panel data models in the presence of serially correlated errors and weakly exogenous regressors. The ¯rst is the ¯rst di®erence GMM estimator as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the second is the transformed Maximum Likelihood Estimator as proposed by Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002). Thereby, we consider the ¯xed e®ects case and weakly exogenous regressors. The ¯nite sample properties of both estimation methodologies are analysed within a simulation experiment. Furthermore, we will present an empirical example to consider the performance of both estimators with real data. JEL Classification: C23, J64
Although the commoditisation of illiquid asset exposures through securitisation facilitates the disciplining effect of capital markets on the risk management, private information about securitised debt as well as complex transaction structures could possibly impair the fair market valuation. In a simple issue design model without intermediaries we maximise issuer proceeds over a positive measure of issue quality, where a direct revelation mechanism (DRM) by profitable informed investors engages endogenous price discovery through auction-style allocation preference as a continuous function of perceived issue quality. We derive an optimal allocation schedule for maximum issuer payoffs under different pricing regimes if asymmetric information requires underpricing. In particular, we study how the incidence of uninformed investors at varying levels of valuation uncertainty and their function of clearing the market effects profitable informed investment. We find that the issuer optimises own payoffs at each valuation irrespective of the applicable pricing mechanism by awarding informed investors the lowest possible allocation (and attendant underpricing) that still guarantees profitable informed investment. Under uniform pricing the composition of the investor pool ensures that informed investors appropriate higher profit than uninformed types. Any reservation utility by issuers lowers the probability of information disclosure by informed investors and the scope of issuers to curtail profitable informed investment. JEL Classifications: D82, G12, G14, G23
Job creation schemes (JCS) have been one important programme of active labour market policy in Germany aiming at the re-integration of hard-to-place unemployed individuals into regular employment. In ontrast to earlier evaluation studies of these programmes based on survey data, we use administrative data containing more than 11,000 participants for our analysis and hence, can take effect heterogeneity explicitly into account. We focus on effect heterogeneity caused by differences in the implementation of programmes (economic sector, types of support and implementing institutions). The results are rather discouraging and show that in general, JCS are unable to improve the re-integration chances of participants into regular employment.
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
With ubiquitous use of digital camera devices, especially in mobile phones, privacy is no longer threatened by governments and companies only. The new technology creates a new threat by ordinary people, who now have the means to take and distribute pictures of one’s face at no risk and little cost in any situation in public and private spaces. Fast distribution via web based photo albums, online communities and web pages expose an individual’s private life to the public in unpreceeded ways. Social and legal measures are increasingly taken to deal with this problem. In practice however, they lack efficiency, as they are hard to enforce in practice. In this paper, we discuss a supportive infrastructure aiming for the distribution channel; as soon as the picture is publicly available, the exposed individual has a chance to find it and take proper action.
We determine optimal monetary policy under commitment in a forwardlooking New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. The lower bound represents an occasionally binding constraint that causes the model and optimal policy to be nonlinear. A calibration to the U.S. economy suggests that policy should reduce nominal interest rates more aggressively than suggested by a model without lower bound. Rational agents anticipate the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the future and this amplifies the effects of adverse shocks well before the bound is reached. While the empirical magnitude of U.S. mark-up shocks seems too small to entail zero nominal interest rates, shocks affecting the natural real interest rate plausibly lead to a binding lower bound. Under optimal policy, however, this occurs quite infrequently and does not imply positive average inflation rates in equilibrium. Interestingly, the presence of binding real rate shocks alters the policy response to (non-binding) mark-up shocks.
This paper shows that a capital budgeting process in which the division manager is required to engage in personally costly influence activities prior to a project approval has beneficial incentive effects: It provides the manager with incentives to acquire costly information about project prospects and helps to elicit the revelation of the acquired information. As a consequence, imposing influence costs on the manager can lead to improved capital allocations. The optimal level of influence costs, chosen by the firm, trades off ex ante incentives for information acquisition against efficient use of the acquired information ex post.
The paper is a follow-up to an article published in Technique Financière et Developpement in 2000 (see the appendix to the hardcopy version), which portrayed the first results of a new strategy in the field of development finance implemented in South-East Europe. This strategy consists in creating microfinance banks as greenfield investments, that is, of building up new banks which specialise in providing credit and other financial services to micro and small enterprises, instead of transforming existing credit-granting NGOs into formal banks, which had been the dominant approach in the 1990s. The present paper shows that this strategy has, in the course of the last five years, led to the emergence of a network of microfinance banks operating in several parts of the world. After discussing why financial sector development is a crucial determinant of general social and economic development and contrasting the new strategy to former approaches in the area of development finance, the paper provides information about the shareholder composition and the investment portfolio of what is at present the world's largest and most successful network of microfinance banks. This network is a good example of a well-functioning "private public partnership". The paper then provides performance figures and discusses why the creation of such a network seems to be a particularly promising approach to the creation of financially self-sustaining financial institutions with a clear developmental objective.
In this paper, we propose a model of credit rating agencies using the global games framework to incorporate information and coordination problems. We introduce a refined utility function of a credit rating agency that, additional to reputation maximization, also embeds aspects of competition and feedback effects of the rating on the rated firms. Apart from hinting at explanations for several hypotheses with regard to agencies' optimal rating assessments, our model suggests that the existence of rating agencies may decrease the incidence of multiple equilibria. If investors have discretionary power over the precision of their private information, we can prove that public rating announcements and private information collection are complements rather than substitutes in order to secure uniqueness of equilibrium. In this respect, rating agencies may spark off a virtuous circle that increases the efficiency of the market outcome.