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Scholars of institutional design attribute large importance to the choice of new institutions. The comparative analysis of how Rwanda and Zambia crafted their new electoral systems and the systems of government regards procedural, structural and rational choice variables which may influence the option for particular solutions. External influences and the type of transition are determinants that can decide which actors make their interests prevail. The degree of innovation or conservatism of new institutions is mainly a result of the speed of the process and the kind of actors involved. However, rational reflections on how to produce legitimacy and minimize personal risks which take into consideration the state of conflict in the country decide on the speed and on innovative outcomes. The structured analysis of only two cases uncovers already that it is rather difficult to realise the transfer of design recommendations into reality.
Le fait de savoir si le Saint-Empire romain germanique constituait un État est, en soi, une question peu stimulante, la réponse dépendant qui plus est des représentations fondamentales que l’on se fait de l’État. La recherche allemande, obsédée par le modèle de l’État national souverain, s’est accordée à penser pendant près d’un siècle et demi et en dépit de toutes les ruptures institutionnelles que l’Empire ne formait pas un État. En référence à cette tradition, l’introduction du concept d’« Empire-État complémentaire » (« komplementärer Reichs-Staat ») a mis en émoi une partie de la communauté des historiens modernistes germanophones, tandis qu’une autre part accueillait avec sérénité ou bienveillance ce nouveau modèle interprétatif. On pourrait ce faisant et en s’appuyant sur l’historicité de la formation de « l’État » procéder à l’analyse de l’Empire à partir de divers modèles. Mais une telle approche n’est pas sans conséquences sur l’appréciation de l’histoire allemande dans son ensemble. Définir l’Empire comme État et nation bouscule sensiblement le « grand récit » traditionnel : l’écart par rapport à une voie réputée normale de l’histoire européenne a jusqu’à présent conféré au passé allemand une signification pourvue d’une finalité tantôt légitimante tantôt déstructurante, mais toujours facteur d’intégration politique. Le concept d’Empire-État complémentaire ébranle l’idée de la singularité de l’histoire allemande moderne* sur un point capital, car il facilite la comparaison avec d’autres pays et oblige à considérer l’Allemagne comme partie prenante de l’Europe des États modernes. La notion d’Empire-État complémentaire ne peut dès lors servir ni de point de départ d’une « voie allemande particulière », ni d’archétype ou de modèle supra-étatique et supranational, ou d’équivalent fonctionnel de l’Europe contemporaine. ...
Since the 2008 financial crisis, European largest banks’ size and business models have largely remained unchallenged. Is that because of banks’ continued structural power over States? This paper challenges the view that States are sheer hostages of banks’ capacity to provide credit to the real economy – which is the conventional definition of structural power. Instead, it sheds light on the geo-economic dimension of banks’ power: key public officials conceive the position of “their own” market-based banks in global financial markets as a crucial dimension of State power. State priority towards banking thus result from political choices over what structurally matters the most for the State. Based on a discourse analysis of parliamentary debates in France, Germany and Spain between 2010 and 2020 as well as on a comparative analysis of the implementation of a special tax on banks in the early 2010s, this paper shows that State’s Finance ministries tend to prioritize geo-economic considerations over credit to firms. By contrast, Parliaments tend to prioritize investment. Power dynamics within the State thus largely shape political priorities towards banking at the domestic and international levels.
In times of crisis, governments have strong incentives to influence banks’ credit allocation because the survival of the economy depends on it. How do governments make banks “play along”? This paper focuses on the state-guaranteed credit programs (SGCPs) that have been implemented in Europe to help firms survive the COVID 19 crisis. Governments’ capacity to save the economy depends on banks’ capacity to grant credit to struggling firms (which they would not be inclined to do spontaneously in the context of a global pandemic). All governments thus face the same challenge: How do they make sure that state guaranteed loans reach their desired target and on what terms? Based on a comparative analysis of the elaboration and implementation of SGCPs in France and Germany, this paper shows that historically-rooted institutionalized modes of coordination between state and bank actors have largely shaped the terms of the SGCPs in these two countries.
We present evidence on the way personal and institutional factors could together guide public company directors in decision-making concerning shareholders and stakeholders. In a sample comprising more than nine hundred directors originating from over fifty countries and serving in firms from twenty three countries, we confirm that directors around the world hold a principled, quasi-ideological stance towards shareholders and stakeholders, called shareholderism, on which they vary in line with their personal values. We theorize and find that in addition to personal values, directors’ shareholderism level associates with cultural norms that are conducive to entrepreneurship. Among legal factors, only creditor protection exhibits a negative correlation with shareholderism, while general legal origin and proxies for shareholder and employee protection are unrelated to it.
This article examines the type of economic analyses of capitalism presented by leading exponents of the neoclassical, marxian, Austrian and institutionalist schools of economic thought. Although each school has something to offer, it is argued that all except the institutionalist school are largely insensitive to different types of structure within capitalism and are blind to the cultures and institutions which characterize different kinds of capitalism. This conclusion is reached by addressing three issues: the problem of universal and specific assumptions in economic analysis; the question of "necessary impurities" in an economic system; and the relationship between actor and structure. It is concluded that institutional economics is most sensitive to the immense actual and potential variety within capitalism itself, and recognizes that the development of different capitalist systems can be divergent rather than convergent.