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The paper considers optimal monetary stabilization policy in a forward-looking model, when the central bank recognizes that private-sector expectations need not be precisely model-consistent, and wishes to choose a policy that will be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs that are close enough to model-consistency. It is found that commitment continues to be important for optimal policy, that the optimal long-run inflation target is unaffected by the degree of potential distortion of beliefs, and that optimal policy is even more history-dependent than if rational expectations are assumed. JEL Classification: E52, E58, E42
This paper considers the desirability of the observed tendency of central banks to adjust interest rates only gradually in response to changes in economic conditions. It shows, in the context of a simple model of optimizing private-sector behavior, that such inertial behavior on the part of the central bank may indeed be optimal, in the sense of minimizing a loss function that penalizes inflation variations, deviations of output from potential, and interest-rate variability. Sluggish adjustment characterizes an optimal policy commitment, even though no such inertia would be present in the case of a reputationless (Markovian) equilibrium under discretion. Optimal interest-rate feedback rules are also characterized, and shown to involve substantial positive coefficients on lagged interest rates. This provides a theoretical explanation for the numerical results obtained by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) in their quantitative model of the U.S. economy.
This dissertation introduces in chapter 1 a new comparative approach to model-based research and policy analysis by constructing an archive of business cycle models. It includes many well-known models used in academia and at policy institutions. A computational platform is created that allows straightforward comparisons of models’ implications for monetary and fiscal stabilization policies. Chapter 2 applies business cycle models to forecasting. Several New Keynesian models are estimated on historical U.S. data vintages and forecasts are computed for the five most recent recessions. The extent of forecast heterogeneity for models and professional forecasts is analysed. Chapter 3 extends the forecasting analysis to a long sample and to the evaluation of density forecasts. Weighted forecasts are computed using a variety of weighting schemes. The accuracy of forecasts is evaluated and compared to professional forecasts and forecasts from nonstructural time series methods. Chapter 4 adds a new feature to existing business cycle models. Specifically, a medium-scale New Keynesian model is constructed that allows for strategic complementarities in price-setting. The role of trade integration for monetary policy transmission is explored. A new dimension of the exchange rate channel is highlighted by which monetary policy directly impacts domestic inflation. Chapter 5 tests whether simple symmetric monetary policy rules used in most business cycle models are a sufficient description of reality. I use quantile regressions to estimate policy parameters and find asymmetric reactions to inflation, the output gap and past interest rates.
This paper reviews the rationale for quantitative easing when central bank policy rates reach near zero levels in light of recent announcements regarding direct asset purchases by the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. Empirical evidence from the previous period of quantitative easing in Japan between 2001 and 2006 is presented. During this earlier period the Bank of Japan was able to expand the monetary base very quickly and significantly. Quantitative easing translated into a greater and more lasting expansion of M1 relative to nominal GDP. Deflation subsided by 2005. As soon as inflation appeared to stabilize near a rate of zero, the Bank of Japan rapidly reduced the monetary base as a share of nominal income as it had announced in 2001. The Bank was able to exit from extensive quantitative easing within less than a year. Some implications for the current situation in Europe and the United States are discussed.
Inflation-targeting central banks have only imperfect knowledge about the effect of policy decisions on inflation. An important source of uncertainty is the relationship between inflation and unemployment. This paper studies the optimal monetary policy in the presence of uncertainty about the natural unemployment rate, the short-run inflation-unemployment tradeoff and the degree of inflation persistence in a simple macroeconomic model, which incorporates rational learning by the central bank as well as private sector agents. Two conflicting motives drive the optimal policy. In the static version of the model, uncertainty provides a motive for the policymaker to move more cautiously than she would if she knew the true parameters. In the dynamic version, uncertainty also motivates an element of experimentation in policy. I find that the optimal policy that balances the cautionary and activist motives typically exhibits gradualism, that is, it still remains less aggressive than a policy that disregards parameter uncertainty. Exceptions occur when uncertainty is very high and in inflation close to target.
Notenbanken haben heute nicht die Aufgabe die Geldmenge zu kontrollieren. Ihr Job ist es, den Wert des Geldes – und damit den Preis der Wirtschaftsgüter in der jeweiligen Währung – zu stabilisieren. Doch wie ist diese Preisstabilität am besten herzustellen? Muß man dabei nicht doch die Geldmenge im Auge behalten? Unter monetären Ökonomen gibt es dazu eine wissenschaftliche Debatte.
Dem Druck standhalten
(2013)
Inflation ist ein Konstrukt. Sie wird von unterschiedlichen Akteur*innen unterschiedlich wahrgenommen. Zum Teil passiert dies, weil Warenkörbe differieren, zum Teil weil Erwartungen unterschiedlich gebildet werden. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die Heterogenität der Infl ation und ihrer Wahrnehmung und was dies für die Zielgröße der Zentralbankpolitik bedeutet.
Inflation ist ein Konstrukt. Sie wird von unterschiedlichen Akteuren unterschiedlich wahrgenommen. Zum Teil passiert dies, weil Warenkörbe differieren, zum Teil weil Erwartungen unterschiedlich gebildet werden. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die Heterogenität der Inflation und ihrer Wahrnehmung und was dies für die Zielgröße der Zentralbankpolitik bedeutet.
Für Zwecke des privaten Konsums werden ständig Gegenwarts- und Zukunftsgüter bewertet und gehandelt. Ein zuverlässiges und umfassendes Maß für die allgemeine Kaufkraft des Geldes und deren Veränderung sollte diesem Grundsachverhalt Rechnung tragen. Im Unterschied zu konventionellen statistischen Verbraucherpreisindizes ist ein ökonomischer Lebenskostenindex intertemporal angelegt, da er die effektiven Konsumgüterpreise (Effektivpreise) über den Planungshorizont der privaten Haushalte bündelt. Ein Preisstabilitätsstandard, der diesen Zusammenhang ausblendet, ist tendenziell verzerrt und leistet einer asymmetrischen Geldpolitik Vorschub.
Effektivpreise sind Gegenwartspreise für künftigen Konsum, sie berücksichtigen Güterpreise und Zinsen bzw. Vermögenspreisänderungen, sind konsumtheoretisch und wohlfahrtsökonomisch fundiert und bilden die zentralen Bausteine für die Modellklasse der ökonomischen Lebenskostenindizes. Nutzentheoretisch gesehen sind Effektivpreise bewerteter Grenznutzen der letzten konsumierten Gütereinheit, und die daraus abgeleiteten Effektiven Inflationsraten sind intertemporale Grenzraten der Substitution.
Die Autoren entwickeln einen intertemporalen Lebenskostenindex auf der Grundlage des Konzepts der Effektivpreise und stellen empirische Zeitreihen und kohortenspezifische Szenarioanalysen für Deutschland vor.