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This paper analyzes a comprehensive data set of 108 non venture-backed, 58 venture-backed and 33 bridge financed companies going public at Germany s Neuer Markt between March 1997 and March 2000. I examine whether these three types of issues differ with regard to issuer characteristics, balance sheet data or offering characteristics. Moreover, this empirical study contributes to the underpricing literature by focusing on the complementary or rather competing role of venture capitalists and underwriters in certifying the quality of a company when going public. Companies backed by a prestigious venture capitalist and/or underwritten by a top bank are expected to show less underpricing at the initial public offering (IPO) due to a reduced ex-ante uncertainty. This study provides evidence to the contrary: VC-backed IPOs appear to be more underpriced than non VCbacked IPOs.
This paper analyzes a comprehensive data set of 160 non venture-backed, 79 venture-backed and 61 bridge financed companies going public at Germany´s Neuer Markt between March 1997 and March 2002. I examine whether these three types of issues differ with regard to issuer characteristics, balance sheet data or offering characteristics. Moreover, this empirical study contributes to the underpricing literature by focusing on the complementary or rather competing role of venture capitalists and underwriters in certifying the quality of a company when going public. Companies backed by a prestigious venture capitalist and/or underwritten by a top bank are expected to show less underpricing at the initial public offering (IPO) due to a reduced ex-ante uncertainty. This analysis provides evidence to the contrary: VC-backed IPOs appear to be more underpriced than non VC-backed IPOs.
Over-allotment arrangements are nowadays part of almost any initial public offering. The underwriting banks borrow stocks from the previous shareholders to issue more than the initially announced number of shares. This is combined with the option to cover this short position at the issue price. We present empirical evidence on the value of these arrangements to the underwriters of initial public offerings on the Neuer Markt. The over-allotment arrangement is regarded as a portfolio of a long call option and a short position in a forward contract on the stock, which is different from other approaches presented in the literature.
Given the economically substantial values for these option- like claims we try to identify benefits to previous shareholders or new investors when the company is using this instrument in the process of going public. Although we carefully control for potential endogeneity problems, we find virtually no evidence for a reduction in underpricing for firms using over-allotment arrangements. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for more pronounced price stabilization activities or better aftermarket performance for firms granting an over-allotment arrangement to the underwriting banks.
EFM Classification: 230, 410
Over-allotment arrangements are nowadays part of almost any initial public offering. The underwriting banks borrow stocks from the previous shareholders to issue more than the initially announced number of shares. This is combined with the option to cover this short position at the issue price. We present empirical evidence on the value of these arrangements to the underwriters of initial public offerings on the Neuer Markt. The over-allotment arrangement is regarded as a portfolio of a long call option and a short position in a forward contract on the stock, which is different from other approaches presented in the literature.
Given the economically substantial values for these option-like claims we try to identify benefits to previous shareholders or new investors when the company is using this instrument in the process of going public. Although we carefully control for potential endogeneity problems, we find virtually no evidence for a reduction in underpricing for firms using over-allotment arrangements. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for more pronounced price stabilization activities or better aftermarket performance for firms granting an over-allotment arrangement to the underwriting banks.
Over-allotment arrangements are nowadays part of almost any initial public offering. The underwriting banks borrow stocks from the previous shareholders to issue more than the initially announced number of shares. This is combined with the option to cover this short position at the issue price. We present empirical evidence on the value of these arrangements to the underwriters of initial public offerings on the Neuer Markt. The over-allotment arrangement is regarded as a portfolio of a long call option and a short position in a forward contract on the stock, which is different from other approaches presented in the literature. Given the economically substantial values for these option-like claims we try to identify benefits to previous shareholders or new investors when the company is using this instrument in the process of going public. Although we carefully control for potential endogeneity problems, we find virtually no evidence for a reduction in underpricing for firms using over-allotment arrangements. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for more pronounced price stabilization activities or better aftermarket performance for firms granting an over-allotment arrangement to the underwriting banks.
Die Betreuer am neuen Markt sollen die Effizienz des Handels durch Bereitstellung zusätzlicher Liquidität erhöhen. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht den Liquiditätsbeitrag der Betreuer in zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Jahren. Die Beteiligung der Betreuer am Umsatz des Marktes hat im beobachteten Zeitraum deutlich abgenommen. Ihre Orderlimits und -volumina hingegen haben die Markttiefe erhöht. Weiterhin zeigt sich, daß die Betreuer sowohl in liquiditätsschwachen Titeln als auch in liquiditätsschwachen Marktphasen zur Steigerung der Liquidität beigetragen haben.
Im Rahmen einer Ereignisstudie am deutschen Kapitalmarkt wird untersucht, ob Adhoc- Mitteilungen korrekt eingesetzt werden. Die Ergebnisse belegen, daß Nemax-50-Unternehmen die Veröffentlichung potentiell positiver Meldungsinhalte bevorzugen und die Bekanntmachung negativer Mitteilungen verzögern. Außerdem veröffentlichen Nemax-50-Werte in positiven Marktphasen besonders viele Mitteilungen und einen besonders hohen Anteil an positiven Meldungsinhalten, um von der positiven Stimmung der Marktteilnehmer zu profitieren. Dax-30-Werte verhalten sich dagegen regelgerecht. Die Befunde belegen die Notwendigkeit einer stärkeren Überwachung des Veröffentlichungsverhaltens der Emittenten, die in 2002 am Neuen Markt gelistet waren.
This paper investigates whether firms employing IAS or US GAAP exhibit measurable differences in proxies for information asymmetry and market liquidity. Sample firms are drawn from the "New Market" at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. All firms listed in this market segment are required to provide financial statements in accordance with either IAS or US GAAP as part of the listing agreement. The sample choice provides a market-based comparison of the two standards holding disclosure requirements and standard enforcement constant. I find that differences in the bid-ask spread and trading volume are relatively small and more likely to be driven by firm characteristics than the choice of accounting standards. In contrast, New Market firms have lower spreads and higher turnover when compared with size-matched firms in other market segments following German GAAP. The results suggests that rigid disclosure regulation of the New Market matters in terms of information asymmetry and liquidity, but that the choice between IAS and US GAAP is of second order importance.
JEL Classification: D82, G30, M41
In contrast to the US and recently Europe, Japan appears to be unsuccessful in establishing new industries. An oft-cited example is Japan's practical invisibility in the global business software sector. Literature has ascribed Japan's weakness – or conversely, America's strength – to the specific institutional settings and competences of actors within the respective national innovation system. It has additionally been argued that unlike the American innovation system, with its proven ability to give birth to new industries, the inherent path dependency of the Japanese innovation system makes innovation and establishment of new industries quite difficult. However, there are two notable weaknesses underlying current propositions postulating that only certain innovation systems enable the creation of new industries: first, they mistakenly confound context specific with general empirical observations. And second, they grossly underestimate – or altogether fail to examine – the dynamics within innovation systems. This paper will show that it is precisely the dynamics within innovation systems – dynamics founded on the concept of path plasticity – which have enabled Japan to charge forward as a global leader in a highly innovative field: the game software sector as well as the biotechnology industry.
Using a unique, hand-collected database of all venture-backed firms listed on Germany´s Neuer Markt, we analyze the history of venture capital financing of these firms before the IPO and the behavior of venture capitalists at the IPO. We can detect significant differences in the behavior and characteristics of German vs. foreign venture capital firms. The discrepancy in the investment and divestment strategies may be explained by the grandstanding phenomenon, the value-added hypothesis and certification issues. German venture capitalists are typically younger and smaller than their counterparts from abroad. They syndicate less. The sectoral structure of their portfolios differs from that of foreign venture capital firms. We also find that German venture capitalists typically take companies with lower offering volumes on the market. They usually finance firms in a later stage, carry through fewer investment rounds and take their portfolio firms public earlier. In companies where a German firm is the lead venture capitalist, the fraction of equity held by the group of venture capitalists is lower, their selling intensity at the IPO is higher and the committed lock-up period is longer.