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Le gouvernement de soi et des autres: Zu Auftrittsverboten für türkische Regierungsmitglieder
(2017)
Die hochproblematische Verfassungsreform in der Türkei führt innerhalb der EU zu ungewöhnlichen Allianzen: In seltener Einmütigkeit wird länderübergreifend von ganz rechts bis weit ins linke politische Spektrum hinein ein Auftrittsverbot für türkische Politiker gefordert. Das gefühlt häufigste Argument bemüht dabei die Souveränität: Man möchte die Kampagne der türkischen Regierung für ihre die Gewaltenteilung gefährdende Verfassungsreform nicht auch noch im eigenen Land haben. In einer pluralistischen Gesellschaft weckt solche Einmütigkeit Zweifel, die sich bei näherem Hinschauen verfestigen – und zwar in juristischer wie politischer Hinsicht.
In a political and economic perspective, the recent ECJ judgment on the OMT program is not more than a footnote, a short sideshow in a seemingly never-ending sequel of another dimension. Legally, however, I find the case quite remarkable. Unlike its Advocate General, the ECJ did not yield to the temptation to respond in kind to the FCC’s provocations. In particular, it avoids the issue of domestic vs. European constitutional identity that juxtaposed the FCC and the Advocate General. Instead, the ECJ has shown political responsibility and legal foresight in framing what could become a masterpiece of truly cooperative, other-regarding constitutional pluralism.
Bundesfinanzminister Wolfgang Schäubles Behauptung, Griechenland könne wegen Art. 125 AEUV nur außerhalb der Eurozone seine Schulden gegenüber anderen Euro-Staaten und EFSF bzw. ESM restrukturieren, beruht auf einem Denkfehler, wenn nicht gar auf einem Taschenspielertrick. Die Pringle-Rechtsprechung des EuGH zeigt: Das Europarecht schaufelt sich nicht sein eigenes Grab. Man muss es nicht erst umgehen, um die Ziele der Union wahrhaft zu verwirklichen.
The recovery plan of the Commission entitled "Next Generation EU" proposes a compromise that goes beyond the ominous lowest common denominator. With a package of EUR 750bn in total, comprising EUR 250bn in loans and the rest in grants, the Commission paves the way for both forward-looking public finance and constitutional innovation. The proposals are masterpieces of high-tech legal engineering. Again, European constitutional law evolves through crisis. Yet, again, it stands to reason how far the proposed instruments will shift the European Union towards enhancing solidarity and democracy.
Governments, economists and intellectuals have called for common European bonds or increased own EU funds to address the recession induced by Covid19. Unfortunately, the German government, joined by the other members of the “Frugal Four” (Austria, Finland, the Netherlands), has categorically rejected to look into any such measures and favours using the ESM. This reaction created a déjà vu experience for citizens and governments of the heavily affected southern Member States of the EU. The proposal to use the ESM raises fears of another wave of austerity amounting to yet another lost decade for economic, social, and ecological development in Europe.
The case for corona bonds
(2020)
Corona bonds are feasible and important to preserve the European project. We set out a number of principles that might serve as a blueprint for the European institutions. Importantly, Corona bonds could be issued through a new public law entity and include all the safeguards required for the protection of the fundamental values of the EU. This proposal is pragmatic in the sense that it facilitates the choice European leaders have to make now; necessary to secure the resilience of the European Union. The political risks are significantly higher now than in 2010. The gargantuan challenge of tackling the combined impact of climate change, migration, digitalization, geopolitical shifts, and the spread of autocracy, requires leadership and joint action by the Council and the Eurogroup.
This policy note summarizes our assessment of financial sanctions against Russia. We see an increase in sanctions severity starting from (1) the widely discussed SWIFT exclusions, followed by (2) blocking of correspondent banking relationships with Russian banks, including the Central Bank, alongside secondary sanctions, and (3) a full blacklisting of the ‘real’ export-import flows underlying the financial transactions. We assess option (1) as being less impactful than often believed yet sending a strong signal of EU unity; option (2) as an effective way to isolate the Russian banking system, particularly if secondary sanctions are in place, to avoid workarounds. Option (3) represents possibly the most effective way to apply economic and financial pressure, interrupting trade relationships.