Refine
Year of publication
- 2020 (3) (remove)
Language
- English (3)
Has Fulltext
- yes (3)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (3)
Keywords
- schizophrenia (2)
- inter-individual variability (1)
- magentoencephalography (MEG) (1)
- neural oscillations (1)
- perceptual closure (1)
- precision weighting (1)
- predictive coding (1)
- repetition suppression (RS) (1)
- synaesthesia (1)
- visual priming (1)
Institute
Background: Cognitive dysfunctions represent a core feature of schizophrenia and a predictor for clinical outcomes. One possible mechanism for cognitive impairments could involve an impairment in the experience-dependent modifications of cortical networks.
Methods: To address this issue, we employed magnetoencephalography (MEG) during a visual priming paradigm in a sample of chronic patients with schizophrenia (n = 14), and in a group of healthy controls (n = 14). We obtained MEG-recordings during the presentation of visual stimuli that were presented three times either consecutively or with intervening stimuli. MEG-data were analyzed for event-related fields as well as spectral power in the 1–200 Hz range to examine repetition suppression and repetition enhancement. We defined regions of interest in occipital and thalamic regions and obtained virtual-channel data.
Results: Behavioral priming did not differ between groups. However, patients with schizophrenia showed prominently reduced oscillatory response to novel stimuli in the gamma-frequency band as well as significantly reduced repetition suppression of gamma-band activity and reduced repetition enhancement of beta-band power in occipital cortex to both consecutive repetitions as well as repetitions with intervening stimuli. Moreover, schizophrenia patients were characterized by a significant deficit in suppression of the C1m component in occipital cortex and thalamus as well as of the late positive component (LPC) in occipital cortex.
Conclusions: These data provide novel evidence for impaired repetition suppression in cortical and subcortical circuits in schizophrenia. Although behavioral priming was preserved, patients with schizophrenia showed deficits in repetition suppression as well as repetition enhancement in thalamic and occipital regions, suggesting that experience-dependent modification of neural circuits is impaired in the disorder.
Individual differences in perception are widespread. Considering inter-individual variability, synesthetes experience stable additional sensations; schizophrenia patients suffer perceptual deficits in e.g. perceptual organization (alongside hallucinations and delusions). Is there a unifying principle explaining inter-individual variability in perception? There is good reason to believe perceptual experience results from inferential processes whereby sensory evidence is weighted by prior knowledge about the world. Different perceptual phenotypes may result from different precision weighting of sensory evidence and prior knowledge. We tested this hypothesis by comparing visibility thresholds in a perceptual hysteresis task across medicated schizophrenia patients, synesthetes, and controls. Participants rated the subjective visibility of stimuli embedded in noise while we parametrically manipulated the availability of sensory evidence. Additionally, precise long-term priors in synesthetes were leveraged by presenting either synesthesia-inducing or neutral stimuli. Schizophrenia patients showed increased visibility thresholds, consistent with overreliance on sensory evidence. In contrast, synesthetes exhibited lowered thresholds exclusively for synesthesia-inducing stimuli suggesting high-precision long-term priors. Additionally, in both synesthetes and schizophrenia patients explicit, short-term priors – introduced during the hysteresis experiment – lowered thresholds but did not normalize perception. Our results imply that distinct perceptual phenotypes might result from differences in the precision afforded to prior beliefs and sensory evidence, respectively.
Individual differences in perception are widespread. Considering inter-individual variability, synesthetes experience stable additional sensations; schizophrenia patients suffer perceptual deficits in, eg, perceptual organization (alongside hallucinations and delusions). Is there a unifying principle explaining inter-individual variability in perception? There is good reason to believe perceptual experience results from inferential processes whereby sensory evidence is weighted by prior knowledge about the world. Perceptual variability may result from different precision weighting of sensory evidence and prior knowledge. We tested this hypothesis by comparing visibility thresholds in a perceptual hysteresis task across medicated schizophrenia patients (N = 20), synesthetes (N = 20), and controls (N = 26). Participants rated the subjective visibility of stimuli embedded in noise while we parametrically manipulated the availability of sensory evidence. Additionally, precise long-term priors in synesthetes were leveraged by presenting either synesthesia-inducing or neutral stimuli. Schizophrenia patients showed increased visibility thresholds, consistent with overreliance on sensory evidence. In contrast, synesthetes exhibited lowered thresholds exclusively for synesthesia-inducing stimuli suggesting high-precision long-term priors. Additionally, in both synesthetes and schizophrenia patients explicit, short-term priors—introduced during the hysteresis experiment—lowered thresholds but did not normalize perception. Our results imply that perceptual variability might result from differences in the precision afforded to prior beliefs and sensory evidence, respectively.