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The capital requirements of Solvency II allow insurers to make discretionary choices. Besides extensive possibilities regarding the choice of a risk model (ranging between a regulatory prescribed standard formula to a full self-developed internal model), insurers can make use of transitional measures and adjustments, which can have a substantial impact on their reported solvency level. The aim of this article is to study the effect of these long-term guarantee measures and to identify drivers of the discretionary decisions. For this purpose, we first assess the risk profile of 49 European insurers by estimating the sensitivities of their stock returns to movements in market risk drivers, such as interest rates and credit spreads. In a second step, we analyze to what extent insurers’ risk profiles influence their discretionary decisions in the capital requirement calculation. We gather information on discretionary decisions based on hand-collected Solvency II data for the years 2016 to 2020. We find that insurers optimize their reported solvency situation by making discretionary decisions in such a way that capital requirements for material risk drivers are clearly reduced. For instance, we find that the usage of the volatility adjustment is positively related to the interest rate risk as perceived by financial markets, even when controlling for the portion of life insurance in technical provisions. Similarly, the matching adjustment is linked to significantly higher credit risk sensitivities. Our results point out that due to discretionary decisions Solvency II figures can substantially deviate from a market-oriented, risk-based view on insurance companies’ risk situation.
European insurers are allowed to make discretionary decisions in the calculation of Solvency II capital requirements. These choices include the design of risk models (ranging from a standard formula to a full internal model) and the use of long-term guarantees measures. This article examines the impact and the drivers of discretionary decisions with respect to capital requirements for market risks. In a first step of our analysis, we assess the risk profiles of 49 stock insurers using daily market data. In a second step, we exploit hand-collected Solvency II data for the years 2016 to 2020. We find that long-term guarantees measures substantially influence the reported solvency ratios. The measures are chosen particularly by less solvent insurers and firms with high interest rate and credit spread sensitivities. Internal models are used more frequently by large insurers and especially for risks for which the firms have already found adequate immunization strategies.
Why bank money creation?
(2022)
We provide a rationale for bank money creation in our current monetary system by investigating its merits over a system with banks as intermediaries of loanable funds. The latter system could result when CBDCs are introduced. In the loanable funds system, households limit banks’ leverage ratios when providing deposits to make sure they have enough “skin in the game” to opt for loan monitoring. When there is unobservable heterogeneity among banks with regard to their (opportunity) costs from monitoring, aggregate lending to bank-dependent firms is inefficiently low. A monetary system with bank money creation alleviates this problem, as banks can initiate lending by creating bank deposits without relying on household funding. With a suitable regulatory leverage constraint, the gains from higher lending by banks with a high repayment pledgeability outweigh losses from banks which are less diligent in monitoring. Bank-risk assessments, combined with appropriate risk-sensitive capital requirements, can reduce or even eliminate such losses.
We study the interplay of capital and liquidity regulation in a general equilibrium setting by focusing on future funding risks. The model consists of a banking sector with long-term illiquid investment opportunities that need to be financed by shortterm debt and by issuing equity. Reliance on refinancing long-term investment in the middle of the life-time is risky, since the next generation of potential short-term debt holders may not be willing to provide funding when the return prospects on the long-term investment turn out to be bad. For moderate return risk, equilibria with and without bank default coexist, and bank default is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Capital and liquidity regulation can prevent bank default and may implement the first-best. Yet the former is more powerful in ruling out undesirable equilibria and thus dominates liquidity regulation. Adding liquidity regulation to optimal capital regulation is redundant.
Exit strategies
(2010)
We study alternative scenarios for exiting the post-crisis fiscal and monetary accommodation using the model of Angeloni and Faia (2010), that combines a standard DSGE framework with a fragile banking sector, suitably modified and calibrated for the euro area. Credibly announced and fast fiscal consolidations dominate – based on simple criteria – alternative strategies incorporating various degrees of gradualism and surprise. The fiscal adjustment should be based on spending cuts or else be relatively skewed towards consumption taxes. The phasing out of monetary accommodation should be simultaneous or slightly delayed. We also find that, contrary to widespread belief, Basel III may well have an expansionary macroeconomic effect. Keywords: Exit Strategies , Debt Consolidation , Fiscal Policy , Monetary Policy , Capital Requirements , Bank Runs JEL Classification: G01, E63, H12