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This essay reflects on the convergence between Jürgen Habermas’ work and the theoretical framework put forward by the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt, arguing in favor of the characteristics of the Frankfurt school in Habermas and pointing out research possibilities in the field of Organizational Studies (OS). We discuss the essential theoretical aspects of the work by Horkheimer (1975) “Traditional and Critical Theory,” and produce a critique on the use of generational chronology as the main criterion for understanding the intellectual movement of the Frankfurt School. The methodology is based on the critique of the interpretation using the philosophical hermeneutics (RICOEUR, 1990) and observes the propositional nature of an interpretation offered in theoretical essays (MENEGUETTI, 2011). To support the provocative proposition of this work, we establish a dialogue with authors such as Bottomore (2001), Freitag (2004), Nobre (2004), and Melo (2013)) discussing a non-generational characterization of the Frankfurt School’s members and the proximity of Habermas in relation to the pioneer works on the Critical Theory. We believe that (i) the re-reading of the emancipatory purpose (HABERMAS, 2002); (ii) the deconstruction of the impartiality of the scientific knowledge (HABERMAS, 1987); (iii) and the incorporation of the philosophy of language into the Frankfurtian social criticism (HABERMAS, 2012) are important contributions of Habermas to the Frankfurt’s critical theory. As for a proposal for the field of organizational studies, this esseay concludes that recognizing Habermas as a Critical Theory scholar of the Frankfurt School may constitute a new research agenda for the field. The contribution of this essay lies in helping researchers in the field of Organizational Studies to understand Habermas’ work differently and not as a non-critical or utopian production. In this perspective, it is clear that Habermas’ intellectual production is politically engaged in contemporary social problems, which is a dimension neglected by the researchers of the field of Organizational Studies in Brazil.
This paper intends to present some considerations on a possible epistemology of noise as a response to theory of recognition and its bases on theory of communicative action. The principal movement will be to recover some aspects of Marcuse’s and Foucault’s perspective on the disturbances narratives in social sphere. The interest for them becomes stronger from Habermas’ perspective on their “performative contradicions”. Both of them would appeal to social aspects that escapes from critical normativities. Foucault’s structures of power as well as Marcuse’s psychoanalytical drives would represent aspects of the same Habermasian problem: the absence of auto-critical rationality. However, we can question: what would offer to the two authors the limits of communicative action?
The increase in the volume of litigation verified since the 1990’s, having the Brazilian society as context, made the judiciary open itself to new technologies which facilitate the access to justice, as well as to a faster resolution of the demands. However, the intense insertion of technical rationalization in the process and decision operations by the judiciary, during the last years, led to a legalization supported by presuppositions of technical-instrumental regulation. According to the goal policy established by the CNJ, the annoyance of the instrumental rationality is present “with respect to purposes”, which demands, more and more, a mere fulfillment of previously instituted goals from the law operators. The matter is to know if the implementation of new technologies to solve the growing litigation coming from the complexity of societies is enough to adjust the Law to a post-conventional platform. If the social complexity implies resources coming from new technologies, it’s not certain that such technologies, on their own, satisfactorily answer a judicial model which, seen under the eyes of the post- conventional legitimacy and regulation, is adequate to complex societies. This illustrates that a judicial model, able to deal with the social plurality, must take into account not only the rules of instrumental rationality, but also the fundamental issues of communicative rationality. This current work intends to evaluate if the applicability of the instrumental rationality in the judiciary equally allows the law to extent the useful conditions of the communicative rationality to the consensual formation of will and opinion in the Democratic State of Law.