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This paper studies the incentives of German firms to voluntarily disclose cash flow statements over time. While cash flow statement are mandated under many GAAP regimes, its disclosure has not been mandatory in Germany until recently. Nevertheless, an increasing number of firms provides cash flow statements voluntarily. These firms are likely to be influenced by recommendations of the German accounting profession, IAS 7 as well as the respective standards of other countries. The idea of the paper is to study this influence by looking at the adoption pattern over time and the format of the cash flow statement. It documents the development of voluntary cash flow statement disclosures by German firms with respect to ”milestones” in the evolution of German professional recommendations and respective international standards. The cross-sectional determinants of voluntary and international cash flow statements are analyzed using probit regressions and factor analysis. The results are generally consistent with the idea that capital-market forces drive voluntary cash flow statements that are in line with international reporting practice.
It is widely believed that the ideal board in corporations is composed almost entirely of independent (outside) directors. In contrast, this paper shows that some lack of board independence can be in the interest of shareholders. This follows because a lack of board independence serves as a substitute for commitment. Boards that are dependent on the incumbent CEO adopt a less aggressive CEO replacement rule than independent boards. While this behavior is inefficient ex post, it has positive ex ante incentive effects. The model suggests that independent boards (dependent boards) are most valuable to shareholders if the problem of providing appropriate incentives to the CEO is weak (severe).
Vor dem Hintergrund allgemeiner Bedingungen der Anreizkompatibilität wird für verschiedenen Kapitalmarktmodelle untersucht, ob zwischen den Anteilseignern eines Unternehmens Einmütigkeit besteht und, wenn ja, mit welchem Unternehmensziel der finanzielle Nutzen der Anteilseigner maximiert wird. Von besonderer Bedeutung für die Anreizkompatibilität der üblichen linearen Erfolgsteilung ist die Bedingung pareto-effizienter Risikoteilung. Sind für den Erfolg des Unternehmens spezifische Störterme relevant und soll der Entscheidungsträger in relativ starkem Umfang am Erfolg beteiligt werden, ist die Risikoteilung zwischen ihm und den (anderen) Anteilseignern pareto-inferior. Anreizkompatible erfolgsorientierte Belohnungs- bzw. Prämienfunktionen für den Entscheidungsträger sind dann konvex und zustandsabhängig. Aktienoptionsprogramme können als Approximationen an solche Prämienfunktionen interpretiert werden.
We analyze the effect of committee formation on how corporate boards perform two main functions: setting CEO pay and overseeing the financial reporting process. The use of performance-based pay schemes induces the CEO to manipulate earnings, which leads to an increased need for board oversight. If the whole board is responsible for both functions, it is inclined to provide the CEO with a compensation scheme that is relatively insensitive to performance in order to reduce the burden of subsequent monitoring. When the functions are separated through the formation of committees, the compensation committee is willing to choose a higher pay-performance sensitivity as the increased cost of oversight is borne by the audit committee. Our model generates predictions relating the board committee structure to the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, the quality of board oversight, and the level of earnings management.
The road to shareowner power
(1999)
A dramatic rise in shareowner power and improvements in corporate governance tan be achieved in the next few years by expanding the role of proxy advisory firms. This will require changing the way such firms are paid. They are now paid directly by investors who buy their advice; but this arrangement suffers from a free-rider problem. Instead, they should be paid by each corporation about which they are advising, in accordance with shareholder vote so as to preclude management influence. This arrangement would make it economically feasible for advisory firms to expand their services, becoming proactive like relational investors. Any proxy advisor other than the market leader Stands to gain tremendously by initiating this new System. lt would eliminate the natura1 monopoly feature of the current System, and spread the tost more equitably across all shareowners. lt would also enable proxy advisory ftrms to market their Services to individual investors via the internet.
Der Beitrag führt in das sozialpsychologische Phänomen des Gruppendenkens ein. Kennzeichen und Gegenstrategien werden anhand von Zeugenaussagen vor dem Wirecard-Untersuchungsausschuss am Beispiel des Aufsichtsrats illustriert. Normative Implikationen de lege ferenda schließen sich an. Sie betreffen unabhängige Mitglieder (auch auf der Arbeitnehmerbank), Direktinformationsrechte im Unternehmen (unter Einschluss von Hinweisgebern) und den Investorendialog (auch mit Leerverkäufern).
Seit zwanzig Jahren befaßt sich die Finanzmarktforschung einerseits mit Fragen der Bewertung und des Managements von Finanztiteln auf effizienten Kapitalmärkten und mit Fragen der Managementkontrolle auf unvollkommenen Märkten. Der folgende selektive Überblick konzentriert sich auf zentrale Aspekte der Theorie und Empirie der Managementkontrolle bei asymmetrischer Information. Ziel ist die Auseinandersetzung mit der unlängst vorgetragenen These zu den Mythen der Unternehmenskontrolle (Martin Hellwig 1997). Der aktuelle Überblick wird entwickelt vor dem Hintergrund der Gutenberg’schen Position eines eigenständigen Unternehmensinteresses, losgelöst von den Interessen der shareholder oder anderer stakeholder. Diese Position von Gutenberg verbindet sich im dritten Band der „Grundlagen der BWL: Die Finanzen“ von 1969 mit der Forderung nach Einhaltung eines sog. finanziellen Gleichgewichts. Erst in jüngster Zeit werden auch kapitalmarkttheoretisch fundierte Modelle entwickelt, die auch Raum bieten für eine Autonomie des Managements gegenüber dessen stakeholders.
Where do we stand in the theory of finance? : a selective overview with reference to Erich Gutenberg
(1998)
For the past 20 years, financial markets research has concerned itself with issues related to the evaluation and management of financial securities in efficient capital markets and with issues of management control in incomplete markets. The following selective overview focuses on key aspects of the theory and empirical experience of management control under conditions of asymmetric information. The objective is examine the validity of the recently advanced hypothesis on the myths of corporate control. The present overview is based on Gutenberg's position that there exists a discrete corporate interest, as distinct from and separate from the interests of the shareholders or other stakeholders. In the third volume of Grundlagen der BWL: Die Finanzen, published in 1969, this position of Gutenberg's is coupled with an appeal for a so-called financial equilibrium to be maintained. Not until recently have models grounded in capital market theory been developed which also allow for a firm's management to exercise autonomy vis-à-vis its stakeholder. This paper was prepared for the Erich Gutenberg centenary conference on December 12 and 13, 1997 in Cologne.
This paper analyzes the impact of blockownership dispersion on firm value. Blockholdings by multiple blockholders is a widespread phenomenon in the U.S. market. It is not clear, however, whether dispersion among blockholder is preferable to having a more concentrated ownership structure. To test for the direction of the effect, we use a large dataset of U.S. firms that combines blockholder information, shareholder rights information, debt ratings, accounting information, and financial markets information. We find that a large fraction of aggregated block ownership negatively affects Tobin’s Q. The negative impact is larger if blockowners are more dispersed, suggesting that a concentrated ownership structure is to be preferred on average. Results are robust to controlling for blockholder type as well as proxies for shareholder rights. Our empirical findings are also confirmed if we study the impact of ownership dispersion on firm debt ratings rather than Tobin’s Q. JEL Classification: G3, G32
We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks may increase their reserve holdings through an internalization effect or decrease them because of a diversification effect. The merger also affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and aggregate liquidity needs. Mergers among large banks tend to increase aggregate liquidity needs and thus the public provision of liquidity through monetary operations of the central bank. JEL Classification: G24, G32, G34