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We analyze cyclical co-movement in credit, house prices, equity prices, and longterm interest rates across 17 advanced economies. Using a time-varying multi-level dynamic factor model and more than 130 years of data, we analyze the dynamics of co-movement at different levels of aggregation and compare recent developments to earlier episodes such as the early era of financial globalization from 1880 to 1913 and the Great Depression. We find that joint global dynamics across various financial quantities and prices as well as variable-specific global co-movements are important to explain fluctuations in the data. From a historical perspective, global co-movement in financial variables is not a new phenomenon, but its importance has increased for some variables since the 1980s. For equity prices, global cycles play currently a historically unprecedented role, explaining more than half of the fluctuations in the data. Global cycles in credit and housing have become much more pronounced and longer, but their importance in explaining dynamics has only increased for some economies including the US, the UK and Nordic European countries. We also include GDP in the analysis and find an increasing role for a global business cycle.
his paper distils three lessons for bank regulation from the experience of the 2009-12 euro-area financial crisis. First, it highlights the key role that sovereign debt exposures of banks have played in the feedback loop between bank and fiscal distress, and inquires how the regulation of banks’ sovereign exposures in the euro area should be changed to mitigate this feedback loop in the future. Second, it explores the relationship between the forbearance of non-performing loans by European banks and the tendency of EU regulators to rescue rather than resolving distressed banks, and asks to what extent the new regulatory framework of the euro-area “banking union” can be expected to mitigate excessive forbearance and facilitate resolution of insolvent banks. Finally, the paper highlights that capital requirements based on the ratio of Tier-1 capital to banks’ risk-weighted assets were massively gamed by large banks, which engaged in various forms of regulatory arbitrage to minimize their capital charges while expanding leverage. This argues in favor of relying on a set of simpler and more robust indicators to determine banks’ capital shortfall, such as book and market leverage ratios.
Has economic research been helpful in dealing with the financial crises of the early 2000s? On the whole, the answer is negative, although there are bright spots. Economists have largely failed to predict both crises, largely because most of them were not analytically equipped to understand them, in spite of their recurrence in the last 25 years. In the pre-crisis period, however, there have been important exceptions – theoretical and empirical strands of research that largely laid out the basis for our current thinking about financial crises. Since 2008, a flurry of new studies offered several different interpretations of the US crisis: to some extent, they point to potentially complementary factors, but disagree on their relative importance, and therefore on policy recommendations. Research on the euro debt crisis has so far been much more limited: even Europe-based researchers – including CEPR ones – have often directed their attention more to the US crisis than to that occurring on their doorstep. In terms of impact on policy and regulatory reform, the record is uneven. On the one hand, the swift and massive liquidity provision by central banks in the wake of both crises is, at least partly, to be credited to previous research on the role of central banks as lenders of last resort in crises and on the real effects of bank lending and monetary policy. On the other hand, economists have had limited impact on the reform of prudential and security market regulation. In part, this is due to their neglect of important regulatory choices, which policy-makers are therefore left to take without the guidance of academic research-based analysis.
The complexity resulting from intertwined uncertainties regarding model misspecification and mismeasurement of the state of the economy defines the monetary policy landscape. Using the euro area as laboratory this paper explores the design of robust policy guides aiming to maintain stability in the economy while recognizing this complexity. We document substantial output gap mismeasurement and make use of a new model data base to capture the evolution of model specification. A simple interest rate rule is employed to interpret ECB policy since 1999. An evaluation of alternative policy rules across 11 models of the euro area confirms the fragility of policy analysis optimized for any specific model and shows the merits of model averaging in policy design. Interestingly, a simple difference rule with the same coefficients on inflation and output growth as the one used to interpret ECB policy is quite robust as long as it responds to current outcomes of these variables.
What happened in Cyprus
(2013)
This policy letter sheds light on the economic and political backround in Cyprus and provides an analyses of the factors which lead to an intensification of the crisis there. It discusses the severe consequences of the errors made in the recent establishment of an adjustment program for Cyprus by the Europroup for European economic management as a whole.
This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some banks, the amount of insured deposits increased significantly; for others, it was a minor change. Our analysis shows that the more affected banks increase their investments in risky commercial real estate loans and become more risky relative to unaffected banks following the change. This effect is most distinct for affected banks that are low capitalized.
On the backdrop of the 2008 financial crisis this paper introduces an understanding of societal crises as a reduction in the meaning production of social entities, which can either be internally or externally provoked. The emergence of constitutions and, more generally, constitutional structures, can be understood as responses to both forms of crisis. This is the case because they are double-edged structures which are simultaneously oriented towards the maintenance of internal order and stability within a given social entity at the same time as they frame the transfer of the meaning components between the social entities and their environments. Thus, the 2008 financial crisis indicates a failure of constitutional bonding. When observed from an overall structural perspective, the reasons for this failure can be traced back to an increased discrepancy between the structural composition of world society and the constitutional structures in place. The crisis reflects a failure to respond to two simultaneous, inter-related and mutually re-inforcing structural transformations. First, there is the increased globalisation, which has led to massive dis-locations in the relative centrality of the different national configurations for the reproductive processes of functional systems. Second, there is a structural transformation of the transnational layer of world society through a reduced reliance on the centre/periphery differentiation and an increased reliance on functional differentiation. One of the many consequences of this development is the emergence of new forms of transnational law and politics. A new constitutional architecture which reflects these transformations is needed in order to ensure an adequate constitutional bonding of economic processes, as well as of other social processes.
On the backdrop of the 2008 financial crisis this paper introduces an understanding of societal crises as a reduction in the meaning production of social entities, which can either be internally or externally provoked. The emergence of constitutions and, more generally, constitutional structures, can be understood as responses to both forms of crisis. This is the case because they are double-edged structures which are simultaneously oriented towards the maintenance of internal order and stability within a given social entity at the same time as they frame the transfer of the meaning components between the social entities and their environments. Thus, the 2008 financial crisis indicates a failure of constitutional bonding. When observed from an overall structural perspective, the reasons for this failure can be traced back to an increased discrepancy between the structural composition of world society and the constitutional structures in place. The crisis reflects a failure to respond to two simultaneous, inter-related and mutually re-inforcing structural transformations. First, there is the increased globalisation, which has led to massive dis-locations in the relative centrality of the different national configurations for the reproductive processes of functional systems. Second, there is a structural transformation of the transnational layer of world society through a reduced reliance on the centre/periphery differentiation and an increased reliance on functional differentiation. One of the many consequences of this development is the emergence of new forms of transnational law and politics. A new constitutional architecture which reflects these transformations is needed in order to ensure an adequate constitutional bonding of economic processes, as well as of other social processes.
This paper aims to analyze the effects of financial constraints and the financial crisis on the financing and investment policies of newly founded firms. Thereby, the analysis adds important new insights on a crucial segment of the economy. We make use of a large and comprehensive data set of French firms founded in the years 2004-2006, i.e. well before the financial crisis. Our panel data analysis shows that the global financial crisis imposed a shock (mostly demand-driven) on the financing as well as on the investments of these firms. Moreover, we find that financially constrained firms use less external debt financing and invest smaller amounts. They also rely on less trade credit. With regard to bank financing, newly founded firms which are more financially constrained accumulate less bank debt and repay initial bank debt slower than their non-financially constraint counterparts. Finally, we find that financially constrained firms are affected to a smaller degree by the financial crisis than their less financially constrained counterparts.
Effective market discipline incentivizes financial institutions to limit their risk-taking behavior, making it a key element for financial regulation. However, without adequate incentives to monitor and control the risk-taking behavior of financial institutions market discipline erodes. As a consequence, bailing out financial institutions, as happened unprecedentedly during the recent financial crisis, may impose indirect costs to financial stability if bailout expectations of investors change. Analyzing US data covering the period between 2004 and 2014, Hett und Schmidt (2017) find that market participants adjusted their bailout expectations in response to government interventions, undermining market discipline mechanisms. Given these findings, policymakers need to take into account the potential effects on market discipline when deciding about public support to troubled financial institutions in the future. Considering the parallelism of events and public responses during the financial crisis as well as the recent developments of Italian banks, these results not only concern the US, but also have important implications for European financial markets and policy makers.